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I. Introduction 
 
This book deals with the agrarian transformations of the Balkan 
Peninsula in the 18th-20th centuries. While focusing on the external and 
internal challenges and responses the volume gives a brief summary on 
the socio-economic transformations these had caused, and at the same 
time it tries to compare the evolution of the Balkan agriculture with the 
development of the neighboring Hungary – representing a different 
agrarian system.  
Though agrarian systems in Southeast-Europe were able to play 
decisive role in supplying Europe only for short periods,1 the 
agriculture of the Balkan Peninsula yet deserves deeper investigation as 
(1) 80% of the population of the Balkan Peninsula earned their living 
from agriculture even in the 1930s, and the state budget also relied 
on the agrarian incomes for a long time (tithe constituted 30% of 
state revenues not only in the Ottoman Empire around 1900, but in 
successor states as well); 
(2) thus, agrarian production was deeply intertwining with social and 
even with political questions, which was not so characteristic for 
Western Europe after the industrial revolution; 
(3) as this region was still characterized by the preindustrial stage of 
development, determined by climatic impacts, geographic 
conditions, self-subsistence and peasant mentality alien to the 
capitalist thinking; 
(4) as the development here can be rather described by constant 
transformations, responses to external (shift from the Levantine to 
the Atlantic world economy with all its consequences) or internal 
challenges (extreme population growth), than by quantitative 
increase (output/hectare); 
                                                          
1   As it was in 1847 for example. But generally, the region could not compete with the mass 
production of Russia, USA, etc. Even the famous special exports products, like Greek 
raisins, Bulgarian rose oil, Romanian walnut were more significant for the producer, than 
for the target country (probably with the exception of Macedonian tobacco). 
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(5) thus, the region gives a good (and still actual) example for 
adaptation problems: extensification vs. intensification, large 
estates vs. smallholdings, for the failure of general modernization 
financed by agriculture, or for growth consumed by population 
increase, etc.; 
(6) though the area was not homogeneous regarding its climate, land 
tenure systems, products etc. (that most of us might think of the 
Balkans), but despite this diversity these states had a common fate 
in failing to give adequate answers for the challenges on the long 
run; 
(7) this higlights, that adaptive-reactive models – a key feature of 
peripheries and peripherization2 – are not always successful; 
(8) without a knowlegde on these problems, the (level of) sovietization 
(which also showed a diverse pattern on the Balkans) of the 
agriculture between 1945-1990 with its present consequences also 
remains incomprehensible; 
(9) the moral of the changes in the long 19th century (the shift from 
Asian-type production system to a capitalistic world economy) 
might be informative in identifying recent problems and a cure for 
these, as the transformations during the EU-integration process 
(return from a Soviet-type system to the capitalistic order) could be 
interpreted similarly to the changes that took place in the 19th 
century. 
 
The key process determining the outcome of events (and that also helps 
us understand some of the recurring problems) was the so-called “first 
globalization“, during which the region shifted from the Levantine 
economy to the Atlantic system. This resulted in drastic changes. Prior 
to its integration to the global market this region represented an area 
with optimal landuse fit in the physical geographical and climatic 
conditions characterized by best practises fit to the economic needs of 
the Levantine centre. This resulted in a diverse economy, where 
                                                          
2    The difference (and thus the border) between Southeast-Europe and other, neighboring 
peripheric regions (East-Central Europe) applying reactive model is the success in adaptation. 
(This also implies that the boundaries of regions are not stable on the long run). 
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smallholdings, large estates, dry economies, irrigated cultures and 
mediterranean cultures existed together. But the shift from the 
Mediterranean economic system to the Atlantic world economy (a 
process repeated again after the EU-accession) induced basic changes in 
agriculture and rural societies, like 
- the formation of complementary economies (the region became the wheat 
supplier of the West, while the latter abandoned grain production 
and turned toward supporting urban markets with milk, butter and 
eggs) as a result of the increasing international division of labour; 
- a decrease in diversity of products, the retreat of animal husbandry 
(landuse conflicts owing to large population increase); 
- creating an economic system highly exposed to external circumstances; 
- the dominance of smallholdings (which offers a possibility to analyze 
the competitiveness and sustainability of small dry and 
mediterranean economies over centuries); 
- the decay of large estates: this allowed us to compare the 
competitiveness of different forms of land-tenure system 
(smallholdings vs. large estates); 
- the oversupply of labour force, which resulted in low labour utilization 
and overpopulation, clearly marking the limits of the sustainability 
of the existing systems, while it hindered the reallocation of 
workforce into industry, determined the living standards and the 
general macroeconomic situation as well; 
- the transformation of traditional social patterns (zadruga, egalitarianism, 
the lack of individualism, political movements, etc.); 
- inducing de-industrialization (data allow us to compare 
competitiveness in industrial and agrarian sectors, and to analyze 
microsocial strategies, political ideas and institutions, which had to 
cope with the problem of low outputs); 
- the dissolution of communal property (partly reversed by the 
Sovietization in some countries). 
Based on local data and sources – instead of reconstructing the 
uncertain macroeconomic data for this region as regional economists 
did earlier – using a regional and temporal comparative approach the study 
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aims at investigating the competitiveness, resilience and sustainability of 
different agrarian systems through a quantitative analysis of the data and 
their versatile (re-)interpretation (including historiographic debates). 
Our approach is based on Wallerstein’s center-periphery and Toynbee’s 
challenge-response theory. As we intended to focus both on specific and 
common agrarian problems and solutions in the region (though the 
Balkan Peninsula was a periphery of the Atlantic system, but this did 
not necessarily imply that its agrarian system was homogeneous) 
instead of sketching multiple parallel agrarian histories supranational 
approach was applied; and the different countries appear in order to 
illustrate certain specific/key patterns or important processes. This 
causes differences in emphasis regarding the separate sub-chapters. 
The long-term analysis of trends offers a possibility to get acquainted 
with the consequences of the integration process, which may be helpful 
in judging the changes and in promoting agrarian planning after the 
EU-accession. 
 
(a) Problems 
 
When investigating the agriculture of the Balkan Peninsula and 
Hungary in the 18–20th century several factors have to be taken into 
consideration, which may influence the agricultural outputs and 
systems: 
(1) As each plant has specific needs, the climatic diversity of the region 
has an effect on the pattern and production of cultures. Climatic 
conditions limited the prospects of production (cotton or orange was 
simply unfit for the climate in Hungary despite the efforts during the 
communist regime). Fruits, tobacco, rose and olive need sunshine 
over yearly 2000-2200 hours and hot summer. Orange, figs, almond 
and vegetables are not frost-resistant. Wheat is sensitive to 
precipitation, rye tolerates colder climate, etc. Sometimes production 
did not have evident climatic constraints, but it was simply not 
worth, if outputs are compared to the input costs and work (rice in 
Bulgaria).  
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(2) The diverse physical geographical conditions (mountain ranges, gentle 
sloping hills and great plains, dissected coastal areas and landlocked 
basins) also influence the scope of available crops and their yields 
through their influence on microclimate, soil productivity and 
mechanization. Carstic plateaus along Dalmatia and in the Dinarides 
suffer from water shortages. Mountain soils are thinner, less fertile 
(owing to the leakage of nutrients), more exposed to erosion and 
require more energy (due to slopes) to produce the same amount of 
crop, compared to the loess covered plains of Hungary, Romania 
and North-Bulgaria characterized by chernozem soils.  
(3) By the 19th century peasants also had to face the consequences of the 
previous human impact on the landscape. Deforestation of 
Mediterranean mountainous regions resulted in the abundance of 
secondary vegetation, macchia shrubs; in continental plains the 
spread of Carpathian steppe: the ’puszta’. The changing microclimate 
threatened with local droughts, while increased wind erosion 
destroyed cultivated land (in South-Hungary Robinia pseudoacacia 
and lowland grapes were planted in the 18th century to halt this 
process). Animal husbandry in mountains resulted in increased soil 
erosion, and this hindered reforestation.  
(4) The region was culturally versatile with different (often inimical) 
political and social systems (Orthodox-Byzantine-Osmanli and 
Catholic–Western). The invesigated area was a contact (or frontier) 
zone of civilizations, thus different social structures and behavior 
patterns characterized the region throughout centuries. This also 
influenced the agrarian systems (taxation, surplus, landholding size, 
land tenure system etc.).  
(5) Due to the above mentioned, the economic structure was strikingly 
different (belonging to two “world” economies at the beginning of 
our investigation) showing great temporal and also spatial variety 
(serfdom–freeholders; prebendal3 estates–private property; 
Grundherrschaft and Gutsherrschaft, etc.) even in regions with same 
climatic and social patterns. 
                                                          
3    Estates given to fulfill certain (military) services without transferring full property rights (not 
inheritable, not for sale, etc.) in the Ottoman empire (timars, ziamets). 
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(6) Internal problems (population pressure) and external challenges (market 
demand, integration into the international division of labour, climatic 
events) can further modify the original (or optimal) patterns of landuse, 
overwriting the existing natural differences. Owing to these, the 
variation of continental-monocultural and policultural-
mediterranian; self-sustaining or market-oriented; smallholdings 
dominated and large-scale agriculture characterized the region – 
with a general tendency towards homogenization after the 1850s. 
Almost all combinations appeared during the investigated 200 years: 
monocultural smallholdings for tobacco, cotton, olive oil and grape 
existed in the Mediterranean regions, and there were also 
monocultural large landholdings producing rose, cotton, etc. 
Policultural smallholdings operated in Greece at the end of the 18th 
century. Prior to the 1840s animal husbandry dominated both 
smallholdings and large estates in Bulgaria and Hungary. In the 19th 
century these smallholdings were transformed into monocultural 
grain-producing continental small farms in Serbia and Bulgaria, 
while Romania, Macedonia and Hungary was characterized by the 
dominance of large, grain producing monocultural estates of 
continental type. Both were responses to the same challenge - the 
grain hunger of the West. The actual responses often turned out to be 
inadequate, if conditions changed and the producers could not adapt 
to the changes (the loss of diversity in production ruined the ability 
to respond to changes). Extensification, that was once a real solution, 
became exigence: low technological level or the lack of capital (that 
usually appeared together) often conserved obsolete and 
unreasonable structures.  
(7) The lack of synchronous and unilinear trends. Administrative or 
political changes did not go always side by side with social and 
economic changes: for a long time the composition of government 
revenues did not change in some of the successor states of the 
Ottoman Empire, while on the other hand these were characterized 
by remarkable socio-economic changes (in Bulgaria); in other cases 
the apparent changes in the political system did not trigger 
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structural/social changes in the agriculture for decades (in Greece 
and Romania). 
(8) The problems of quantification (lack of data) make it hard to assess the 
level of development in case of agrarian economies. Reliable and 
methodologically consistent statistics from larger areas exist only 
from the second half of the 19th century (data collection was guided 
by statisticians like Jakšić for Serbia, Popov for Bulgaria, Keleti and 
Fényes for Hungary), by the time some of the great transformations4 
had already taken place rendering comparisons problematic.5 If we 
want to get accurate knowledge on the improvement agrarian 
productivity (represented by t/ha or income/ha values) prior to the 
1870s, we have to obtain information both on area sown and yields 
or prices. But Ottoman tax conscriptions in the early 19th century 
often lack mentioning these all at the same time. Assessing input 
costs is also difficult: sometimes the volume of seed is given in 
conscriptions without the area sown, sometimes the opposite. 
Furthermore, prices changed quickly in case of agrarian products of 
regions in preindustrial phase, where outputs were mainly 
determined by the climatic impacts. Therefore five-year averages are 
required in order to measure development trends properly, but these 
are rare in the early decades of the 19th century. Furthermore, high 
grain unit prices do not necessarily imply low output (low unit 
prices can refer to regional scarcity), such as high income/ha values 
do not always mean an increase in output (t/ha) – this can indicate 
shortages as well. The uncertainity in tax-ratio is another problem 
(see iltizam or tax-farming entrepreneurship) that hinders us to measure 
the output ratio – even in cases when the extent of cultivated land 
                                                          
4    Like the integration into the Atlantic economy as grain producers in the 1840. 
5    Most of the data used prior to the 1890s was based on conscriptions or tax-registers, which 
covered only smaller areas, so instead of systematic sampling one has to rely on local scale 
(district level) case studies. Commercial registers concentrate local data to one point, but 
both the extent of attraction zone, and the relation between exported and total production 
remains problematic. Systematic statistics (censuses) are neither reliable nor comparable to 
each other (their system also changed over time) – and even the recent estimations on 
national income for the period between 1850-1920 differ significantly (see the difference 
between Gini, Clark, Bairoch and Maddison).  
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and the value of tithe is given. This explains the remarkable 
difference between Palairet’s, Popov’s, Lyberatos’s and Ivanov’s 
calculations on agrarian incomes regarding Bulgaria, or we may 
mention the different agrarian GDP estimates of Stoyanovich, 
Palairet and Lampe for Serbia as well. 
(9) The regional differences in measurement units and the diversity of 
coexisting currencies are further hindrances. Current prices are not 
informative in case of temporal comparison (due to inflation), real 
prices (expressed in golden francs, or in grams of silver) are not 
informative, if we want to compare two regions. Purchase power is a 
better index, but it is much difficult to estimate.  
 
(b) The agro-ecological features of the region 
 (i) Vertical and horizontal dissection 
 
The investiagted area is characterized by great vertical and horizontal 
dissection, which influenced both the history and mentality of nations 
beyond agrarian systems. Geographers of the 19th century claimed that 
crop producing nations tended to consider rivers and basins as basic 
elements determining their geographic approach, but for livestock-
raising transhumance societies mountain chains, watersheds are the real 
axes that rather connect than separate. The physical geographical units 
(like the great basins along river Danube) are and were divided between 
political entities. The Hungarian Great Plains extends to the northern 
part of Serbia (indicating the direction of the geopolitical aspirations of 
the Hungarian Kingdom based on the above mentioned approach), the 
Romanian plains lay towards N-Bulgaria (but the Romanian aspirations 
targeted the mountains owing to the difference in the way of living). 
Rivers of the region connect large basins with each other (like river 
Danube), but also connect mountainous zones with plains, functioning 
as trade routes in order to exchange goods produced in different regions 
(Sava, Drava, Morava, Olt, Jantra, Lom, Isker). Beyond the watershed of 
Danube small basins functioning as local production centers and rivers 
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delimiting trade directions (Vardar, Tundzha, Marica and Haliakmon in 
Thessaly) diversify the general picture, making it more fragmented.  
The geological settings of the Balkans are complicated due to the 
abundance of both compressive and dilatational tectonism and the 
numerous micro-plates. The mountain chains of the younger, Eurasian 
system are diverse regarding their direction, base rocks, and physical 
geographical features as well. Beside limestones, volcanic and magmatic 
rocks are also abundant in the Carpathian ranges, which continue in the 
Balkan Mountains. As these relatively young mountains did not 
undergo remarkable denudation processes, ores of the hydrothermal 
phase dominate as raw material (copper, silver, gold, etc. in Majdanpek, 
Bor, Zalatna). The Dinarides in the West show a more massive outlook 
with narrow and quick rivers dissecting the ranges. Here only carstic 
plateaus offer some space to settle and cultivate land, but surface waters 
are rare. Towards the South both the rock composition and direction of 
mountains becomes more diverse owing to tectonism (ores 
compounded with steel are more frequent in Albania). The older 
(Variscan), blocky and folded granitic-metamorphic mountains of Rila, 
Pirin and Rodope exposed to longer denudation, therefore eroded to the 
zone of iron ores (Samokov mines) were later rejuvenated due to young 
tectonism, pleistocene glaciation and the erosion of torrent waterflows 
under the subsequent humid subtropic climate. The shores are 
dissected: while along the Adriatic coast abrasional shores are frequent 
giving a fragmented outlook to the southern parts of the Balkans, 
limans and sandy strands are rare and occur in the Black Sea region. 
(ii) Climate  
 
From climatic aspects the investigated area is bimodal. The Hungarian 
plains surrounded by mountains show basin character, where the 
natural zonation of climatic belts became discontinuous-concentric. In 
the centre of the basin the amount of yearly precipitation is under 500 
mm, while it increases concentrically to 800 mm towards the basin 
fringes and over 1000 mm in the mountains. The Icelandic minumum 
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brings maximum precipitation in May-June, which is excellent for 
wheat. The average yearly temperature is between 8–12 oC, in winter it 
hardly fells below -3oC, but remains under 0 oC even in the 
southernmost parts in the basin due to the penetration of Arctic-
Siberian drier air masses (Voyeykov-axis). The number of frosty days is 
around 90–120: the vegetation period lasts from April to September, 
with drought threatening in July-August. Summer temperature 
increases concentrically from 19 to 22 oC to the south. The number of 
shiny hours in the basin exceeds 2000–2200 yearly (Dfb: cold temperate 
climate in Köppen style).  
The Balkan Peninsula is characterized by ’normal zonation’ with 
gradually increasing yearly temperature averages to the South (from 11 
to 18oC with 20-26oC summer monthly averages and -1 to +10oC in 
winter), and decreasing precipitation to the East (from 1500 to 500 mm). 
The Dinarides ranging from the North to the South even emphasize this 
latter phenomenon further, creating a ’shadowzone’ east of the ranges. 
The southern and western shores are dominated by Mediterranean 
climate (Csa and Csb in Köppen style) with moderate winters over 0 oC 
(monthly average) and with substantial precipitation between 
September-February due to the predominant Genovese minimum. This 
air mass is pushed out by the downward winds from desert Sahara 
during summer: the season is therefore hot and dry, between 23–26 oC. 
The other parts of the peninsula are dominated by wet (Serbia) and 
dry continental climate with substantial precipitation during spring and 
summer allowing optimal circumstances for different cultures. Due to 
the substantial horizontal and vertical dissection the climate is very 
diverse. Mountain chains generated a drier continental district around 
Saloniki (Bsk, semi-arid climate, Köppen-type) and around Ruse-Burgas 
(500–600 mms, Cfa). The number of shiny hours exceeds 2000 again only 
in the southern parts of the peninsula and in Romania, where the 
climate is similar to the Hungarian. In the Romanian plains the drier, 
warmer Dfa type also occurs, excellent for maize. 
The old map of Cvijić (1922) indicates temperate continental climate 
down to the Ruse-Burgas line in the East and to the Kavala-Seres-
Janina-Mostar-Zadar line in the South and West. From Edirne to Ruse 
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and Craiova steppe climate was indicated. Vertical zonation and 
additional precipitation modifies this simplified categorization. Thus 
from Sarajevo to Prokletije Mts., in Rila, Pirin and Pindos Mts. alpine 
(oceanic) climate was indicated (or Cfb), while in the Vardar, Marica, 
Tundja, Shkumbi and Haliakmon valleys wet mediterranean climate 
appeared. 
 
(iii) Soils 
 
Beside climate the quality and condition of soils also influence 
productivity. In continental climate chernozem (lowland steppe with 
woods) and brown soils (wet woodlands on hills) are dominant 
(climazonal soils), which are favourable for the agriculture due to their 
high Ca-humate content and their good structure. Other soil types 
formed under local (even secondary, anthropogenic) processes. Sandy 
soils of alluvial fans are not favourable for agriculture owing to their low 
humus content and bad water capacity. They are threatened by wind 
erosion. Soils along rivers are often characterized by unfavourable 
conditions: clayey aggregates, Fe-humates and their high water-table.   
In the Mediterranean regions terra rossa is the dominant climazonal 
soil. The shortage in Ca- and K-humates (these soils are rich in Fe) and 
bad structure (loose and thin upper layer) or low water-table influence 
productivity unfavourably in these terrains. Mountain slopes built up of 
limestones (Dinarides) have good buffer capacity, but the soil is thin 
and erodable, while the low pH (acidic soils with low buffer capacity) 
and high Fe-content of granitic base rocks (Rila, Pirin) are not 
favourable for agriculture. Calcareous mountain soils are optimal for 
olive trees, viticulture (the long roots reach the deep water table and 
stabilize both the plant and soil) and animal husbandry, the podsolic 
soils of volcanic rocks for the latter. 
In Mediterranean climate the main anthropogenic threats are soil 
erosion owing to deforestation and compaction owing to overgrazing (beside 
the enumerated natural constraints). In continental plains salinization 
was one of the major threats due to the features of base rocks and the 
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water table. This process was accelerated after river regulations in the 
Carpathian basin in the 19th century. 
(iv) Agroeconomic needs and best practices 
 
Optimal places of production are delimited by the ecological needs of 
plants determined by soils and climate. In order to produce orange and 
lemon the average daily temperature should be minimum 12.5–13 °C, the 
optimal is 23–24 °C, but cannot exceed 37–39 °C. Air humidity should 
be over 75%, thus the proximity of seas is also required. Olive trees grow 
slowly (it takes 15 years to produce olive oil) but can live 1000 years. 
They prefer calcareous soils (limestone), suhshine, light winds. Their 
water demand is low, they do not require intensive cultivation (contrary 
to wheat), rather space. Olive trees grow huge and deep roots (down to 
6 meters) to collect water. As the fruits always appear only on new 
branches, the tree density in olive orchard should be low – offering a 
possibility to secondary crops or grazing. Olive tolerates drought 
during summer, but cannot bear too much water and long frosty 
periods. In case of grape minimum 10oC is required for biological 
processes to be triggered. After the beginning of vegetation period even 
a frost of -1– -2 oC at night can severely damage the output. Grape 
cannot endure permanent daily average temperature over 35 oC, but has 
small water demand thanks to the deep roots. Grape needs light, 
therefore often planted to slopes facing to the south. The optimal zone 
for its production is delimited by yearly average temperature between 
9–21 oC. Good wheat outputs can be expected only on chernozem soils 
on the natural or artificial steppes characterized by temperate climate. It 
also favours brown soils of former woodlands or riverine soils (not too 
sandy or clayey and wet). Wheat needs balanced precipitation 
conditions in spring (May), dry weather during harvest. Summer 
droughts and winter colds (temperature under -20 °C) severely affect 
outputs. Maize needs 25–35°C in the vegetation period and hot weather 
in late summer and early autumn, or 1100–1400°C altogether between 
April and September. In this period maize needs at least 450–550 mm 
precipitation and sunshine over 2000 hours. A sudden drought can 
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reduce the output by 30–50%, and high precipitation can also have 
harmful consequences, if the proportion of soil pores filled by air 
exceeds 80%.  
Agroeconomic needs are only one side of the coin, the other is the 
application of best practices to produce high output. (1) In Serbia and 
Bulgaria monocultural grain producing smallholdings became 
dominant, though small unit size is not favourable for grain production. 
(2) Replenishment of organic matter was also rare, animal manure was 
used up to heat houses during winter. (3) Since dry soils need deep 
ploughing for which iron ploughs are optimal, the abundance of ralo-
type wooden ploughs in the Balkans enlightens the fact, that the term 
’best practice’ (best output) should always be interpreted according to 
the actual conditions of agriculture. (4) Tobacco, rice, rose, vegetables are 
labour intensive cultures or need special knowledge and irrigation. The 
lack of skills can cause severe secondary effects: the over-irrigation 
resulted in sunken roads, and abandoned ricefields – after the 
emigration of Muslims – led to the recurrence of malaria around 
Plovdiv. (5) Potato (in W-Europe planted to solve famines) remained 
relatively unwelcomed in the Balkans, although the climatic conditions 
were not unfavourable for this products. 
 
Figure 1. Landuse of the Balkans in 1898 
 
Szende, Gy.: Földrajz-statisztikai tabellák a Föld összes államairól. s.l. 1898.   
Thus, the versatility of physical geographical conditions resulted in 
diverse agrarian systems (in Greece pastures dominated, the proportion 
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of arable land was small; in Serbia forests dominated) from the 
beginnings (figure 1), that were later overwritten by the changes of 
external circumstances.   
 
(c) Concept 
 
The story outlined here does not offer the ultimate truth as neither of 
the narratives are able to do so. There are still many debated questions 
regarding the output of the agriculture both at macro- and local level 
(especially for the 19th century), as well as concerning the profitability 
of different estates or the welfare of producer society. (1) These 
phenomena often have regional patterns, (2) the interpretations are 
influenced by the selected variables, (3) and finally, the interpretations 
of the agrarian performance were often not impartial, as this had 
relevance in legitimizing political regimes and ideologies.   
Data accessibility and reliability is another problem of investigations. 
Official statistics (after the 1870s) are often methodologically different 
from those of the 1920s. Despite efforts on harmonizing and analyzing 
data,6 there are still many uncertanities. In preindustrial countries the 
output is determined by climatic events, therefore there is a constant 
fluctuation beyond general trends or cycles, making it more 
complicated to estimate wealth or trace periods of prosperity. 
Comparative works from Balkan scholars are missing,7 they rather focus 
on one country8 (in that case there is the problem of changing state-
borders) or on small localities (to avoid any involvement in politically 
                                                          
6   Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens 1834–1914. Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 87. 
München, 1989; Axenciuc, V.: Evoluţia economică Romaniei: Cercetari statistico-istorice, 1859–
1947. Vol. 1-3. Bucharest, 1997, 2000.   
7    The only exception is the trend-analysis from Berov. 
8     Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, Economic Change in Yugoslavia. Stanford, Oxford, 1955; Vučo, 
N.: Poljoprivreda Jugoslavije 1918–1941. Belgrade, 1958; Daskalov, R.: Balgarskoto obshtestvo. 
Tom. 1–2. Sofia, 2005. and Calic, J-M.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 1815–1941. München, 1994. 
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sensitive issues),9 while western comparative works are rather syntheses 
built on a certain theory,10 than deep methodological analyses.11 
Thus, the same events were often interpreted differently by western 
and local scholars, partly because of certain political reservations, partly 
because of the different methodology or accessibility to data. Palairet 
claims, that prior to 1878 the Balkan agriculture showed better 
performance than after, while Ivanov challenged this statement raising 
the issue of “convergence or decline” and “what happened if…” again.12 
Berov in the 1980s stated, that agrarian development was slow between 
1840–1878, as any increase in outputs was consumed by population 
increase,13 thus the era of growth began only after 1878 (but export 
quantities and local data contradict to his statement), while Palairet 
calculates with increasing population pressure and stagnating-declining 
per capita output only after 1878 and speaks about prosperity in the 
Ottoman era. Lyberatos criticize the methodology of both.14 The 
estimations of Stojanović in 1919, then the recent calculations of 
Sundhaussen, Palairet and Lampe on Serbian agrarian GDP are 
contradictory even for 1910,15 because in the case of self-subsisting 
societies with low marketization it is hard to estimate the production 
                                                          
9    Like Draganova, Sl.: Berkovskoto selo v navecherieto na Osvobozhdenieto: statistichesko izsledvane 
spored osmanskite danachni registri. Sofia, 1985. 
10  Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 1800–1914: Evolution Without Development. Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2003. (international division of labour, globalization); Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. 
R.: Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations. 
Bloomington, 1982. 
11   An example for the latter in western countries: Zagorov, S. D.–Bilimovich, A. D.–Vegh, J.: The 
Agricultural Economy of the Danubian Countries, 1933-45. Stanford Univ. Press, 1955. 
12  Ivanov, M.–Tooze, A.: Convergence or Decline on Europe’s Southeastern Periphery? Agriculture, 
Population and GNP in Bulgaria, 1892–1945. The Journal of Economic History 67, 2007/3. 672. 
13   The basic difference between the two approach is that Palairet considers the Tanzimat as an 
economically prosperous era (successful integration into the Atlantic economic system – 
with present analogies with the EU-accession), while Bulgarians refuse this as their 
legitimations stems from the refusal of the Ottoman past. 
14   Lyberatos, A.: From Imperial to National Lands: Bulgarian Agriculture from the Russian–Ottoman 
(1877–78) to the Balkan Wars (1912–13). In: Eldem, E.–Petzemas, S. D. (eds.): The Economic 
Development of Southeastern Europe in the 19th century. Athens, 2011. 137–72. 
15   Lampe, J. R.: Varieties of Unsuccessful Industrialization: The Balkan States before 1914. The Journal 
of Economic History 35, 1975/1. 56–86; Stoyanovich, K.: The Economic Problems of Serbia. Paris, 
1919. 89. and 145–50. 
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through the tax incomes of the government. The performance of 
different landholding patterns is often also a political question, thus 
vigorously debated: Greek large estates did not show better outputs 
than smallholdings, while the Bulgarian or the Romanian large estates 
seemed to be more effective. The interpretation of agrarian crises (which 
layers suffered the most) is also contested: Labrousse stated that the 
smallhorders were the losers, while Landes and Post denied this.16 
Even pure statistical considerations without presumptions can lead 
to different interpretations: per hectare and per capita values, such as 
the usage of current or fixed prices or purchase power will not give the 
same result. Calculating with the numerous currencies is also a source 
of uncertainity when measuring wealth or growth.17 
In our approach the history of the agriculture in the Balkans between 
the 18th-20th century can be described at macro-level by a gradual shift 
from the Levantine economy towards the Atlantic. Due to the changing 
circumstances (external demands) the original role of the peninsula in 
the international division of labour had to be abandoned and new 
agrarian systems and cultivation patterns were adopted to fit into the 
new system of international division of labour. Some of the responses 
proved to be successful, some eventually failed (like grain producing 
smallholdings). As a consequence, the agrarian development in the 
Balkans differed from that in other parts of Europe: the “green 
revolution”18 (meaning either a change in cultures or in applied 
technologies) took place in the Balkans later, the radical changes in the 
19th century pointed to another direction. The production of fruits, 
vegetables, milk, eggs, tobacco or industrial plants, that became regular 
in West-Europe, remained of secondary importance here: intensification 
in cultivation – as an alternative – became important only after 1900.  
                                                          
16   Labrousse, C. E.: La mouvement ouvrier et les ideés sociales en France de 1815 à la fin du XIXe siècle. 
Paris, 1948; Post, J. D.: A Study in Meteorological and Trade Cycle History: The Economic Crisis 
Following the Napoleonic Wars. The Journal of Economic History 34, No. 2. 1974. 339–40. 
17  The piaster/franc ratio moved between 5:1 and 4.5:1 even when piaster was considered 
stable, thus one may wonder whether data reflect a 10% growth in the examined economy 
or simply a change in exchange rates. 
18   Zanden, J. L., van: First Green Revolution: The Growth of Production and Productivity in European 
Agriculture, 1870–1914. Economic History Review 44, No. 2. 1991. 215–39. 
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There were two main reasons for the belated progress: (a) the low 
level of urbanization (low consumption, self-sustaining economies) and low 
level of industrialization (low demand for raw material, low mechanization), 
depressed demand and slowed down the spread of modern technology 
in farming; partly (b) because the Balkan served as food supplier of western 
Europe in the new economic order, while the latter abandoned self-
subsistence and turned towards more intensive cultures (regarding both 
capital and labour). Contrary to all achievements and the misleadingly 
profitable periods (1840–78) on the Balkans, this ’detoured’ or 
’complementary’19 development and the abandonment of ecologically 
viable landuse20 had serious consequences for the future: because of 
path-dependency it decreased competitiveness, hindered renewal, and 
even delayed industrialization.  
The structure of each chapter begins with the analysis of global 
trends on the Balkans as – in our opinion – external impacts were the 
main determinative factors.21 On the other hand chapters will highlight 
divergent developments: as neither the initial agrarian structure(s) were 
homogeneous, nor did all sub-regions responded to the same challenges 
in the same way, the alternative paths are analyzed as case-studies. 
Beside the process-oriented approach, spatial comparison also 
characterizes the structure of sub-chapters. We examine how much 
globalization uniformized the production of agrarian systems (table 1), 
how it transformed agrarian societies, and how it affected productivity, 
social mobility, wealth and livelihood. Thus our approach is not purely 
of economic nature. The chapters use local-scale data to control the 
traditionally used macroeconomic data and to grasp regional variation. 
 
Table 1. The types and transformation of Balkan agrarian systems (1780–1940) 
Legend  
PR = prebendarial estates 
S = smallholding 
L = large estate 
n.a. = non-allodial 
a. = allodial (landlord’s demesne) 
g = grains 
m = meat 
c = cotton 
t = tobacco, 
poppy 
o = olive, grape 
M = monocultural dry 
D = diverse continental, 
policultural, combined 
Dm = Diverse 
Mediterranean 
T = transhumance 
H = animal husbandry 
U = unfavourable price 
tendencies 
F = favourable price 
trends 
                                                          
19  A development not parallel with the Atlantic way. 
20  A shift towards a landuse exposed to external (but not climatic!) circumstances. 
21  The Balkans pursuited not proactive, but reactive policy, which is the feature of peripheries. 
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 Country   1780–1810 1815–1840 1840–1876 1880–1910 1920–1940 
Serbia 
  
  
  
dominant 
estate 
type 
PR S S S S 
dominant 
product 
m, g m m g, plum g 
character D M M M M 
market 
prices 
U (fixed price) m: F F U then F F, then U 
Bulgaria 
  
  
  
dominant 
estate 
type 
PR 
1. S, 2. L (non 
a., 
sharecroppers) 
1. S, 2. L (non a., 
sharecroppers) 
S S 
dominant 
product 
m, g m, g g g 
g, tobacco, 
vegetables 
character D M with H M M D 
market 
prices 
U (fixed price) m: F F U then F F, then U 
Romania 
  
  
  
dominant 
estate 
type 
L L L L 1. L, 2. S 
dominant 
product 
g, m m, g g, m g, m g 
character M with T M with T M with T M with T M with T 
market 
prices 
U (fixed price) F F U then F F, then U 
Bosnia 
  
  
  
dominant 
estate 
type 
PR PR 1. L (a. and n.a.) 1. L (a. and n.a.) 1. S, 2. L 
dominant 
product 
m, g m, g g, plum g, plum g, plum 
character     M with H M with H M with H 
market 
prices 
U (fixed price) U (fixed price) F U then F  F then U 
Macedonia 
  
  
  
dominant 
estate 
type 
PR L L 1. L (n.a), 2. S S 
dominant 
product 
g, c g, c g t, g t, g 
character Dm Dm M with T D D 
market 
prices 
U (fixed price) F F F (for g U) U 
Greece 
  
  
  
dominant 
estate 
type 
  1. L, 2. S 1. L, 2. S 1. L, 2. S 1. S, 2. L 
dominant 
product 
o, c o, c o, c o o, g 
character Dm Dm Dm Dm Dm 
market 
prices 
U (fixed price) F F F  for g U 
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II. Agriculture and rural societies during the 
Napoleonic Wars (1780–1820) 
In order to analyze the transition of natural economies to market 
economies we have to reconstruct the initial – more or less natural – 
conditions, when the area was the part of the Levantine economic 
system. The 18th century brought about significant internal changes in 
taxation, population numbers, regional distribution and social 
stratification, as well as in the agrarian system (including landholding 
size, composition of products and state intervention into land-tenure 
systems). External challenges – like the increasing demand on food in 
Western Europe due to the Napoleonic Wars – and the given responses 
modified these transforming patterns further, challenging the 
provisionist policy pursuited by Istanbul (which was based on 
supplying the capital with food on fixed, low prices). The response to 
the increasing demand on food – exploited by local landlords (ayans) – 
resulted in the realignment of trade routes, thus this process contributed 
to the decentralization of the state. Though these changes in the 
Ottoman economy proved to be then temporal and socially limited, but 
paved the way to the great economic transformations that took place 
during the 1830–70s  in the Balkans (This process also went side by side 
with political changes: the Tanzimat). 
 
(a) Agriculture in the Ottoman Empire 
 
(i) Changing structures 
 
Internal changes 
By the end of the 18th century significant changes had taken place in the 
structure of the agriculture as a result of epidemics, wars, migration and 
external factors. (1) The raiyet chift, this peasant landholding ranging to 
averagely 10 hectares, created from miri (state) lands to serve as basis 
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for taxation lost its function owing to the progressive social 
differentiation and growing population pressure (figure 1). The Ottoman 
state failed to halt this process – partly owing to its internal weakness. 
The raiyet chift was originally planned for the optimal exploitation of 
the workforce, as one adult male was able to cultivate 5 ha of land 
(supposing 50% fallow land in a year). But as the Christian population 
increased by 50% during the 18th century in the Balkan Peninsula,22 this 
growth created a surplus in labour force and the fragmentation of 
economic units (since primogeniture was not common in the Balkans).  
This change had a significant impact on state incomes, it increased 
social burdens, and influenced livelihood of askeris as well. (2) The 
second significant change was that the askeri landholdings also lost 
their original functions: as military service became more expensive (due 
to the changes in warfare and the inflation between 1780–1830), low 
incomes ruined their competitiveness. The main goal of the spahis and 
janissaries (like the 4 dahi in Belgrade) then was to transform the existing 
prebendal system into a new one, where their ownership is more or less 
secured, and the influence of landlords over the reaya (and his output) is 
strengthened, while (military) services towards the state are eliminated 
or can be substituted for money. As this ambition coincided with the 
state’s need for extra income owing to the wars, new forms of 
ususfructus, like life-long tax-farming of lands and customs (malikane) 
appeared. These later became heritable even without military service. 
The transformation of agrarian system thus created a new „feudal” elite, 
and the competition for private property between the producers, the 
landlords and the state sharpened. Until the state maintained the 
concept of internal borrowing (and tax-farming was a part of this 
policy), this system blossomed. But when the state – owing to shortage 
of money – changed its financial policy and generated inflation (first 
artificially, later because of supply shortages due to overexport), the 
positions of the ’feudal’ elite began to weaken.  
                                                          
22   McGowan, B.: The Age of the Ayans, 1699–1812. In: İnalcık, H.–Quataert, D. (eds.): An Economic 
and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. Vol. II. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994/1997. 653. 
and Minkov, A.: Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahası – Petitions and Ottoman Social 
Life 1670–1730. Leiden, 2004. 81. 
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External challenges 
The growing western demand on wheat (induced by the wars of the 
Napoleonic era and by climatic anomalies) contributed to the birth of 
proto-capitalist activities on the Balkans (and tax-farming can be 
interpreted like this), which accelerated the transformations in 
agriculture. The demand, side by side with the political challenges (the 
Russian economic advance through the Black Sea after 1783) led to 
wheat speculations – tax-farmers and local ayans bought grains at low, 
fixed prices from the producer, but exported it to the West at real 
market prices instead of supplying Istanbul.23 The local “strong men” 
even encouraged peasants to hide the grains or organize local markets – 
as this activity was more risky for the officials (they were threatened by 
confiscation of their wealth as punishment). Unfortunately, speculation 
and overexport often generated local shortages, which caused 
inflation,24 destabilizing the situation further. Istanbul soon had to face 
both the decrease of central incomes and food shortages, while inflation 
further encouraged the practice of overexport. The partial abandonment 
of state provisionism and centralized grain redistribution did not help: 
the bread in Istanbul had become more expensive by 1806 than in rural 
areas, however it was just the opposite in 1798.25 Inflation and shortages 
created unrest among artisans (including the janissary troops), which 
weakened the central power further.26 This social crisis was marked by 
enhanced social mobility and migration. 
The numerous wars also exerted heavy pressure on peasantry: 
between 1768–1812 there were only 20 years of peace out of 45. This 
means that extraordinary taxes (avariz) became more or less regular. 
Military expenses reached 1.5 million pound sterling in 1776 (150–180 
million grams of silver or 35–40% of the budget), similar to the English 
                                                          
23  See the case of the speculant Ibis aga. Dimitrov, Str.: Istoriyata na edin ayanin. Sbornik v chest 
na akad. Dimitar Kosev. Sofia, 1974. 65–78. 
24   Beyond the state driven depreciation of coins to get more silver and gold for the treasury. 
25  Vinaver, V.: Ceni i nadnici u Dubrovniku u XVIII veku. Istorijski časopis, 1958. 315–332.  
26 Increasing food prices were harmful for craftsmen as well, but fortunately the demand 
towards industrial article also increased, as the increase in number of new guild masters 
proves. Todorov, N.: Balkanskyat grad XV-XIX v. Sofia, 1972. 59. 
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value. While this sum put the Ottoman Empire in parity with other 
Powers in the 1740s, in the 1770s the same amount was considered small 
in a war, therefore the state was continuously seeking new sources.27 
Together with the demographic pressure (due to estate fragmention and 
refugees arriving from the lost Crimea) wars and fiscal burdens also 
decreased the political and economic stability, while social mobility 
increased. This forced peasants to develop several strategies from 
banditism to more peaceful practices in order to avoid the increase of 
burdens. 
 
(ii) Agricultural production and society 
 
The differentiation and social strategies of peasantry  
Agrarian systems were more diverse than in the 19th century during the 
wheat prosperity. Smallholdings were dominantly not monocultural 
units, like crop-growing estates later, but rather economies adapted to 
the physical geographical and climatic conditions and seasonal changes 
(and not to external demands, as later). Peasant economies were based 
on the division of labour. Large estates were rare in this century: only 
10–20% of farming units exceeded 30–40 ha:28 prior to the great 
prosperity of the 1840s the elite was mainly involved in the trade of 
wheat, rather than in production. 
As the number of Christian tax-payers grew by 30–50% between 
1700–70 showing great regional variety29 – prior to the „kirdzhali” era, 
when stagnation came –, social differentiation and fragmentation of 
peasant landholdings increased (figure 1). Around Edirne 40% of the 
family economies were under 10 hectares or raiyet çift (producing 4000–
                                                          
27  Eton, W.: A Survey of the Turkish Empire. London, 1799. 41–47. This was also similar to the 
Austrian value: one year of war meant 180 million grams of silver additional costs in 1740, 
but it grew to 350 million in the 1760s, marking the desperate needs of central budget.  
28  For the size of large landholdings see Gerber, Ch.: Social Origins of the Middle East. Boulder, 
CO, 1987. 26–39. Though only 10–20% of the units exceeded 40 ha, their proportion from the 
land was significantly greater. For the involvement in trade see: Dimitrov, Str.: Istoriyata na 
edin ayanin… 
29  McGowan, B.: The Age of the Ayans, 653.  
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5000 akçe, the minimum required for self-subsistence in case of a family 
of six), thus were considered poor, while 30% of peasants had more 
than 20 ha land (with 7000–10 000 akçe income or 1000–1500 grams of 
silver).30  
 
Figure 1. Social differentiation in rural areas during the 18th century 
(based on 4 villages and cca. 180 estates) 
 
 
Data from: Parveva, S.: Village, Town and People in the Ottoman Balkans 16th-mid – 19th Century. 
Analecta Isisiana CVIII. Istanbul, 2009. and Istoriya na Balgariya. Tom. 5. Sofia, 1985. 
 
Muslim landholders were a bit richer: 55% of askeris had more than 2 
raiyet çifts around Edirne, while among Christian reaya this was 20% 
(table 1).31 As the average peasant estate size was still 0.9 raiyet çift for 
the total region, this differentiation took place contrary to the theoretical 
possibility of maintaining an egalitarian peasant society.32 Furthermore, 
although Istanbul was near, thus transport costs were low, fixed prices 
(peasants were paid only 60 akçe per grain units instead of 120–150 
akçe, the real market price)33 limited the participation of peasants in 
trade and commerce.  
 
                                                          
30  Parveva, S.: Zemyata i horata prez XVII – parvite desetiletiya na XVIII v. Sofia, 2011. 223–24. 374. 
31  This difference had been eliminated in Bulgaria by the 1870s owing to general enrichment, as 
Draganova’s data evidenced this. 
32  Gerber, Ch.: The Social Origins, 30. 
33   Ibid. 227–28.   
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Table 1. Difference between the landsize of askeri and reaya layers aroung Edirne 
 (18th century)  
Layer (prs) 
under 1 
çift 
1–2 çifts 2–3 çifts 3–4 çifts 4–12 çifts 
above 12 
çifts 
Reaya (592) 231 (39%) 185 (31%) 79 (13%) 44 (7%) 53 (9%) 0 
Askeri (75) 19 (25%) 15 (20%) 8 (11%) 4 (5%) 21 (28%) 8 (11%) 
Parveva, St.: Zemyata i horata, 374. 
During the second half of 18th century taxes paid by the reaya (the 
tithe,34 the avariz; for Christians the cizye, ispence and overtaxation due to 
tax-farming) could reach even 25–30% of the peasants’ income,35 while 
in the second half of the 19th century this fell to 15–18%, (but increased 
in absolute numbers, as peasant production also grew). One could 
imagine how hard this burden could be, if the lower tax rates of the 
1870s were still heavy enough to produce unrest, although that time the 
increase of state revenues went side by side with the economic 
prosperity of the agriculture.  
It is also true that peasant incomes expressed in grams of silver had 
doubled by the 18th century compared to the 16th (from 400–500 grams 
of silver to 800–900 grams),36 but as the tax rate remained the same, this 
meant increasing taxes as well. In the 18th century agrarian output was 
stagnating (partly due to the lowly fixed prices) while the price index 
                                                          
34   The tithe was 12–18% according to McGowan, B.: The Age of the Ayans, 681.  
35  Berov, Ly.: Ikonomicheskoto razvitie na Balgariya prez vekovete. Sofia, 1974. From this, the 
muaccele values of mukataas were not larger than 10% of the production. A rich Bulgarian 
village with averagely 12 hectares per household paid 200 grosh/household around 1780 as 
taxes (1000 grams of silver for a family of 5), while 1 ton of wheat cost 300–400 grams of 
silver that time (increasing from 40 to 400 grosh due to the inflation between 1780–1820). If 
we suppose 40–50% as fallow land as usually, wheat production could not exceed 6 tons, 
which would make income to 3000-4000 grams of silver together with husbandry.  
Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század 
végétől a 20. század közepéig. Vol. I. Budapest, 2014. 49. 
36  Berov puts the ispence to 25, the cizye to 40, the avariz to 25 akçe, while the income of the 
household did not exceed 500 akçe (400 grams of silver) in the 16th century. Together with 
the tithe paid to spahis, total taxes reached 150 akçe. Berov, Ly.: Ikonomicheskoto razvitie, 55. 
The value for the late 18th century is given by Canbakal, H.–Filiztekin, A.: Wealth and 
Inequality in Ottoman Lands in the Early Modern Period. AALIMS – Rice University Conference 
on the Political Economy of the Muslim World, 4–5 April 2013 (working paper) 
http://aalims.org/uploads/Rice_v1.pdf  and by own calculations using Parveva’s data. 
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increased.37 These eliminated any increase in welfare. The Gini–index 
between the richest 25% and the rest of the urban society grew until the 
kardzhali era, and towns were still twice as rich as rural areas regarding 
the income expressed in silver (1800 vs. 900 piasters per tax-payer 
around 1810).38 
Regional and denominational differences were also not negligible. 
While Pamuk puts central tax incomes per capita to 20 grams of silver,39 
which is 120 grams per family, Bulgarian sources cite even 200 
grams/household in richer rural areas. This difference may also refer to 
the leakage of central incomes. 
Overtaxation could lead to the transformation of landuse and land-
ownership. In Khalika village (Peloponnese) the tax, altogether 400–700 
piasters/household proved to be too high compared to the productivity. 
The settlement asked for a loan of 50 000 piasters to pay the debts, but 
failed pay it, thus the village was turned into a chiftlik large-estate of 
the tax-farmer, where debts were redeemed by corvéé.40 
Most of the calculations showed, that the mentioned social 
differentiation stopped during the kardzhali era, while both social and 
horizontal mobility increased. Differences between urban layers were 
decreasing in 1780–1800,41 the role of social ranks in explaining 
differences in wealth also sank from 50% to 25%,42 and reliogious 
differences also faded. Unfortunately, these positive tendencies went 
parallel with the general impoverishment of the society. 
                                                          
37  Özmucur, S.–Pamuk, Ş.: Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489–1914. 
The Journal of Economic History 62, No. 2, 2002. 293–321. 
38  Canbakal, H.–Filiztekin, A.: Wealth and Inequality… and Atanasov, Hr.: V osmanskata periferiya: 
obshtestvo i ikonomika vav Vidin i okolinostta prez XVIII vek. Sofia, 2008. 28.  
39  Karaman, K.–Pamuk, S.: Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500–1914. The Journal 
of Economic History 70, No. 3, 2010. 593–630. 
40   McGowan, B.: The Age of the Ayans, 689. 
41  Using average wealth/median wealth index based on the data of Atanasov. Atanasov, Hr.: 
Property Trends among the Urban Population of Rumelia in the 18th Century as Indicated by 
Inheritance Inventories from Russe, Sofia and Vidin. Bulgarian Historical Review, 2013/3-4. 33–
59. Using the data of Todorov, but correcting it with purchase power and inflation one 
would also come to the conclusion, that urban wealth did not increase between 1790–1810. 
Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol II. fig. I.7-8; esp. I. 12. and tables I.27; I. 29. 
42   Canbakal, H.–Filiztekin, A.:Wealth and Inequality… 
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As no effective government measures were taken to stop social 
differentiation, the population had to apply several micro- and 
macrosocial strategies – beside the adaptation of economies to these 
changes (see next chapter).  
The instability resulted in ruralization at the end of the 18th century. 
This could be observed even in the composition of urban incomes in 
Morea: agricultural incomes constituted 50% of the total (like in the 16th 
century Sliven)43 referring to the collapse of trade pattern as autarchy 
became dominant due to banditism.44 Around Edirne the ratio of arable 
land varied between 20–80%, while grazing land reached 30–60%: this 
versatility implies rather local markets and small-scale intraregional 
division of labour, than direct involvement in international trade. 
Marketization even during the Napoleonic Wars remained low, as 
indicated by the small number of participants in trade: as a result of the 
provisionist state policy and centralized redistribution, the profits 
dominantly accumulated in the hands of Istanbul merchants and ayans 
collecting the surplus, and did not leak down to broad layers of 
producers. This is a major difference between the Napoleonic and the 
consecutive economic prosperity of the 1840s. The rural regions turned to 
autarchy as political destabilization ruined markets (and mainland 
transportation costs were high). 
Migration was one of the exit strategies. When the inhabitants of 
Matruki village offered their land as a chiflik, because they were unable 
to pay the loans, many peasants fled to the nearby town, Agrafa and 
became weavers (weavers often had tax-exemption).45 This did not help 
the rest of the community, who had to take over their burden as well 
(the community had similar obligations as in Russia).46 Although 
migration was forbidden, because lower outputs could ruin incomes 
from tax-farming (thus it was detrimental to the state as well),47 the 
weakening of the central government made these regulations often 
                                                          
43  Parveva, S.: Village, Town and People in the Ottoman Balkans 16th-mid – 19th Century. Analecta 
Isisiana CVIII. Istanbul, 2009. 
44  Vacalopoulos, A. E.: History of Macedonia 1354–1833. Thessaloniki, 1973. 427 and 468. 
45  McGowan, B.: The Age of the Ayans, 689. 
46  In the old Slavic world the community (obština) bears responsibility, not the individual. 
47  Peasants were forced to return unless they left the obština 10–15 years ago. 
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unenforceable. The attacks of Ali Tepeleni or that of the Bushatlis 
generated migration waves and these not only modified population 
density or the ethnic pattern of a region,48 but influenced landuse too. 
The abandoned lands became exposed to the land-concentration 
attempts of the ayans, while in overpopulated areas the consequences of 
extensification and deforestation caused a landuse conflict between 
animal husbandry and crop-producing. The facts that forests had almost 
disappeared by the end of the 18th century from the Southeast and that 
75% of ploughlands were under cultivation refers to land scarcity, 
overpopulation and progressive fragmentation of estates.49 
Unlike earlier, conversion to Islam as a strategy of survival was not 
general in the 18th century. Convertite families could receive cca. 5000 
akçe support from the ruler once in a lifetime,50 which equaled to the 
yearly income of a middle-class peasant farm. But this rarely was 
enough to establish a new farm, rather to stabilize an existing one. The 
strategy of conversion was often applied to avoid cizye – large parts of 
Albania became Muslim around the Albanian Opar and Shpat due to 
this –, or to handle inheritance problems within a family. Although 
wealth was usually distributed among Moslems and even far relatives 
could inherit, in a family with only one Muslim convertite Christian 
relatives were excluded from the heritage,51 thus further land 
fragmentation could be stopped (as primogeniture was unusual in 
Balkan societies).  
Hiring poor relatives was another strategy to avoid fragmentation 
(Morea); extended families of cohabiting relatives (zadruga) played a 
similar role. Family heads cultivating even 30 ha worked together with 
3-4 married brothers and sons in Croatia.52 In mixed-combined 
                                                          
48 Thessaly and S-Macedonia was emptied, while the Christian population of the NW-Balkans 
has tripled. 
49  In regions, where the proportion of uncultivated land (this is not equivalent with fallow!) 
remained extreme, as it was in Dalmatia (50%), it was the result of soil erosion owing to 
deforestation. This also led to overpopulation and impoverishment. Stoyanovich, Tr.: A Study 
in Balkan Civilization. New York, 1967. 18–19. 
50   See Minkov, A.: Conversion to Islam in the Balkans… 
51  Serafimov, A.: Motivi za dobrovolna islyamizaciya na Balkanite ot sredata na XVII do kraya na XVIII 
v. http://sashekashe-istoria.blogspot.hu/2009/01/blog-post_6092.html. 
52   Grandits, H.: Familie und sozialer Wandel im ländlichen Kroatien. Böhlau, 2002. 90. 
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economies this was normal, because these farms required extra labour 
force. In Tǎrnovo (Bulgaria) 20% of the cizye-payers had no land at all in 
the 18th century, they were conscripted as wage-labourers, argats.53 The 
division of labour on these farms was well-organized: one of the males 
dealt with bees or olive-orchard, the other took care of sheep and draft 
animals, the third looked after the crop, etc. But this landless stratum 
was susceptible to all forms of violence: paramilitary kardzhali troops of 
the late 18th century were recruited from these landless peasants (also 
from Christians), who wanted to become askeri.54 
The differentiation even took place among the Muslim agrarian-
military elite (askeri). As timar landholdings usually exceeded 30 
hectares to produce the minimum 3000 akçe surplus (beyond the 
producers’ needs) to feed a spahi – smaller units were even confiscated 
as these were inapt to maintain a cavalryman –, the frequency of smaller 
askeri landholdings55 can be considered as the sign of another strategy, 
referring to the external dilution of the class. Rural peasants often tried 
to become janissaries while keeping their land, as the askeri status was 
still very prestigeous: the janissaries of Vidin became the wealthiest 
social class from the poorest under Pazvandoğlu.56 Tax-exemption, 
guild membership (allowing market activity), regular salary were very 
attractive for rural masses searching for supplementary income to 
compensate the fragmentation of their land. On the other hand, 
janissaries also tried to acquire smaller landholdings with peasants. 
Finally, the transformation of production structure in accordance with 
the available land and workforce was also among adaptation techniques 
to cope with the changes of the 18th century. In Arcadia town 
households cultivated no more than 2 hectares: ploughlands were 
missing, olive orchards were flourishing instead.57 Here even 
households with more than 1 male workforce were not automatically 
among the richest, which refers to absolute overpopulation. 
                                                          
53  Dimitrov, Str.–Stoykov, R.: Socialnata diferenciaciya sred selyachestvoto v Tirnovsko kam kraya na 
XVII i nachaloto na XVIII v. Izvestiya na Instituta za Istoriya. Sofia, 1964. 188–90. 
54   See Mutafchieva, V.: Kardzhaliysko vreme. Sofia, 1993. 
55   Only 30% of askeris owned more than 4 chifts around Edirne according to Parveva. 
56   From the data of Atanasov, Hr.: V osmanskata periferija… 
57   See Parveva, S.: Village, Town and People… 
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Production systems, outputs and economic strategies 
If we compare the income from grains at the end of the 18th century 
with that of the 1840s and 1870s, one may find that there were only 
small differences in output/household (expressed in silver), contrary to 
the doubling grain prices. The similarity in revenues of these two 
periods is due to the fact, that the average peasant landholding was 
larger in the 18th century, reaching 8–15 ha, while in the 1870s the 
average in Eastern Rumelia was 3.5 ha (and 4 ha in Serbia). This implies 
that income per hectare has doubled within 100 years. This was only 
partly the result of the increasing grain prices, another factor was the 
decrease of the proportion of fallow land, which decreased from 50% in 
the middle of the 18th century in Bulgaria and Serbia to 35% by 1880 
and to 20% after 1920. (This puts the area of sown land/household to 4–8 
ha in the 18th and 3–6 in 19th century). The extensification and price 
increase also meant that the improvement in yields/ha could not be 
significant: in case of wheat the output ratio was only 4:1 in the 18th 
century far away from the European average58 and was around 5:1 
hundred years later. The same ratio was mentioned in Hungary.59 
These implied further two features: (1) small economic units under 
10 ha could not be considered as monocultural grain producer systems 
in the 18th century, as these simply could not supply a family of 6, thus 
would have been unsustainable. Beside bad and fluctuating yields and 
fixed prices, geographical conditions and decreasing unit sizes 
(overpopulation) also made grain production unprofitable in many 
places. Due to the zaharea (compulsory delivery at low fixed prices to 
Istanbul) the Romanian principalities marketed only 100 000 quintals of 
wheat in the 1750s, only 15% of the volume marketed a century later. 
Ottomans abolished fix prices to encourage exports after 1774, but only 
temporarily: by 1833 wheat had reached only 20% of the exports. 
                                                          
58  Beside the low technological level another reason for the low output ratio regarding grains 
can be the abundance of other crops on arable lands! 
59  Glósz J.: Területi hiány és felesleg Magyarország gabonatermelésében a 19. század első felében. Korall 
36, 2009. 119–40. The output was around 0.6 tons/hectares, equalling with 3.5:1 output ratio. 
The values for the Balkans are calculated from the data given by Parveva. See explanation 
under table 2 referring to grain output under 600 kg/ha. 
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Peasants rather shifted to produce maize, as it was free from zaharea, 
while provided food for animals, and offered the possibility to plant 
other vegetables between the rows.60 Even Romanian landlords on large 
estates refrained from producing grains: only those were involved in 
form, who were using gypsy slaves for cultivation. 
(2) The high proportion of fallow land implies that the significance of 
animal husbandry could not be negligible. Husbandry had greater 
significance in the eastern parts of the peninsula (supplying Istanbul) 
and in the Serbia (supplying Austria and Hungary). Even in the 1840s 
the bulk of the income of peasantry came from animal products in the 
fertile plains around Pleven,61 and pig export constituted more than 50% 
of the value of Serbian exports. In the Romanian principalities – as the 
price of cattle and horses increased fivefold during the Napoleonic Wars 
– the Ottomans installed a 50% ad valorem export tariff on them (either to 
increase state revenues, or to hinder shortages due to overexport). This 
compelled many to turn towards pig exports, which was not taxed by 
Ottoman authorities – the value of exported swine and pork reached 
that of the grain exports in 1812–19.62 
The fragmentation of land compelled villagers to adapt and search 
for alternative products. The mentioned remarkable intraregional 
differences in landuse were the result the contraction of markets and the 
consequence of this diversification. For example, in Karaağaç the 
average farm size was 3–5 ha land/household, only half of the unit size 
measured in the neighboring Mihaliç, while tax/household was the 
same. This means twice as much tax/hectares. But small farms do not 
necessarily mean poverty: the higher tax per land unit was the result of 
the higher output/ha, because Karaagaç was located near Edirne, and 
became its fruit-supplier (table 2).63 On the other hand, in Kjafir Hadji 
village, rich in arable lands, 50% of villagers had more than 10 ha (figure 
1), thus here wheat production was still profitable. 
                                                          
60   Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 83. 
61  Draganova, Sl.: Documents of the 1840’s on the Economic Position of the Villages in Central North 
Bulgaria. Bulgarian Historical Review, 1988/2. 87–100. 
62   Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 84. 
63 Thus we cannot estimate the wealth of a settlement based on tax per land unit without 
knowledge on landuse. 
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Table 2. Average grain incomes of different farm types around Edirne  
(beginning of the 18th century) (7 akçe = 1 gram silver) 
Settlement 
House-
holds 
Tax 
(mukataa 
value in 
akçe) 
Total 
sown 
dönüms 
Dönüm/
house-
hold 
Sown 
dönüm 
/house 
Mukataa
/house-
hold 
Grain 
income/ 
household* 
Mihaliç 66 18 000 5 478 200 
83  
(40%) 
273 (3%) 
3500+6400 
akçe 
cca. 1400 
grams of 
silver 
Karaağaç 54 15 000 0 80 0 277 
0 (fruit, 
orchard) 
Omurca 16 7 000 1 600 270 
96  
(40%) 
438 (4%) 
11 500 akçe 
1650 grams of 
silver 
Ismece, 
Pavlikyan, 
Sökün, Hasköy, 
Yürükçekler  
86 220 000 16 168 680 
188  
(28%) 
2 558 
(11%) 
22 560 akçe 
3220 grams 
of silver 
* Calculating with 2 kile products / dönüm, which equals with 120 akçe (at low fixes prices, which is 
half of the price in Istanbul). Based on Parveva, S.: Village, Town and People … 
Another alternative strategy against fragmentation was winegrowing. 
One hectare of vineyard produced 3000 akçe per year, 5 times more than 
a wheat growing economy of the same size (table 3). One hectare of olive 
orchard produced 7000 akçes yearly.64 It is not surprising that Inalcik 
pointed out that the grain-producer Anatolian peasant economy was 
worth less, than the diverse, mixed farming of the Balkans. 
Unlike grape and olive, wheat gave yield even in the first year, the 
wheatland was cheaper, and thus secured a quick return rate, while 
viticulture was a labour and capital intensive activity.65 But – contrary to 
its relative cheapness – only large estates invested in grains that time. 
Nevertheless, this still was a rational choice: since the technical level did 
not enable famers to decrease the fallow, animals were raised to utilize 
them by fertilizing the land during grazing, while eating up a part of the 
produced crops. The boiars of the Romanian principalities were 
                                                          
64   1 olive tree gave 3 okes or 35 akçe: one hectare of land could grow 200 trees. 
65  Altough the price of 1 dönüm (0.1 ha) of vineyard and its yearly production was rated around 
1000 akçe, giving a 3 year return – even better than the return rate in case of grains – the 
initial capital was higher. 
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involved in husbandry and wine-growing in the 18th century due to the 
limited prospects in wheat-production. Peasants delivering corvéé spent 
10 times more days with cultivating winestocks than on arable lands, 
and income from husbandry and spirits was 3-4 times higher than from 
grains in the 18th century.66 Due to low prices and limited export 
facilities (the costs of wheat transportation over 50–70 kms or 18 hours, 
eliminated the profits, reasoning the high number of local market 
centres), allodial lands in the Romanian principalities produced not more 
than 5% of all grains. Neither their extent was more than 5% of the total 
land owned by the boiars. Despite this, the wheat that appeared on local 
markets (securing the food-consumption for example of wine-growers) 
still came from large estates: wheat-producing smallholders hardly had 
surplus that time.  
Cotton could have been another alternative for wheat-producing 
monocultural economies. One hectare produced 3600 akçe (4-5000 was 
considered as minimum for a family of 5) exceeding the productivity of 
wheat by 4 or even 6 times. It was one of the export products of the 
South in the 18th century. The temporary decline of cotton production67 
can be reasoned by the fact, that cotton required intensive commercial 
relations both with foreign and inland partners: each cotton growing 
area needed a local market to buy foodstuffs. The wheat to supply the 
cotton growing population could not have been transported from more 
than 200 kms, because its high transports costs in the 18th century 
would have eliminated the profits earned from cotton. That is another 
reason why we meet so mosaic agricultural pattern on the Balkans in 
this century, and it is evident why cotton exports decreased during the 
Napoleonic Wars (the blockade and anarchy made commercial ties 
unsustainable). In many cases the lack of labour force or the 
unpopularity of intensive work (cotton required cca. 5 times more days 
                                                          
66   Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 84. 
67  S-Macedonia exported 3.2 million kile of wheat (15 million grosh), 0.8 million okes of wool 
(S-Albania, Larisa, Doiran, Strumica) and cotton for 5 million grosh from Seres and Melnik 
prior to the devastation that emptied the region. Vacalopoulos, A. E.: History of Macedonia, 
427. 468. 
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spent on fields compared to grains) hindered its spread.68 As cotton also 
required irrigation, its production costs were also greater, thus the rate 
of return was not exceeding that of the grains. 
In the 18th century mixed farming had certain advantages compared to 
monocultural units, like (1) smaller area secured self-subsistence owing to 
the greater productivity (table 3); 
 
Table 3. The output of 1 dönüm (0.1 ha) land in the 18th century 
 
*minimum 4000-5000 akçe is required yearly to sustain a family of 5-6. 
 
(2) The diversity of products also decreased the threats imposed by 
extreme weather and price fluctuations (to which monocultural units 
were more likely to be exposed). In Arcadia town (Morea) 80% of 
farmers had at least vineyards or olive orchards. The averagely 70 olive 
trees/family provided 2500 akçe income yearly (375 grams of silver) 
which was not enough to subsist, therefore other forms of agriculture 
(or industry) were also considered as additional income source. 
Diversity was abundant not only at regional level or between villages, 
but within the settlements as well: in Arcadia 50% of inhabitants 
worked in all forms of agriculture. But it was definitely not the wheat 
production that saved the population from starvation as the average 
size of arable land was 0.7 hectare/households (table 4). 
(3) Finally, the accessibility to cash, as olive or wine could not be all 
consumed locally, but had to be marketed.  
Mixed farming also had two features that later proved to be fatal in 
the competition: (1) the diverse product structure required access to 
different agro-ecological microenvirons: in practice it meant numerous 
parcels often far away from each other. (2) The mentioned diversity 
required extra workforce to spare time. And when the great shift to 
                                                          
68  That is why it met with resistance even in Egypt. Girard, M. P. S.: Memoire sur l’agriculture, 
l’industrie et le commerce de l’Égypte. Description de l’Égypte, état moderne. I, Paris, 1822. 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k621   
50-65 kgs of wheat 60–100 akçe* 
20 olive trees 720 akçe 
cotton 360 akçe 
vineyard 300–400 akçe 
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grains took place owing to external demand (in Bulgaria) or 
overpopulation (in Serbia) the fragmented pattern became 
disadvantageous. This shift generated oversupply in labour force: in 
case the parcels had not been fragmented, 1 man’s workforce would 
have been enough to cultivate 5 ha grainland. (Furthermore, many 
farms totalled even less acreage). 
 
Table 4. Composition of agrarian income in settlements with different geographical 
conditions (in akçe, without animal husbandry) in the 18th century*  
Revenue 
source (in 
akçe) 
PLAINS 
Arcadia 
town (217 
house) 
PLAINS 
Filiatra 
village 
(168) 
HILLS  
Varibobi 
village (11 
households) 
HILLS 
Hristianou 
village (18 
households) 
Income 
per 
house 
Arcadia 
Income 
per 
house 
Filiatra 
Share 
in %, 
Arcadia 
Share in 
%, 
Filiatra 
Income 
per house: 
Varibobi 
Income/ 
house in 
Hristianu 
Grains 50 000 
310 000 
(0.5 
çift/hh.) 
110 000 (2.4 
çift/hh.) 
47 000 (0.6 
çift/hh.) 
250 
1850 
1 çift = 
140 kile 
(7:1 
output) 
5.0 40.1 
10 500 
* 1 çift = 
67 kile 
(4.5:1 
output) 
2 600 
* 1 çift =73 
kile (5:1 
output) 
Grape 400 000 390 000 6 000 14 000 1 843 2 300 34.8 48.2 500 780 
Olive tree 603 000 106 000 1 200 4 500 2 779 630 52.2 13.1 110 250 
Cotton 90 000 8 000 0 1 440 415 47 8,0 1 0 80 
Total 
income in 
akçe* 
1 145 000 815 000 110–120 000 60–66 000 5 276 4800 100.0 100.0 11 000 4000 
* 7 akçe = 1 gram silver. Based on Parveva, St.: Zemyata i horata, 165–69.  
In the Peloponnese the differences between the continental and 
Mediterranean agriculture were even more obvious. Here orange and 
pomegrenade orchards, apricot and cherry trees were grown in small 
gardens of 100x25 m. This agrarian system had its own natural cycle: 
from December to March olive oil was produced in oil presses, in 
March-April (as a preparation for the hot summer in order to replenish 
salt and energy) cheese and butter was produced and wool was 
collected; in May-June wheat was harvested, in July mulberry leaves 
were collected to feed silk-worms; from August to October tobacco and 
fruits were gathered, and the latter were dried as food for the winter.69 
Sometimes combined or Mediterranean economy was not a question 
of choice, but remained the only viable option (in case of prograding 
                                                          
69  Parveva, St.: Agrarian Land and Harvest in South–West Peloponnese in the Early 18th Century. In: 
Parveva, St.: Village, Town and People, 71–75. 
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estate fragmentation or overpopulation). The economic units of 3-4 
hectares in Filiatra (Morea) would have been insufficient to supply a 
family of 5 or 6, even if we calculate with 1 ton/ha average wheat yield 
on 3 sown hectares (and this became regular in the Balkans only in the 
1910s). Neither physical geographical conditions did favour this 
solution. And since the limited availability of land hindered extensive 
animal husbandry, the only way out was to adapt the combined 
economy based on grape, figs, olive orchards. This also implies that 
territories suffering from absolute land scarcity could not profit from 
wheat even when transport costs fell and wheat prices went up in the 
1840s (unless yields did improve significantly).  
The real problem was, that by the end of the 19th century this 
alternative form of agriculture became more expensive pushing 
peasants towards crop-growing. An olive orchard of 1 ha (enough for 
self-subsistence!) in Preveza cost 130 ₤ (and a fruit plantation with trees 
was 80 ₤),70 while in case of cropland an investment of 30 ₤ was needed 
to buy 6 ha land – enough to sustain a family. But while investment cost 
did not change over time (and were in favour of grains), the difference 
in productivity of the two landuse types decreased due to the 
amelioration of wheat yields and the increase in wheat prices. In 1870 
one hectare of ploughland cost 6–700 piasters and produced around 1 
ton of grains worth at least 800-900 piasters, while one hectare of olive 
orchard cost 18,000 piasters with yearly 6000 piasters income.71 For a 
smallholder arable lands meant a definitely cheaper investment with 
quicker return. In Preveza the averagely 120–150 olive trees/families on 
small parcels of 0.5 ha produced 2700 piasters yearly income, similar to 
the North-Bulgarian households72 producing wheat on 4–5 hectares. But 
the Greeks were still in a worse situation as their children could not 
afford to buy an own orchard of average size owing to its greater capital 
requirement (9000 piasters) and there was simply not enough space to 
                                                          
70  For data on Preveza see: Mihov, N.: Naselenieto na Turciya i Balgariya prez XVIII i XIX. v. Tom. 
IV. Sofia, 1935. 392. In other words, 5 hectares of wheatland (enough for self-subsistence) 
produced 10 units of income in cash in the 1860s, while an orchard producing originally 12 
gave only 6. 
71   For calculations see: Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom,Vol. II. 
72   Data: Draganova, Sl.: Berkovskoto selo… 
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establish new, maize producing units of 3-5 hectares (producing the 
same yearly income), even if they had money for this (2500–3000 
piasters). Thus, the population surplus was forced to migrate or 
restratify into the industry (if there was any)! 
So, in order to operate a viable economy based on dry cultivation of 
grains (producing 4–5000 akçe yearly)73 at least 5–7 sown hectares were 
needed in the 18th c. That is the reason why the raiyet çift was originally 
set to 10 hectares in continental economies. Such an economic unit (like 
farms in Omurca, around Edirne), would have produced 2500–3500 kgs 
of wheat (calculating with 50% fallow and 3.5:1 output/input ratio 
producing 600 kg/ha grain), while a family of 5 consumed 1.3 tons.74 
With the tax equalled to 300–500 kgs, and seeds for next year (0.7–1 ton) 
the farm still remained viable.  
The example above hardly shows any surplus. This means, that extra 
expenses, like the regular collection of war taxes (avariz) from the end of 
the 18th century on – meant a heavy additional, unplanned burden and 
contributed to the destabilization of rural areas and to the spread of 
banditism as a strategy to break out. Hristianou, a village producing 
grains on small economic units, exemplifies well the threats of this 
phenomenon (table 5). 
 
Table 5. Limits of livelihood in a wheat producing smallholder community in the 18th c. 
 (data given in grams of silver for a household)  
Income 
from land* 
Tithe** Seed*** Food Remainder 
 Cizye, 
ispence 
Other expenses 
(avariz) 
640 100 100 360 80 60 20 
* or 4500 akçe without animals; ** calculated with 14% due to tax farming; *** Total income (from grapes 
an olive trees) was converted to grain equivalent to simplify calculation. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73   See table 2–4 and also the value of kisve bahası. 
74   Calculating with 250 kgs of grain consumption per capita.  
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(iii) The system of provisionism and its collapse  
 
The collapse of provisionism 
We can enumerate several synergic events that shocked the 
provisionist policy of the Ottoman Empire and allowed the infiltration 
of elements of market economy – resulted in growing exports from the 
Balkans, internal shortage of foodstuffs, increasing local prices, social 
crisis and destabilization and finally, the abandonment of economic 
isolation. 
(1) The impact of climatic anomalies shocking Western Europe was 
one of these. According to Grove the El Niño was responsible for the 
series of bad harvest in France between 1789–93 causing longlasting 
social and political consequences.75 Lamb stated that volcanic eruptions 
also contributed to the bad weather in 1783–1806 and 1811–18 (Mount 
Sourfriére and Tambora eruptions).76 As all this correlated with 
increasing grain prices, Ottoman malikane owners began to export the 
grain overseas instead of carrying it to Istanbul. This not only meant 
that the central treasury lost huge sums (the crop monopoly produced 
10 million kurush income for the elite),77 as it was then the local ayans 
who exported the grain instead of the state78 (the government was also 
unable to raise the prices of malikane rights as this was sold life-long!), 
but central authorities also lost control on local prices. Soon food 
shortage occurred (the capital city required 140 000 tons of wheat 
                                                          
75  Grove, R. H.: The Great El Niño of 1789–1793 and Its Global Consequences: Reconstructing an 
Extreme Climate Event in World  Environmental History. Medieval History Journal 10, No. 1–2, 
2007. 75–98. 
76 Lamb, H. H.: Volcanic Dust in the Atmosphere: with a Chronology and an Assessment of its 
Meteorological Significance. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Ser. A, 266, 1970. 
425–533. 
77  Kosev, D.: Kam izyasnyavane na nyakoi problemi ot istoriyata na Balgarya prez XVIII i nachaloto na 
XIX.v. Istoricheski Pregled, 1956/3. 32. It was a great business, however we do not know 
how much income would heve been produced in case of free trade. 
78  Here we refer to the fate of Ibis aga, who was executed for speculation. Dimitrov, Str.: 
Istoriyata na edin ayanin… 
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yearly),79 local prices went up and the central power weakened. In 1780 
one oke of grain cost 5 para (0.1 kurush/kg) both in Istanbul and 
Saloniki (that time wheat from Saloniki was exported only to Istanbul). 
By 1800 the price had increased to 12 para (0.25 grosh/kg) in Istanbul, 
but this was still half of the price measured in Saloniki, where western 
prices dominated!80 The bread in Istanbul became more expensive by 
1806 than in rural areas (28 piasters/oke in Istanbul, 21 in Bosnia) 
however it was the opposite in 1798 (11 vs. 14 piasters/oke).81  
Inflation caused social crisis among urban dwellers and artizans, 
including the janissaries as well. (They were supporters of protectionist 
policy, thus opponents of trade liberalization propagated by the 
Powers). Rebellions broke out. The sultan – who earlier sold berats to 
many merchants (granting them the right to trade) in order to increase 
the state revenues – soon prohibited exports in a ferman (1804) written 
to the governor of Saloniki. But merchants continued their activity, 
because they wanted to get rid of the worthless Ottoman currency 
(inflation always encourages exports!). 
(2) The second factor was the effect of the Napoleonic Wars with its 
permanently high wheat demand and prices. The blockade made 
expensive mainland transport the only solution: this caused price 
increase and the strengthening of Balkan ayans (similarly to the first 
factor), and the Empire started to fall apart into ’local enterprises’. 
(3) The third phenomenon breaking the shell of ’splendid isolation’ 
was that the Ottomans lost the monopoly of trade over the Black Sea 
after 1783. Ships under Russian flag (often Greek indeed) appeared 
offering better price for the goods than the Empire did – now legally. As 
a consequence, Istanbul lost its hinterland that secured its food 
consumption at low prices. This exacerbated the effect of illegal 
maritime trade around Saloniki, which was then a double blow.   
                                                          
79  Aynural, S.: Bakers and Millers of Istanbul. In: Faroqhi, S.–Deguilhem, R. (eds.): Crafts and 
Craftsmen of the Middle East. Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean. 
New York, 2005. 153–73. 
80   Kasaba, R.: The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century. Albany, 1988. 
19. and Walpole, R.: Travels in various countries of the East; being a continuation of Memoirs 
relating to European and Asiatic Turkey. London, 1820. 112. 
81   Vinaver, V.: Ceni i nadnici u Dubrovniku, 315–32. 
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Finally, the Empire abandoned the practice of fixed prices to secure 
the inflow of grains to Istanbul, but this meant extra costs for the state. 
The integration into the world market economy began. 
Prior to the partial liberation of prices,82 during the preindustrial 
(Napoleonic) upswing, the duties of agrarian producers increased due 
to the sharpening rivalry between the state and tax-farmers over 
resources. The central treasury tried to increase the price of tax-farms 
by prohibiting life-long mukataas in order to compensate the losses, 
while local landlords and tax-farmers tried to shift this burden on 
peasants. In practice this meant that in the kaza of Dobrich in 1786 the 
6250 kile tax-wheat was still sold at 50 akçe instead of 140.83 Stagnating 
prices confirm, that the main goal was to exclude producers from 
market competition. Regions that were unable to bypass 
Constantinople, like Varna, tried to sell wheat as processed foodstuff in 
1817,84 as these were not under price limitation (narh). The harvest in 
1834 was so good, that Bulgarians sold wheat even without permission 
through Brăila.85 This also confirms, that the agreement on free trade in 
1838 merely legalized the formerly existing practices! 
Not only wheat, but other products also participated in this traffic 
turning from intraregional into interregional trade. Meat price in 
Vienna increased from 2 to 3.5 grams of silver between 1770–1850, 
while in the Balkans it was only 1.5–2.5 grams of silver (figure 2).86 So, 
transporting meat to Vienna was profitable despite the more expensive 
                                                          
82   In 1833 Istanbul increased fixed prices to 9.5 grosh/kile, but Bulgarians were still able to sell 
it illegally at 11–12 grosh prices (380–460 piasters). Paskaleva, V.: A Contribution to the History 
of Trade in the Bulgarian Lands during the 1st half of the 19th c. Bulg. Hist. Review, 1980/2. 33. 
83   Dimitrov, Str.: Osmanski izvori za istoriyata na Dobrudzha i Severoiztochna Balgariya. Sofia, 1981. 
118–120. and Parveva, St.: Zemyata i horata, 228. In 1764 80–90 kgs of wheat was collected 
from households around Saloniki by the new tax-farmer compared to the 60 kg levied 
earlier. Cvetkova, B.: Izvanredni danaci i darzhavni povinnosti v balgarskite zemi pod turska vlast. 
Sofia, 1958. 142. 
84   Istoriya na Balgarija, Tom. 5. 80–81. 
85   Dokumenti za Balgarskata Istoriya, Vol. III. Dokumenti iz turskite darzhavni arhivi 1564–1908. 
Ed.: Dorev, P. Sofia, 1940. 190–97. 
86  Berov, Ly.: Änderungen der Preisbedingungen in Handel Österreichs mit den Balkanländern im 15-
18 Jahrhundert. In: Österreichs Handel mit Südosteuropa und die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung 
der bulgarischen Länder bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts. Mitteilungen des Bulgarischen 
Forschungsinstitutes in Österreich. IV/B/II. Wien, 1981. 13–35. 
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upstream transportation. (While the advantage of cheaper downstream 
transport was eliminated by low fixed prices in Istanbul, which cut 
back profits). Contrary to this, wheat was cheaper in Vienna (0.5–1 
grams of silver between 1760–1830 and 0.5 to 1.7 grams in the Western 
Balkans without transport costs). This meant that Balkan wheat 
producers were unable sell their product in Central Europe, it was the 
market of Hungarian producers then. This turned Balkan grain 
merchants towards the maritime harbors, while mainland transport 
routes were exploited by those who dealt with animals, wine, etc. 
 
Figure 2. Changes in grain prices on the Balkans 
 
Data: Berov, Ly.: Änderungen der Preisbedingungen in Handel Österreichs mit den Balkanländern im 
15-18 Jahrhundert. In: Österreichs Handel mit Südosteuropa… Mitteilungen des Bulgarischen 
Forschungsinstitutes in Österreich. IV/B/II. Wien, 1981. 
So, beside the actual Western consumption patterns and prices there 
were two other factors that could limit the profitability of grain 
exports: (1) the tariff policy of western states and (2) the costs of 
mainland and maritime transportation. The Balkan wheat was 
temporarily pushed out by the protectionist policy of Britain and 
France soon after the Napoleonic Wars (Corn Law), as both countries 
wanted to protect the interest of local producers from the cheap Balkan 
grains, especially after steamships decreased transportation cost from 
40% to 15% by the 1840s.87  
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The wealth of agrarian strata measured to other classes  
Land was the major source of wealth in the 18th century and it 
remained in the 19th century too: among the askeris its proportion 
reached 30–50% of the wealth enumerated in heritage inventories (even 
among janissaries, who originally did not own land), houses constituted 
further 10–20%, and the rest came from other activities (industry, mills, 
weapons, loans). Those who earned their living from agriculture were 
not among the richest in the 18th century. Peasants were poorer than 
artizans and left behind not more than 60–75 kurush (then 1000–1300 
grams of silver), the agrarian middle class (or janissaries) had 500–700, 
while the rich timariots’ wealth reached 2000–5000 kurush (over 35 000 
grams of silver) according to the inventories of Vidin (1710–1810).88 
In the 1830s – prior to the great upswing – the yearly earnings of 
agricultural wage labourers were not higher than 200 piasters (or 2 
grosh daily),89 while craftsmen like abadjis, boyadjis, arabadjis still earned 
more (between 350 and 500).90 Agricultural smallholders – çiftçi, either 
free peasants or shareholders – were richer, than artisans in the local 
center, Priština (600–900 piasters), but not in the nearby rural Vučitrn.91 
Although landlords were still dominating the leading social class (20 
out of the 50 richest tax-payers were landowners in Priština), but the 
variety of terms applied on them (çiftlik sahibi, timar süvari, spahi) 
testifies the changes in the agrarian structures. Spahis were pensioned, 
and those who managed to keep their land were not richer (1750 grams 
of silver yearly income), than the emerging new layer of çiftlik owners 
(1900 grams silver yearly income). The progressive differentiation of the 
’feudal’ ruler class meant that 25–30% of the local spahis were unable to 
buy a single rifle from their land revenues in the 1840s in Priština,92 and 
                                                          
88   See the data of Atanasov. 
89   1 gram silver = 1 grosh = 1 kurush = 1 piaster = 0.2–0.25 French francs. 
90   The price of 1 ha was 400–700 grams of silver in the 1860s. 
91  Data from: Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul, 2007. 363–413. Temetuat 
defters Nr. 15477. and Nr. 15465. The two towns represent locations isolated from maritime 
markets. 
92   A rifle worth 50 grosh in 1750 means 800–1000 grams of silver/grosh in 1844. 
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80% was unable to produce the 3000 grams of silver (3000 grosh)93 
income yearly. In Radovish 50% of timariots reached this limit in the 
1840s, but after their pensioning only 20% earned more than 3000 grosh 
in 1869.94 Pensioning meant an immediate relief for the state, that spared 
yearly 1000 grosh per spahi after pensioning. Furthermore, their state 
lands could be sold to the producers after 1858. The sum spared by the 
pensioning could finance the establishment of the modern army without 
causing any additional fiscal burden for the central treasury (the salary 
of one foot soldier substituting the spahi was 5–6 piasters daily, for half 
a year cca. 1000 piasters, just the same value mentioned above).95 
(b) Agriculture in landlocked non-Ottoman lands 
 
The term Southeast-Europe covers borderlands of the Ottoman Empire 
and also some – geographically diverse – frontier areas96 that were not 
(always) subjected to Ottoman rule. The gradual retreat of the Ottoman 
Empire created a mosaic-like, fragmented transitional zone with diverse 
patterns. Sometimes phenomena similar to the Ottoman structure 
prevailed (the salary and organization structure of military personnel in 
the Croatian Militärgrenze resembled that of the spahis), while 
sometimes the development took a sudden turn (the abolition of large 
estates and prebendal estates in Serbia). Some areas retained their pre-
Ottoman structures (civil Croatia), or were integrated into a new center 
earlier than others (Southern Hungary to the Habsburg Empire), or 
were put under special administration, which influenced landuse and 
agriculture (Militärgrenze).  
                                                          
93  The original limit in the 16th century – that time equalling with 3000 akçe – for timar-estates. 
94  See data: Dimitrov, Str.: Kam vaprosa za otmenyavaneto na spahiyskata sistema v nashite zemi. 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1956/6. 36; Dimitrov, Str.: Politikata na upravlyavashtata varhushka v 
Turciya prez XVIII v. Istoricheski Pregled, 1962/5. 32–60. and Draganova, Sl.: Materiali za 
Dunavskija vilayet: Rusenska, Silistrenska, Shumenska i Tutrakanska kaza prez 50-te-70-te godini 
na XIX v. Sofia, 1980. 1st page of Table 19. 
95 For this see Demeter, G.: Essays on Ottoman Modernization. Industrialization, Welfare, Military 
Reforms. Sofia, 2017. Chapter 3. 
96  Rivers and large moors surrounded by forests could be as good frontiers as high mountain 
ranges or less populated dry carstic plateaus. 
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(i) The birth of a smallholder society – The origins of Serbian 
agrarian structure 
 
The Serbian agrarian system represented a different model compared to 
the prevailing Ottoman. Although according to Bataković it was not 
only the economic oppression that fuelled the Serbian uprising in 1804, 
as from the 36 petition written to the Sublime Porte between 1793–1806 
only 5 mentioned agrarian problems, the fight for supremacy between 
the elite groups (janissaries, spahis, orthodox starešinas) over the land and 
reaya resulted in the dissolution of existing çiftlik estates. This was 
against the then general trends in the Empire.97  
However, this did not mean that abuses were immediately over: the 
Serbian elite tried to substitute the old landlords and exploit the reaya. 
Matija Nenadović had 1005 peasants serving with kuluk (corvéé). The 
starešina of Krumla used force to acquire land from peasants in 1825. 
Usury was another form to acquire land: Vučo mentions that for a loan 
of 130 ducats, 310 had to be repaid within 2 years, and a loan of 40 
ducats finally cost 140 after 3 years.98 The expropriation the Ottoman 
çiftliks instead of distributing them among producers was also frequent: 
in Batini village, the starešina bought the land under market price from 
expatriating Muslims. Peasantry was not an unified stratum that time, 
their rights and obligations differed: Vučo mentions 6400 tax-payer 
peasants and 7900 serving with kuluk in 108 villages. 
In order to abolish these practices, and thus to hinder the emergence 
of new landlords, Prince Miloš considered all expropriated Ottoman 
land as state or obština property (he decided not to distribute all land 
among producers).99 Although this approach was similar to the former 
Ottoman practice, the abolishment of kuluk in 1821 (state taxation was 
introduced instead, unifying the obligations) increased the costs of 
cultivation and made it unprofitable for çiftlik estate owners.  
                                                          
97 Batakovic, D.: A Balkan-Style French Revolution? The 1804 Serbian Uprising in European 
Perspective. Balcanica 36, 2005. 113–28. 
98  Vučo, N.: Prvobitna akumulacija kapitala u Srbiji. Istorijski časopis 29–30, 1983. 289–94. 
99  Ibid. 
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The socio-economic structure has transformed: Serbia became a 
smallholder society: only 10% owned more arable land than 3 hectares 
in 1834.100 In order to avoid further differentiation and the 
impoverishment of peasantry (that forced many to become a hajdut, and 
hindered the consolidation of state) Miloš also introduced the okučje in 
1836 based on the practices in the Croatian Militärgrenze. This meant 
that the house of the peasant and a small parcel of land cultivated by a 
pair of oxen became unalienable and could not be mortgaged. (Similar 
practise also existed in the Ottoman Empire: there the reaya owned 500 
m2 unalienable land). This was just the opposite of what was happening 
in Hungary, where these restrictions originating from 1351 had been 
abolished by 1848 in order to promote loans and accessibility to capital 
for modernization.  
This change had serious consequences: (1) it slowed down 
capitalistic development, land (and capital) concentration, accessibility 
to credits, restratification. Thus it hindered modernization efforts, while 
(2) it did not save the existing economic units from fragmentation, 
division between inheritors. The optimal size of economic units 
originally set to the socio-economic needs was slowly decreasing. The 
free trade of land after 1844 also influenced the process of 
fragmentation.101 The increasing number of economic units – up to 370 
thousand in 1910 – also meant the increase in proportion of land (%) 
under the okučje. (3) Contrary to the original purposes, usury also 
prevailed, as the new, differentiated head-tax (substituting the tithe 
paid to spahis) had to be paid in cash (so-called maktu system), but 
smallholders hardly had marketable surpluses to obtain money. (And in 
case of tax arrays the state retained the right to confiscate property 
under okučje). Unlike in Bulgaria in the 1840s, producers in Serbia were 
not able to profit from favourable price trends due to the 
monopolization of exports by Miloš and his manipulation with the 
currency. Thus increased peasant participation in market processes due 
to the maktu system did not mean their participation in external trade: in 
the 1820s only 60–70 merchants were able to compete with the prince (a 
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101 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 115. 
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decade later under the liberal ustavobraniteli 1000 new licences were 
issued). Livestock was the main product (new resistant species like 
mangalitsa were raised), partly because the roads were in such a bad 
condition that it took one week to reach Belgrade from Kragujevac and 
this made grain trade expensive, doubling the prices. (The transport 
price of 100 oke grain cost 9 dinars between Smederevo-Belgrade, while 
the local price was 10 dinars). The other reason for the preference of 
animal products in exports was that general price index of meat was 
50% higher in Europe in 1830, than in Serbia (the difference decreased to 
20% in 1890 and 5% in 1910).102 
Although taxes paid to spahis were abolished, state taxation did not 
mean a relief for the peasantry. The differentiated head-tax produced 
more (7 million grosh in 1835), than the tithe earlier.103 On the other 
hand the subsidy paid to the Ottoman state had fallen from 45% of the 
central state revenues to 11% by 1834–38, which was a great difference 
compared to Bulgarian lands.  
The introduction of head-tax triggered the dissolution of zadrugas 
(which also lost their ’defensive’ functions as peace came), because costs 
grew: head-tax increased from 35 to 60 grosh. In Serbia 118 thousand 
zadrugas existed with 1.7 million members in 1886, by 1903 their 
number had been halved. Until the increasing state taxes met with 
increasing export incomes (per capita exports increased from 6.6 dinars 
in 1835 to 34 in 1875, but then stagnated till 1910),104 the problems of the 
old and new structures remained invisible.  
The existence of the okučje or the zadruga or the prevalence of animal 
husbandry became problematic only when demographic pressure met 
with decreasing profits (and the increasing demand of the budget). 
Overpopulation was partly the result of the settling policy of the 
principality offering a 3 year tax exemption and 3 ha of land to each 
newcomer (very small compared to Hungary in the 18th century) to 
increase population number and state revenues (thus 33% of the 
                                                          
102 Bairoch, P.: European Foreign Trade in the 19th Century. Journal of European Economic History 
2, 1973. 20. 
103 Ljušić, R.: Knjezevina Srbija, 51–71. 
104 Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. III. 20–21. 
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population increase reaching 666 thousand between 1835–75 was due to 
settlers).105 Natural reproduction rate was also among the highest in 
Europe. Population increase induced a conflict between grain 
production and animal husbandry. The political stability promoted the 
expansion of ploughlands (while during the instability of Ottoman rule 
pig was preferred as wealth due to its greater mobility). Peasants came 
down from the woodlands of Šumadija to the valleys, and started to 
grow maize for the animals, which were earlier fed on acorns. The 
gradual dissolution of zadrugas which were typically engaged in mixed 
farming also paved the way towards monocultural grain producing 
units more vulnerable to external challenges.106 But the shift to 
monocultural grain production simply does not fit to smallholdings.  
Soon after the shift to grain production the decrease of wheat prices 
meant the next shock to tackle. Side by side with the shrinking revenues 
labour surplus on small farms became extreme – an estate of 5 hectares 
was able to sustain a family of 5 persons, but its cultivation required 
only the workforce of 1.5.107 In western Europe only 15–20% of the 
labour capacity remained unexploited in the 18th century, while in 
Hungary it was 25%, but 45% in Romania! In Serbia a woman worked 
180 days, a man 160, elderly people 70, children 110, while in Europe 
the average was 205 days.108 But only 50 days were spent on the fields 
(see: Rakovica village in 1930), the rest was spent around the house. 
Self-exploitation for economic reasons – to earn more profits – was 
rare in Serbia.109 The reason for this was not inborn lazyness (orthodox 
people had more than 180 religious holidays, when they did not work, 
and this was high compared to the 70 catholic holidays), but rather the 
                                                          
105 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 116. 
106 Although the criticism on the productivity of zadrugas might be true, but their larger estates 
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recognition, that under these technical conditions the land would not produce 
more even if all members of the family spent all days with fieldwork. This 
unutilized labour force was especially significant in zadrugas, as Strausz 
recognized. And as the development of the industrial sector was slow, 
the labour surplus could not be reallocated. 
Thus the economic system built up by Miloš had its own 
weaknesses. The need for cash pushed the peasants toward the loans 
provided by usurers, as there were no banks. The difficulties of 
accumulating wealth in land encouraged investors to invest into trade. 
On the one hand it hindered the accumulation of passive capital in land 
(contrary to Greece where 1000 million drakhmas were invested into 
land compared to the 850 million active capital of which 35% came from 
trade), on the other it increased consumption, although the population 
had low purchase power. It is not surprising that Miloš wanted to keep 
shopkeepers away from villages (there were only 200 in 1852) as he 
calculated with the harmful effects of increasing consumption on self-
sustaining peasant economies,110 and of course also wanted to hinder 
any capital accumulation that might endanger his economic power. 
The dethronement of Miloš resulted in the victory of ustavobraniteli 
and the liberalization of economy (but this went side by side with the 
further centralization of administration). Lands became subjects of 
mortgage, which increased social mobility an made capital 
accumulation possible in agriculture. When Miloš returned and his son, 
Mihailo Obrenović became the ruler, the Minimum Homestead Act was 
reinstalled in order to conserve the existing structure of agriculture. To 
mitigate the increasing land hunger some community lands were 
distributed (1861) among the members of the new generation. In 1873 a 
new law on okučje was issued, but those farms having tax debts towards 
the state were still excluded from the protection, and still many 
practices existed in private sphere to bypass the law.111 Finally, the new 
law of 1898 increased the amount land under protection to 3.5 
                                                          
110 Merchants were rather interested in trade (imports) than in investing into other sectors of 
economy, and within trade imports were preferred to exports (comprador capital). 
111 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 462. 
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hectares/household saving 15% of the peasantry112 from the loss of their 
landholdings. According to the amendments the house and 2000 m2 
could not be mortgaged or confiscated even by the state in case of tax 
arrears. As land fragmentation went on (contrary to the Slovene lands, 
representing a different way of development where smallholdings also 
played a great role, but primogeniture was usual, and where animal 
husbandry – cattle breeding, Alpine milk-production – also prevailed 
owing to geographic circumstances and due to the fact that labour 
surplus migrated or was urbanized) by 1920 42% of the lands in Serbia 
had fallen under this prohibitive law.113 But it still did not mean an 
improvement in general conditions: since indebtedness was usually the 
consequence of the insufficient amount of land or production, this 
measure only took away a possible solution (credits: interest rates were 
maximized in 12% in 1860) instead of solving the problem.  
The problem of okučje, tax arrears and mortgaging (as a 
consequence) is best illustrated by the fact that 87% (20 thousand cases) 
of forced auctions owing to debts between 1850–1909 was executed on 
peasant landholdings, although their share from total debts reached 
only 35% (5.8 million dinars). The average peasant debt in these 
auctions was only 300 dinars (while in case of urban dwellers it was 
2500 dinars), referring to poverty and scarcity of cash. 70% of forced 
auctions in case of peasantry was in connection with tax arrears.114 
Smallholdings under the given circumstances (low technological level, 
great population increase, products with low added value) seemed to be 
unsustainable, but politicians could not work out an alternative. 
The Serbian agrarian model was definitely the opposition of the 
traditional English (or of the transforming Hungarian): it hindered free 
reallocation of labour of labour force and capital accumulation. Such a 
structure could not trigger industrial revolution (that’s why guilds 
survived till 1911, while they were abolished in Hungary in 1872 
                                                          
112 In other words, half of the stratum owning less than 3.5 ha was endangered. Data Petrović, J.: 
Prelaz seljaka u varoši radnike. Belgrade, 1924. 34. 
113 Ibid. 30. 
114 Vučo, N.: Razpadanje esnafa u Srbiji. Vol. II. Belgrade, 1954. 114–15.  
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inducing a migration of artizans from Vojvodina to Belgrade).115 By 1897 
11% of rural population became landless and 55% of farms (160 
thousand families) was smaller than 5 ha.116 Agrarian yields were low: 
in Užice, Pirot and Vranja grain production was only 6 quintals/ha and 
since estates were under 3-4 ha, these regions were unable to sustain a 
family of 6 from grain production without supplementary revenues.117 
Thus, the lack of factories and the isolation of urban guilds forced 
villagers to migrate as itinerant craftsmen (torbari), or to participate in 
household industry, or simply became pečalbari, agricultural wage 
labourers. Approximately 100 thousand males (or 25% of farms) was 
engaged in these activities in Zlatibor (pottery), Nišava (wood-carving, 
pottery, carpet and rug making) and Suva Planina.118 In some regions 
revenues from home industry could reach even 20–25% of the 
agricultural income in the 1860s.119 Of course their work was not 
efficient: Savić claimed that a ropemaker could produce 1000 kgs yearly, 
but as he was engaged in agriculture too, he only produced 60 kgs to 
substitute the missing agrarian income.120 
The urban-rural dichotomy remained significant even after the rule of 
the ’defenders of constitution’. Urban dwellers earned averagely 190 
dinars per capita at current prices in the 1860s, while villagers 112 
dinars. This difference had increased further by 1910 as the nominal 
income of urban dwellers had doubled, while the income of agrarian 
                                                          
115 Vučo, N.: Položaj seljastva. Bd. 1. Eksproprijacija od zemlje u XIX veku. Belgrade, 1955. 
116 Konstandinović, N.: Seljačko gazdinstvo u Jugoslaviji. Belgrade, 1939. 18–19. 
117 The statistics of Sundhaussen show an average output of 6 q/ha of grain in Užice, Pirot and 
Vranja, 7.4 in Niš (while 9.2 in Kruševac). Average landholdings were under 3 ha in Užice, 
Vranja and Toplica and under 4 ha in the mountainous Pirot and Niš. In the latter the 
average household size was 6.8 persons and it was 7.3 in Vranja (compared to the Serbian 
average which was only 6 persons). 3 sown hectares could not produce more than 2 tons of 
wheat, and 7 persons consumed the same amount – without calculating with seeds, animal 
consumption and taxes. In Serbia overpopulation was more important coercive factor than the 
changing external circumstances (unlike in Bulgaria) that motivated structural changes.  
118 Calic, M.-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 105.  
119 In Pirot 7000 people was engaged in ropemaking producing 1.3 million dinars, almost 200 
per family, constituting 25% of the yearly income for a family of 6. But this was ruined by 
the Bulgarian competition after 1878. 
120 Savić, M.: Naša industrija i zanati – njine osnovice, stanje, odnosi, važnost, putevi, prošlost i 
budućnost. Vol. 2. Sarajevo, 1922–1928. 180. 
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population was around 160–170 dinars at current (1910) prices. This also 
means that real income per capita in agriculture decreased from 190 
dinars (expressed in 1911 prices) in 1860 in the next 50 years.121 Serbia 
was even more ruralized than Bulgaria: only 4 % of the population lived 
in settlements over 2000 inhabitants in 1834 and it was 7% in 1863. 25% 
of urban dwellers still earned their living from agriculture.   
Beyond the urban-rural dichotomy differentiation between villages also 
took place. In the rich Belica village 66% of the farmers earned profits 
from animal husbandry (averagely 166 dinars), while in the poor 
Trnava only 31% had incomes from animal husbandry rated to 37 
dinars averagely. Poverty was great: 40% of farmers had no ploughs, 
72% had no carts pulled by horses, 38% lacked beds, 20% even tables.122 
Despite the conservative policy of Miloš, that even hindered the 
establishment of shops in rural areas, the social differentiation of 
peasantry did not stop and this prohibition was soon abolished by the 
supporters of ustavobraniteli to secure the positions of urban layers 
(rural-urban dichotomy). The number of shops increased over 1000.123 
Thus, when the law of 1868 classified the inhabitants into 8 categories 
based on their wealth and income, serving as basis for the taxation, the 
categories for peasantry and urban dwellers were set differently, 
reflecting the significant difference in their wealth. While in Veliko 
Gradište 60% and in Majdanpek towns 80% of households owned more 
than 150 ducats wealth, among the agrarian population of Jagodina 
district this was only 20%. Based on wealth, the poor layers had similar 
shares from both urban and rural population: the proportion of dwellers 
grouped into I-II. tax categories was 50% in the villages, and only a bit 
smaller in towns. The unclassified (exempted) population was 25% in 
rural areas, while only 12–15% in the two towns (figure 3). 
 
                                                          
121 The original value in 1860s was similar to the Bulgarian, but while the latter rather 
stagnated, the Serbian per capita value decreased according to Palairet. 
122 Avramović, M.: Selo u Srbiji, 243. 
123 Markets were small and isolated: the Serbian peasant spent 15 dinars yearly in fairs (70–90 
dinars/family), which is only 15% of the net income of an estate of 5 ha. The main articles 
bought in shops were sugar (87% of peasants bought sugar in local stores), coffee (62%) and 
only 44% bought rice or oil (supplementary foodstuffs). 
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Figure 3. Stratification of peasantry based on wealth and incomes in Jagodina district in 
the 1860s 
 
Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije, 311–13. és Katić, B.: Štruktura stanovništva … 
Despite the rural-urban dichotomy, sectoral differences in welfare 
were not so evident. Though only 9% of agrarian earners was classified 
into the (III–IV.) wealthier tax-category in the mentioned 2 towns,124 but 
people living from agriculture in urban environment were not poorer, than 
artisans. In Veliko Gradište the 164 agrarian families constituting 26% of 
the population owned 28% of the total wealth. This means average 
wealth: industrial workers and craftsmen constituting 23% of tax-payers 
                                                          
124 Katić, B.: Štruktura stanovništva Velikog Gradišta i Majdanpeka. Istorijski Časopis 35, 1988. 119–
31. 
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and owned 20% of the total wealth. Since artisans were not richer than 
agrarian population, this could be another reason why farmers refrained 
from restratification into industry, if having enough land. Merchants 
constituting 15% of the local society were definitely the richest, as they 
owned 40% of properties, similarly to the Bulgarian case.  
Contrary to the differences measured in agrarian wealth, the incomes in 
rural areas were surprisingly similar. Since greater wealth did not produce 
larger agrarian incomes, as proven by the analyis of Jagodina (the average 
wealth dispersed between 50–190 ducats,125 while the deviation of 
average incomes was monthly 5–11 Thalers/family) and Gorna 
Resava,126 this confirms, that peasantry focused on self-subsitence and 
did not produce more than it needed, even if circumstances were given 
to produce surplus (figure 3)! 
 
 
(ii) Borderlands 
 
Croatian lands were composed of at least two different landscapes and 
three administrative systems. The climate and landforms in Slavonia 
(between Drava and Sava rivers) were similar to the Hungarian: cattle, 
grains and wine (Srijem) characterized the region, with numerous non-
allodial large estates (Erdődy-family). Civil Croatia (and even more 
Dalmatia) with its less fertile carstic limestone mountains offered a 
different way of living. The Militärgrenze located along the Ottoman 
border had a special administrative status with a different social 
structure, dominated by orthodox peasant-soldiers (graničari) exempted 
from peasant taxes in return for their compulsory military services. 
The situation in Croatia was somewhat better than in Bosnia, where 
kmets (çiftlik-peasants subjected to landlords) working on 20 ha 
                                                          
125  1 ducat = 50 grosh. 
126 Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije (1834–1867). Belgrade, 2014. 311–13. Village Plažana 
(Gorna Resava) had altogether 8000 ducats wealth, meaning 55 ducats per family, while the 
income was monthly 7.5 Thalers per family. This put the village into the I. category based 
on the wealth, but III. based on income. In Medvedi village a household had averagely 155 
ducats (category III.) but the income was only 8.5 Thalers/month/family, slightly higher 
than in the first example. 
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produced approximately 7 t grains of which only 3.5 remained after 
taxation. (Even the free Muslim smallholder with his only 6 ha could 
not keep more than this.) The local elite of the military borderland, the 
kapetans of graničari earned yearly 720 livre (or 3200 grams of silver) 
from their 60 jutar127 of arable land and 25 kosać days of pasture in the 
18th century, reaching the minimum income of a viable spahi-timar in 
the Ottoman Empire. (It is not surprising that similar structures 
persisted and similar salaries were given along the frontier zone). They 
were allowed to have 20 horses, 30 cows, 20 oxen, 100 sheep. Since 1758 
their salary has been doubled to 58 Ft monthly (1300 livre/year).128 
 
Table 6. Estate sizes among nobility prior to 1848 (sample) 
 
Croatia Slavonia 
Estate size 
in sessio 
Number 
of estates 
% 
Total 
number 
of sessio 
% 
Number 
of estates 
% 
Number 
of 
sessio 
(selište) 
% 
0–3 sessio 17 3.3 73 0.6 0     
 
3–9 218 44.8 915 6 1 2.5 7  0 
9–45 208 40 4472 31 9 23 253 3 
45–90 42 8.1 2531 17.6 5 12.8 308  3.53 
90–180 21 4 2645 18.4 9 23 1215  13.5 
180–270 6 1.2 1356 9.4 4 10.2 924  10.5 
270–360 6 1.2 2077 14.4 1 2.5 285  3.2 
over 360 1 0.2 387 2.7 5 26 5762  65 
Altogether 519 100 14 456 100 36 100 8754 100 
Bićanić, R.: Počeci kapitalizma u Hrvatskoj ekonomici i politici. Zagreb, 1952. 77. 
In Civil Croatia three quarters of the arable land was held under 
feudal titles, but the bulk of this was urbarial, not allodial. The estates of 
poorer landlords (3-5%) were similar to that of the kapetans (reaching 3 
                                                          
127 1 jutar = 1 cadastral hold = 0.5575 ha. Thus it is 33 ha or more than 2 sessio. 
128 Bićanić, R.: Počeci kapitalizma u Hrvatskoj ekonomici i politici. Zagreb, 1952. 58. 
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sessio). 40% of the noble owned between 3–9 sessio129 and another 40% 
between 9–45 sessio (table 6), thus the proportion of noble landlords with 
more than 3 sessio was greater than that of the askeris around Edirne!  
Although the theoretical peasant landholding was said to reach 19 
jutar arable land and 5 jutar pasture in Croatia, while 32 jutar arable 
land and 10 jutar pasture in Slavonia, but if we analyze the distribution 
of peasant economies we may come to the conclusion that 60% of 
producers worked on 30% of land (similarly to Bosnia). This means an 
average of 0.5 sessio/family130 (similarly to Hungary) (table 7) not better 
than around Edirne! In 1850 the zadruga existing here became 
hereditary, but its dissolution was not permitted. This hindered land 
concentration in Croatia.131 
Calculating with 30% fallow, the sown area of a peasant ranged to 13 
jutar (7 ha), producing 5200 kg of grain according to Bićanić. This is 
somewhat better output/ha than measured in Bosnia. But after the 
deduction of the 10% given to the Church, the 10% tithe to the landlord 
and the seed for the next year, the remainder totalled 3200 
kg/household, which was now not much higher than in Bosnia. In 
Croatia 1 jutar arable land produced 22–35 francs income in 1847 (table 
8).132 Compared to the data from the 18th century (12 livre or francs) the 
development is undeniable, but this growth was partly the result of the 
40% price increase and not of the improvements in yield/ha.133 The tax 
was worth altogether 80–140 francs (20%), or the income of 4 jutar: thus 
any difference between Bosnia and Croatia was the result of the better 
still yields or higher prices, but not of the lighter taxes.  
Based on the tax, the income of the nobility can be calculated as well. 
A nobleman with 9 full sessio had only 600–800 francs yearly from the 
lands, while the “bene possessionati” had 8000–14 000 francs. The Count 
                                                          
129 Hypothetic land unit cultivated by 1 peasant workforce unit: one sessio reached 14–22 jutar 
in Croatia and 24–40 jutar (or 12–20 ha) in Slavonia and Hungary. 
130 In Požega or Srijem 50% of landholdings were under 0.5 sessio, while in Zagreb only 33%. 
But in the former case the average sessio size was greater (see previous footnote), 
eliminating the regional differences. 
131 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 68–69. 
132 Or 40–70 francs/ha putting the yield under 1t/ha. 
133 In 1785 10 Kreuzer was worth 3.8 kg in rye and this fell to 2.2 by 1848. 
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Batthyany-estate produced 100 000 francs income, while wealthy urban 
citizens also earned 8000 francs yearly.  
 
Table 7. Average size of Croatian kmet estates (peasant sessio) based on 133 estates in 1847 
Region Sessio Kmets 
Average 
size (in 
sessio) 
0–0.5 sessio 0.5–1 sessio 1–2 sessio over 2 sessio 
kmets 
total 
sessio 
kmets 
total 
sessio 
kmets 
total 
sessio 
kmets 
total 
sessio 
Zagreb 2671 3020 0.86 
1112 
(33%) 
397 
(15%) 
978 
(30%) 
800 
(28%) 
814 
(20%) 
1183 
(34%) 
116 
(4%) 
291 
(12%) 
Varaždin 1017 1477 0.67 
653 
(45%) 
248 
(25%) 
649 
(45%) 
523 
(52%) 
168 
(10%) 
231 
(23%) 
7 
(0.5%) 
16  
(1%) 
Požega 1380 2441 0.6 1244 467 1021 696 175 218 1 2 
Srijem 1382 3530 0.4 3037 980 459 351 31 44 3 7 
Total 6450 10 468 0.6 
6046 
(60%) 
2092 
(30%) 
3107 
(31%) 
2370 
(35%) 
1188 
(12%) 
1676 
(25%) 
127 
(1,2%) 
316 
(5%) 
Bićanić, R.: Počeci kapitalizma, 107. 
Table 8. Regional differences in productivity of 1 jutar (0.55 ha) 
Region 
Yearly 
income  
(in Ft)* 
Price of 
one jutar 
arable land 
(in Ft) 
Output of 
1 jutar 
wheatland   
Output of 
1 jutar rye 
Output of 
1 jutar 
maize 
Return 
rate (in 
years) 
Croatia 17.6 70 12 11 17 4 
Dalmatia 7.4 37 5 5.5 9 5 
Hungary 15.2 61 11–14 9–12 10–15 4 
Vojvodina 18.3 73 14 16 15 4 
Styria 22 110 9.5 9.5 18.5 5 
Moravia 22.3 180 15 13.5 19 8 
Militärgrenze 10.7 43 10 9 20 4 
Bićanić, R.: Počeci kapitalizma… *1 Ft = 2 francs = 10–11 grams silver. 
Southern Hungary (Bácska-Vojvodina, Banat) was almost 
depopulated in the Ottoman era. During the 18th century intensive 
resettlement policy took place encouraged by the Habsburg Empire. 
The proportion of Orthodox population (serving formerly as auxiliary 
troops of Ottomans, later of the Habsburgs,134 also including many 
                                                          
134 In the temporary military district along Tisza and Danube rivers. Koroknai, Á.: Gazdasági és 
társadalmi viszonyok a Dunai és Tiszai határőrvidéken a XVIII. sz. elején. Budapest, 1974. 23-69. 
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refugees from Kosovo) dominating in the 1720s decreased, as the 
Catholic German newcomers (considered as more reliable subjects, than 
Hungarians for example) had received huge parcels and tax exemption 
for three years.135 They were settled as tenants on lands owned by the 
state treasury (their landlord was the state), their large settlements were 
planned by engineers. As a consequence, inequalities in S-Hungary 
were small in 1780 (landless were rated here only to 20%, while in other 
parts of Hungary it was over 35%). Side by side with the general 
enrichment due to the possibilities of extensification, a great change 
took place in landuse and product structure too. In 1720 60% peasant-
soldiers of the Danubian Military Border owned less then 2 ha 
ploughland (which is a small value compared to the peasant-soldiers in 
Croatia) as they were involved in livestock farming and trading-
smuggling.136 By 1767 the average extent of farms exceeded 16 ha, 
higher than in Croatia and Hungary, and land was also more fertile. The 
output per economic units was among the highest as early as in 1720, 
but as economies were also large, the yield/ha was not outstanding.137 
Intensification began only in the second half of the 18th century: the 
growth of taxable population between 1720–1780 was well above the 
country average (the number of tax units increased by 60% vs. 10%) and 
by that time grain yields/ha also became the highest in the country (over 
600 kg/ha).138 Partly to population increase, partly to high soil-fertility, 
crop production won, husbandry retreated: as early as in the 1850s the 
proportion of arable land increased to 65% from total cultivated in 
Southern Hungary (while in other parts of the country this took place 
only in the 1890s).139 Land fragmentation remained low: the average 
                                                          
135 After the initial 3 years of tax exemption expired, the settlers were burdened with indirect 
taxes. Until 1829 the German inflow to the Banat was free, than a limit of 300 forints wealth 
was set, making an end to the migration wave (in Serbia, the migration wave just begun, but 
the land offered for peasants was definitely smaller, thus settlers were also poorer). 
136 Koroknai, Á.: Gazdasági és társadalmi viszonyok, 118–19. 
137 For data see: Magyarország története, Vol. 4/2. Budapest, 1989. 926–85. The chapter on 
agriculture was written by Vörös, K. and Wellman, I. 
138 That time outputs on ’free’ and non-allodial lands was higher (1:4) in Hungary, than in 
allodial lands cultivated by compulsory unpaid corvéé (1:3). 
139 See maps in Historical Geographical Atlas of Hungary for Regional Analysis of Socio-Economic 
Phenomena. Budapest, 2016. Ed.: Demeter, G. (http://www.gistory.hu/g/hu/gistory/gismaps) 
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parcel number per estate was 5-6 (favourable for future mechanization 
and land-concentration), while it was above 10 in other regions. 
During the reign of Joseph II the purchase of state lands became free 
for local inhabitants and soon for noblemen as well. The latter managed 
to oblige peasants to robot (corvéé) and tithe as it was elsewhere in 
Hungary. During the Napoleonic era these services were commutated 
to money, but after the wars and the collapse of grain prices and due to 
the inflatory policy of Habsburgs resulting in the depreciation of coins 
landlords rather required tax and services in form of fieldwork (from 52 
days with animals or 104 days on foot - in case peasants had less than 1 
sessio, the burdens were proportionally smaller). Taxes, dues, attempts 
on redemption and population increase all contributed to the process 
that by the 1840s 50% of the peasants living here had become landless.140 
 
 
(iii) Integration into the imperial division of labour – Hungary  
 
 
In Hungary there had been numerous changes after the liberation from 
Ottoman rule both in production systems and in social patterns and 
processes (migration, land availability, services to landlords).  Despite 
its efforts to consolidate the circumstances and uniformize services and 
burdens, the first centralized regulation in the 1770s did not terminate 
regional diversity in agriculture. The existing diversity was only partly 
due to the differing geographical conditions. In urbanized regions, like 
Vác and Sopron, peasants recognized the significance of crop rotation as 
early as the middle of the 18th century.141 In many places the traditional 
redistribution of lands was abandoned (while it survived in 
Transylvania till the middle of the 19th century), which was a step 
forward to private property (contrary to the Balkan zadruga or obština – 
communal lands), though serfdom itself survived. Nonetheless, 
obligations of peasants were less serious in liberated lands (tax 
exemption, greater farm sizes) due to the low supply of labour force 
compared to overpopulated and furthermore mountainous 
                                                          
140 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 67. 
141 Magyarország története, Vol. IV/2. 931. 
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northwestern Highlands (Slovak regions characterised by low soil 
fertility). Corn began to spread on fallow instead of backyards and as it 
required hoeing: this contributed to the increase of fertility even without 
manuring.142 Tobacco remained the crop of the poor with small amount 
of land (similarly to Macedonia at the end of the 19th century), large 
estates’ share in tobacco production was then insignificant. Former 
soldiers with western experience contributed to the spread of potato, 
which was important in decreasing the threat of famines (for example in 
1772–73) in mountainous regions with low soil fertility. Potato soon 
substituted grains in spirits production, thus grains could be either 
exported to the Cisleithanian parts of the Empire or serve as food for 
areas characterized by shortages.  
Extensivity remained a rational choice on large estates – many of the 
former moors were regulated in the 18th century (the Hanság in Moson 
County, or the Ecsedi-moor in Szatmár County, which was utilized by 
German settlers). However, the old autonomy of Counties hindered 
professional cooperation between the territorial entities, and this often 
caused more harm than benefits. Corn also began to spread on large 
estates as animal fodder for swine (the deforestation during the 
Ottoman period decreased the availability of acorns). Orthodox 
merchants traded with huge amount of livestock, which required new, 
rough species (mangalitsa). These merchants often leased the ’pusta’ 
(villages abandoned during the Ottoman) to feed their animals, which is 
a remarkable change compared to the first decades, when these former 
’mezraa’ were distributed among the local peasant smallholder-serfs still 
small in numbers. Forestry also began to develop – Robinia 
pseudoacacia was planted on quicksand areas in the central part of the 
country by central initiative. As animal husbandry and forestry were to 
cover the central needs of the Empire (for example military purposes, 
warfares), goats and sheep were prohibited from woodlands, and a 30-
year rotational system of clearcuts was implemented in the whole 
country. There were also failed initiatives, like producing cotton, for 
which the climate was inapt (and it remained inapt during the next 
                                                          
142 Ibid. 932. 
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attempt of the communist regime). Horse-breeding also developed 
owing to military needs (Mezőhegyes, Bábolna). Silkworm-breeding 
was abundant in peasant economies, when silk became popular in elite 
circles. Merino sheep appeared especially on large estates to supply 
Bohemian and Moravian textile industry with raw material of better 
quality. After the first attempts in 1773 in Croatia the merino sheep 
husbandry remained prosperous until the arrival of Australian and 
Argentinian wool (1850s).143 
As Hungary became the grain-supplier of Austria, new trends 
occurred in grain-production as well: quantitative approach was 
substituted by qualitative. Thus rye was replaced by wheat, while 
exports declined and internal consumption grew. Though the extensive 
approach was not abandoned and output/ha did not improve, Hungary 
became self-subsistent from grains: famines only occured due to bad 
routes and local climatic anomalies. 
In order to promote the production of surplus and the 
implementation of crop-rotation system the central government 
abolished the tithe paid after fallow if it was cultivated. The state also 
regulated the extent of peasant lands and their obligations towards the 
nobility, but it was unfortunately executed regardless of local 
circumstances. Thus it meant a more strict regulation for the peasants of 
lowlands (formerly occupied by the Ottomans), where earlier a shortage 
of labour force secured better conditions. On the other hand, the 
burdens of peasants in the relatively overpopulated Western and 
Northwestern regions were decreasing after the implementation of the 
changes. These regulations were originally opposed by the nobility, but 
the peasant revolts in Transdanubia in 1765 finally forced the noblemen 
to accept it – but they still found many possibilities to exploit the new 
situation in favour of their interest. These regulations were not 
implemented in Transylvania (as it remained unaffected by the 
mentioned uprising, there had been no coercive factor for the nobility to 
enter into a bargain with the central government), here only proposals 
without any obligation were made by the central government. Thus it is 
                                                          
143 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 69. 
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not surprising, that the average ploughland in a peasant sessio in the not 
so fertile Transylvania was limited in 5 ha, while it was above 10 ha in 
Hungary. (In Transylvania the estate sizes of noblemen were also 
smaller and they wanted to spare the land for their allodium that way, 
while creating circumstances that would force the peasants to work for 
them). This led to the impoverishment of the Transylvanian peasantry, 
thus the outbreak of the Horea-uprising in 1784 was not surprising from 
retrospective approach.  
Furthermore, peasants thought that the new regulations were to set 
up new taxes, thus they admitted less land officially as they really 
cultivated. As the regulations of 1767 were made based on these 
declarations, the peasants became deprived of these unadmitted lands. 
These so-called remanecy-lands were given back to the landlords and 
were either incorporated into the allodial lands producing for markets, 
using cheap labour force based on compulsory work (corvéé, limited 
officially to 2 days/week or 1 day per week in case of the application of 
horsepower) or were leased again to/by peasants, but now for money, 
meaning an extra income for nobility. The third possibility was to 
exploit them as grazing land for merino sheep.  
These meant changes in estate structure as well. For example in Pest 
County 17% of the lands was remanency land belonging to the nobility, 
but used by peasants, while the proportion of sessio (land under direct 
peasant cultivation) reached 48% and allodial lands reached 30% (table 
9). The extent of communal lands decreased very quickly to 5%, while in 
the Balkans these could make up to 30-50% even in the middle of the 
19th century. Peasant lands decreased especially in the central regions, 
while corvéé was increasing. In the western parts of the country corvéé 
reaching 4 days/week on foot decreased remarkably. Thus the average 
peasant landholding was over 0.5 sessio (6 ha ploughland + meadows, 
pastures and garden = 8 ha), which means that there were many 
landless among their lines. The landless were compelled to pay the 
yearly 1 Forint (10-12 grams of silver) regular tax for the landlord, as the 
peasants with land did so, but not the tithe. (Peasants also paid 
originally 10% of their incomes to the Church, but this had decreased by 
that time, ad taxes were paid to the state as well). Their corvéé 
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obligation was only one-third, one-fourth of services delivered by 
peasants with land.  
Regional differences were also remarkable: landless (35% of the 
peasants) were underrepresented in the central and southern part of the 
country (25%) characterized by land surplus. 
 
Table 9. Landuse and distribution of land between productive layers  
(Pest County in the 1780s, in %) 
% Forest Pasture Meadow Ploughland Vineyard Total 
Peasant farms 3.4 55 45 54 96 48 
Community land   20       5 
Landlords' land 
leased to peasants   21 17 20 1 17 
Landlords' land    96.6 6 38 26 3 30 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The substantial decrease in corvéé days after 1767 in the western and 
northwestern regions meant that noblemen did not have enough 
workforce: this threatened with the decrease of incomes, while the 
expenses remained the same, as they wanted to maintain their lifestyle. 
Therefore landlords found illegal ways to secure the surpluses (like 
collecting extra grains), as the punishment for violating the regulations 
was very small (they would rather paid the fine after illegally used 
corvéé, than to abandon this practice). The new system of corvéé itself 
preferred grain production, as wheat required less workdays compared 
to other crops, and work could be concentrated to one period (the 
summer work was very disadvantageous for the peasants, as they had 
to harvest their own grains and the landlords’ also). In the central areas 
animal husbandry managed to keep its positions: 50% of the land was 
used as pasture. This was not typical in the western parts of the country. 
Regarding the composition of revenues and profitability of large 
estates, in Gödöllő (Central-Hungary) 25% of the income of a large estate 
with traditional structure came from feudal services dominated by the 
tithe and corvéé (it could be redeemed by paying money for the 
landlord). 33% of the revenues came from leasing land to peasants or 
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merchants. Allodial incomes (the potential marketable surplus from 
wine, cattle, grains, spirits and beer) constituted 40% of the incomes, but 
in case of wine and grains this came mainly from the tithe and not from 
marketable surplus. Incomes based on tithe and corvéé were the 
cheapest forms of collecting revenues: only 33% of the expenses came 
from here and further 2% from leasing land, while the cultivation of the 
allodial land constituted 66% of the total costs. Thus the profit rate of 
allodial lands was low in these traditional estates. Furthermore, only 
13% of these expenses were recycled into the development and 
maintenance of the economy, while 66% was spent on representation, 
luxury and unprofitable activities, like buildings. On the other hand it is 
also true, that total expenses (owing to the low costs of landlease and 
collecting tithe) still reached only 25% of the incomes, thus even this 
obsolete structure was profitable. 
In other words, incomes from allodial estates reached 40 units, 
expenses were 0.66x25% = 17 units. Income from feudal taxes was 25 
units, costs were 0.33x25% = 8 units. Leased land produced 33 units 
income and no costs. 
 In order to quantify the development between 1720–80 we used a 
regional approach. The distribution of population became more even by 
that time, but differences still did not diminish. The number of tax units 
increased in Central-Hungary, referring to the increase in general 
wealth (and the former overtaxation of western regions). The relatively 
small population number in the central areas and the grain surplus 
resulted in smaller unit prices (table 11). In many of these central 
counties there were no grain markets at all, referring to general self-
subsistence and low profitability. The grain production increased 
remarkably (tripled between 1720–1780, especially in the central plains), 
but the extension of arable lands was even greater (table 12). Thus 
output/ha or output/capita did not increase within this 60 years (the 
data from the two years are slightly comparable, as the extent of fallow 
was unknown). 
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Table 10. Regional distribution of population and tax-unit increase 
 Regions 
1720 
(households) 
1780 (prs) 1720 (%) 1780 (%) 
W and NW-Hungary 99 769 2.1 million 60 50 
Area formerly under 
double taxation 
32 642 1.1 million 20 25 
Central (Ottoman) 
Hungary 
33 452 1.2 million 20 25 
Total* 165 863 4.3 million 100 100 
*Without Transyvania and Croatia. 
 
 Regions 
Tax units, 
1723 
Tax units, 
1780 
% in 
1723 
% in 
1780 
Change 
in % 
W and NW-Hungary 3597 3121 67 58 -13 
Area formerly under 
double taxation 
990 1106 18 21 12 
Central (Ottoman) 
Hungary 
733 1152 13 21 57 
Total 5320 5380 100 100 1 
*Without Transyvania and Croatia. 
 
Table 11. Regional differences in grain prices in 1780 (in Fts/hl) 
 Region Wheat Rye Oat 
W and NW-Hungary 3.77 2.55 1.6 
Area formerly under double taxation 3 2.1 1.1 
Central (Ottoman) Hungary 3 2.1 1.2 
Total* 3.5 2.4 1.4 
*Without Transyvania and Croatia. 
 
Trade showed positive balance despite the double tariff zone (see 
below). Exports (including trade with other parts of the Habsburg 
Empire) reached 11 million Forints (1 florin = 11 grams os silver) yearly 
average between 1767–88, while imports were rated to 9 million Forints. 
The structure of exports showed remarkable changes until the 19th 
century. Agricultural goods kept their share – they constituted 90% of 
the exports and only 15% of imports, – but the 5 most important export 
products (constituting 75% of the agrarian exports) changed over time. 
Cattle as traditional article kept its position (27%), but it was followed 
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by grains (19%) – a new phenomenon. Grain overtook wool exports, 
which was also as new product (13%), the traditional wine and grapes 
(10%) and tobacco (6%, also new). 
 
Table 12. The extension of ploughlands, grain production and per capita outputs 
Ploughlands 1720 (ha) 1780 (ha) 1720 (%) 1780 (%) Increase 
W and NW-Hungary 176 000 760 000 50 43 4.3 
Area formerly under 
double taxation 
63 000 358 000 20 20 5.7 
Central (Ottoman) 
Hungary 
98 000 640 000 30 36 6.5 
Total* 337 000 1 758 000 100 100 5.2 
Grains 1720 (hl) 1780 (hl) 1720 (%) 1780 (%) Increase 
W and NW-Hungary 1 279 000 3 350 000 48 44 2.6 
Area formerly under 
double taxation 
556 000 1 235 000 21 16 2.2 
Central (Ottoman) 
Hungary 
808 000 3 000 000 30 40 2.8 
Total* 2 654 000 7 626 000 100 100 2.9 
Output  
1720 
(hl/ha) 
1780 
(hl/ha) 
1720 
(hl/family) 
1780 ** 
(hl/capita) 
1 hl = 65 
kgs 
W and NW-Hungary 11 5.6 12.9 1.6   (11.2) o 
Area formerly under 
double taxation 
13.5 5.2 17.3 1.1 - 
Central (Ottoman) 
Hungary 
12.2 6.5 24.2 2.6   (18.3) - 
Total* 11.7 6.5 16 1.8   (12.6) - 
* without Transyvania and Croatia, ** output per family in parenthesis: 1 family = 7 persons 
 
The role of Hungary and Transylvania within the economic system 
of Habsburg Monarchy at the turn of the century resembled that of the 
Balkans – but only from certain aspects. The tariff law of 1754 enhanced 
division of labour between Austrian and Hungarian lands by creating a 
double tariff zone, an external and internal one. Tariffs had to be paid 
twice for Hungarian products, if they were to leave the Habsburg 
Monarchy (this was similar in the Ottoman Empire, where gümrük often 
had to be paid between vilayet boundaries as well!), and for foreign 
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import products if they targeted Hungary. This increased export and 
import costs, thus prices too. The tariffs were even increased further by 
30–60% during the Napoleonic Wars, and the export of wheat, wine, 
cattle was banned towards foreign lands to secure the internal needs of 
Austria (this was also similar to the provisionist stance of the Ottoman 
Empire regarding exports before the 1780s). Due to this only 8% of 
exports went and 10% of imports arrived from abroad even in the 1820s. 
The goal of the double tariff zone beyond securing the Hungarian 
foodstuff and industrial raw material for the developing Austrian parts, 
was to also to secure the Hungarian market for Czech and Austrian 
industrial products, while to protect the local industry from the German 
Zollverein. Thus, Czech and Austrian goods paid maximum 5% tariff at 
this internal tariff border, while foreign products paid over 20–30%. Due 
to the protectionist-provisionist policy of Vienna, Hungary did integrate 
into the European economic system, but was a part of the imperial 
economic order.  
 
Table 13. Regional differences in social stratification of peasantry, 1780 
  Region 
Sessio and 
population (%) 
Peasants 
on sessio 
(%) 
Landless 
(%) 
Houseless 
(%) 
W and NW-Hungary 45 / 50 45 48 60 
Area formerly under double 
taxation 
20 / 25 25 29 17 
Central (Ottoman) Hungary 35 / 25 31 22 22 
Total without Croatia and Tr. 100 100 100 100 
 Region 
Average farm 
size (in sessio) 
Peasant 
(%) 
Landless 
(%) 
Houseless 
(%) 
W and NW-Hungary 0.46 64 28 8 
Area formerly under double 
taxation 
0.37 64 31 4 
Central (Ottoman) Hungary 0.51 75 22 5 
 
In order to maintain this system in Hungary, the system of 
production, the obligations of peasants, the relation of peasants to the 
land and to the landlord had to be redefined (1767). This regulation 
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(urbaria) beyond its social aspects and internal consequences discussed 
earlier, also secured the frames of mass production for imperial markets 
– such as the increasing length of state roads (770 kms in 1790 and 1770 
kms in 1850) were to do so. Prior to this overall regulation peasants paid 
their services in cash or in crop instead of corvéé in the central parts of 
the country, while corvéé (robot) was dominant only in the western 
parts of the country near the Viennese markets. 
The consequences of these two measures (the urbaria and the double 
tariff zone) are still debated in literature as many claimed that the tariff-
system and the division of labour contributed to the de-industrialization 
of Hungary. Although the Hungarian exports of processed goods 
increased by 75% between 1831–46, the 2.7 million francs was still low 
(cca. 3-5% of exports) compared to the doubling imports reaching 85 
million francs.144 Food and raw materials still constituted 85% of exports 
in the 1830s. On the other hand, exports exceeded imports by 15–30% 
not only between 1767–89, but the balance remained positive until the 
1840s, and agrarian exports have doubled in value during the second 
half of the 18th century (from 10 to 25 million forints), exceeding the 
value of Hungary’s contribution to the imperial budget (table 14).145 
Many claimed that Hungary could have sold his wheat and wool at 
distant markets, but the truth is, that unless extreme circumstances 
existed (Napoleonic Wars and the Western subsistence crisis in 1810–
17), the transport of these goods had been very expensive prior to the 
revolution of transportation. It is not surprising that grain production 
(and as a consequence, large allodial landholdings) characterized only 
the area supplying Vienna. The distant Hungarian regions were able to 
export only non-perishable articles with high added value (like wine) or 
livestock146 that time, but not grain. Although the per capita grain 
production had exceeded 300 kgs by 1800 (table 15), the country could 
not tackle its local famines (Maramureş) owing to the bad infrasturcture.  
                                                          
144 Magyarország története, Vol. 5/1. 266. 
145 Gyimesi, S.: Utunk Európába. A magyar és az európai gazdaság viszonya a honfoglalástól a 20. 
század elejéig. Budapest, 1999. 73. (2 francs = 1 forint).  
146 Gunst, P.–Veliky, J.–Velkey, F.: Polgárosodás és szabadság. Magyarország a 19. században. 
Debrecen, 1999. 34.  
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Another argument is that the tariff zone did not protect Hungarian 
grains from the competition of the Galician or Russian wheat, especially 
after the construction of Kaiser Ferdinand Nordbahn, that decreased 
transport costs – while Hungary lacked railways prior to 1845 and 
shipping was slow.147 But the truth is that Hungary was able to cover 
only 35% of the raw material needs of Austria in the beginning of the 
19th century (the remainder came from elsewhere even without the 
existence of the mentioned railway line) and received only 45% of its 
exports,148 while Austria’s share was over 90% from the Hungarian 
export-import. This relationship was asymmetric, typical for center-
periphery relations. 
 
Table 14. Hungarian trade with the Habsburg Monarchy 
 (in million francs, representing 90% of the total trade of the country) 
Yearly averages  Exports Imports 
1789 24 18 
1819–28 75 63 
1840–46 110 100 
 
From macroeconomic aspects the Habsburg Monarchy expected (1) 
the increase of central revenues from this policy. (Hungary did not pay 
indirect taxes after consumption, since the Hungarian nobility was 
exempted from taxation, while self-subsisting peasants hardly 
purchased anything – and the tariff zone was ’justified’ to compensate 
this).149 Further goals were (2) the integration of the Empire – promoted 
by the division of labour –, and (3) to catalyse industrial revolution 
(Czech textile and glass). But an integration effort based on the 
emphasis of borders and diverging economic structures seemed to be 
paradox indeed and failed in 1848.  
                                                          
147 It took 3 weeks to reach Vienna from Buda prior to the era of steamships, that reduced the 
time for 2-3 days. 
148 Gyimesi S.: Utunk Európába, 73. 
149 Gunst, P.–Veliky, J.–Velkey, F.: Polgárosodás és szabadság... The net income of the state was 50 
million forints and only 20% of this was provided by Hungary, while constituting 42% of 
the Empire’s population. 
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It is true that – beyond functional similarities – there were also 
remarkable structural differences between the Balkan and Central-
European practices. Hungarian goods were not sold at fixed prices, 
even if were not allowed to leave the tariff zone. Thus landlords were 
able to earn profits during the Napoleonic prosperity. This era meant a 
great change compared to the end of the 18th century, when securing 
autarchy was the main goal of economic policy. Prior to the Napoleonic 
turn only the large landholdings of Transdanubia and state lands 
produced surpluses directly to markets: the allodial lands (demesne) of 
the Festetich family increased tenfold between 1740–90. It was precisely 
these noblemen living near the Viennese markets who urged the 
changes in 1767 stressing the corvéé instead of services paid in kind or 
cash, while noblemen in the other parts of the country sold only the 
collected tithe on the markets with no intention to increase marketable 
surpluses. For example in the distant Zemplén County only 28% of 
lands was allodial, in Pest County, nearer Vienna it increased over 45%. 
The Napoleonic increase in demand initiated a radical change: allodial 
production began to increase against peasant production on the sessio:150 
in Gödöllő (near Pest) the size of the allodial estates increased fourfold 
within 20 years.151 This was the opposite what happened in the 
Romanian principalities (also characterized by large estates): here the 
tithe was increased, thus allodial lands were distributed among 
shareholders. 
But some of the allodial lands were not utilized as manors, but were 
rather re-leased to peasants under heavier conditions as originally 
(censual lands) to extract more revenue. In 1780 in Zemplén 33% of lands 
cultivated by peasants belonged to this type.152 Thus several parallel 
processes existed in the agriculture: one was characterized by the 
extensification of production, deprivation of land from peasants in order to 
create allodial estates (similar to the Bosnian beglik, Mediterranean 
latifundiums, etc.). Here the production was secured by corvéé, which 
was very cheap, but rather inefficient, although that way the peasant 
                                                          
150 Magyarország története… Vol. 5/1. 325. 
151 Gyimesi, S.: Utunk Európába… 72. 
152 Ibid. 
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could be excluded from competition for markets. Another variation of 
extensive economies was based on the collection of revenues in kind 
from peasants (similarly to the practices in Balkan çiftliks and Romania), 
the third was the same based on collecting cash (this form encouraged 
peasants to market the surplus). 
A general sign of the extensification was the increase of arable lands 
and pastures against forests: in the middle of the 19th century 250 
thousand ha of woodland was transformed. As a consequence of 
deforestation floods, gullying and soil erosion was regularly mentioned 
in hilly regions as threats remaining unhandled at the end of the 18th 
century.153  
 
Table 15. Grain production and exports, animal population and wool production of 
Hungary, 1789–1848 
 Year 
Grain 
production 
(1000 tons) 
Grain exports 
(1000 tons, %) 
In million 
francs 
Prices in 
francs/t 
Per capita 
grain 
output 
1798 2325 93 (4%) 4.6 50 270 kgs 
1831–40 4185 190 (4.5%) 26 136 370 kgs* 
Magyarország története, vol. 5/1. 270.     2.7–4 million ha sown area. * Compare to table 11 (ch. 4). 
 Year Cattle (1000) Pig (1000) Sheep (1000) Horse (1000) 
1789 2396 (260)*     451 
1819 2321 3000 6000 700 
1845 4800 (390)* 4000 (295)* 18 000  1000 
*() Animals per 1000 persons in brackets. 
 Year 
Wool 
production 
(1000 t) 
Wool exports 
(1000 t and %) 
Unit price in 
francs 
Wool 
output/sheep 
1809 13 440  n.a  n.a. 2 kgs 
1822–27 9240  n.a. 1000 1.53 kg 
1842–44 21 000 13 160 (60%) 2100 1.2 kgs 
 
                                                          
153 Data from: Takács, P.–Udvari, I.: Zemplén megyei jobbágy-vallomások az úrbérrendezés korából, 
Vol. I-III. Nyíregyháza, 1995, 1996, 1998. and Csorba, Cs.–Tóth, P. (eds.): A Mária Terézia kori 
úrbérrendezés 9 kérdőpontos vizsgálatai. Borsod, 1770. Miskolc, 1991.  
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The other process was to modernize the estate based on intensification,154 
through the implementation of new species, crop-rotation, enhancement 
of knowledge and the application of wage-earners. But modernization 
concerning the composition of products was not necessary until the 
demand for traditional products remained high (table 15). 
Prior to the Napoleonic era 50% of the exports came from livestock 
while only 4% of grain production was ’exported’ in broad terms. 
Despite this, the increase of allodial lands due to the growing wheat 
demand meant that grazing lands were turned into arable lands: this 
resulted in a decrease in the proportion (but not in the value) of 
livestock exports in the next decades. The continental blockade from 
1806 increased the role of domestic sugar beet production and 
revitalized the Levantine trade as well. After 1815 things have changed 
a little, the demand on grains and sugar beet decreased, and the export 
of wool became prosperous in order to supply the western industrial 
revolution with raw material. The wool export of the 1840s was equal to 
the total wool production in 1809 (under war prosperity!) or 66% of the 
production in the 1840s, thanks to the doubling prices (from 1 franc/kg 
to 2 francs). This enhanced the landuse conflict further between crop 
producers and animal husbandry.155 As a result of this conflict, wool 
output per sheep began to drop, while total production still grew and – 
until prices began to decrease – exports also increased due to the lack of 
local processing industry.156 The prosperity of Hungarian wool ended 
when the Australian and Argentinian wool flowed the markets in the 
1850s, lowering the prices, and giving a good opportunity to wheat 
porducers to increase their influence. 
The favourable conditions for wheat exports did not end with the 
Napoleonic prosperity. The price of wheat tripled between 1798–1840 
                                                          
154 The first agricultural high-school, the Georgicon was established in 1797 in Keszthely.  
Gunst, P.–Veliky, J.–Velkey, F.: Polgárosodás és szabadság, 35. 
155 Ibid., 37. 
156 This process was unfavourable for the economy as recognized by the statistician Elek Fényes 
in the 1850s. He argued, that the balance of trade could have been +20 million instead of the 
measured +8 million (total exports reached then 50 million), if processing industry had 
operated, and the country had exported processed products instead of exporting raw 
material and buying back end-products. 
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(still prior to the great prosperity between 1840–1870), grain production 
has doubled (per capita output reached 370 kgs,157 well above the 
personal needs), such as exports. But still only 5% of the production was 
exported, which rather refer to the fact that the country hardly had any 
marketable surplus, than to decreasing demands (the wheat targeted 
Viennese markets and not France of Britain protected by tariffs after 
1816). The fivefold increase of export incomes was rather based on the 
favourable prices than on the broadening of marketed quantity, and this 
had serious consequences after the 1870s. 
The decline of wool did not mean a dropback for husbandry in 
general. Between 1803–15 the price of pigs tripled (partly due to the 
depreciation of banknotes, partly to the increasing demand).158  The 
number of livestock grew further after the end of the Napoleonic 
prosperity (table 15), despite the rivalry between the region and the 
Balkans. (The number of pigs showed the smallest increase: it was only 
25% as the result of the Serbian exports). Wine production increased 
from 9 to 14 million hl between 1809–47, and 25% of this production 
was exported. Finally, tobacco production also doubled from 16 000 to 
32 000 tons, and 50% of this was exported. As an interference of the 
external processes and the tariff system Hungary had 4 main export 
products in the 1820s: wool (30 million francs), grain (25 million), 
livestock (12 million) and wine (table 15). 
*** 
In Hungary 90% of the population earned their living from agriculture 
in the beginning of the 19th century. By 1910 this decreased to 62%. The 
extensification (as a result of the changes in external circumstances and 
the regulations of 1767) caused an already discussed landuse conflict 
between peasantry and nobility competing for revenues.  
More than 0.5 million noblemen lived dominantly from agriculture. 
In Transylvania their number was 0.1 million. Their social 
differentiation was significant regarding both welfare and occupation. 
The Esterházy-family had more than 100 000 hectares, other aristocrats 
(magnati), like the Count Széchenyi family had 50 000. The elite of the 
                                                          
157 It was 3 tons on 5 ha – to make it comparable with Balkan values. 
158 Magyarország története, Vol. 5/1. 248. 
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countryside was called “bene possessionati” (Kölcsey, Lónyai, Szemere, 
Deák, Beöthy and Tisza families). The Count Tisza family had 5000 ha, 
while 90% of the nobility owned nothing beyond the title (armalists) or 
had only 1 or 2 sessios. Although nobility was differentiated in economic 
sense, it was united in terms of law until 1836, when tax was levied on 
those noblemen who were sitting on peasant sessio or had less then 2 
peasants. This meant the dilution of the ’one and the same freedom of 
nobility’. When taxation became general in 1848, these layers were 
compensated by granting them the right of voting regardless of their 
wealth (in order to win them for the cause of modernisation, since they 
tended to behave conservatively after taxes had been imposed on them).  
Peasants cultivated (but not owned) 70% of the land in Hungary, (in 
Transylvania they 0.9 million ha out of the 3.7 million ha was worked 
by them).159 The aggregate number of days spent on corvéé reached 35 
million, and peasants paid more than 26 million francs yearly tax (this 
amount was similar to the contribution of Hungary to the imperial 
budget in the beginning of the 19th century, or it meant 40 francs per 
family head). In Transylvania the tax/economic unit was even 30% 
higher. This definitely means that the share of peasants from the 
production was smaller, than their proportion from the total 
population. The average size of peasant landholdings in the 1840s was 5 
ha arable land160 (less than 4 hectares in Transylvania), with large 
regional disparities: in the northernmost part of the country 1 sessio was 
officially 10 ha, while in the more fertile south this could be even 25 ha 
(Banat). This also means that significant fragmention took place 
between 1767–1848: serfs averagely cultivated half of a sessio (although 
they were allowed to rent other, censual or remanency lands). Peasants 
had no more than 2 million hectares at their own disposal around 1800: 
due to extensification this had increased to 3.5 million ha by 1848, but 
the number of sessios also increased by 66% (from 190 to 313 thousand), 
thus unit sizes did not increase.161 After the reforms of 1848 former serfs 
obtained 40% of the land in Hungary and 20% in Transylvania, while 
                                                          
159 Gunst, P.–Veliky, J.–Velkey, F.: Polgárosodás és szabadság, 47. 
160 To this the grazing land used jointly by the community or the landlord had to be added. 
161 Gyimesi, S.: Utunk Európába, 95. 
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constituted more than 70% of the population. Since the proportion of 
land units under 10 ha was still around 20–30% in 1900 in Hungary, one 
may conclude that the living standards of peasantry depended mainly 
on prices and technological advance, since the bulk of land was 
obtained by the former landlords. 
In Hungary the traditions of peasant market production did not fade 
away (peasants were competing for markets since 1514). Especially the 
inhabitants of oppids (600 towns inhabited by serfs paying the tax to the 
landlord collectively, approximately 1 million people, or 10% of 
peasants) who lived under better circumstances, were able to produce 
surplus and market products. The towns of the Plains (Debrecen, 
Kecskemét, Cegléd, Szeged) paid their duties to the landlord in cash (or 
soon received the status of free royal towns and became exempted from 
taxes paid to landlords), thus they commanded their own labour force 
and time. Szarvas and Nyíregyháza paid more than 2 million francs to 
their landlords in the 1840s to redeem their duties forever. This was a 
rare case: only 2% of the land used by peasants managed to get rid of 
duties and services and became real private property prior to 1848. 
Redemption before 1848 referred to the welfare of the community.162 
Others were not so lucky. Fragmentation of peasant estates is 
confirmed by the fact, that the proportion of landless cotters reached 
50% by 1848 within peasantry (similarly, in 1900 50% of the farmers had 
less then 2.5 ha, thus the situation did not ameliorate significantly in the 
next 60 years). 0.7 million persons were applied on allodial estates as 
labourers and thus were in personal dependence from the landlord.  
Beyond differences within and between classes, the regional 
disparities were also not negligible. The most profitable lands (more 
than 36 Kreuzer profits on 0.2 ha) were located along the Danube and in 
the Banat, in the Hajdúság and in Borsod and Heves counties. No 
profits were measured in the northeastern part of the country, and 0–12 
Kreuzer was measured in Croatia, Slavonia and the Partium (W-
Transylvania).163 In Transyvania the extent of arable land/person 
decreased under 0.5 ha as early as in 1815, resulting in a migration 
                                                          
162 Gunst, P.–Veliky, J.–Velkey, F.: Polgárosodás és szabadság,  41–43. 
163 Magyarország története, Vol. 5/1. 348. 
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during the subsistence crises.164 Pasture per peasant family was under 1 
ha, while on the Plains it exceeded 2 ha.165 It also means that highlander 
peasants did not have enough fodder to feed their draft animals, 
furthermore in the less fertile mountainous areas (only 10 % of the 
cultivated land was of good quality in Transylvania) 4-6 oxen were 
needed for ploughing, while on the Plains 2 was enough. Slovakian and 
Rusin peasants of the hilly regions in Zemplén County had less than 
1/2–1/4 sessio, while suffered from soil erosion in hills and floods in 
valleys at the end of the 18th century, so dire necessity compelled them 
to work as harvesters in summer on the Great Plains.  
The society of noblemen was differentiated in Transylvania: only 21 
(0.5 %) had more than 1000 serfs, 3200 (85%) had less than 50, 422 had 
between 50–500 serfs. These circumstances hindered the intensification 
of production and capital accumulation, while the surplus to be 
marketed remained small. Production was inefficient: the allodial land 
was usually small and dispersed: 15% of total allodial lands was on 
small parcels (0.5 ha per village!). Only 15% of noblemen had their land 
concentrated in one village.  
Therefore market processes could not be general. In the beginning of 
the 19th century three types of landlords existed. The first collected the 
services from serfs in cash or kind, let the serf lease the remanency lands 
instead of attaching these to their allodial estates. As their allodial land 
remained small, corvéé was not preferred. This was characteristic for the 
nobility in ’Tiszántúl’ owing to the bad traffic possibilities prior to the 
great river regulations. The poorer noblemen or landlords of 
Transylvania also refrained from using corvéé (using corvéé was the 
second type of behavior) and the marketization of surpluses. Here the 
colonicatura, the arable land of serf was usually greater than the allodial 
lands between 1792–1818.166 
The third type was not only prone to land concentration, depriving 
peasants from any land surplus, but also shifted from corvéé to paid 
labour. Early in the 1840s in Keszthely (Transdanubia), 50% of the 
                                                          
164 Ibid. 327. 
165 Ibid. 329. 
166 Magyarország története, Vol. 5/1. 332. 
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works on the Festetich-estates were carried out as paid labour. These 
noblemen reinvested their profits into land or buildings, or lent it for 
interest, but still did not pay attention to invest into industry. They 
propagated extensification even when wheat prices fell, in order to 
compensate their losses, and turned pastures into arable land (South-
Transdanubia) first after the collapse of wool prices (1850s), then after 
the decline in grain prices (in the 1870s). While in case of the former 
event many were able to react successfully to the challenge by 
transforming their farms, in the latter case they failed to give an 
adequate answer: the response was further extensification without 
landuse changes, producing a vicious circle.  
The story of these large holdings is full of turns. Though after the 
1770s remanency lands were often attached to allodial holdings, many of 
these landlords leased the expropriated lands to peasants for a certain 
share of the crop or extra corvéé in the 19th century again. The reason for 
this was that while during the Napoleonic prosperity it was worth 
demanding labour (to produce more and to deprive peasants of surplus, 
thus excluding them from competition), after 1815 due to inflation and 
the contraction of markets this strategy – maximizing the amount of 
wheat from allodial estates – was not profitable any more, and 
alternative income sources had to be taken into consideration. As the 
conditions were not unbearable for the leaseholder peasant, many of the 
declassed-landless peasants paid for the land to cultivate it. So, statistics 
stating the general impoverishment of peasantry prior to 1848 do not 
always reflect the reality, first because the country average was cca. 0.5 
sessio per peasant even in the 1780s (as was in 1848), second, because 
the remanency land cultivated by peasants was not counted in these 
statistics! 
In the 1820s the extent of pastures began to increase owing to the 
wool-hunger of Czech textile-industry. The Esterházy-estates had more 
than 150 thousand sheep. The traditional Hungarian racka sheep was 
substituted by western merino species giving more wool: the number of 
racka fell to one-third in Sárospatak, while on the Hunyady estate (S-
Transdanubia) the number of western sheep increased from 4000 to 20 
thousand. New methods to wash the wool were also developed on the 
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Wesselényi-estates (the output was 4 oke of unwashed or 1 oke of 
washed wool/sheep, similar to the values in the Balkans). But in 
Western Slovakia sheep were still raised for their flesh, milk, cheese and 
skin, while ethnic Germans rather focused on wool. 
Some of these large landholdings began to modernize the cultivation 
methods as well. The Festetich estates in Keszthely used a 10-year crop 
rotational system early in 1799 (this means less than 10% fallow). After 
the foundation of the Georgicon – established by the Festetich landlords 
in 1797 in Keszthely providing experts and space for experiments – a 
second modern agrarian high school was established in 
Mosonmagyaróvár on the estate of Habsburg princes in Moson County. 
While in 1720 only 27% of the villages used a three-year rotation system 
with fallow, by 1828 this increased to 66%.167 Two-year rotational 
system was used by 45% of the settlements in 1720, this decreased to 
24% in 1828.168 Thus, the proportion of fallow also decreased to 35% by 
1828 (while it was around 45-50% in Bulgaria that time). Western crop 
rotational systems were adapted on the estates of Prince Karl in 
Magyaróvár, Count Széchenyi in Nagycenk, Count Batthyány in 
Ikervár. On the other hand, according to the conscription of 1828 still 
only 1% of villages exploited fallow land by producing crops, the most 
frequent utilization of fallow remained animal husbandry, which 
provided the essential manure as well. The regional shortage of manure 
often hindered the transformation of fallow: in Transylvania manure 
was used only in every 14 years instead of the normal 5-7 years because 
of shortages. The reason for the small proportion of sown fallow was 
not only the low level of agriculture,169 but also that landlords retained 
the right to collect the tithe from here as well between 1806–36 (earlier 
these were tax-free lands). Contrary to peasants who – in order to 
replenish organic matter – began to plant potato in fallow lands (this 
was rare on the Balkans), landlords rather tended to utilize fallow as 
pasture. In order to get higher outputs fallow was tilled thrice before 
                                                          
167 In Transylvania the 3-year crop rotational system dominated only 47% of villages in 1815. 
168 Magyarország története, Vol. 5/1. 340. 
169 Maize was initially sown in fallow land as a step to exceed the level of the three-year crop 
rotation system, but this was often hindered by the landlords. 
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sowing. Alfalfa was sown on fallow land, which – beyond being fodder 
– also contributed to the replenishment of Nitrogene content in the soil. 
Another sign of modernization (and diversification) was the spread 
of sugar beet (on the Jósika-estates) or the rape (in Csákigorbó), 
referring to the fact that the interaction between industry and 
agriculture – as conditio sine qua non of industrial revolution – had just 
begun. Tobacco became popular again during the era of continental 
blockade, when the Virginian tobacco was excluded from Europe. The 
extent of peasant vineyards also increased by 13% between 1770–1813: 
in Croatia (Fruška Gora) this increase exceeded 20% between 1804–17. 
The demand on wine also increased owing to the wars. Intensive ways 
of wine-growing as well as new species occurred. 
Iron ploughs appeared not only in the western part of the country 
close to the Viennese markets, but in Central-Hungary (Heves, the 
Kunság and Jászság). These required less draft power, while tilled the 
land deeper, which was especially important in case of dry soils or 
economies lacking enough draft animals. Sickles were substituted by 
scythes: the latter was 4 times more efficient. In Munkács and in Pest the 
first thresher-factories were built, threshing machines started to 
substitute horses. 
It is not surprising therefore that yields were improving. But they 
were still not significantly better than outputs in the Balkans. While in 
the 17th century the output ratio was 3.5:1, in the 1840s it increased to 
4:1, in other words 225 kgs of seed sown on 1 ha produced 0.9 tons/ha.170 
In Austria this level was exceeded as early as in 1790, while in 
Mecklenburg the output ratio was 8:1 even in 1750, then 12:1 in the 
1840s. The reason for the lag can be explained partly by the difference 
between the effectiveness of allodial and peasant production: for 
example, the rye output was 3 times greater in allodial lands.  
Stalling became more frequent in the country – formerly oxen in the 
Great Plains were kept on the fields even in winter and exported as 
livestock or used as draft animals. In Transylvania transhumance 
prevailed. Contrary to these, in regions, where stables and stalling 
                                                          
170 Magyarország története, Vol. 5/1. 347. 
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became dominant, cattle were mostly kept for their milk, cheese and 
butter – these products were sold at the urban markets, especially in 
Vienna – but not for flesh. This was the most profitable form of utilizing 
cattle: in 1828 the profit/cattle was measured the highest in Western-
Transdanubia and in Heves and Szolnok Counties – in regions where 
milk production dominated. In the center of the country horses were 
used as draft animals instead of oxen – partly because these could 
participate in transportation in these regions distant from markets.171 
From military purposes horse-breeding was also of key importance: the 
activity of Count Széchenyi therefore was welcomed by Austrian 
politicians as well. 
 
 
(iv) Quantification of grain production and its distribution 
between social strata – Hungary  
 
As grains began to overshadow animal products in the 19th century, it 
is worth investigating the distribution of grain production between 
different social strata and the role of local and external markets in the 
redistribution of production and profits. A similar study is carried out 
for Bulgaria as a comparison in the next chapter, but the results are 
hardly comparable, due to the many problems regarding the reliability 
and the quantification of data in both countries. 
Although Hungary appeared as an exporter (furthermore, a net 
exporter indeed, as it exported more grains, than imported) in ’external’ 
grain markets, this did not imply automatically, that it had enough 
grains to feed its population. Even a country with a positive grain balance 
(producing more than demanded), could suffer from internal shortages, if 
production was unevenly distributed between the different social strata and 
regions, or price trends/purchase power favoured exports rather than internal 
marketing. The positive grain balance in Hungary was composed of the 
balance of allodial production and the balance of peasant production. 
While allodial estates showed evident surpluses (the production largely 
                                                          
171 Ibid. 353. 
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exceeded the consumption needs of the owners) and thus most of the 
grain exports stemmed from these estates of the nobility, this still could 
imply a deficit in peasant grain production, if peasants had insufficient 
land at their own disposal. Furthermore, this hypothetic grain deficit 
can be true either for only few or for all peasant strata; and it could 
show territorial patterns as well: deficits can be local, regional or valid 
for the total territory of the country. Local and regional shortages would 
imply the great role of internal markets in grain redistribution and also 
a competition between export and internal markets. On the other hand, 
if peasants had surpluses, they could also participate in exports, 
although this was not encoureged by the authorities: a report from 1794 
argued, that peasant participation in foreign trade would deteriorate 
their taxability, therefore we may suppose that they rather appeared on 
internal markets.172 
In order to analyze these processes and to quantify them (1) the 
volume of internal trade was compared to the exports; (2) the 
proportion of peasant grain production was measured to grains coming 
from large estates. (3) The surplus of peasantry (and the distribution of 
surplus between peasant layers, including the question of viable estate 
size) and (4) the average output/hectare of smallholdings compared to 
large estates is also discussed, (5) as well as the changes in social 
stratification of peasantry and (6) the surplus ratio on allodial estates. 
Glósz claims, that grain balance was fragile prior to the 1840s and 
outputs neither increased quickly, nor constantly, thus any increase in 
exports (which constituted only 5% of the production prior to the 1840s, 
while in Bulgaria this could reach 30% after the great turn) supposed a 
decrease in internal markets. Thus the prioritization of exports indirectly led to 
a deterioration in intraregional food redistribution and division of labour, 
invoking an increasing influx of population from the highlands (suffering from 
grain shortages) to the plains. In order to test this hypothesis it is worth 
analyzing the distribution of grain production and demands of the 
different social classes (nobility, urban population, peasantry) and the 
internal stratification of producers.  
                                                          
172 Glósz, J.: A birtokviszonyok hatása Magyarország gabonamérlegére a 19. század első felében. In: 
Eszmék, forradalmak, háborúk. Vadász Sándor 80 éves. ELTE, Budapest, 2010. 207. 
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In order to do this, first we have to calculate the distribution of 
arable land between peasants and nobles. The estimations differ: in the 
1850s 58% of cultivated area (including forests) was owned by the nobles, 
32% was freed from servage after 1848, and further 8% was free peasant 
estate prior to 1848 according to Galgóczi. Contrary to this, Wellmann 
puts the proportion of cultivated lands worked by peasants to 60%, while 
Orosz stated that 70% of the arable lands was cultivated by peasant-serfs, 
10% was owned by towns and only 25% was allodial large estate in 
1848. In my opinion, there’s no contradiction, as everybody above used 
different measurement units. Galgóczi mentions the structure of 
ownership after the land reforms, Wellman spoke about land worked 
(but not owned) by peasants (including leased land), while Orosz wrote 
only about arable land, and since forests were also abundant among 
allodial large estates, this could explain the high proportion of land 
owned by nobility given at Galgóczi. 
It is generally accepted, that at the end of the 18th century only 33% 
of the cultivated land was considered as sessio173 cultivated by peasants 
for their owns needs, while they constituted the majority of society.174 
This means (compared to Galgóczy’s data) that peasants were unable to 
acquire substantial land beyond their sessios during the reforms after 
1848. Our calculations for 1865 show that 75% of the total cultivated 
area was smallholding175 (although this category includes not only 
peasantry, but the lower strata of nobility too), and large estates reached 
25% (table 17b in chapter III). (Knowing that in 1767 50% of the sessios – 
ranging to 33% of the cultivated land – belonged to large estates over 
1000 hold owned by the nobility, one may put large estates to 40% of the 
cultivated land). 
Patterns showed a regional variation: in Heves and Győr Counties 
arable lands on sessios were estimated to 50% of the total cultivated 
ploughlands, while in Sopron and Moson Counties in the West this was 
                                                          
173 Economic and tax unit of peasantry showing a regional versatility in size, but usually 
considered 32 cadastral hold or 17 hectares. 
174 Wellmann, I.: A mezőgazdaság a felvilágosult abszolutizmus korában. In: Ember, Gy.–Heckenast, 
G. (eds.): Magyarország története 1686–1790. Budapest, 1989. 931–84. Fónagy, Z.: Nemesi 
birtokviszonyok az úrbérrendezés korában I-II. Budapest, MTA BTK, 2013.  
175 Under 5-6 ha. 
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85% even in the beginning of the 19th century. At the end of the 18th 
century a very diverse picture could be observed even within a smaller 
area: the arable land of the sessios ranged from 30 to 90% at settlement 
level in Zemplén (see map 1).176 
This meant, that prior to 1848 some 13.5 million hold arable land + 
meadows were used as sessios,177 some 2.1 million hold of ploughland 
was cultivated by other tax-payers (urban dwellers, lower nobility, 
landless peasants) while 5.7 million hold was considered allodial estate, 
worked by the corvéé of peasants (and daily wage labourers after 1848). 
If we accept the calculations of Glósz, putting the output of 
smallholders to 10 pm/ha and the output of the allodial estates to 13 
pm/ha (including fallow and supposing similar landuse for these 
layers), this means, that 25-33% of the grain was produced on allodial lands 
constituting 20-25% of the arable lands owned by less than 5% of the 
population (nobility).178 Thus (1) the relative productivity of large estates was 
some 30% better, than of smallholdings, (2) and the evident population 
growth from 4 to 8 million (without Croatia) between 1720–1780 put the 
pressure especially on peasantry. Was the number of sessios enough to 
sustain the growing population? If the extent of cultivated lands had not 
increased, the ’hypothetic’ per capita ’grain output’179 for the peasantry 
would have been halved between 1720-85 (as yields did not improve). 
But the extent of sessios cultivated by peasants also increased from 5 
million hold to over 11 million between 1767–1850. The number of sessios 
also grew from 193 000 to 313 000 side by side with the population 
increase. This also implied, that contrary to the marxist claims, the 
average landsize/serf family did not decrease (on the other hand, the number 
of peasants with less than 0.25 sessio significantly increased!). As the 
number of peasants (families) having some land increased from 430 to 
540 thousand, the average unit size increased modestly from 0.5 to 0.6 
sessio from 1767 to 1848 according to Varga,180 while Galgóczi and S. 
                                                          
176 Data from: Barta, J.: Ha Zemplín vármegyét az útas visgálja, I-II. Debrecen, 2009, 2015. 
177 While it was only some 5 million in 1767. 
178 The majority did not have large estates. 
179 Including meadows income converted to grain equivalent. 
180 Varga, J.: A jobbágyi földbirtoklás típusai és problémái. Budapest, 1967. 110–31. 
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Sándor181 speaks about stagnation regarding average unit sizes (table 
18). As 1 sessio then meant averagely 32 holds (15 hectares), this meant 14 
and 18 holds arable land and meadows per serf family respectively. The so-
called remanency lands (for example clearcuts) ranging to 3 million 
holds increased this value to 19 and 24 holds respectively.  
In 1767 there were 293 000 peasants with sessio and further 150 000 
(33%) lived without significant amount of land. (The latter had 
averagely 1.6 hold compared to the 17 holds of the former group. They 
were hired/obliged to work on allodial estates). 50% of the peasants 
with land had less than half a sessio (cultivating 33% of the land and of 
the sessios), while only 5% had more than 1 sessio even at the 
’beginnings’ (12% of the total land, 10% of the sessios) (table 16). 
 
Table 16. The differentiation of serfs in 1767 based on non-allodial estates size (I) 
 Based on 
unit size I 
Number of 
sessio 
Total size 
in hold 
Serf with 
sessio 
Landless 
serf with 
house 
Landless 
serf 
Average 
sessio size 
for 1 serf 
Average unit 
size in hold 
for 1 serf 
over 1 sessio 12 391 397 504 9315 3533 1568 1.33 42.67 
0.75-1 22 668 744 112 25 692 8344 1654 0.88 28.96 
0.5-0.75 43 364 1 450 572 70 278 19 989 5100 0.62 20.64 
0.25-0.5 48 161 1 751 333 122 686 38 503 12 004 0.39 14.27 
under 0.25 12 419 562 361 65 267 38 168 5729 0.19 8.62 
other 1267 61 902 0 23 020 2879 0.05 3.00 
Altogether 140 270 4 967 784 293 238 131 557 28 934 0.48 17.00 
0.5-1 sessio 66 032 2 195 000 95 970 28 333 8700 0.69 22.87 
 
Comparing the distribution of peasant landholding sizes in 1767 
with the later statistics of S. Sándor Pál, in the 1850s only 6.5% of 
peasants had more land than 1 sessio (it was 10% in 1767) and 48% had 
less than 0.5 sessio (43% in 1767). This means, that declassation within 
peasantry was not significant (table 19), due to the growth in the number of 
total sessios from 140 to 250 thousand! Only the proportion of larger 
                                                          
181 Galgóczi, K.: Magyarország-, a Szerbvajdaság s Temesi Bánság mezőgazdasági statisticája. Pest, 
1855. 103. and S. Sándor, P.: Parasztságunk a Habsburg önkényuralom korszakában 1849–1867. 
Budapest, 1951. 13–14. 
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peasant estates decreased significantly. The statistics of Galgóczi (1855) 
claimed, that 3% of sessios were bigger than 1 sessio (it was 9% in 1767). 
(It is also true, that the number of peasants with less than 0.25 sessio grew 
from 12 000 to 50 000, while their proportion remained the same).182  
 
Table 16b. The differentiation of serfs in 1767 based on non-allodial estates size (II) 
Based on 
unit size 
II 
Number of 
sessio 
% 
Total 
size in 
hold 
% 
Serf 
with 
sessio 
% 
Landless 
serf with 
house 
Landless 
serf 
Average 
sessio size 
for 1 serf 
Average 
unit 
size for 
1 serf 
under 8 
hold 
8379.63 5.98 246 672 4.96 41 361 14.10 17 400 4287 0.20 5.96 
8-16 43 219.18 30.82 1 450 650 29.18 119 586 40.78 43 963 10 679 0.36 12.13 
16-24 46 809.38 33.38 1 671 993 33.63 84 873 28.94 27 647 7840 0.55 19.70 
24-32 25 391.33 18.11 902 193 18.15 32 780 11.18 12 562 3496 0.77 27.52 
over 32  15 165.75 10.81 638 372 12.84 14 638 4.99 6965 1755 1.04 43.61 
other 1267.63 0.90 61 902 1.25 0.00 0.00 23 020 2879 0.05 3.00 
Altogether 140 232.88 100 4 971 782 100 293 238 100 131 557 30 936 0.48 16.95 
Compare with table 7 for Croatia. Own calculation based on Fónagy, Z.: A nemesi birtokviszonyok. 
 
Table 17. The differentiation of serfs in 1767 based on non-allodial noble estates size  
Estate size 
in hold  
Number 
of sessio 
% 
Unit size 
in hold 
% 
Serf 
with 
land 
% 
Landless 
peasant 
with 
house 
Landless 
peasant 
Sessio/serf 
Land 
(hold)/ 
serf 
Land 
(hold) 
for all 
peasants 
under 11  546 0.39 15 881 0.32 2468 0.84 15 090 2148 0.22 6.43 0.81 
11-20  1006 0.72 34 808 0.70 3280 1.12 1848 223 0.31 10.61 6.50 
20-50- 3490.7 2.49 119 015 2.39 9540 3.25 7400 1049 0.37 12.48 6.62 
50-100  5734.8 4.09 194 068 3.90 14 672 5.00 9289 1359 0.39 13.23 7.66 
100-200  9870.8 7.04 330 060 6.64 24 767 8.45 14 721 1973 0.40 13.33 7.96 
200-500  26 672 19.02 867 148 17.44 61 861 21.10 26 327 5753 0.43 14.02 9.23 
500-1000  30 096.8 21.46 992 519 19.96 63 279 21.58 22 116 6218 0.48 15.68 10.83 
over 1000  63 575.5 45.34 2 444 113 49.16 114 667 39.10 35 479 12345 0.55 21.31 15.04 
Altogether 140 233 100 4 971 782 100 293 238 100 131 557 30 936 0.48 16.95 10.91 
Own calculation based on Fónagy, Z.: A nemesi birtokviszonyok… 
                                                          
182 As Sándor and Galgóczi used different categorization, there is some contradiction between 
the two statistics referring to the same era (after 1848), see the category of 16 holds. 
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Table 16 refers to the differentiation of peasantry based on the land at 
their own disposal. Table 17 offers another classification: it indicates 
peasants working on the lands based on the size of large estates. Some 
50-66% of the (non-allodial) land distributed to sessios was owned by 
large estate owners (while 60% of peasants cultivated them). It is also 
evident, that peasants working on these lans had larger average farm 
size. As an average peasant family hardly could cultivate 20 (or, if the 
landless peasants are included into the set) averagely 15 holds alone, one 
may assume larger families for them, or weaker land quality. Many serfs 
were not bound to their sessio and were free to move (map 1): this is another 
marxist statements that was falsified. It is also true, that the layers 
retaining the right of free movement had less land then the average (see 
the case of Zemplén County). 
 
Table 18. The differentiation of serfs over time (1767–1850) 
Literature  Serfs  Number of sessios Average unit size 
Fónagy (1767) 293 238* 140 232** 0.48 
Varga (1767) 429 378 193 506** 0.45 
Varga (1848) 539 753 313 417 0.58 
S. Sándor (1850s) 624 134 254 048 0.40 
Galgóczi (1850s) 545 252 256 711 0.47 
*Serfs with land included, without Croatia and Transylvania. ** Landless serfs also had some land.  
 
Regional differences in land fertility were not negligible and this 
influenced the official size of one sessio (that also showed regional 
differences). The arable land on a sessio in Bács County was set to 38 
holds, while it was only 20 holds in Pölöske at the estate of Count 
Széchenyi. A whole sessio (including inner gardens and meadows) in 
Torontál was twice greater than a sessio in Veszprém.183 
 
                                                          
183 In Kecskemét the landhold size varied between 20-200 cadastral hold, and 150 peasants had 
even more, 200-500, while officially one sessio ranged only to 32 hold. In Hajdúszoboszló 
1100 peasants had less than 5 holds. In Veszprém County farms ranging to 13-19 holds were 
considered large locally. Glósz, J.: A birtokviszonyok… 
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Agroeconomic diversity: land quality in 1800 in Zemplén (1=good) – compare pattern with the next map! 
Differences in agroeconomic potencial: tax value/tax payers in Rhenish florins (right) 
 
Regional versatility of agrarian tax incomes: income from head tax measured to total tax income (left) 
(1=100%, 1 dica = 1.5 Rft). Income from land tax in percent of the total tax income (right) 
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Spatial pattern of the social differentiation of serfdom: proportion of landholder serfs with less than 0.5 
sessio (left). / Proportion of landless serfs measured to peasantry under taxation (right, in %) 
 
Proportion of landholder serfs retaining the right of free movement (left). / Distribution of agrarian 
sources between social classes: spatial pattern of proportion of land (in %) cultivated by serfs (right) 
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Average extent of land per 1 noble person (including family members and landless noblemen, left, in 
hold). / Average extent of land per one peasant (including family members, right, in hold) 
 
The intraregional features of demographic pressure: average extent of arable land per one tax-payer 
peasant family head (left, in hold) in 1776.  / Number of tax-payers per one sessio (right) 
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Change in number of serfs (including landless) between 1776-1800 (1776 = 100 %) 
 
Differentiation rate within serfs: change in number of serfs with landholding, 1772–1800 (difference 
between their proportion in 1772 and in 1800 measured in %, red: incresase, green: decrease) 
Tax-pressure: the change of the number of tax units measured to the change in number of serfs 
(including landless) (right, red: increase of tax units exceeds that of serfs) 
 
 
Map series 1 
 
 
Based on the data collected by  
Barta, J.: Ha Zemplín vármegyét… Vol. 2.  
Maps were created within the framework of 
project K 111 766 (Elaboration of GIS 
platform to study the regional differences in 
Austria-Hungary), supported by the 
Hungarian Research Fund. 
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The differentiation of peasantry also showed regional variations: in 
Krassó County (Banat) the upper limit of arable land was 28 holds, while 
the poorest had only 5-6 holds. In Mohács 1744 hold was distributed 
between 530 peasants, and although peasantry was quite differentiated 
here, no-one had more than 18 holds in 1778 (compare this to Zemplén 
in map 1). In the mountainous Mátraalmás the average extent of arable 
land did not exceed 6 holds (8 holds together with the meadows and 
inner gardens).184 This implies grain scarcity in mountains. 
 
Table 19. Different estimations on the declassation of serfs between 1767–1850 
Sándor Pál (in 1951, for the 1850s) Galgóczi (1855) and Glósz Fónagy and Varga (1767) 
over one sessio 
 
  over 1 sessio 17 262 3.1% over 1 sessio 12 391 8.9 
1 sessio 40 380 6.5% 1 sessio 48 599 9.0% 0.75-1 sessio 22 668 16.2 
0.66 sessio 6458 1% 0.5-1 sessio 43 865 8% 0.5-0.75 sessio 43 364 3.0 
0.5 sessio 281 260 45% 0.5 sessio 173 119 32%       
0.25 sessio 254 160 41% 0.25 sessio 239 692 44% 0.25-0.5 sessio 48 161 34.4 
0.12 sessio 41 872 6.7% under 0.25 22 715 4% under 0.25 12 419 8.9 
under 0.5   47% under 0.5   48% 0.5 or under   43% 
 
Glósz put the lower limit of self-subsistence to 0.25-0.5 sessio (8-16 hold 
or 5-9 hectares, which implied 6-11 hold or 3-6 ha arable land calculating 
with the average grain outputs, 3.5:1 or 4:1) based on the wheat 
demand. The consumption of richer families was considered twice as 
great as the poor families with the same family size, because the larger 
farms required extra workforce185 and draft animals to feed. He also 
estimated the total grain output for different farm sizes and their 
consumption in order to assess the surplus (table 20). Thus, according to 
Glósz only some 8-10% of the peasants (beside the landless) were 
unable to sustain themselves prior to 1848: those who had less than 0.25 
sessio. Wellman claims, that this limit has to be drawn at 0.5 sessio on 
the example of Bakonypeterd. On the other hand, Dávid Zoltán claimed 
that 18 out of the examined 29 serfs with less than 0.25 sessio also had 
                                                          
184 Glósz, J.: A birtokviszonyok, 204.  
185 Farms over 0.5 sessio could not be cultivated by the workforce of a simple family. 
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positive balance – but this balance did not stem exclusively from grain, 
but from other income sources as well. Our calculations for the Balkans 
rather confirm the 0.5 sessio-limit. 
 
Table 20. The differentiated grain balance of peasant households after Glósz (in pm) 186  
Sessio 
size 
Arable 
land in 
hold 
Sown 
area 
Grain 
output 
in pm 
House-
hold size 
Consumption 
per capita 
(draft animals, 
seeds, tax) 
Household 
demand in 
pm 
Surplus or 
scarcity in pm 
per household 
Total surplus 
or demand 
in pm 
1.50 42 28 280 8 10 80 200 3 452 000 
1 28 18 185 7 10 70 115 5 588 000 
0.75 21 14 140 6 10 60 80 3 509 000 
0.5 14 9 93 5 9 45 50 8 309 000 
0.25 7 4.5 46 5 9 45 0 0 
0.12 4 2.2 23 5 9 45 -22 - 500 000 
Glósz, J.: A birtokviszonyok… 
 
Summing up the calculations in table 20, out of the 50 million pm 
total grain produced on the sessios, 20 million pm occured as net surplus 
for peasants (or 40%), similarly to Bulgaria after the 1840s. (Sándor puts 
the surplus to 18.5 million, and the demand of estates under 0.25 sessio 
to 1 million). The hypothesis on large surpluses is confirmed by the 
evidence, than even in the mountainous Nógrád County 14 settlements 
and further 11 settlements in the very small Torna County appeared in 
internal markets to sell their grains, well prior to the Napoleonic 
prosperity.187 The peasant replies to the official questionnaire on 
marketing habits in Abaúj and Szepes County also confirm this 
(1770s).188 Surplus was measured in Gömör and Túróc Counties (both 
mountainous) decades later, in the 1840s.189 Even grain from the 
smallholdings with 5-6 hold arable land around Sárospatak could appear 
                                                          
186 Pozsonyi mérő = 62 litres or 46-49 kgs. 
187 Schneider, M.: Dézsma és robot. A jobbágylakosság helyzetet a XVIII. század végén a mai Nógrád 
megye területén. Salgótarján, 1971. and Rémiás, T.: Torna vármegye társadalma a XVIII. 
században. Bódvaszilas-Miskolc, 2002. 
188 Takács, P.–Udvari, I.: Adalékok Abaúj vármegye XVIII. század végi vásáraihoz és az Abaúj megyei 
lakosság vásározási szokásaihoz. A Herman Ottó Múzeum Évkönyve XXVIII-XXIX. Miskolc 
1991. 66. 
189 Magyar Gazda, 1843/38-39. 1843/65. 
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on markets. In Maramureș, a county characterized by large grain and 
food deficits, 50% of the potato and maize production was forced to sell 
because of taxation reasons in 1870. Oppids in the plains paid their taxes 
in cash collectively, this also required participation in internal markets. 
Production was so specified and division of labour was so advanced in 
these towns, that for example in Kecskemét 2/3 of the farmers did not 
produce any grain at all, leaving a good market for the rest 33% to sell 
grains to them and buy meat or fruits and vegetables in return. Here a 
peasant estate of 160 hold in 1829 could store 500 pm grain.190 It is 
therefore not surprising that the Balkan countries could not sell 
substantial amount of grain to Hungary with the exception of extreme 
cases (as in 1830-31 during the cholera epidemics). 
But this seemingly huge surplus is elusive, because not only the 
conscripted 150 000 landless peasants (33% of the peasant layer, who 
cultivated averagely 1-3 hold land in 1767, utilizing the clearcuts, 
remanency-lands) had to be fed from this surplus, but there were other 
landless strata simply omitted from the conscription and thus from the 
previous calculations. Their total number was estimated to 600 000 in 
the 1840s with an uncovered need of 19 million pm consumption 
(calculating with 6 pm/capita – no draft animals, no seeds and tithe tax). 
Further 90 000 had some land (averagely 2.5 hold), but not enough to 
feed themselves. Further 100 000 had no house at all. Thus their total 
need with the need of serfs having 0.25 or less than 0.25 sessio was 
estimated to 23 million pm.  
This means, that the formerly mentioned 18.5-19 million pm surplus 
of wealthier peasant layers was not sufficient to cover the needs of the poor 
layers. Therefore internal marketing seemed to be a good business not 
only for the wealthy peasants, but for the nobility as well to sell the 
grains produced on their allodial estates, as cca. 4-5 million pm grain was 
missing from peasant households as net deficit. Peasantry as a whole was not 
self-sustainable owing to the estate structure favouring allodial lands, but was 
dependent on the nobility in economic sense too (regarding grains). The 
formerly mentioned deficit of 23 million pm had two main reasons: the 
                                                          
190 Iványosi Szabó, T.: Kecskemét gazdasági fejlődése 1700–1850. Kecskemét, 1994. 221, 107. 
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territorial deficit between lowlands and highlands owing to different fertility 
was assessed 17.5 million pm responsible for 75% of the deficit,191 while the 
rest 5-6 million stemmed from the internal differentiation of the peasantry, 
responsible for only 25%. So, although differentiation was advanced as we 
pointed out, regional differences in fertility still had a greater role in 
determining the deficits. This also implies, that if external markets 
offered favourable prices than local markets, allodial grains were rather 
sold there generating local shortages and price increase in internal 
markets. This triggered migration processes as highland peasants were 
forced to come to the lowlands to work as daily wage labourers to earn 
extra incomes or grains. Seasonal migration further ameliorated the 
possibilities of large allodial landholdings (the higher the labour 
surplus, the cheaper the workforce was). Cheap labour meant cheap 
production and greater profits in case of export. This created a vicious 
circle until world grain prices began to fall or a local climatic impact 
disturbed the markets. (A similar process occured, when in the 1880s 
the phylloxera ruined the highlanders’ income surplus and a new 
movement toward the lowland grain producing areas began). 
Furthermore, this feedback was based on external factors, which decreased the 
possibilities of tackling with the problem. 
Did allodial estates have substantial surpluses to supply both 
peasants and foreign markets? Orosz puts the ratio of allodial lands to 
20–27% of the total in 1851 (total cultivated arable lands and meadows 
that time were rated to 22 million hold, thus allodial estates ranged to 
cca. 5 million hold),192 while 10% was cultivated by towns and privileged 
communities (jász, kun, hajdú districts).193 He estimated the total output 
of allodial estates to 14 million pm calculating with 13 pm/hold yield. 
This amount exceeds the deficit of peasantry. But there are uncertanities 
regarding the absolute numbers. The total grain output of the country 
was 85 million pm in 1858, and if the nobility used 20% of the arable land, 
                                                          
191 Glósz, J.: A gabonakereskedelem feltételrendszere Magyarországon a 19. század első felében. A hiány 
és a felesleg területi mérlege. Aetas, 2009/4. 16-32. 
192 10 million in 1865 together with not noble large estates. 
193 Orosz, I.: Magyarország mezőgazdasága a feudalizmus alkonyán. In: Orosz, I.–Für, L.– Romány, P. 
(eds.): Magyarország agrártörténete. Budapest, 1996. 
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their grain production should be also at least 20%, 17–18 million pm 
(calculating with similar output on large estates and smallholdings). If 
we accept that the yields/ha were greater on allodial estates than on 
smallholdings, this value should be even higher. Orosz used a relatively 
high output/ha value, but despite this, his total numbers are still small: 
so, either the output/ha or the quantity of allodial land was 
miscalculated. Glósz used a different method: he calculated the extent of 
grain growing areas putting them to 7 million hold, 20% of which (1.4 
million hold) was exploited directly by the nobility. Supposing the same, 
13.5 pm/hold output, this means 19 million pm grain, from which the 
production of Croatia, Slavonia and the military districts has to be 
deduced. Thus 17.5 million pm remains. If we accept that the allodial 
land ranged up to 25% instead of 20%, this means 20 million pm output. 
This seems to cover the needs both of nobility and the net deficit (the 4-5 
million pm) of the peasantry at first sight,194 but the seeds (20%) and the 
consumption of draft animals, families and wage labourers has to be 
deduced from this value, while the 10% tithe tax paid by serfs to the 
landlord has to be added. Orosz puts the local consumption of the 
nobility to 2 million pm, that of the harvesters to 5 million, thus he 
calculated with 6-10 million pm surplus. However, he fails to mention 
the consumption needs of animals. Glósz calculates with 0.2 million 
family heads working on allodial estates (1 million with family 
members). Although in 1828 there were only 217 000 people – including 
family members – living on ’puszta’, but this value is underestimated, 
and the increase in their numbers was great: in Regéc it increased from 
94 to 246 between 1826–1843, in Mernye from 131 to 208 between 1829–
1848 referring to the expansion (prosperity) of allodial production. 
Finally, Glósz put the consumption of nobility together with these 
labourers to 2 million pm (calculating with 5 pm/capita). Animal 
consumption was estimated to 2 million pm based on Schwartner (1809) 
                                                          
194  That is why we accept the higher value – Hungary was a grain exporter (although only 4-
5% of the production was sold) and this could not have been maintained for a long time if 
internal shortages had been general, without finding a product (like potato) to substitute 
grains in case of overexport (For the possible effects of overexport see the example of the 
Ottoman Empire in the 1790s). 
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and Érkövy (1863),195 seeds were calculated to 4 million pm (or 20%, 
referring to 1:5 output), while the 10% tax of the peasants was also 3-4 
million. This means, that some 14–15 million pm would still remain as 
marketable surplus. But this seems to be a high value (over 66% of the 
production), if we compare it to specific, but well-documented cases: 
the allodial estate at Vrászló (ranging to 3000 hold in Somogy County) 
sold only 24% of its grains from the 30 000 pm produced, even in 1846 
during the great grain prosperity (these numbers also reflect to low 
output/ha values).196 Prior to this, the Gindly family in Tolna County 
was able to market also 25% of its grain in 1790. (So, there was no real 
difference between the proportion of surplus before the Napoleonic 
prosperity and during the general upswing). The Esterházy dukes in 
1831 managed to market 146 000 pm out of the 468 000, which is 31%. In 
Tata-Gesztes this was 24% in 1829 and 34% in 1831. In Csokonya 
(Somogy County) this was 50% between 1812–14 – possibly influenced 
by high prices of the Napoleonic era.197 On the other hand, the grain 
surplus of the noble Darvas family was not more than 10% of the 
production in the same era, while the Deák family in Zala County with 
modest estate size managed to sell 30% of its grain production. 
Thus, generally speaking, allodial estates could not spare and 
market more than 33% of their production – similar to Bulgarian 
peasants and çiftlik-owners. Using this analogy, the surplus for the 
whole layer could not be more than 7 million pm in that case. If we 
reduce this value with the 4-5 million pm deficit of peasant smallholders 
and landless peasants, we may assume that the exportable surplus 
could not be more than 2-3 million pm or 3-4 % of the total production 
prior to 1848 (table 21).198 This was a low value compared to that of the 
Balkans (it was 10% even in Bosnia in 1910), but it coincided with the 
data mentioned in the previous chapter (90 000 to 190 000 tons between 
1800–40) validating the calculations. It is surprising, that while 
                                                          
195 Schwartner, M.: Statistik des Königreichs Ungern. Ofen, 1809; Érkövy, A.: Az 1863. évi aszályosság 
a Magyar Alföldön. Pest, 1863. 63. 
196 Kaposi, Z.: A vrászlói uradalom termelése és gazdálkodása a XX. század első felében. Somogy 
megye múltjából, 1988. Levéltári Évkönyv 19. Kaposvár 1999. 193–94. 
197 Data collected by Glósz.  
198 Glósz puts yearly exportable surplus varying between 0 and +10 million pm. 
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Bulgarian peasants could sustain themselves from grain production, but 
the Hungarian peasantry could not (we used average hypothetic values in 
our calculations regarding Bulgaria, supposing farm sizes above 5 ha 
and export volumes of different harbours deconstructed to producer 
level: table 3 and 7 in Chapter III; while in the case of Hungary Glósz 
calculated with differentiated values). 
If we compare these results to the quantities sold at the internal 
market (which ranges to minimum 4-5 million pm, the net deficit of 
peasantry), one may come to the conclusion, that internal markets were 
more significant prior to the 1820s, than external markets (like in 
Serbia). It was mainly after 1848 – parallel with the economic 
transformation and the next price increase –, when foreign exports 
overshadowed the internal markets. 
 
Table 21. A simplified balance of Hungarian grain production in the 1830s, after Glósz 
 
In pm  
(46 kgs units)  
In holds (0.5 ha) 
Total grain production 85 000 000 22 000 000* 
From this: allodial grain production of noblemen 20 000 000 5-5.5 000 000 
Allodial surplus 7 000 000  
Peasant grain production 50 000 000 11-13 000 000 
Surplus of wealthy peasants 19 000 000 
* Including fallow 
over 33%, thus the 
output/hold is not 4 
pm, but 5.5 indeed 
(275 kgs/0.5 ha) 
Deficit of smallholders and landless 23 000 000 
Deficit of peasantry (covered from internal market) 5 000 000 
Net surplus (to external markets) 2 000 000 
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III. Integration to the world market (1840s–
1870s) 
 
This era brought dramatic changes in the production system at many 
places, clearly indicating that the shift from the Ottoman economic 
space to the Atlantic in the Balkans has begun. A huge part of the 
peninsula became involved in the “grains for manufacture” international 
division of labour. As economic changes (1838: free trade, introduction 
of market prices) went side by side with the social changes of the 
Tanzimat (abolition of spahi-landlordship in 1832, securing property 
rights: 1858),199 and transports also became cheaper, broad layers of the 
society were able to participate in this division of labour – compared to 
the earlier, Napoleonic stage. The most evident sign of these 
transformations – beside the political challenges – was the spread of 
smallholdings and monocultural grain production both on small and 
large-estates. 
 
 
(a) The effect of the liberalization on prices, trade patterns and 
wages 
 
(i) Regional effects of international division of labour 
 
The demand for food in western Europe did not decrease after 1815. 
Population growth and high production cost (or even shortages) in the 
West acted as pressures towards greater market integration of the 
Balkan farming economies. Increasing grain prices together with a 
drastic change in tariff policy of western states made exports profitable 
for the Balkan, while steam shipping reduced the transport costs from 
40 to 13%.200 
There were numerous events behind the changes in western tariff 
policy. First, Germany, the former wheat supplier of England and 
                                                          
199 The reforms of the Tanzimat could be successful partly because these coincided with the 
economic prosperity. 
200 Berov, Ly.: Transport Costs, 75. 
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consumer of British industrial articles, changed its economic policy and 
turned to protectionism (List). Britain had to find new markets for her 
industrial stuff, and new supplier of food for the increasing population. 
Therefore the wheat–industrial stuff trade shifted to the area of the 
Ottoman Empire. Then the bad harvest after the eruption of the 
Cosaguina and the famine of 1846–47 (which is also driven back to 
climatic anomalies)201 convinced western statesmen that autarchy in 
agriculture has to be abandoned, as it neither produces cheap, nor 
enough food. As the industrial revolution increased not only the 
population number in the western countries, but the purchase power as 
well, the trade of industrial stuff made it possible to finance grain 
imports. Thus, contrary to the Napoleonic prosperity, it was neither the 
war demand, nor the climatic events that maintained this process, but it 
was the restratification of western population into industry and its 
growing purchase power that broadened the division of labour between 
the two regions. 
This caused structural changes on the Balkans as well. The fall of the 
janissaries (propagators of protectionism and defenders of small-scale 
industry) in 1826, the Balta Liman agreement in 1838, that deprived the 
Ottoman state of monopolizing the trade, putting an end to the 
provisionist economic policy, and finally the abolition of high import 
tariffs on grains in Britain in 1846 (indicating the victory of the 
industrial lobby over landlords)202 created a new economic order in the 
region, allowing the free influx of Balkan wheat to the West. Increasing 
wheat prices (from 400 to 800-1000 grams silver/ton) were then 
accompanied by growing exports, clearly marking the prosperity cycle 
(growing output could also result in price decrease, as in 1929!). This 
grain prosperity increased the living standards, thus it prolonged the 
Ottoman rule over the peninsula even when other cohesive forces 
beyond economic interests did not work at all. The process lasted till the 
elimination of price differences in the two regions and until the 
equilibrium was disturbed by the dumping of Russian and Argentinian 
wheat, which finally led to the decrease of export prices. 
                                                          
201 Lamb, H. H.: Volcanic Dust… 
202 Cheap wheat meant cheap labour force and larger profits. 
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But for the Balkans the era of “first globalization” was also the period 
of de-industrialization. Since the wealth accumulated from trade was not 
invested into the industrial sector, but rather into agrarian production, 
the end of the favourable external circumstances deprived participants 
of profits and of tools to give successful responses to the new 
challenges. (The Hungarian noble elite suffered from the same at the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars, but the story repeated itself on the Balkans 
60 years later).203 
After these changes in trade policy, the import dependency of Great 
Britain regarding wheat soon increased from 5 to 65%. Local production 
fell from 3 million tons to 1.3 milllion, while imports grew from 0.3 to 3 
million tons – in order to secure the 250 kg/capita consumption for the 
population, that increased from 14 to 26 million between 1830 and 1880. 
The grain exports from Saloniki indicates this phenomenon well. 
Ranging to 480 thousand kile (12 000 tons or 3.5 million grams of silver) 
at the end of the 18th century – and this did not increase significantly up 
to the 1830s (16 000 tons, 4-4.5 million grams of silver) with the 
exception of 1810–16 – exports exceeded 40 thousand tons in 1847 
during the great Irish famine.204 This meant a tenfold increase in export 
values (35 million grams of silver) due to the increasing unit prices, 
while the exported volume only tripled. 
Even relatively distant areas were able to react to the changes in 
Western European demands due to the decrease in transport costs and 
the changes in supply policy of the Empire. Sulina’s export was 54 000 
tons already in 1837, and this increased to 124 000 tons after the 
liberalization of trade by 1847 and to 265 000 tons by 1862.205 In 1851 366 
thousand hl of wheat and 500 thousand hl of maize traveled from Brăila 
to Istanbul, but 460 and 1000 thousand hl to Europe, marking the 
                                                          
203 After wars had been over, grain prices fell, the artificial inflation eliminated the internal 
state debt towards the war-suppliers, and many of the traditional families lost their wealth, 
because they were unable to modernize their economies, as noble lands could not be 
mortgaged, and banks refrained from crediting to properties considered as manus mortua. 
204 Istoriya na Balgarija, Tom. 5. 71. 
205 Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy.: Európa gazdasága a 19. században 1780–1914. Budapest, 1987. 592. 
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changes both in production structure and in trade routes. Grain exports 
increased to 500% during the Crimean War.206 
Prior to these changes the Romanian principalities were dominantly 
focusing on animal husbandry to supply Istanbul with meat (the 
transportation of livestock was cheaper than that of wheat). In the 1820s 
only 16% of cultivated area was ploughland. This changed dramatically 
after the 1840s. Nonetheless, this not only changed the structure of 
economy and the distribution of social burdens, but the structure of 
exports as well, pushing agrarian societies towards increased 
vulnerability owing to price fluctuations.207 Here, the elite was able to 
exclude producers from trade, while this failed in Bulgarian lands. 
In Moldova the proportion of grains from exports has doubled 
(reaching 80% from total exports) between 1837–47 owing to the 60% 
price-increase and the doubling of exported quantities (table 1). This 
increase – both in prices and exports – can be explained by the fact, that 
the devalvation of Ottoman piaster increased export exigency 
(merchants wanted to get valuable currency). Contrary to this, the next 
price increase (33%) in 1859 was unable to increase the exported 
quantity further, and this refers to the local limits of export capacities 
(climatic impact). Finally, in 1863 an only 10 percent increase in prices 
generated the doubling of export quantities: it definitely meant that 
export exigency persisted even when price conditions were not so 
favourable at all. The principalities became increasingly dependent on 
the export of grain, and it was the direct consequence of the 
homogenization of the Moldavian agrarian structure, which proved to 
be very dangerous. The three events (of different type) represent the 
driving processes for the whole Balkans. 
The early stages of wheat prosperity and the sensitivity of grain 
exports determined by external processes can be observed on the example of 
Burgas. Here exports first increased from 1000 to 12 000 tons between 
1826 and 1839 as the result of the Ottoman devalvation policy and the 
                                                          
206 Diculescu, Vl.–Iancovici, S.–Danielopolu, C.–Popa, M. N.: Relaţiile comerciale ala ţari Romaneşti cu 
Peninsula Balcanica (1829–58). București, 1970. 18–19. 
207 In preindustrial societies agrarian outputs usually oscillate as cultivating methods are not 
developed enough the overwrite the harmful impact of climatic events. 
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introduction of free trade, then it grew to 30 000 tons in 1847 due to the 
Western subsistence crisis, peaking once again with 30 000 tons in 1853 
as the result of a war prosperity.208 
The revitalization of trade was observable in the acceleration of 
urbanization processes. The population of Danubian ports, like Ruse 
increased by 40% between 1831 and 1866, a 25 percent increase was 
measured in Vidin at the same time, while in the landlocked Sofia and 
Shumen – though these were also important grain producing centers – 
this remained under 10%.209 
 
Table 1. Wheat export of Moldva and grain prices 
Year 
Total 
exports 
(million 
lei) 
Wheat 
exports 
(million 
lei) 
Wheat 
volume 
(1000 hl) 
Price 
increase 
in % 
Wheat 
from total 
exports (%) 
Grain 
in tons 
Grain 
prices in 
Lei/ton210 
1837 30 12 691  40 53 898 222.6 
1843  30 1118 57  87 204 344.0 
1847 52 45 1591 -8 87 124 098 362.6 
1857 58 40 1527 –7 69 119 106 335.8 
1859 73 59 1728 33 81 134 784 437.7 
1863 134 120 3409 10 90 265 902 451.3 
Based on: Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History… 
 
The second consequence of trade liberalization beside the increase of exports 
was an unfavourable change in the balance of trade. While Austria-
Hungary had negative trade balance with the Ottoman Empire prior to 
the 1830s, it suddenly reversed. Upstream transports from Ruse were 
smaller than downstream imports from Austria, although 22% of the 
North-Bulgarian wheat exports went to Austria-Hungary.211 This 
unfavourable process culminated after the 1870s, when the balance in 
                                                          
208 Shterionov, St.: Juzhnoto chernomorie prez vazrazhdaneto. Sofia, 1999. 165. 
209 Todorov, N.: The Balkan Town in the Second Half of the 19th century. Etudes Balkaniques, 2. 
1969. 32–35. 
210 1 leu equalled to 40 para prior to 1837 (equalling to the piastre), 60 paras prior to 1843 and 
100 para after 1850. Diculescu, Vl.–Iancovici, S.–Danielopolu, C.–Popa, M. N.: Relaţiile 
comerciale… 
211 Paskaleva, V.: Ikonomicheskoto pronikvane na Avstriya u nas ot 30-te godini na XIX. vek do 
Krimskata voyna. Istoricheski Pregled. 1956/2. 37–38. 
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most of the Balkan ports became negative, contrary to situation in the 
previous decades, when – according to Redens’s data – mainly 
Constantinople showed deficits.212 
Thus, the Danubian trade did not create such great extra revenues as 
one would expect. Danubian merchants, as the Rachkov, Sahatchiyski 
and Arnaudov families had some 250–300 000 grosh capital (50-60 000 
francs).213 In Svishtov the free capital did no exceed 40 000 francs for 
larges trade houses, which equalled to the value of 400 hectares of 
cropland – which is a larger çiftlik indeed. Thus, the value of mobilized 
capital abled merchants to invest into agriculture, but the lack of capital 
concentration – neither of the mentioned merchants were match for the 
great traders in Saloniki, whose capital (whether be Jews, Greeks or 
English) reached 100 000–1 000 000 million francs214 – hindered 
investments in industry. To establish a large factory – like the one that 
was operated (but not owned) by Dobri Zhelyazkov – at least 1 million 
kurush (200 000 francs) was needed. This condition could be fulfilled by 
hardly anyone in the central parts of the peninsula: probably 
Tapchilestov in Istanbul and the Georgiev brothers in Bucharest had 
such amount of money. When the grain prosperity was over, many of 
these middle-scale merchants could not response to the challenge by 
transferring their capital into other sectors, compared to those who 
diversified their activity earlier. 
Intermediating trade was still a great business.215 During the 
Crimean War the Kisimov merchant house collected a capital of 1.2 
                                                          
212 Reden, Fr. W. von: Die Türkei und Griechenland in Ihrer Entwicklungs-Fähigkeit. Frankfurt am 
Main, 1856. 259. 
213 Berov, Ly.: Ikonomicheskoto razvitie,  78. 
214 For this see: Damianov, S.: French Commerce with the Bulgarian Territories from the eighteenth 
Century to 1914. In: Vacalopoulos, A. E.–Svolopoulos, C. D.–Kiraly, B. K. (eds.): Southeast 
European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the mid eighteenth century to 1914. 
War and Society in East Central Europe. Thessaloniki, 1988. In Saloniki Argiri Matheos had 
100 000 francs capital and 250 000 francs yearly income. The Jewish merchant houses, like 
the Allatini, Modiano and Fernandez had more than 1 million francs capital, the yearly 
turnover reached 2 million. The English Abbots had 1.5 million francs of capital, while 
Theagenis Kharissis had 0.25 million. 
215 Kosev, D.: Otrazhenieto na krimskata voyna (1853–1856) v Balgariya. Istoricheski Pregled, 1946–
47/2. 185. 
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million kurush from transportation. The comparison of data collected by 
Mihov and Draganova shows that wheat prices at ports were much 
higher than in the centre of the peninsula (2:1).216 Together with the 
changes in transportation costs – freight rates fell from 40% of prices at 
the end of the 18th century to 25%, then to 13% in 1840s’ in case of 
wheat – this enables us the estimate the benefit of transport heading 
towards the large harbours. Subtracting freight costs from harbor prices 
one may get a profit rate in transport exceeding 25%. It was a huge 
benefit compared to other regions and to other economic activites: in 
Poland the profit rate of traders using mainland roads decreased from 
14–17% to 5–15% in the 18th c.217 
The mentioned price difference was partly the result of the external 
demand, but geographical conditions were also responsible for it. 
Interregional differences regarding the value and composition of 
production and exports were not negligble prior to 1873. Regions 
producing grains over 10 kile/capita (250 kgs) like Thrace, Rila-Vitosha 
and the Danube vilayet became involved in grain exports according to 
the data of Sax (table 2–3). While production in Thrace was stagnating, 
the Danubian vilayet showed a remarkable increase.  
Regarding total per capita export values, the 35 francs in Macedonia 
and the 65 francs in Thessaly were considered extremely high compared 
to the imperial average (15–20 francs). It is not surprising that these 
provinces were in the centre of interest of the young Balkan states.218 In 
Bulgaria, prior to 1878 grains constituted 66% of the exports (10 
francs/capita), but the value of per capita grain exports was even greater 
in Romania, exceeding15 francs/capita. The total grain export of the 
peninsula was worth 90 million francs securing the consumption of 2 
million western inhabitants and 66% of this came from Romanian lands.  
 
                                                          
216 In 1853 1 kg of wheat equaled with 0.77 gramms of silver in Saloniki and 0.65–0.80 in Varna, 
while in Berkovica and Sofia the grain bought from producers was 0.33 gramms in silver. 
Berov, Ly.: Parvite ciklichni krizi na evropeyskiya kapitalizma i stopanskata konyunktura v 
balgarskite zemi prez XIX. v. Istoricheski Pregled, 1978/6. 22–36. 
217 Berov, Ly.: Transport Costs,  75. 
218 Dufour, B. J.: Étude du mouvement commercial de la Turquie en 1863. Annales du commerce 
extérieur. Paris, 1865. 3–71. 
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Table 2. The agrarian output in the South-Balkans according to Sax (1870s) 
Agrarian product 
Thrace, 1873 S-Macedonia 1873 W-Macedonia 
1.1 million, 
without Burgas, 
Sozopol, Midia, 
Aitos 
per capita  
1.3 million 
Maleš, 
Plaškavica 
per capita 
 0.8 million 
Monastir, 
Janina, Ohrid, 
Prilep 
per capita 
Grain altogether 
(kile) 
12 000 000 10.9 6 000 000 4.62 4 320 000 5.4 
Silk (oka) 200 000 0.2 200 000 0.15     
Cotton (oka)     3 000 000 2.31 100 000 0.13 
Tobacco (oka) 1 000 000 0.9 3 000 000 2.31 280 000 0.35 
Sheep (db) 2 000 000 1.8 1 000 000 0.77 1 000 000 1.25 
Goat (db) 1 500 000 1.4 800 000 0.62 1 500 000 1.88 
Cow(db) 200 000 0,2         
Swine (db) 50 000 0     50 000 0,06 
Vinestock (db) 50 000 000 45,5 38 000 000 29,23 70 000 000 87,5 
 
Agrarian 
product 
Rila–Vitosha, 1873 Danube vilayet 1873 Danube vilayet, 1864 Thrace, 1877 
0.5 
million 
per 
capita 
2.5 million, 
Niš, Danube 
delta without 
Sofia 
per 
capita 
2.3 
million 
per 
capita 
1.5 million 
per 
capita 
Grain altogether 
(kile) 
16 000 000 32 42 500 000 17 7 200 000 3,13 15 000 000 10 
Silk (oka)     1 500 000 0,6     200 000 0,13 
Cotton (oka)             500 000 0,33 
Tobacco (oka) 700 000 1,4 1 000 000 0,4     1 000 000 0,67 
Sheep (db) 1 500 000 3 3 500 000 1,4 
6 300 000 2,74 
2 500 000 1,67 
Goat (db) 500 000 1 500 000 0,2 700 000 0,47 
Cow(db) 100 000 0,2 500 000 0,2 1 000 000 0,43 250 000 0,17 
Swine (db) 12 000 0,024 100 000 0,04 300 000 0,13 50 000 0,03 
Vinestock (db) 1 000 000 2 12 000 000 4,8     50 000 000 33,33 
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Table 3. Production and exports of main harbors  
Port and 
attraction zone 
Wheat 
production 
in million 
kile  
Exports in 
million 
kile and % 
Value of 
total 
production 
(million 
piasters)* 
Value of 
exports in 
million 
piasters* 
Families (6 
persons 
averagely, 
in 
millions) 
Production 
per family 
(kile) 
Production 
and 
exports per 
family in 
piasters 
Surroundings 
of Edirne, 1849 
2.6 0.5 (25%) 25-27 5 0.1 
25 
(500 kg) 
250 
50 
Pleven, 13 
villages, 
animal 
husbandry, 
1840 
200 000 kg  0.1  
385 
households 
 250 
Moldva, 1837 
1847 
 
54 000 tons, 
124000 tons 
 
21.6 
50* 
0.2  
110 
250 
Edirne, 1846  5.2  40 0.1?  400? 
Enos, 1845  0.4  4 0.06–0.1  50 
Enos, 1847  1.5  15 0.06–0.1  150 
Burgas, 1851, 
1852 
 0.3 and 0.9  3 and 9 0.1  30 and 100 
Svishtov  2.5  25 0.12  200 
Macedonia 1847 
(and Saloniki, 
1852) 
5.7–6 
2.6 (33%) 
67 
26* 
(total of 
Saloniki = 
40 million 
piasters, 
1847) 
0.12 
50 
(1000 kgs) 
510 
Seres, 
 1851–1853 
1.9 and 3.1 20 and 33 0.03 
60 and 100 
(1500-2500 
kgs) 
600 and 
1000 
Volos 4.1 0.4 (10%) 41 4 0.03 
120 
(3000 kgs) 
1200 
130 
Bulgaria and 
„Rumelia” 
1848 
 4.4-5  45-50 
3 million 
persons 
 = 0.5 m 
families 
 95–100 
Anatoly, 1858 25  250  
7.4 million 
persons, 
=1.25 m 
families 
20 200 
Stara Zagora 
kaza, 1859 
0.75 0.2 (30%) 14 4 0.0055 125 
2300 
700 
Kazanlik kaza, 
1859 
1 0.3 (30%) 15,2 4,5 0.008 122 
1855 
550 
Sanjak of 
Plovdiv, 1867, 
(here 1 kile =60 
okes!)** 
4.5 1.2 (25%) 260** 70** 
0.8 million 
persons= 
0.15 m 
families 
30** (90) 
(2250 kgs) 
1700** or 
460** 
*Original data are indicated by bold letters, others are calculated using 400-500 piaster/ton prices = 
during the wheat boom the prices had doubled, thus the per capita production and exports mentioned 
here should be doubled. 1 kile of Constantinople = 20-22 okes, 25 kgs. 1 ton = 40 kile. 
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** In 1867 calculated with 1000 piasters/t and 1 kile = 60 okes  
Data: Heuschling, X.: L’Empire de Turquie. Territoire. Population. Gouvernement. Finances. Industrie 
agricole, manufacturiére et commerciale. Voies de communication. Armée. Culte… Bruxelles, 1860; 
Farley, J. L.: Modern Turkey. London, 1872; Ubicini, A.: Letters on Turkey. London, 1856. 327.; 
Viquesnel, A.: Voyage dans le Turquie d’Europe. Description physique et géologique de la Thrace. 
Paris, 1868; Hochstetter, F.: Reise durch Rumelien im Sommer 1869; Kanitz, F.: Donau-Bulgarien und 
der Balkan. Historisch-geographisch-etnographische Reisestudien aus den Jahren 1860-1879. Leipzig, 
1882. Band II. 214. 
For the population of administrative units see Fényes E.: A Török Birodalom leírása történeti, statisztikai és 
geographiai tekintetben. Pest, 1854. 387–424. and McGowan, B.: Economic life in Ottoman Europe: taxation, 
trade and struggle for land, 1600–1800. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981. 88–92. 
 
The fact, that the highest export/capita values were not measured in 
the grain exporting regions warns, that originally there had been more 
favourable agrarian products than wheat (like cotton, as industrial raw 
material). Wool became of secondary importance in everywhere (18 
million francs) due to the trends in international division of labour. 
Thessaly was in the lead regarding cotton production/capita, but most 
of the cotton exports stemmed from Macedonia (50% of the exports) 
overtaking tobacco (15%), silk (15%) and grains (12%).  
 
(ii) Trends, prices and wages in agriculture 
 
These structural changes had impacts not only on agriculture, but on 
Balkan societies as well. The general (export) price index based on 26 
foodstuffs showed cycles in the Balkan Peninsula (similar to the 
Kondratieff-cycles, figure 1). The curve rather represents the impacts of 
global processes on the Balkan peninsula (the local price index showed 
great correlation with western trends) than local effects, referring to the 
high degree of integration into the global system. The first price cycle 
began at the end of the 18th century due to the shortages stemming 
from overexport to the West during the Napoleonic Wars and high 
transport costs.219 After the wars prices fell. The abolition of fixed prices, 
trade monopolies and the liberalization of markets initiated an increase 
in the prices of local foodstuffs again. Prices converging to the western 
prices were favourable for the rural Balkan societies. The process lasted 
                                                          
219 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 41. and Berov, Ly.: Transport Costs… 
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till the end of the Crimean War, then another decline of prices came, 
which was followed by the upswing during the Great Eastern Crisis. 
But the dumping of Russian and American wheat on markets in the 
1870s finally put an end to high prices.  
Land prices were also similar to food prices, with a minor lag 
between the two curves (r=0.65). These cycles were the result of the 
interference of prices in different sectors:.220 the period of high industrial 
prices did not always coincide with high agricultural prices (r=0.5) on 
the Balkans: while in 1780–1800 both were high, the next cycle in 1800–
20 was dominated by the price increase of foodstuffs the together with 
animal products, referring to international division of labour. The cycle 
in 1840–70 was dominated by crop prices (de-industrialization), while 
the last cycle after 1880 was determined by increasing livestock prices 
and decreasing wheat prices (figure 1). 
The economic prosperity made the execution of Ottoman reforms 
possible. While the reforms of Selim III at the end of the 18th century 
lacked fiscal stability, during the Tanzimat era the central budget was 
increasing. The price fluctuations and cycles not only influenced the 
macroeconomic situation, but the living standards of peasantry (and 
other layers) as well.  
While wheat prices were increasing, the price of wool and cotton 
goods declined. Agricultural wages increased parallel with wheat 
prices. Industrial wages also grew, but the price decrease of industrial 
products and the price increase of bread endangered local 
entrepreneurs’ (guildsmen) profits. While in the 1840s it was evident 
that agrarian labour was cheaper, than the industrial owing to the 
oversupply, this changed within years. First growing wheat prices 
                                                          
220 Berov, Ly.: The West European Trade Cycle and Price Movement in the Salonica Economic Region 
during the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. In: Vacapoulos, A. E.–Svolopoulos, C. D.–
Kiraly, B. K. (eds.): Southeast European Maritime Commerce, 285–86. Cotton was cheap, its 
price was stagnating at the end of the 18th century (1.1 franc/kg). European demand 
increased only after the 1820s, but prices did not increase as tariffs on American cotton were 
abolished. The civil war pushed prices up to 5 francs/kg, and Saloniki’s export grew from 
2.8 million francs to 15 million. After 1867 the dumping of Egyptian cotton lowered the 
prices again. Tobacco prices were around 1.3 francs/kg in 1780, by 1900 it went up to 3 
francs/kg. 
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increased agrarian wages, pushing workers towards the agrarian sphere 
between 1850–70, then the lack of industrial labour force produced 
increasing industrial wages. The low supply of agrarian labourers after 
1878 also triggered price increase among agrarian wage earners,221 and 
finally the recurring agrarian price increase (after 1900) increased the 
fieldworkers’ wages once again (see process in table 5). 
As the unit prices of industrial goods were decreasing, the 
agricultural wage-labourers purchase power on industrial goods 
increased to tenfold (!), while it only doubled measured in bread (table 
4). The purchase power of industrial workers on bread even decreased 
in 1847–70, then improved. By 1910 both layers were able to purchase 
the same amount of industrial and agricultural stuff. It is also evident 
based on the wages, that the era prior to 1840 was favourable for 
industrial workers, and the period between 1850–80 favoured the 
agrarian labour force (table 5). 
 
Figure 1. Export price index based on 26 goods (yearly and 5-year average) (1888=100, 
dark), and price index of land in Bulgaria (1800=100, current prices, light) 
90
50
130
170
210
1790 18811815 1850 1907
 
Berov, Ly.: Parvite tsiklichni krizi… and Berov, Ly.: The West European Trade Cycle…Berov, Ly.: 
Dvizhenieto na tsenite na Balkanite  prez XVI–XIX v. i Evropeyskata revolutsiya na tsenite. Sofia, 1976. 
and Berov, Ly.: Dvizhenieto na tsenite na balkanite prez XVI–XIX v. i Evropeyskata revolutsiya na 
tsenite. Istoricheski Pregled, 1975/3. 92–102. 
 
 
                                                          
221 After 1858 then 1878 many wage-labourers was able to obtain own land and was not 
compelled to work for others. 
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Table 4. Prices, wages and purchase power of workers 
Index 1840 1847 1860–1870 cca. 1900 
Wheat price (piasters/t) 400 800 600–900 600–700 
Wheat price in gramms of silver 400 800 600–900 600–700 
Price of cotton cloth (francs/kg) 24 10 8–10 
 
Price of woolen cloth (francs/kg) 26 24 17–22 16** 
Purchase power on cotton stuff for agricultural 
workers (index)* 
1 4 10–15 
 
Purchase power on woolen stuff for 
agricultural workers (index) 
1 2 5.8–7.5 10 
Purchase power on graisn for agricultural 
workers (index)  
1 1 2.2–3.3 3.4–4 
Purchase power on cotton stuff for 
industrial workers (index) 
1 3.1 7–9 
 
Purchase power on woolen stuff for 
industrial workers (index) 
1 1.35 3.8–5 5 
Purchase power on grain for industrial 
workers (index) 
1 0.6 1.7–2.3 1.7–2 
Wages from Ta Van Long: Razvitie na naemnija trud v zanayatchiystvoto v Balgariya (1888–1910). 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1991/12. Grain prices from Dokumenti za balgarskata istoriya iz germanski arhivi 
1829–1877. Sofia. 1963. 94–150. No. 22. Doklad-statisticheski tablici na pruskiya konsul. Ch. Blunt do 
Lecoq otnosno koraboplavaneto, targoviyata i predeneto na koprina v Solun prez 1840–1845 g. 
Sächsisches Landesarchiv, Dresden, Korrespondenz mit dem königlichen Konzul zu Konstantinopel. 
No. 23. Doklad statisticheska tablica na Ch. Blunt do Lecoq za dvizhenieto na korabite na Solunskoto 
pristanishte prez 1847 g., No. 24–32. Industrial products’ prices are from Michoff, N.: Contribution a 
l’histoire du commerce de la Turquie et de la Bulgarie III. Rapports consulaires français. Svichtov, 1950.  
*See table below.  **In 1892, Sariivanov. 
 
Table 5. Differences in the wage of agricultural and industrial workers of the centre and 
the periphery 
Year 
Daily wage of 
harvester in 
grosh 
Bulgarian industrial daily wage  
unskilled/skilled in grosh 
Ratio of 
industrial/ 
agricultural wage 
1840 2 4 
2 = favourable for 
industrialization 
1850 4 5 / 7 1.2 
1870 10 10 / 14 1.2 
1883 15 8 / 10 
0.5 =critical for 
industrialization 
1900/1905 12.5–14 10 / 14 1 
Sources: Ta Van Long: Razvitie na naemnyja trud… and Özmucur, S.–Pamuk, S.: Real Wages… 
*The higher the value, the greater the pressure is toward stratification of labour force into industry. 
Low ratio represents a reverse process – restratification into the agrarian system. 5 grosh  = 1 franc 
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(b) The profitability of agrarian production 
 
(i) The formation and transformation of chiftliks  
 
Unlike in the early 19th century merchants during the grain prosperity 
tended to invest into grain production beside transportation. Thus, large 
estates created in the beginning of the 19th century prevailed. Their 
regional distribution was diverse, such as their origin, and also 
numerous types and forms existed: the beglik represented the allodial 
type large estate (demesne, latifundium) cultivated often by corvéé 
(forced, unpaid labour), while chiftlik, gospodarlik, agalik represented the 
non-allodial Grundherrschaft-like type large landholding, which was 
distributed among shareholders (averagely 10 ha/unit).222 The 
proportion of chiftlik lands was only 10% in E-Rumelia, 22% in N-
Bulgaria, 10% around Sofia, but 50% in Macedonia.223 
Although Lampe stated that large estates declined after 1815 in the 
eastern part of the Balkans,224 this is only true for their share from total 
cultivated land, but not for the productivity. Data suggest that 10 or 
20% of peasants worked on 20-25% of the cultivated land producing 30-
40% of crops.225 These numbers suppose that per capita and per hectare 
outputs in large estates were somewhat better than on smallholdings in 
Macedonia and Bulgaria (the merchant Brakalov rented an estate of 
1000 ha producing 20 000 Burgas kile, which meant 1500 kg/ha output 
exceeding the production of smallholdings in Kjustendil or Berkovica 
                                                          
222 Beside the expropriated quantity (fixed or proportional), the method of cultivation (forced 
or paid labour) could be a further feature to typify the large estates. 
223 Levintov, N. G.: Agrarniy perevorot v Bolgarii v 1878–1879gg. In: Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot 
tureckogo iga. Moskva, 1953. 158–60. 
224 Lampe, J. R.– Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 132–40. 
225 See different data from Berov, Ly.: Ravnishte na ikonomichesko razvitie na balgarskite zemi po 
vreme na osvobozhdenieto. Trudovi na visshiya ikonomicheski institut „Karl Marx”. I. Sofia 
1979. 45–50. and Quataert, D.: The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914. In: Inalcik, H.–Quataert, D. (eds.): 
An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. 864. 
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reaching only 1000 kg/ha output).226 However researchers do not agree 
in the proportion of applied workforce, thus per capita outputs and the 
effciency of large estates is still debated (and it had regional pattern as 
well: unlike in Bulgaria, in Greece the productivity of smallholdings 
exceeded that of large estates owing to the different composition of 
products). 
Although the increase in proportion of chiftliks from total cultivated 
land has stopped by the 1860s in European Turkey (considered as the 
sign of decline by Lampe), but as the extent of cultivated lands had doubled 
owing to the extensification between 1840–70,227 the same was true for the 
extent of large estates. This is also a good indicator of the extensive 
nature of farming in the Balkans, where output growth mainly 
depended on increased acreage and not on the intensification of 
production. Until corvéé existed or daily wages remained low (around 2 
grosh in 1840s, this increased to 4-5 by the 1860s),228 the cultivation of 
large estates was cheap, and until the decline of grain prices they were 
usually profitable.  
Ottoman reforms, like the abolishment of timars and spahiluk in the 
1830s did not mean the dissolution of large estates or that peasants 
automatically became landowners. Although spahis were deprived of 
the right to collect taxes in kind and were pensioned, the local Muslim 
elite – able to pass life-long malikane down to their descendants (in 
Vidin, in Macedonia, in Bosnia and in the šop region) – often managed 
to maintain control over lands (in Vidin, Niš). This meant double 
taxation for these peasants, as not only the new representatives of the 
central government (voyvoda) collected the tithe usually in cash after the 
reforms (maktu-system), but the landlord expropriated as well at least 5-
10% of the production (in Bosnia and Macedonia even 33%). 
The transformation of spahiluk to chiftlik estates was even promoted 
by the state purchases in the beginning, during the era of provisionist 
                                                          
226 See Draganova, Sl.: Kyustendilski region 1864–1919: Etnodemografsko i socialno-ikonomichesko 
izsledvane. Sofia, 1996. These data challenge the 18th c. theory of Arthur Young, who 
claimed, that free peasantry provided greater productivity, than serfdom or forced labour. 
227 Berov, Ly.: Ravnishte, 20. 
228 See Kosev, D.: Vastanieto na selyanite v severozapadna Balgariya prez 1850 g. i negovite prichini. 
Istoricheski Pregled 6, 474–93.  
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policy: in 1834 Istanbul ordered 550 000 kile of wheat from North-
Bulgaria, but 1 million in 1837. Later it was the the export price-increase 
that fuelled this process: after the abolition of price limits Bulgarian 
grain exports increased tenfold.229 Thus, beside the traditional Muslim 
elite, Christian tax-farmers, voyvodas or merchants (chorbadjis), also 
bought their own chiftlik.230 Large estates were no more exclusively 
askeri (or Muslim) landholdings. 
According to Hristov most of the early chiftliks were established as a 
result of some kind of indebtedness of peasants. If the reaya was unable 
to pay the tithe to the spahi – and this was a common phenomenon 
between 1803–14 – a loan was offered (borch). If the peasant could not 
pay it back, he had to offer a share from the harvest or to work for the 
spahi.231 In Karamanica village a spahi bought a small estate and within 
10 years most of the villagers lost their estates owing to borch and were 
forced to pay an amount from their crop to the spahi (kesim). 
Precedent was also a driving force. Vodnjanci village was given to 
Memish aga by Pazvandoğlu through a tapu, although this was miri 
(state) estate, and Pazvandoğlu had no rights over it. After the death of 
the aga and Pazvandoğlu the estate was declared emptied (mahlul) by 
the state and given to Celebi aga instead of giving it back to the 
peasants.232 
During the Russian-Turkish war in 1806–12 and 1828–29 100 
thousand Bulgarians escaped to Romania, and though many returned, 
the local ayans have confiscated their property, as they did not pay the 
taxes.233 
                                                          
229 Berov, Ly: Agrarnoto dvizhenie v Iztochna Rumeliya po vreme na osvobozhdenieto. Istoricheski 
Pregled, 1956/1. 5. 
230 Istoriya na Balgariya. Tom. 6. Sofia, 1987. 41. Like Hadji Mano in Sofia. Coko Kableshkov in 
Plovdiv, the Robev brothers in Monastir did the same. 
231 Hristov, Hr.: Nyakoi problemi na prehoda ot feodalizma kam kapitalizma v istoriyata na Balgariya. 
Istoricheski Pregled 17, No. 3, 1961. 91. and Hristov, Hr.: Kam vaprosa za zagrabvaneto na 
selskite zemi i sazdavaneto na chiftlici i gospodarlici v Evropeyska Turciya prez XVIII-XIX v. 
Izvestiya na Instituta za Istoriya. 1964. 153–55.  
232 Zahariev, J.: Kamenica. SBNU. Tom. 40. 1935. 379. 
233 Statistische Mitteilungen über Bulgarien (Aus der Zeitung von Odessa) – Das Ausland. 5 Jahrg. 
Bd. 1. Nr. 30-41. München, 1832. 161. As local ayans were responsible for taxation, defence, 
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The smaller spahi estates not transformed into chiftliks or 
gospodarliks were not profitable – in Radovishte Çaus Ahmed managed 
to collect only 1500 grosh from the villagers, which is not more than the 
production of a smallholding itself. Husein in Padeš also collected 1500 
grosh revenue.234 Prior to the pensioning of spahis (bedel-i timar) around 
Belogradchik 38 out of 45 villages served Muslim landlords. After their 
pensioning peasant burdens decreased by 20–40%. But peasants could 
not become landowners here prior to 1858: in 1842 twenty villages were 
given again to Muslim tax-farmers and landlords.235 This was not 
unique: between Niš and Sofia more than 300 villages under chitflik or 
gospodarlik managed to get rid of the burdens only after 1878. Here 55% 
of the villages depended from a landlord compared to the more 
prosperous coastal areas, where 70% of the peasantry owned his estate 
by the 1870s.236 
Were the chiftliks profitable? If not, there hadn’t been investments 
here, and we have detailed data on this even from the 1860s. (It is also 
true, that 23 chiftliks had already been distributed by 1874 owing to the 
decrease of grain prices or the increase in labour costs).237 The rental 
costs of the chiftlik rented by the mentioned Brakalov – who borrowed 
the money from Topchileshtov – reached 400 000 kurush for 6 years 
(yearly average: 70 000), which – calculating with 800 piasters/ton price 
– was hardly more than 100–150 tons or 10% of the production.238 The 
chiftlik was cultivated by 100 men (chift), each worked 10 ha. Further 
350–400 part-time workers were needed in summer.239 The 100 
permanent workers kept 0.9 million grosh value from the harvest 
(including animal fodder and seeds), harvesters received 4–5 grosh 
daily which meant daily 1400–2000 grosh for 350–400 workers and 
                                                                                                                                
and local budget, their interest was to maintain the system of services regardless of who 
pays the tax. 
234 Dimitrov, Str.: Kam vaprosa za otmenyavaneto, 48–49. 
235 Istoriya na Balgariya, Tom. 5. 242. 
236 Tonev, V.: Balgarskoto chernomorie prez vazrazhdaneto. Sofia, 1995. 75. Further 15% had to take 
part time jobs, and 15% was working on chiftliks. 
237 Berov, Ly: Ravnishte, 20. 
238 Tonev, V.: Balgarskoto chernomorie, 73–74.  
239 Ibid. 
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altogether 0.15-0.2 million grosh for 100 days. Adding up these and the 
rental price the total costs reached 1.1 million kurush a year. So this 
estate was only profitable, if the averagely 1500 tons of wheat was sold 
at least at 700 grosh/ton (140 francs) price. Wheat price reaching 1000 
grosh/ton (200 francs/ha), as in 1868, meant a 25% profit rate. But after 
1878 prices fell from 160 to 110 francs/ton (1882–94), eliminating profits. 
A smaller chiftlik of 60 ha needed 3 workers in winter and 9 in 
summer (1864). The chiftchi working on the fields received 1000-1200 
grosh in cash and crop and each cultivated 5 sown hectares by a pair of 
oxen. For such an estate the permanent workers meant 12-24 000 grosh 
expense. The 150 harvesters in summer meant additional 6000-10 000 
grosh. The 60 hectares could produce 90-100 tons of wheat. As that time 
1 ton of wheat was worth 100-130 francs, the total income was 10 000 
francs (50 000 grosh), while the expenses reached 7000 francs (33 000 
grosh),240 making the profit rate to 30% – without subtracting the seeds. 
But if we use prices from 3 years earlier, this profit would disappear. 
As it can be seen from table 6 the profitability of large estates was 
limited by external circumstances, like price fluctuations and labour 
wages.241 
 
Table 6. Profitability of a large estate (chiftlik) with 600 dönüm of sown arable land in 
optimal and deteriorating case (1870s–1880s)  
 
Wheat price 
in francs (t) 
Daily wage 
of labourers 
(grosh) 
Yield 
/ha (kg) 
Income 
(grosh) 
Expenses 
(grosh) 
 
Income/Expense 
ratio 
Maximum 
value 
160  
(before 1880) 
16  
(after 1880) 
1800 80–90000 40000 
 Optimal case (cca. 
1870): 
 3 : 1 
Minimum 
value 
100  
(after1880) 
5–10  
(prior to1880) 
1500 50–60000 20–30000 
 Worst case (cca. 1880) 
5 : 4 
 
Work on chiftliks was not mechanized. As wheat prices fell after 
1873/1878 owing to the oversupply (Russian and American grains), the 
labour wages – which were increasing – eliminated the surplus. The 
                                                          
240 Data from:  Todorov, N.: Novi danni za agrarnite otnosheniya u nas ot 60-te godini na XIX. vek. 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1958/5. 102–113. 
241 Hristov, Hr.: Nyakoi problemi na prehoda ot feodalizma… 83–107. and Todorov, N.: Novi danni za 
agrarnite otnosheniya…   
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liberation of the Bulgarian state and the distribution of land abandoned 
by Muslims created a temporary oversupply of land and shortage of 
labour force on large estates: everyone had his own small holdings of 5 
hectares that made self-subsistence possible, thus was not compelled to 
work for others any more. In Stara Zagora daily wages increased from 
10 grosh/day in 1877 to 15–17 grosh, in Gabrovo harvesters received 5-
12 grosh in 1877, but asked for 40 in 1885.242 This put an end to the 
prosperous chiftlik estates here, while these survived in Bosnia, 
Macedonia and Thrace, that is, in lands which remained under Ottoman 
rule. Here the different social and agrarian conditions – the lack of free-
holdings with proper size to secure self-subsistence, which pushed the 
peasants to work for others, the persistence of cheap enforced labour 
(corvéé) and sharecropping – maintained these large estates. 
 
(ii) Profitability of agrarian production: peasant economies 
 
This chapter investigates the numerous (intertwining) problems of 
smallholdings still debated in literature: (1) whether these were 
profitable enough to compete with large estates in case of similar 
conditions, (2) whether monocultural grain production fit to 
smallholdings or not, what alternative ways of cultivation were 
practised in this period (landuse conflicts), (3) what transformations 
these changes induced in families, whether there was an oversupply of 
workforce or not, (4) where and why the smallholdings could exceed 
the level of self-subsistence, etc. Some special cases will be discussed 
separately (the Greek model or Croatia in the next chapters), this part 
focuses on “free” smallholdings turning towards grain production 
(Serbia, Bulgaria). The above mentioned questions regarding 
“smallholdings” that were parts of non-allodial large estates (chiftliks) 
will also be discussed in a later chapter (Macedonia, Bosnia), as these 
were only indirectly influenced by the external circumstances (their 
profitability is discussed in the chapter on large estates). 
                                                          
242 Mollov, J.–Totev, Yu.: Ceni na zemedelskite proizvedeniya u nas prez poslednite 54 godini 1881–
1934. Sofia, 1935. 90. and Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 181.  
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Grain production 
Although cultivation techniques were obsolete on small estates (an 
average chiftlik used 3-4 iron ploughs and 10-15 wooden ploughs, ralo, 
while smallholders mostly used the latter),243 this did not necessarily 
mean that they were not profitable, especially if we consider, that their 
number increased in many districts. 
The present chapter investigates the distribution of production 
between different social layers in the Balkan regions and the changes in 
this – comparing the situation in the Napoleonic Wars (1780–1815) to 
the next prosperous stage in 1840–73. Our presumption is that if 
producers managed to participate in earning profits from the increasing 
grain prices it could decrease social tensions. For example, in Ottoman 
Bulgaria numerous revolts broke out (1835, 1836, 1837, 1841, 1842, 1850, 
1862, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1876), but none during the great western famine 
of 1846–50, and the revolutionary wave of 1848 – with the exception of 
Romania, where the socio-economic system completely differed from 
that in Serbia or Bulgaria – did not reach the region. 
Although wheat prices doubled during the Napoleonic era 
compared to 1787, transport costs also increased by 50%. This also 
meant that most of the profits was realized in/consumed by transport 
and trade that time, local producers did not benefit from the processes 
until freight costs decreased. By the 1840s this situation changed: grain 
prices has doubled again, while freight rates declined. The abolishment 
of fixed prices and the implementation of maktu system in 1832244 (the 
spahi-tax farmers lost their right to collect taxes in kind, and voyvodas 
collected it in cash instead) compelled peasants to sell their wheat in 
markets. With the infiltration of western (higher) grain prices into the 
peninsula, even smallholders were able to receive extra income, unless 
they were excluded from market processes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
243 Dimitrov, Str.: Chiflishkoto stopanstvo prez 50-60-te godini na XIX. vek. Istoricheski Pregled, 
1955/2. 16. 
244 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History… 135. 
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Table 7. Wheat exports and production at different localities decomposed to one family 
Region Population 
Production or 
export 
Production per 
capita (and per 
family of 5 
members) 
Value of 
production/exports 
per capita (and per 
family of 5 members) 
Production of Tuna 
vilayet, 1876 
2 300 000 32 000 000 kile 360 kgs and 2000 kgs 300 p and 1500 p 
Exports ofTuna 
vilayet, cca. 1850  
 
3 million kile = 
78 000 tons 
35 and 200 kgs 30 and 180 p 
Exports of towns 
along the Danube, 
1854 
110 000 
families 
250 000 kile (1 
kile = 50 p for 
wheat, 
altogether 10 
million. 
15 kg and 7 kgs 20 and 100 p 
Exports of Ruse 
and its hinterland, 
1876 
55 families = 
300 000 
persons 
500 000 centner 
= 25 000 tons, 
21 million p 
100 kgs  
(and 450 kgs) 
100 and 400 p 
 
Exports of 
Bulgaria and E-
Rumelia, 1840 
2 500 000 
800 000 kile = 
21 ezer tons 
8 and 45 kgs 4 and 20 p 
Vidin, total 
production in 1847  
7000 families 
1,1 million kile = 
28 000 tons 
0.8 t and 4 t 700 and 3800 p 
Exports of Burgas, 
1848 
700 000 prs 
(total Sanjak of 
Plovdiv) 
1.3 million kile 
= 32 500 tons 
50 kgs 25-40 p and 125–200 p 
Exports of 
Bulgaria and E-
Rumelia, 1847 
2 500 000  
4.3 million kile 
= 110 000 tons 
44 and 220 kgs 35 and 200 p 
Production of 
Tuna vilayet, 1865 
 
7 100 000 kile = 
185 ezer tons 
85 and 420 kgs 85 and 420 p 
Exports of Tuna 
vilayet, 1865 
 
4 335 000 kile = 
110 000 tons 
50 and 250 kgs 50 and 250 p 
Exports of Edirne 
vilayet, cca. 1870 
1 300 000 
28 million 
piasters 
 25 and 125 p 
Prior to prosperity 
Production of 
Saloniki, 1839 
 
75 million 
piasters (12–20 
piasters/kile) 
 250 piasters/household 
Exports of 
Saloniki, 1839 
 
5 million 
piasters (7–8%) 
 17 piasters/household 
Production of 
Macedonia, 1840 
800 000 
3 million kile = 
78 000 tons 
100 kgs and 500 kgs 40 and 200 p 
Exports of 
Macedonia, 1840 
800 000 450 000 kile 15 and 75 kgs 8 and 40 p 
Prior to 1846 the grain price is calculated as 400 p/t after 1846 we calculate with 840 p/t. 
Based on Bulgarie et Roumelie. Annales du commerce extérieur. Paris, 1850. 9–10. and Michoff, N.: 
Beiträge zu Handelsgeschichte Bulgariens II. Band 1–2. Sofia, 1953.  
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So, liberalization had the potential to decrease social tensions. 
However, this depended on the distribution of the surplus production 
between the different social groups and this showed significant regional 
differences too. For example, in the Romanian principalities peasants became 
excluded from the markets by the 1830s. Though the Romanian elite and 
the Orthodox Church had managed to acquire one-third of land from 
the peasants by the beginning of the 19th century,245 merging them to 
their own allodium,246 from the 1820s on (after the Reglament 
Organique of Count Kiselev) the process reversed. The role of allodial 
estates soon began to decrease in the Romanian principalities, as the 
tithe was increased from 1/10 to 1/5 of the production.247 Grain delivered 
to landlords by peasants exceeded the amount produced on allodial 
holdings using corvéé by three to five times, therefore for landlords it 
was more profitable to lease the land for sharecroppers, than forcing the 
corvéé. By 1833 50% of the cultivated land had been worked by peasant 
smallholders, who were deprived of the surplus through heavy taxes 
and compulsory services. Therefore peasants were excluded from 
                                                          
245 In order to avoid increasing central taxes (the principalities were farmed out as huge ’tax-
farms’ for the Phanariots, and the candidate who paid the highest price received the right to 
rule them as temporarily assigned prince), the peasants of the Romanian principalities 
offered their land to monasteries or boiars keeping the right to use it, while paying the 10% 
tithe. Peasants became sharetenants (they often even gave up their individual liberty to get 
rid of the head-taxes), whose free movement was forbidden (contrary to the processes in 
Serbia). Roucek, S.: Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems. Stanford Univ. Press, 1932. 295.  
246 In the first half of the 18th century the Romanian ruling class expropriated the production 
through a tithe in kind or in cash rather than to apply. Corvéé (clacă) was only 12 days a 
year in 1750 and further 12 days convertible into cash – very low compared to Habsburg 
lands. As the wars in 1736–39 forced many to flee to Transyvania, the lowlands began to 
suffer from labour shortages, and this was against both grain production and corvéé. Lampe, 
J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 84. The temporary turn after 1780 in the grain 
prices and the depreciation of Ottoman coinage reversed the pattern in compulsory 
services: the redemption of clacă days in cash was increased tenfold. Though this hardly 
exceeded the rate of the inflation between 1780–1818, for peasants usually lacking cash it 
meant a great problem. Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 84. 
247 McGowan, B.: Economic life, 73. The wars forced the boiars to leave for safe places, like 
Bucharest and they leased their estates to merchants, who were profit-oriented as 
temporary owners, which resulted in the doubling of tithe, now extended to corn as well, 
which was spread earlier together with pigs, because of low taxes and the lack of 
compulsory delivery. 
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profiting from grain sales (by 1847 80% of the export income came from 
grains): markets were dominated by the 665 merchants.248 
In Macedonia the profits of producers (peasants) was also smaller 
compared to Bulgaria, where smallholdings dominated and the 
proportion of chiftliks from total cultivated land was around 20%.249 In 
Macedonia the proportion of chifliks reached 50% (87/165 settlements 
were considered chifliks in Monastir, 87/150 around Skopje)250 and the 
producer was deprived of one-third or even half of the production sold 
directly by the landlord. Landlords even tended to substitute tenants’ 
share from the yield with paid labour, just to deprive producers from 
the grain itself.251 Since smallholding was not exclusive, in order to 
estimate peasant participation in exports, the share of the landlords 
from total grain production was calculated based on the frequency of 
large estates and then subtracted from the total output together with the 
profits on transportation.  
The regional differences and the differences in intensification of 
trade are revealed through the export values measured to the 
population of the harbours’ hinterland (table 3 and 7). These values refer 
to the possible maximum earnings per households from exports, from 
which the costs of transport and the profits of merchants (25%) also has 
to be subtracted, while the remainder has to be distributed between the 
different social groups (landlords and producers) participating in 
market processes. 
Thus, for example the 34 million piaster surplus (measured to the 
prevoius year) in Saloniki in 1847252 would produce 225 piasters income 
surplus per family without subtracting the above mentioned. These 
modifying factors reduce the income surplus to 30, 90, 20 piasters per 
                                                          
248 Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy.: Európa gazdasága, 592.  
249 There is a debate about the effectivity of chitfliks. If we accept Lampe’s data that only 10% of 
the Bulgarian peasantry worked on the 20% of the lands, producing 30% of output, that 
would put per capita effectiveness too high, which is in contradiction of the statement, that 
”corvéé-like services” are not profitable. But on the other hand, most of the chifliks were not 
allodial units, rather composed of smallholdings. 
250 Hristov, H.: Agrarnite otnosheniya v Makedoniya prez XIX. v. i nachaloto na XX v. Sofia, 1964. 86. 
251 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 134. 
252 Dokumenti za balgarskata istoriya iz germanski arhivi 1829–1877. Sofia. 1963. 94–150. No. 22. 
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peasant farms between 1846–48 in Macedonia. Due to the better social 
structure in Bulgaria this was 50 piasters in 1847, around Svistov it 
could reach 100 piasters and 200 piasters around Plovdiv.253 
Was this a significant amount to mitigate social tensions? Definitely, 
especially compared to the situation in the Romanian principalities. This 
30–60 piasters of surplus equalled to the yearly cizye254 (in Moldova this 
was still responsible for 70% of central incomes in 1839, even after the 
limitations of the Reglament Organique by Count Kiselev, who 
decreased its value from 78 piasters), or with the monthly salary of an 
industrial worker. Furthermore, the total income of peasants from grain 
trade reached 250 piasters per family, higher than the tithe-income of 
the central government in the Danube province, which was 150 piasters 
per household in 1864 (60 million piasters total) increasing to 250 in the 
next few years.255 So, in these very years the income surplus of 
peasantry exceeded per capita taxes. (That is why subsequent tax-
increases – depriving peasants of these surpluses – created heavy unrest 
in the 1870s). Without these remarkable profits, Bulgarian peasants 
could not have bought land after the Ottoman land reforms in 1858. In 
Bulgaria 30-40% of the produced grains was exported256 – the 
Hungarian allodial large estates produced similar surpluses, but this 
was divided between internal and external markets, thus it was a very 
high value for smallholdings indeed.  
On the other hand one year’s profit was not enough to buy a 
modern plough which cost 370 grosh (70 francs). 
 
 
 
                                                          
253 In the region of Varna French shipped grains worth 45 million piasters, 50 thousand tons. 
Damianov, S.: French Commerce, 20. After the deduction of the trade profits 30 million 
piasters remain, which makes the totel income per household to 150 piasters calculating 
with 200 thousand families. After the deduction of the landlords’ share (chiftlik was 
significant in this region) 75–100 piasters still remained. 
254 Hadzibegić, H.: Džizja ili Harač. Prilozi 5. Sarajevo, 1954–55. 102. 
255 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 48. 
256 Berend, T. I.–Ránki Gy.: Közép-Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19-20. században. Budapest, 
1969. 84. During the decline in 1880–1910 it was only 15–18%. 
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Animal husbandry 
 
As we saw the profit rate of large estates could reach 20-25% under 
favourable circumstances, so it was similar to that of the transport. 
Smallholdings could send the same proportion of their production to 
external markets. But what about other agricultural activities? There 
was a growing rivalry over the lands between grain production and 
animal husbandry, due to the diverse production structure of the 
latter:257 the wool was consumed by the textile industry, supplying the 
Ottoman army prior to 1878, while livestock supplied the the capital 
with meat (Plovdiv transferred alone 250 thousand animals yearly).258 
The high proportion of fallow land offered plenty of space for animals 
producing manure to fertilize arable lands. In 1847 623 thousand 
Transylvanian sheep were grazing in Bulgarian lands. Calculating with 
50 grosh per each, they were worth 25 million piasters. These animals 
gave 1.2 million okes of wool, which meant 5 million piasters 
(calculating with 4 grosh/oke). This meant an added value of 20%! 
Subtracting the costs of land rents, which was 2-3000 piasters for 1000 
sheep, at least 3.5 million grosh profit still remained, making the profit 
rate over 12%. This wool worth 4 piasters in Ottoman Turkey was sold 
at 10 piasters/oke in the Viennese markets owing to the great demand. 
(Transport costs from Brasov to Vienna would mean only a 10% 
increase in prices).  
Lacking grain surplus, Serbia participated in the new Atlantic 
system of division of labour by exporting livestock. Due to cheap 
transportation of livestock259 Serbian animals rather headed for Austria 
and not for Istanbul, because the previous was nearer and did not fix 
                                                          
257 25% of the animal products were dairies, 33% was given by meat, the rest was considered 
industrial raw material (wool, skin). 
258 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 61; Hochstetter, F.: Reise durch Rumelien im Sommer 1869. 
Mitteilungen der kaiserl. und königl. geographischen Gesellschaft in Wien. Band XIII-XV. 
1871–1873. 175. In 1869 150 thousand sheep arrived from Albania and Bosnia towards 
Plovdiv, while from the neighborhood of Istanbul further 160 thousand sheep and 100 
thousand horses arrived to the summer grazing.  Plovdiv was a redistributive center.  
259 The reason was the higher added value for the same amount of meat compared to grains. 
The added value was 100 kg grains was 150 grams of silver, but was 250 for animals and 
290 grams for wool (transport costs were fixed and based on weight).  
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the prices. In the 1840s only 60 000 Serbian sheep traveled to the 
Ottoman capital260 worth maximum 3 million piasters (calculating with 
50 piasters unit price), while the value of animal exports towards 
Austria exceeded 10 million dinars (50 million piasters).  
Owing to the great demand the number of sheep and goats 
increased from 4.8 million to 6.3 million between 1866–74 in the lowland 
Danube province.261 In the 1870s 28 percent of the farms fed more than 
50 animals, 25% had less then 10.262 Diverse utilization of sheep 
increased their unit prices from 50 to 75 piasters. Prosperity is also 
shown by the fact that beglik tax reached 20% of the value of animals 
(17 piasters) in mountainous areas, while elsewhere it remained 5 
piasters. This ruined the traditional woodland grazing as the costs of 
animal husbandry became higher the the benefits from selling firewood. 
Large-scale sheep-breeding in mountainous areas (like in the 
Rhodopi) was usually organized in a transhumant way: during summer, 
the sheep were pastured in the mountains near the villages of the 
shepherds. During winter, they were kept in lowlands, for example 
north of the Aegean, where there usually was no snow and where big 
landlords rented land to the pastoralists, who in turn also watched the 
flocks of the lowland landlords.263 The flocks were pastured by 
professional shepherds and not, such as in (semi-)nomadism by the 
whole household. Women, children and the elderly remained at home 
in the native villages, where they cared for the small mountain farms 
and were also often employed in household industry (weaving). In the 
mountainous regions it was the border changes since 1878 and the 
increasing transformation of community land into privately cultivated 
land which undermined the conditions for transhumance and 
disadvantaged animal husbandry vis-à-vis agriculture. 
In lowlands it was the increasing grain prices that endangered the 
prosperity of animal husbandry by intensifying a landuse conflict. 
                                                          
260 Džambazovski, K.: Snabdevanje Carigradske pijacije srednom XIX veka sitnom stokom iz Knježevije 
Srbije. Istorijski časopis 29–30, 1982–1983. 315–25. and Istoriya na Balgariya, Tom. 5. 278. 
261 Draganova, Sl.:  Kolichestven analiz na ovcevadstvoto v balgarskite zemi pod osmanska vlasti ot 
sredata na XIX. vek do osvobozhdenieto. Sofia, 1993. 11. 
262 Ibid. 35. 
263 BEUERMANN; BRUNNBAUER: 
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While in the 1840s around Pleven grain production gave only 1/3 of the 
rural income (totalling 3000 piasters per household),264a generation later, 
in 1859 in Kazanlik kaza only 15% of the income (ranging to 3700 
piasters/household) came from animal husbandry. The proportion of 
textiles from income did not exceed 10% even in the more urbanized 
Stara Zagora district, while grains were responsible for 70% of revenues 
– clearly indicating the change and the decrease in the diversity of the 
production as well.265 
Summing up all these mentioned we may come to the conslusion 
that the profit rate of almost all forms of agrarian activities were similar to that 
of industrial activities, or even surpassed that, while the latter definitely 
required much capital,266 which was missing. This explains the process of 
deindustrialization. 
(c) Modernization efforts 
 
This chapter includes not only the efforts on the modernization of 
production (which can be considered partly as a local initiatives), but 
also the efforts of central government on the modernization of tax 
revenues and land tenure system, which resulted in increasing burdens 
(discussed later).  
Ottoman Turkey produced only 33% of its own potential. The British 
consul in Galaţi pointed out early in 1844 that Varna and Burgas could 
transfer 80 million piasters export (half of this in form of wheat), 
equalling with 20% of the total export of the peninsula. This was thrice 
as much as the actual export.267 It is not surprising therefore, that the 
British were devoted to the construction of the Ruse-Varna railway 
                                                          
264 Since grazing lands constituted only 10% of lands, it was evident that fallow land was used 
for animal husbandry. 
265 Poyet, C. F.: IIIé lettre du docteur Poyet á la Société de géographie contenant la description de 
Quezanlik Turquie d'Europe (Thrace). Bulletin de la Société de géographie. IVé série. Tome 18. 
Année 1859; Poyet, C. F.: IIé lettre du docteur Poyet á la Société de géographie contenant la 
description du kaza de Eski-Zagra (Bulgarie). Bulletin de la Société de géographie. IVé série. 
Tome 18. Année 1859. Paris, 145–79. 
266 The first factory of Zhelyazkov cost only 140 000 piasters, the second one 1 000 000. 
267 Demeter G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. I. 153. 
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(1866), which enabled them to compete with Austrian transports on the 
Danube. On the other hand the Empire represented 20% of the 
grainland of Europe. British capitalists argued, that European wheat 
production could be increased by 15% in case of the optimal 
exploitation of Ottoman lands, that way decreasing the feeding costs the 
western industrial workers. This idea reveals, that beyond making the 
Ottoman Empire more stable, British had their own well-calculated 
interest behind each advice.268 
In the era of growing demand on wheat the English adviced the 
transformation landuse, that of grazing lands to arable land. For example 
around Varna 3750 hectares was used as meadows producing 11 000 
piasters state tax. If this had been exploited as ploughland – calculating 
with 1 kile (25 kgs) seed for a dönüm and 5:1 output ratio and 50% 
fallow land – this would have produced more than 2500 tons of wheat 
rated to 1.2–2.5 million grosh after which 120-250 000 piasters of tithe 
could have been collected as state tax. Nevertheless, it meant more 
work, and the observers had certain negative reservations about the 
enthusiasm of peasants in case of such a structural change. (The 
proposed increase of state taxes on animal husbandry could push 
producers to turn towards wheat production).  
Another idea of the English observers was to put consumption under 
taxation instead of production (tax reforms). But the Ottoman Empire did 
just the opposite in the case of trade, because the volume of 
consumption was yet not high enough in the Empire to compensate the 
losses in direct taxes. The rate of indirect taxes in the Balkans remained 
low until the 1900s.  
The third British idea was to tax the land unit instead of production, 
because it would force the producer to cultivate the fallow land. The 
proposed 1 franc/dönüm269 meant 45 piasters/ha, totalling 250 
piasters/household of 5 hectares. But as statistics show, the average tithe 
in the Danube vilayet – then collected after the production – has already 
increased from 100 to 170 piasters per household early between 1864-
                                                          
268 St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Ch.: Residence in Bulgaria. Twelve year study of the Eastern Question in 
Bulgaria. London, 1877. 160.  
269 Ibid. 198.  
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1867, then to 250 piasters by 1868 (and it was even higher in Plovdiv 
sanjak) even without implementing this change. This made the proposal 
of land tax obsolete within a decade. Nevertheless, the idea was not 
forgotten: the Bulgarians utilized it after 1878, when they wanted to 
expropriate the uncultivated lands of Muslim refugees. 
The Ottoman land reforms in 1858 were also the part of the 
modernization attempts, although there is still a debate in literature 
whether the government intended to (1) support the extensification of 
cultivation, (2) stabilize large landholdings, (3) maintain smallholdings, 
or (4) simply extract extra revenues regardless of the impact on the 
regionally diverse land tenure types. 
Owing to the implementation of free circulation of land many 
peasants managed to get full ownership of cultivated land by 
purchasing it from the state. But land reforms were not always 
successful, like the Greek (discussed later). Sometimes they induced 
unfavourable tendencies (even against the original will) on the long run 
(1878, Bulgaria), or merely postponed a crisis generated by 
demographic pressure (Serbia, 1860s, 1920s). What is common that land 
reforms alone, without other changes were unable to contribute 
significantly to the increase of outputs and competitiveness of the agrarian 
sector. Later events proved, that land reforms were essential, but not 
sufficient condition for modernization. 
By the 1870s decreasing wheat prices and increasing labour costs 
threatened the profitability of large landholdings. Could mechanization 
be a solution for these estates? Maybe. In 1869 Zafiropul bey bought a 
threshing machine that produced 4 times greater quantity of grains than 
70 horses and 24 men at the same time.270 But this implied huge costs, 
10 000 francs (1885),271 and such expenses were not available for a 
mediocre chiflik of 60 hectares within few years (the yearly profit was 
not more than 4000 francs). Therefore state intervention was required for 
the amelioration of the situation: 33 steam yokes and 33 harvesters were 
purchased in 1869. Although from economic aspect this was a rational 
                                                          
270 Tonev, V.: Balgarskoto chernomorie, 74. 
271 Keleti K.: A Balkán-félsziget némely országai- és tartományainak közgazdasági viszonyai. Budapest, 
1885. 169–70.  
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step, but as all members of the provincial medjlis were large estate 
owners (except one),272 they were accused of using state taxes to 
promote their own interest.  
The lack of knowledge to operate these machines was another 
hindrance. Unfortunately, the neighboring Hungary also invested a lot 
in buying threshing machines in order to appear on the markets as early 
as possible before the dumping period began. The density of threshing 
machines was very high in Hungary, especially compared to other 
engines: van Zanden claims, that this was the major advantage for the 
Hungarian wheat.  
The state neither abandoned smallholders. Since a modern plough 
cost 70 francs, while a smallholding economy over 5 ha made less than 
50 francs net profits in Serbia273 according to Palairet (after the collapse 
of grain prices in the 1870s), external sources were required for the 
modernization of smallholdings. To overcome usury, the governor of 
Danube vilayet, Midhat pasha introduced the system of agricultural 
credits. Originally these were financed by a 5% surtax on the tithe from 
1865.274 But only 10% of the male population received some credits: 10% 
of them over 2000 piasters, while the average amount was 800–900 
grosh.275 Although 50% of farmers did not earn more than that in a year, 
this still was not enough to fully modernize an economy or to buy new 
lands (this sum equalled to the price of 1.5 hectares of ploughland or to 
a pair of oxen with cart). Though the success of the project was 
questioned even by contemporary observers, the idea was not bad and 
it revived in the forms of cooperatives at the turn of the century. 
 
 
                                                          
272 Lásd: Dimitrov, Str.: Chiflishkoto stopanstvo… 
273 Palairet, M.: Fiscal Pressure and Peasant Impoverishment in Serbia before World War I. The 
Journal of Economic History 39, No. 3. 1979. 724. and Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik 
Serbiens, 274. 
274 Todorova, M.: „Obshtopolezite kasi” na Midhat pasha. Istoricheski Pregled, 1972/5. 63–65.  
275 The total value of land credits reached 11 million in the Danube vilayet and 9 million in the 
Edirne vilayet. 
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(d) Social consequences 
 
The socio-economic changes in Western Europe resulted in a shift in 
taxation towards indirect (consumption) taxes, and the revolutionary 
waves between 1789 and 1849 are claimed to decrease the burdens of 
agrarian societies. The Ottoman state differed from European 
tendencies from this respect, as it still relied on direct and agrarian 
incomes, though the proportions expropriated from the producers 
changed over time, and there was also a remarkable difference between 
the expropriated income and income reaching the central budget. It is 
also worth comparing the burdens on agrarian societies in the liberated 
Serbia or Bulgaria with areas remaining under Ottoman rule (Bosnia, 
Macedonia), because in the newly formed (but still agrarian) states the 
burdens in the beginning decreased (thus state incomes also), as an 
independence without offering a decrease in burdens would not have 
been attractive for masses. This measure did not help overcome the 
differences between the eastern and western parts of Europe.  
 
(i) Burdens of agrarian societies 
 
As the Ottoman state could only rely on the agriculture to finance 
administrative and industrial modernization and to repay the foreign 
debts, the burdens on society (which had decreased from 25-40% of the 
production during the spahi era to 16-20% by the 1850s)276 increased 
again in the 1870s. The central incomes of the Danubian province has 
grown from 79 to 113 million piasters between 1858–64,277 then within 3 
years another increase of 40% was measured (to 150 million). Most of 
this increase stemmed from the agriculture and the proportion of 
agricultural incomes in the budget exceeded 50%.278 In the Danubian 
Province tithe incomes between 1864-67 increased from 40 million to 68 
                                                          
276 Berov, Ly.: Ravnishte, 45–50.  
277 Poujade, E.: Chrétiens et Turcs. Scénes et souvenirs de la vie politique, militaire et religieuse en 
Orient. Paris, 1859. 254. 
278 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 150., Istoriya na Balgarya, Tom 6. 65. and 
Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 19. 
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million, then to 108 million (1868) (or 100, 170, 280 piasters per 
household respectively), beglik increased from 16 to 28 million. The tithe 
in Eastern Rumelia increased from 22 million in 1866 peaking at 50 
million piasters in 1875.279 
The question is, how much of this growing revenue stems from (1) 
the increase of tax rates, (2) from the extension of lands, or from an 
increase (3) in productivity or (4) of prices. The abolishment of export 
tariffs in the 1860s to encourage exports was compensated by the 2.5% 
increase of tithe: thus burdens were shifted from merchants to producers. But 
this tax-increase would mean only a 25% increase of tithe incomes, 
while tithe doubled indeed.280 (And yet we have to add the sums 
disappeared in iltizam-system: British observers also wrote about tax 
farms bought for 400 pounds, but 900 was collected instead).281 
It is therefore not surprising that – although the rate of expropriated 
harvest decreased compared to the 17-18th century –, peasants of 
Plovdiv in 1844 still paid 18% of their land revenues as taxes and it was 
15 % in Berkovica.282 The Russian consul, Moshnin put taxes to 1300 
piasters in case of 5000 piasters wealth, reaching 25%.283 The Austrian 
consul, Martyrt also stated that the old vergi tax was too high and taxes 
altogether reached 20% of the wealth. (Only independence brought 
relief, when iltizam was abolished, and taxes decreased under 10% – 
figure 2–3, table 8).  
This would not necessarily mean empoverishment, if incomes 
(either yields or prices or both) increased as well. Although we have 
                                                          
279 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 176–78. 
280 After 1867 further 2.5% was imposed on those, whose private property was state land prior 
to 1858, to compensate the state. Thus, tithe reached 15% without the profits on iltizam. (The 
tax-increase ended in revolts in 1857 after bad harvest). 
281 St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Ch.: Residence in Bulgaria, 178. The Chomakov merchant house 
bought the tax-farm in Plovdiv for 2.7 million piasters and made 0.6 million piasters of 
profits (22%) in 1849. It is very characteristic that they bought a chiftlik from the revenue 
instead of investing it to industry. Yaneva, Sv.: The Non-Muslim Tax-Farmers in the Fiscal 
and Economic System of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century. In: Nielsen, J. (ed.): 
Religion, Ethnicity and Contested Nationhood in the Former Ottoman Space. Leiden, 2012. 
56–57.  
282 Berov, Ly.: Ravnishte, 45–50. 
283 Moshnin, A. N.: Pridunayskaya Bolgariya. Slavyanskiy sbornik. Sanktpeterburg, Tom. II. 1877.  
367. 
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evidence that local outputs also grew (in Berkovica incomes in 
grosh/dönüm increased from 35 to 70 in case of a landholding of 45 
dönüms; and increased from 20 to 75 in case of a farm of 70 dönüms),284 
all our calculations show, that the increase in income of peasantry did not 
keep up with the pace of the tax increase.285 Thus burdens became heavier in the 
last decade of Ottoman rule (figure 2–3). This was a preindustrial prosperity 
determined by external factors (demand). 
 
Figure 2. Tax-burdens in the 19th century Bulgaria for an average household of 5 persons 
 
 (columns represent current prices, lines silver grams)  
 
What was behind this phenomenon? In order to finance administrative 
and industrial modernization the state had to rely solely on the 
agriculture. Although huge surpluses were gained owing to the 
prospertity driven by favourable external circumstances, two factors 
                                                          
284 See Draganova, Sl.: Berkovskoto selo… 
285 During the Midhat-era the increase of non-tithe taxes has exceeded that of population 
growth (50% vs. 11% measured in Kjustendil). Here the value of tithe also increased by 50% 
between 1864–74. This was only partly compensated by the extensivity and the increase of 
yields, thus taxes rose from 14% of the income to 17–18%. See table II. 56. in Demeter, G.: A 
Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. I. calculated from the data of Draganova, Sl.: Kjustendilski 
region… 
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hindered the industrialization of the Ottoman empire. Unfortunately, 
global tendencies were against industrialization: high grain prices had a 
pull factor on labour force and investing into agriculture was more 
attractive than competing with western industrial imports. 
Figure 3. The increase of incomes (line: silver kgs) and tax ratio measured to income (in %, 
columns) for an average household of 5 
 
Based on Berov (16th century), Draganova (Pleven, Berkovica), Mihov (1859, Edirne 1876), Popov 
(1897, 1911), Keleti (E-Rumélia) Palairet (Danube vilaeet, Sanjak of Plovdiv), Daskalov, Ivanov (tax 
incomes after 1912), Vasilev, Razbojnikov (Küchük Seymen, 1912), Poyet (1859), and Todorov, G. The 
Vilayet of Edirne symbolises area that did not undergo the reforms, the chiftlik of Küchük Seymen 
indicates the situation in areas remaining under Ottoman rule in 1912, Stara Zagora represents 
industrialized regions. 
 
Table 8. A regional comparison of taxes (in grams of silver) 
Tithe 
Serbia, 
1880 
Serbia, 
1910 
Macedonia Macedonia 
Macedonia 
after 1903 
N-
Bulgaria, 
1864** 
N-
Bulgaria, 
1867** 
Bulgaria, 
1900 
silver gram 
/ capita 
40 60 21+60* 34+100* 21+60* 30 60 50 
*with 33% tretina 
 
compare to table 9. **with beglik 
 
 
Table 9. Agrarian taxes measured to income (%) in different regions 
Romania Croatia Bosnia Bulgaria Serbia 
Macedonia 
and Thrace Greece 
20% 20% 35%  
16-18% in the 
1870s,  6-10% 
10+35%, at 
least 20% 
10+20% for share-
croppers  
after 
1820 
tithe+Church 
tax 
10% for 
Muslim 
freeholders  10% after 1878 
head tax 
instead of 
tithe till 1884 
 state tax 
+tretina or 
tax-farming 
5 % draft animal 
tax after 1880 
0
5
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Furthermore, profits from agriculture were consumed by the central 
government as the consequence of the Crimean War. Although the state 
survived the Russian agression, but became indebted, and since both 
the policy of internal borrowing (malikane) and devalvation was unable to 
fuel the modernization earlier, there had not been any other fiscal choice 
than turning to external borrowing. The loans unfortunately consumed 
the agrarian profits and when the favourable external circumstances 
were over, the empire went into bankruptcy.  
From macroeconomic level the abolishment of high export tariffs (10-
12% ad valorem) to encourage exports286 did not mean any losses for the 
state, as tithe was increased instead. Since cca. 30% of wheat was 
exported, tariff incomes reached 3.5% value of the total grain 
production, thus the imposition of an extra +3% tax on the total grain 
production could simply compensate the losses. But it generated a 
heavy burden for the producers.287 Another problem was that by the 
1870s the proportion of the local income used outside the boundary of 
the Danubian and Eastern Rumelian region increased from 55 to 75 % (it 
was 60% in Janina)288 sucking out capital from these regions. This 
caused tensions, especially because the principality of Serbia paid a 
negligible tribute to the Ottomans compared to the Bulgarian taxes.289 
It is also true that there were great regional and religious disparities 
regarding the burdens. Although land-tax did not show religious 
differences – around Varna Muslim villages paid 15%, Christians 10-
20% of their production – Christians constituting 60% of the population 
in 1875 in the Plovdiv sanjak paid 75% of total taxes (twice as much per 
capita as Muslims) – not because they were wealthier, but as a result of 
the new military tax, for example. 
                                                          
286 This step was partly driven by the market contraction after the end of the Crimean War, 
which generally decreased central incomes. Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic 
History, 137. 
287 This was enough to produce revolts after the catastrophic harvest of 1857.  
288 Poujade, E.: Chrétiens et Turcs,  254. and Draganova, Sl.: Les Dépenses du vilayet de Janina et du 
Danube pour L’Année Budgetaire 1870–1871. In: Relations et influences Réciproques entre 
Grecs et Bulgares XVIIIe-XXe siécle. Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991. 151–63. 
289 Expenditure on administration took 60%, 18% remained for education, social and religious 
instutions had only a share of 6%. Draganova, Sl.: Selskoto naselenie na Dunavski vilayet. Sofia, 
2005. 27–31. 
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But the new military system, with a head-tax on Christians was 
disadvantageous for Muslims as well, who had to serve half a year in 
the army, and this meant a loss of workforce for the economic unit. 
While a Christian male had to pay yearly 25-30 piasters military tax, 
Muslims had to pay 5000 piasters for the 20 years, if wanted to buy 
exemption. Therefore Muslims felt, that the could not compete with 
Christian economies: the production per household varied between 
100–240 kile (2600 to 6000 kgs) in the villages around Varna and the 
Muslim smallholders produced worse output values!290 
Beyond social burdens, as each preindustrial society, the Balkan 
societies were also threatened by recurrent climatic anomalies. This was 
especially true for smallholders. According to Labrousse291 the loss of 
revenues stemming from a sudden decline in outputs usually exceeds 
the supposed profits stemming from the increasing unit prices (owing 
to shortages). Although this concept was challenged by Post who 
statistically proved that the opposite can also be true at macroeconomic 
level,292 in countries where masses lived in smallholdings balancing 
between self-subsistence and food scarcity, the population was more 
likely to suffer from the first outcome. Even a 20% decrease in outputs 
would mean that the peasant not only lost the opportunity to sell his 
surplus at markets,293 but this could also endanger next year’ seeds, thus 
the maintenance of the whole system.  
This happened during the bad winter of 1875, when peasants had to 
buy grain for foodstuff and seed. In the beginning of the year the Balkan 
peasant sold his grain for 25 piasters/kile (this was a high price, 1000 
piasters/tons), but could buy only for 90 piasters by August! The usury 
and speculations – in Constantinople the grain prices were fixed at 28-
32 piasters/kile; and those who offered loans for the peasants wanted to 
                                                          
290 St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Ch.: Residence in Bulgaria, appendix F (423.) 
291 Labrousse, C. E.: La mouvement ouvrier, 30–31.  
292 In France wheat prices increased by 80% in 1815 after the eruption of the Tambora, while the 
volume of output decreased only by 12% (136 million hl in 1816 and 154 million in 1818). 
Post, J. D.: A Study in Meteorological and Trade Cycle History, 339–40. 
293 In 1929 after the fall of grain prices the Bulgarian state had to face the consequences of its 
export-supporting policy, which could help those farmers who had marketable surpluses, 
but was ineffective for hundreds of thousands smallholders who hardly had any.  
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get back double grain quantity – together with the tax increases 
exacerbated the tensions culminating in the 1875–76 revolts in 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria.294 The same happened after 1815 to the 
Habsburg Monarchy: due to the decrease of outputs 50% of 
smallholders and only 10% of large estate owners went into bankruptcy. 
Seed and food shortages were more dangerous than falling prices for a 
smallholder society for an autarchic agrarian system. These all prove, that in 
Southeast-Europe in 1840-1870 we still speak of preindustrial prosperity 
determined by external factors (demand, climate) which was not really 
sustainable. 
 
(ii) The living standard of agrarian classes 
 
These all take us to the question how the wealth of agrarian layers 
changed over time? While around 1730 in Tirnovo kaza based on the 
cizye 66% was considered poor and only 5% was rich, by 1831295 the 
proportion of poor decreased to 30–40%, that of the middle class 
increased from 30 % to 50%.296 But there were still great differences 
between the layers. While in Provadia 20% of artizans, 45% of 
merchants and 70% of former landlords earned more than 1000 gros, 
only 10% of peasants belonged to this group (50% of peasants earned 
less than 500 grosh here, similar to Lom 30 years earlier: table 10).297 The 
Tanzimat rather enrichened the layer of merchants, than agrarian producers – 
similarly to Serbia, where reforms leading to different direction were 
implemented. 
                                                          
294 Kosev, D.: Polozhenieto na balgarskiya narod predi aprilskoto vastanie. Istoricheski Pregled, 
1948/2. 145–54. 
295 Dimitrov, Str.–Stoykov, R.: Socialnata diferenciaciya, 188–90.  
296 Draganova, Sl.: Materiali za Dunavskija vilayet, 15. Table 1. (1841); Karpat, K.: Ottoman 
Population 1830–1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics. The University of Wisconsin 
Press. 1985. 36. This difference could also be the result of changes in taxation system! 
297 Todorov, N.: Socialni-ikonomicheski oblik na Provadiya: Istoricheski Pregled, 1963/2. 68–85; 
Todorov, N.: Za naemniya trud v balgarskite zemi, kam sredata na XIX. v. Istoricheski Pregled, 
1959/2. and Todorov, N.: Iz demografiyata na gr. Anhialo (Pomorie). Izvestiya na Balgarskoto 
Istorichesko Druzhestvo, 1967. 159–60. 
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Although according to Berov the income of peasantry grew between 
1837–77,298 but so did the population, which eliminated per capita 
growth.299 Palairet argues, that an increase per economic unit was 
observable, but if it is true, it is rather due to the price increase of the 
period than to increasing per hectare outputs. Agrarian growth was 
fuelled rather by extensification and by price increases (this was 
negligible in the previous period, 1800–37, only 5–10%). 
There were several social layers among the landless peasants 
constituting 15% of Bulgarian and 30% of Macedonian society. The 
Macedonian momak did not have any contract, he worked on the allodial 
estate and for 6 months received 250–300 grosh (hak) and some seeds to 
sow, or 500–600 grosh yearly, or 2 tons of wheat (worth 1000–2000 
piasters). Contrary to the situation in Bulgaria Macedonian agrarian 
labourers’ wage dramatically decreased after 1880 parallel with the fall 
of crop prices,300 and this compelled them to apply for seasonal work in 
industry. Cheap labour made Macedonian industry temporarily 
prosperous, despite the lack of capital to modernize factories. The 
Bulgarian momak was called rataj, earning 250-1000 grosh around Nova 
Zagora and some seeds – their earnings were similar 30 years later (100–
150 francs in 1896).301 Other wage labourers like chapaljis or kopachi 
owned some land (2-5 hectares in Dobrich), but this was not enough to 
subsist without another temporary occupation.302 Kesimdjis were 
contractual peasants handing over a certain amount to the landlord (they 
were not sharecroppers), thus they were interested in the increase of 
production. Chiftchi or izpolichari were sharecroppers, they usually gave 
1/3-1/2 of the production to the landlord as tax. Those chiftliks that paid 
                                                          
298 Berov, Ly.: Promeni v obshtiya obem i tempovete na narastvane na selskostopanszkata produkciya v 
Balgariya prez XIX.v do 1912. Sbornik v chest na akad. Hr. Hristov. Sofia, 1988. 113–14. 
299 In 1815 some 23% of the 5.7 million people in Rumelia lived north of the Balkan Mountains 
(not more than 1.5 million persons), and then it increased to 2 million by 1860s (then 
stagnated till the 1880s), which is an increase of 33% altogether.   
300 In Bulgaria the land refoms provided enough land for argats, and agrarian labour prices 
went up! 
301 Ireček, K.: Patuvanija po Balgarija. (Cesty po Bulharska. Prague, 1888). 238–41. and Trifonov, 
S.–Georgiev, V.: Istoriya na balgarite v dokumenti. Vol. I/1. Sofia, 1996. 449. 
302 Dimitrov, Str.: Za klasovoto razsloenie sred selyanite v Severoiztochna Balgariya prez 70-te godini na 
XIX. v. Izvestiya na Instituta za Istoriya 8, 1960. 228. and 234.  
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wages instead of offering or expropriating a certain share from the 
harvest, could be considered protocapitalistic units. 
Ireček and Sarafov measured the obligations of peasants living 
under the gospodarlik towards the landlord in Küstendil in 1878.303 The 
22 houses of Dragalevci cultivated 70 ha and gave 6000 oke grains (7500 
kgs) and 25 days angariya (corvéé) for the gospodar. This is 3.2 ha and 340 
kg/household grain tax, equalling with the production of 0.5 hectare. 
Thus, at least 15-20% of the income was given to the landlord. As the 
extent of smallholdings grew from 70 ha to 120 ha between 1870–93, the 
50 ha difference was the large estate itself: each household had to 
cultivate further 2.5 ha of allodial estate for 25 days. 
 
Table 10. The social stratification of Provadija town in the 1870s 
Social group 
Average 
income per 
tax payer 
Number 
Income 
under 500 
grosh in % 
Income over 
1000 gros in 
% 
Artizans, craftsmen 940 149 (40%) 34% 20% 
Merchants 1143 49 (13%) 20%  44% 
Farmers 667 40 (11%) 52% 10%  
Wage labourers 660 74 (20%) Todorov, N.: Socialni-
ikonomicheski oblik na 
Provadiya. Istoricheski Pregled, 
1963/2. 68–85. 
Industrial workers 661 17 (5%) 
Apprentices 575 45 (12%) 
 
The regional and ethnic differences within the agrarian population are 
also worth discussion. Draganova’s research proved that Muslim 
landholdings were not significantly larger in North-Bulgaria compared 
to Christian estates (table 11–12).304 The former differences mentioned by 
Parveva characterizing the 18th century slowly vanished. But 
differences in Eastern Rumelia were still significant: around Kazanlik 
the 16 Muslim villages had averagely 7.3 ha per household, in the 36 
                                                          
303 Ireček, K.–Sarafov, B. P. (eds.): Raport na komisiya izpratena v Küstendilski okrug da izuchi 
polozhenieto na bezzemlenite selyani. Sofia, 1880. 10–13. 
304 Draganova, Sl.: Razpredelenie na pozemnata sobstvenost v severozapadna Balgariya v navecherieto 
na osvobozhdenieto. Studia Balcanica XVII, 1983. 164–71. 
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Bulgarian villages this was only 3.5 ha.305 Data from the late 19th/early 
20th century for the Rhodopi Mountains show that Muslim (Pomak) 
families owned on average more land than Christian ones, that is why 
most itinerant artisans and shepherds were Christians.306 According to 
Berov, the wealth of peasantry determined their behaviour during the 
uprisings: in Strelec (Nova Zagora) and in Skalica (Sliven) where the 
average size of landholding was 83 and 125 uvrat (over 25 hectares) 
only 25% of the male population participated in the revolt of 1876.307 
 
Table 11. A comparison of estate size in 4 kazas (in dönüms in 1870) 
 Berkovica k. Ruse k. Shumen k. Silistra k. 
Average size 76 61 60 158 
Average size (Muslim) 50 57 
58 (52 
Tatars) 
189 (74 
Tatars) 
Average size (Christian) 87 67 64 147 
Proportion of Muslim and 
Christian smallholders  
– 
15 and 
19% (20 
dönüms) 
x and 2x 
 (30 dönüms) 
24 and 16% 
(50 dönüms) 
Draganova, Sl.: Berkovskoto selo, 30. and Draganova, Sl.: Imushtestvena i socialna struktura na 
naselenieto v Rusenska, Sumenska i Silistrenska kaza predi Osvobozhdenieto. Istoricheski Pregled, 
1977/3. 98–101. 
 
For the 19th century Berov 
calculated daily 2-2.2 grams of 
silver food consumption per 
capita, or 8 to a family of five. So, 
a peasant family needed at least 
2800 grosh yearly in kind to 
subsist. As he put the revenues 
from wheat to 54 piasters per 
dönüm,308 at least 5 sown 
hectares (8–10 ha) were needed to reach this. In Provadia the average 
was below 700 piasters per household, referring to 2.5 ha (1.5 sown), but 
                                                          
305 Berov, Ly.: Agrarnoto dvizhenie v Iztochna Rumeliya po vreme osvobozhdenieto. Istoricheski 
Pregled. 1956/1. 14. 
306 Brunnbauer, U.: Gebirgsgesellschaften auf dem Balkan. Böhlau, 2004. 169. 210. 
307 Berov, Ly.: Agrarnoto dvizhenie, 19. 
308 Husbandry meant an annual 20–25% surplus. 
Table 12. Average yearly income of tax-payer 
population 
 Ruse Shumen Silistria 
Bulgarian 431 566 285 
Muslim 393 366 257 
Draganova, Sl.: De la production agricole, 
l’imposition fiscale et la differentiation sociale de la 
population paysanne en Bulgarie Nord-Est durant 
les années 60 et 70 du XIX siécle. Bulgarian 
Historical Review, 8. 1977. 91.  
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urban dwellers had other sources of income too. In the 1840s Pleven, 
when animal husbandry was the main source of income (and wealth), 
peasants with 10–15 ha had 4500 piasters income, while peasants with 3 
ha earned 1200 piasters.309 In Stara Zagora and Kazanlik (1859) the 
yearly income/household was 3700 piasters. At the end of the wheat 
prosperity in Keremetli district (in Sofia) 3300 piasters/household was 
measured. In Kyustendil it was 2500–4000 piasters on 10 ha, in 
Berkovica 3500–5000 was measured in 5 ha in the 1870s, in the chiftlik of 
Küchük Seymen 2500–3000 piasters was calculated for units of 4–6 ha in 
1910. All these values refer to the fact, that Palairet’s 200 francs/capita 
for the 1870s is a bit high, while Berov’s 54 grosh/dönüm is low. 
The total value of a peasant economy was 2500 piasters without the 
house (mainly land) in Pleven prior to the great prosperity, it was 8000 
piasters in Berkovsko 30 years later. The house was worth further 3000 
piasters in both cases.  
 
(e) Alternatives of monocultural grain production 
 
The grain-producing smallholding was only one of the alternatives. 
Many areas due to climatic conditions or their inherited-unchanged 
socio-economic structures did not participate in the international 
division of labour “grains for manufactures” or integrated in a different 
way to the Atlantic system. Greece for example participated in 
transportation, exported wine, oil and raisins, while both its estate 
structure (resembling the Ottoman ages for decades) and product 
composition was very different from the Serbian and Bulgarian model. 
Peasants had adopted many strategies of survival to decrease their 
burdens and earn their livings. In Serbia they earned extra income from 
rakija and prunes due to its high income per hectare values; or made 
supplementary earnings from home industry (see previous chapter). In 
Bulgaria potato and other vegetables produced for home consumption 
were not taxed by Ottoman authorities (only when marketed). This 
                                                          
309 Draganova, Sl.: Documents of the 1840’s on the Economic position of the villages in Central North 
Bulgaria. Bulg. Hist. Review, 1988/2. 87–100.  
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strategy was working prior to the wheat prosperity. But, – unlike in 
Ireland – potato did not become a common product even after the 
collapse of grain prices in 1870s due to its greater inputs (1000 kg/ha), 
while its output/input ratio was not higher than that of the grains (5000–
7000 kg in the 1890s). 
Prior to the great wheat prosperity forests were rather turned into 
grazing lands than to arable lands, because taxes on sheep were small, 
3-4 piasters per animal, but the peasant had the right to cut down trees, 
which produced him more income, than expenses.310 For 200 ha of miri 
(state) woodland it was enough pay 400 piasters after 100 sheep, while 
trees cut down produced cca. 3000 piasters. (The small number of 
animals in this example clearly enlightens the fact that this economic 
strategy was extensive, and these grazing lands continued to function as 
woodlands for years). But the increase of beglik tax – especially on 
mountainous areas specialized in sheep-husbandry – ruined this 
alternative (and also stopped deforestation).  
Contrary to the external demand, the Greek (Mediterranean) 
agricultural model remained different from the monocultural 
continental. After the liberation (1830) most of the Ottoman-owned 
land, 580 thousand hectares, 33% of wheat-lands, 75% of vineyards, 87% 
of olive orchards became state property,311 so producers were excluded 
from the trade-driven prosperity and were considered only as 
agricultural labourers. Similarly to Romania, the large landholdings 
together with state and church estates constituted 60% of the cultivated 
land, with great regional variety (in the wheat-producer Macedonia and 
Epirus their ratio was 75%, in Thessaly 50%, while in the geographically 
dissected regions, in Morea and the Ionian Islands it was below 25%). 
Very often the original land tenure system prevailed, the redistribution 
of land was postponed. The total value of large estates reached 1 billion 
drachmas in 1896, twice as much as all other forms, however only 33% 
of the products came from large landholdings. This means, that here the 
                                                          
310 St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Ch.: Residence in Bulgaria, 150. 
311 Babanászisz, Szt.: A görög ipar kialakulása és fejlődése. In: Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy. (eds.): 
Gazdasági elmaradottság, kiutak és kudarcok a XIX. századi Európában. Budapest, 1979. 
359. 
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smallholdings constituting 40% of the cultivated land had greater 
output per hectares (unlike in Macedonia) definitely referring to a 
different production structure and composition of products.  
After 1830 the peasantry owned only 700 thousand ha, 1 ha per 
household. This was deeply below the Serbian or Bulgarian value, 
therefore it was not enough for self-subsistence in case of traditional dry 
grain cultures. Furthermore, 200 thousand out of the 700 000 peasants 
still owned half of the land (with averagely 2 ha/household), while half 
a million households had no more than 0.5 hectares. They had to work 
for others to earn their living: but even calculating with state land and 
large estates, the cultivated land did not mean more than 1-2 ha/worker 
averagely. Thus the population pressure was extreme. Peasants 
working on large landholdings had to pay the tithe plus 20% of the 
products. This system was very similar to the chiftlik system – 
accompanied by overpopulation. 
The first agrarian reform was carried out in 1871. 265 000 hectares, 
33% of cultivated territories, 55% of orchards was sold to 360 thousand 
smallholders for an interest rate of 5% for 25 years. It was not cheap, but 
one-third of peasantry became the owner of the land – averagely under 
1 ha. The reason was not simply the failure of large landholdings to 
susbsist from wheat export – rivals like Argentina, USA, Russia has just 
appeared on the market – it was the physical constraints that made the 
maintenance of monocultural dry economy under such extreme 
demographic pressure unsustainable. This urged the state to intervene: 
in 1880 tithe was abolished, and instead of this a tax after draft-animals 
was implemented, reaching 4-5% of the production. This was among the 
smallest burdens on the Balkans, and the difference, cca. 10% of the 
agrarian GDP could be accumulated in the private sphere.312 This 
resulted in an increase of yields as peasants became interested in 
producing marketable surplus: while between 1830–70 the production 
of raisins, wine, tobacco and olive oil has doubled (exceeding that of 
grains showing only +70% increase), in the next 40 years it increased 
further fivefold, reaching 50% from cultivated area. By 1910 not only the 
                                                          
312 Babanászisz, Szt.: A görög ipar kialakulása, 360.  
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landholding structure, but the composition of products also differed 
both from the Romanian and Serbian agriculture. 
Until 1911 further 265 thousand hectares were given to peasants. 
Although Greece was able to obtain South-Macedonia’s fertile fields, 
thus was given a chance to handle the population pressure (compared 
to Bulgaria or Serbia the emigration to the USA was extreme in Greece), 
the failure in Anatolia put an end to these colonization efforts and more 
than 1 million refugees had to be settled down in the acquired Balkan 
areas. Beyond nationalistic hatred economic motives also fuelled the 
ethnic cleansing that had taken place there.  
After the failure of expansionism the economic strategy was 
reconsidered and in 1922 2 million hectares were distributed among 270 
thousand families, thus viable mediocre holdings were established (9 ha 
averagely), that time when in Serbia and Bulgaria showing the signs of 
overpopulation average landholding size decreased below 5 ha. 
Due to geographical circumstances only 20% of total land was under 
cultivation. As wheat production proved to be unsustainable, the 
policultural character of the agriculture strengthened: while the total 
extent of croplands had grown from 230 000 to 330 000 hectares between 
1860–80, the share of grainlands decreased from 66% to 50%.313 The 
extent of lands producing raisins has grown 35-fold between 1830-1860, 
and the extent of vineyards has increased to 50-fold.314 Between 1860–
1910 the raisin output increased to 14-fold (peaking with 120 000 tons 
exported), tobacco showed a sevenfold increase (table 14). The output of 
wheat also increased to fourfold after the acquisition of the 
economically so important Thessaly in 1881,315 but Greece still required 
grain imports, which was unique among Balkan countries. The average 
yield was not greater than 700 kg/ha (the growth in production hardly 
exceede the growth in sown lands) or 120 kgs/capita, low compared to 
                                                          
313 As the output grew by 70% that time, per ha outputs did not improve, income increased 
only owing to prices. 
314 Babanászisz, St.: A görög ipar kialakulása, 361. 
315 Ibid. 362.   
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both the Serbian 1 tons/ha or to the Hungarian 500 kgs/capita, 316 while 
grapes produced 1700 kg/ha. 
 
Table 13. Costs and profitability of different forms of cultivation in Greece, 1835 
1835 
Land in 
ha 
% 
Value in 
golden 
drachmas 
% 
Production 
in golden 
drachmas 
% 
Value/ 
ha 
Production 
value/ha 
Ratio of yearly 
production and 
initial capital  
grains 775 000 96 387 500 000 84 25 000 000 67 500 32 
0.06, cheap, low 
return rate 
vegetables 5000 0 50 000 000 13 10 000 000 27 10 000 2000 
0.20, expensive, 
quick return rate 
raisins 150 0 4 500 000 1 400 000 1 30 000 2667 
0.09, expensive, 
quick return rate 
high income 
grape 900 0 9 000 000 2 700 000 2 10 000 778 
0.08, deleayed 
income (3 yrs) 
olive 25 000 3 1 200 000 0 1 000 000 2.3 48 40 
0.83, cheap, 
quick return 
rate, low and 
delayed income 
fruits 2000 0 400 000 0 30 000 0 200 15 0.08 
altogether 808000 100 463 400 000 100 36 430 000 100 575 45 0.08 
Based on Babanászisz, Szt.: A görög ipar kialakulása… 
 
If we compare the yearly income with that of the land prices, the 
return rate of 1 ha of wheatland was low: 16 years was reuired. This was 
lower, than in Bulgaria, as land in Greece was more expensive, while 
output was lower. The return rate of vegetables was 4 years, that of 
raisins 11 years, while in case of (productive) olive trees it was 1-2 years 
(table 13). The latter was very cheap, but the output value per hectares 
was still 20 times smaller than that of the grapes (but this was an 
expensive investment), and it needed 10 years to produce the first 
yields. But for poor peasants an olive plantation was still ideal 
producing more incomes than wheat at lower costs (while requiring less 
space). As there was plenty of space between trees, secondary crops 
were also planted there. The share of olive orchards from cultivated 
lands reached 25%, while the output increased to sixfold (table 14). But 
yield/ha values did not increase, thus the strategy of poorer peasants 
was still based on extensivity. If we put the minimum livelihood to 700–
                                                          
316 In Hungary this was 370 kgs even in 1830. 
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800 drachmas (over 3500 piasters) for a family, based on Bulgarian 
analogies, it seems that 1 ha of vineyard could cover the yearly 
expenses, while to obtain the same incomes 10 hectares of wheatland 
was required.  
 
Table 14. The production of different branches of agriculture in Greece   
Culture 
1835, million 
golden 
drachmas 
1860, milion 
golden 
drachmas 
share in 
% 
1909, million 
golden 
drachmas 
share in 
% 
Increase 
between 
1860–1909 in 
% 
Grain 
production 
25 43.4 39 128 38 195 
Other crops 12 30.6 28 165 49 439 
Husbandry n.a. 36.6 33 44 13 20 
Total  n.a. 110.8 100 337 100 204 
 
Culture 1860, ha 1860, % 1909, ha 1909, % increase, % 
Grains 356000 78 567000 57 59 
Raisins 5300 1 55700 5.6 951 
Grape 49250 11 104000 10 111 
Olive 37000 8 260000 26 603 
Altogether 452260 100 1 000433 100 121 
own calculation based on Babanaszisz, Szt.: A görög ipar kialakulása… 
 
Pushed out to fringe areas animal husbandry also became of 
secondary importance. An average Greek cattle weighted about 130 kgs, 
while a French one 370 kgs. Although their number increased by 60% 
between 1860–1909, cattle were usually considered as draft animals. 
Regarding the other possible draft animal, horse, while in Romania the 
average was 3.5 horses/km2, in Hungary 6.6, in Britain 9.0, in Greece it 
was only 1.4 horses/km2. Animal density was low. In Romania the 
average was 106 sheep/100 inhabitants, in Hungary 97, in Greece only 
81. The same index regarding cattle was 7.5 animals in Greece, 40 in 
Romania, 34 in Hungary, 32 in France, and 18 in Spain compared to the 
77 in Ireland. The Greek sheep weighted 20 kgs, while the French 36 
kgs. The unproductive limestone slopes were preferred rather by goats: 
in Greece the ratio was 91 goats/100 inhabitants, in Hungary this was 4 
and in Spain 28 in the 1870s. The dominance of goats always refer to 
poverty, and as their number showed only a 25% increase, while the 
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territory of the state has doubled, their decreasing density referred to 
ameliorating conditions in agriculture. 
 
Urbanization and economic progress in Ottoman Bulgaria on maps 
(maps were drawn by Zsolt Bottlik based on the data of Kornrumpf, J.) 317 
 
                                                          
317 Kornrumpf, H-J.: Die Territoralverwaltung im östlichen Teil der europäischen Türkei vom Erlass der 
Vilayetsordnung (1864) bis zum Berliner Kongress (1878) nach amtlichen osmanischen 
Veröffentlichungen. Freiburg, 1976. 
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IV. Shrinking opportunities of extensive 
agriculture (1873–1914) 
 
The collapse of grain (and cotton) prices after the overdemand of the 
Great Eastern crisis and the dumping of Russian (1861 abolition of 
serfdom), Argentinian and US (1865: end of civil war) products a meant 
a serious problem for smallholdings producing for markets and also for 
the newborn states, which had just restructured their systems in a hope 
that former trends would last for a long time. As the agrarian crisis 
went parallel with a loan crisis (1876, 1897), not only internal (due to the 
decrease of central incomes), but also external sources of modernization 
and transformation were limited (to the redistribution of state and 
community property, for example). Both the states relying on large 
estates and states dominated by smallholdings were forced to export 
grains contrary to price trends. The loss of diversity in production made 
them more vulnerable, while population increase was great and yields 
were fluctuating. These economies were still determined by external 
circumstances. 
 
(a) The impacts of global trends on agriculture, 1873–1900 
 
After 1878 the Eastern Balkans managed to get rid of Ottoman rule thus 
the deprivation of local incomes: new possibilities of capital 
accumulation occurred that could pave the way for industrialization. 
Distribution of land became more even, social tensions decreased, 
landholdings of averagely 5 ha were formed. From this respect the 
Bulgarian and Serbian independence can be considered a success, but 
the expectations did not fulfill. Another interpretation of 1878 depicts a 
more unfavourable picture. First, in many regions of the Balkans social 
problems of agrarian population prevailed (Macedonia, Bosnia), even if 
the agriculture itself showed progress (in Bosnia owing to 
intensification, in Macedonia owing to change in product composition). 
After the dissolution of the integrated markets which were based on the 
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traditional division of labour, Bulgaria and Serbia lost imperial 
purchases and had to fit into the new, Atlantic system. Partly to mitigate 
the shock (it is still debated how much this was intentional), but rather 
from social perspective, Bulgaria adopted to a system of dominantly 
monocultural small-holdings. Smallholdings made economy more 
vulnerable to external changes. By the time the region gained 
independence western wheat prices had just begun to fall (from 160-200 
francs/ton to 100-130 francs), owing to the further globalization of wheat 
market (the penetration of Russian and Argentinian wheat), causing a 
deterioration both in state incomes and in peasant living standard. The 
new structure was able to secure autarchy, but did not offer a chance to 
modernize the smallholdings. The idea of the ’free peasant-state’ relied on the 
formerly favourable external circumstances.  
The vanishing of the expected income surplus hindered the 
modernization of small-holdings (and the industry as well) and together 
with the persisting population pressure it resulted in increasing total, 
but stagnating per capita output. The new structure was able to secure 
autarchy, but nothing more: a peasant economy of 5 ha could hardly 
earn some 50 francs net profit yearly with an average gross yearly 
income of 700-1000 francs. The lack of profits and capital made possible 
only small-scale investments, which could only ensure the purchase of a 
plough or draft animals.  
From agrarian perspective 1878 can also be interpreted also as the failure 
of large estates (largely depending on wages and prices) and animal 
husbandry: this made the agriculture more unifacial and vulnerable. The 
eastern Balkans lost its original functions as textile supplier of the 
imperial army318 and meat-supplier of Istanbul, and – owing to the 
penetration of western artifacts as the result of free trade – had to tackle 
the deteriorating competitiveness. Shifting from the Mediterranean 
economic space to the Atlantic, the region could pursuit neither 
proactive nor protective strategies any more (western merchants 
enjoyed the same tariffs and advantages in Serbia and Bulgaria for the 
next decades, as they enjoyed earlier in Ottoman Turkey), thus became a 
                                                          
318 Ottomans tended to secure military equipment from local products if possible, therefore 
Rumelian textiles did not have to compete with cheap western products of better quality. 
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periphery.319 As a consequence of shrinking markets the purchase 
power also decreased. Together with the decline in textile industry 
herds disappeared after 1878. This decreased the diversity of economy 
further. Thus neither industry could serve as the source of 
modernization, while the persistence of population pressure resulted in 
a land-use conflict between animal husbandry and grain production in 
Serbia. 
Since everyone became a freeholder in the northeastern parts of the 
Balkans (contrary to Macedonia or Bosnia), as land became cheap after 
the dissolution of large estates and the deprivation of many Muslim 
emigrants from their land (even smallholders), noone wanted to work 
for industrial companies. This relative shortage of agrarian labour force 
and the oversupply of land caused an increase in wages, which cut back 
profits both on large estates and in industry (where profits were not 
greater than measured in agriculture). Under these circumstances – the 
flow of labour force to agriculture (or the increasing industrial wages to 
hinder this), decreasing industrial profits, western competition and the 
collapse of sectors producing raw material for industry – many 
industrial enterprises gave up, and deindustrialization continued in the 
Balkans between 1880–1900, even when external circumstances (global 
trends after 1873) would have been favourable for industrialization. 
Until an estate of 5 hectares produced more income for a family, than 
permanent application in industry, restratification did not take place 
(with the exception of Macedonia, where agrarian wages remained low 
owing to small peasant farm size – 80% was below 5 ha – and the larger 
proportion of producing allodial large estates, beglik-Gutsherrschafts, 
based on compulsory corvéé).  
The Balkan countries were still in preindustrial phase, where 
economic cycles were primarily determined by the available quantity of 
food and cultivation technologies (and not by the industry) as 
agriculture still determined the industrial output.  
                                                          
319 The integrated markets based on division of labour in Ottoman Empire offered economic 
security for the Balkans (consuming its industrial goods of different quality), but after 1878 
this opportunity has vanished. 
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The problem with agriculture is that industry usually provides 
greater added value and per capita outputs.320 On the one hand this is 
true: in Serbia 80% of the population worked in agriculture producing 
only 66% of the GDP (while it was 32% in Britain, 40% in Belgium).321 
This means that industry and tertiary produced at least three times 
greater value per capita (on the other hand the initial capital was also 
higher here). The productivity of agriculture was around 58 in 
Yugoslavia (measured to the country average, 100) even in 1938, while 
some industrial branches reached 300–400.322 In Salonica around the 
1850s the average value/ton of incoming goods (40% of which were 
textiles) increased from 400 to 800 piasters, while export unit prices 
(dominantly agrarian products) fell from 500 to 350 piasters. In 1911 the 
volume of the Bulgarian exports was twice as much as the imports (1 
million and 500 thousand tons respectively), while their value were the 
same.323 This means that the added value of agricultural products 
dominating the Balkan exports was radically smaller compared to 
industrial, although added value in industry fell to 50% after the 
liberation of Bulgaria.324 
On the other hand it is important to point out that agricultural 
specialization does not necessarily invoke underdevelopment. Canada 
and Argentina had not developped significant industry by 1910, but 
produced similar GDP/capita to France.325 Hungary also had strong, 
developing agriculture despite the structural changes (abandonment 
ofanimal husbandry) and the social tensions (landless layers). But in the 
                                                          
320 Proportionally agriculture provides greater added value considering 5:1 seed output (80%), 
even if local consumption is taken into consideration (deduction of further 20%), but the 
absolute value is greater in case of industry (raw material can reach 40–60%, while wages 
mean another 15-20%). 
321 Daskalov, R.: Balgarskoto obshtestvo, 1878–1939. Vol. I. Sofia, 2005. 249. 
322 Vinski, I.: Klasna podjela stanovništva i nacionalnog dohotka Jugoslavije u 1938 godini. Zagreb, 
1970. 93. 
323 Vachkov, D.: Balgarskata ikonomika i voinite na XX vek. Razum, 3-4./2005. 187. See also Fig. I. 2. 
in Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. I. 
324 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 193–95. 
325 Maddison, A.: Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992. Paris: OECD, 2000; Maddison, A.: The 
World Economy. A Millennial Perspective. Paris, OECD, 2001; and Maddison, A.: The West and 
the Rest in the International Economic Order. In: Braga de Macedo, J.–Colm, F.–Oman, Ch. (eds.): 
Development is Back. OECD Publishing, 2002. 
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above mentioned countries land concentration was progressing offering 
better possibility for animal husbandry and grains, while in the Balkans 
just the opposite phenomena (fragmentation and wheat-maize 
production) became dominant.  
Thus, not only the availability of land or the stage of initial capital 
accumulation (land concentration) in agriculture, but its structure was 
also a determining factor (beside technologies, mechanization etc.). 
Many consider animal husbandry as a better indicator of agricultural 
development level than crops: the share of animal husbandry from total 
output of agriculture was 77% in the UK, 66% in Germany in the 1910s, 
while 33–36% in Spain and even in Serbia, famous for its pigs (table 
20).326 Although wheat output per hectare in Bulgaria and Romania was 
better than in France, and per capita wine production in Greece or in 
Romania exceeded the French, these did not represent the general 
development level of the agriculture. This also reveals why countries 
with great land supply showed better performance: Argentina and 
Canada could invest into animal husbandry (and food processing 
industry), when meat prices were increasing, while the Balkan states 
could not. Here an opposite phenomenon took place: grains became 
dominant even contrary to the price decrease or the dominant holding 
size, causing a landuse conflict. 
Thus, these countries chose grain production not only because of the 
increasing wheat prices, but because of relative overpopulation: the 
Argentinian model was simply not adaptable owing to land scarcity, as 
it was not simply the export prices that determined the events, but the 
local market needs as well. 1 kg flesh equalling to 7-8 kg wheat 
regarding calory content gave enough food for only 3 days, while wheat 
for 8 days.327 Hajnal explains the differences between Western and 
Southeastern Europe with higher reproduction rates of the latter that 
consumed the increase in outputs. This resulted in increasing total, but 
                                                          
326 Foreman-Peck, J.–Lains, P.: European Economic Development. The Core and the Southern Periphery, 
1870–1910. In: Sevket, P.–Williamson, J. G. (eds.): The Mediterranean Response to 
Globalisation before 1950. Routledge, 2000. 79–87. 
327 See Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. III. Budapest-Debrecen, 2016. 
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stagnating per capita outputs.328 Mazower even claims, had the rate of 
reproduction been similar in these two regions of Europe, the 
differences in GDP would not have increased.329 
It is true, that between 1830–70 wheat production has doubled in the 
Danubian vilayet owing to the western demand, and population 
increase was only 50% (from 1.35 million to 2 millions), but between 
1880–1910 the population of Bulgaria increased by 80% and this was 
neither followed by the increase of per hectare outputs nor by the 
significant expansion of lands. The possibilities of extensivity reached its 
limits by 1910. Without technical advance, labour intensification or 
changes in produced cultures the adopted farming system became 
untenable and also showed signs of labour oversupply. In Serbia 93 
persons dealing with agriculture lived on one square km, this increased 
to 120 by 1930, while in Denmark – choosing the intensification of 
agriculture – this was only 32, and the European average was between 
40–50.330 Thus, the structure of agriculture and the composition (and 
quantity) of marketed products also determined the level of 
development – beside the demographic pressure. Smallholdings were 
inapt for competitive grain production, large estates without 
mechanization (exposed to labour prices) also. Intensification was not 
considered a solution for a long time, partly owing to lack of capital and 
technological knowledge, partly owing to market problems (external 
markets were lost, internal markets were characterized by low 
consumption). The Balkan smallholdings became quite introverted by 
the turn of the century: grain exports shrank to 15-20% of the harvest 
compared to the 30-35% during the great prosperity. 
The relative overpopulation is also reflected in the decreasing size of 
economic units (side by side with the increase in number of 
landholdings): in Serbia average landholding size decreased from 5 ha 
to 4 ha within a generation (in Greece it did not exceed 2 hectares), in 
Bulgaria Egoroff estimated, that 30% of the workforce in agriculture 
                                                          
328 Hajnal, H.: European Marriage Patterns in Perspective. In: Glass, D.V.–Eversley, D.E.C. (eds.): 
Population in History. Aldine Publishing Company, 1965. 101–43. 
329 Mazower, M.: The Balkans. Phoenix Press, 2001. 17–44.  
330 Foreman-Peck, J.–Lains, P:. The Core and the Southern Periphery, 79. 
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remained unexploited.331 Under these circumstances the land reforms 
executed in Greece, Serbia or Bulgaria could solve the problem only 
temporarily: as the average farm size decreased below 5 ha/household 
regionally – and this was the lower limit of profitable/self-sustaining 
traditional (monocultural) dry cultivation that time – it became a futile 
effort to eliminate the recurring differences: despite of all social 
demagogy, these smallholdings simply did not work. Either landsize or 
product structure had to be modified. (Land-concentration would need 
the improvement of industry to handle the landless masses). 
And as internal capital was missing for the transformation, these 
states had to wait for favourable external circumstances again (for the 
increasing grain prices between 1900–29) either to prolong the existence 
of this structure or to change it (protectionism, new products, 
intensification). Agriculture was unable to finance even its own renewal 
from internal resources (one can see it from the failure of the Ottoman 
Empire after 1878 to finance the industrial revolution from agricultural 
surpluses). So when Calic agreed, that demographic revolution without 
industrial revolution was a sort of committing a suicide, and when Cyril 
Black wrote that industrial revolution begins, when the agriculture can 
finance industrialization, both were probably right.332 It seemed that the 
economists of neoclassical theories – propagating the globalizational 
convergence between the Balkan (1870–1913) and the rest of Europe, 
which is still debated – were also right when claimed, that 
modernization could be successful in this region only relying on 
external sources (trade, crediting). But after 1878 the balance of trade 
became generally negative for this region333 reversing the trends 
dominating in 1800–50334 (except for the over-consumption in 
                                                          
331 Egoroff, P.: Die Arbeit in der Landwirtschaft. In: Molloff, J. (Hrsg.): Die Sozialökonomische 
Struktur der Bulgarischen Wirtschaft. Hrsg. Berlin, 1936. 
332 Black, C. E.: The Process of Modernization. The Bulgarian Case. In: Bulgaria, Past and Present. 
Colombus, Ohio, 1976. 111. 
333 Romania also lost the Ottoman market for its grains and became subjected economically to 
Austria-Hungary until the 1890s. Serbia was exposed to Austro-Hungarian influence, but 
had positive balance in many years (it was not a maritime country). 
334 Reden, Fr. W. von: Die Türkei und Griechenland in Ihrer Entwicklungs-Fähigkeit, 259. 
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Constantinople).335 These economists refuse the positive role of internal 
resources, even of population growth (cheap labour force, extending 
markets) that could attract investments, thus ameliorating per capita 
outputs on the long run. Others even challenged the idea of slow 
convergence336 claiming that the GDP of this region was 40–50% of the 
western in 1820 and was stagnating around 30-40% between 1870–1950.  
The question is, whether it was the agriculture responsible for the 
supposed divergence337 between the West and the Rest or not. In an 
experimental study of Foreman-Peck and Lains explaining the character 
of differences, climate (representing agriculture) was responsible only 
for 10% of differences in GDP/capita between GBR and the Balkans, 
while social conditions were calculated responsible for 33% of 
differences between 1870–1910 (and its role was growing). The role of 
other economic factors (taxes, tariff policy, railways) was measured 50% 
in explaining the differences, while physical geographical conditions 
(natural resources, like the abundance of coal) were thought to have 
been responsible for 6-25% of the lag in case of Romania and Bulgaria 
but 45% in case of Greece.338 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
335 The exports of Danubian vilayet was 32,5 million francs prior to 1859, imports were 22 
million. Eastern-Rumelia also had a surplus of 1 million pounds. Mihov, N.: Prinos kam 
istoriyata na targoviyata na Turciya i Balgariya. Tom. 6. Sofia, 1971. 350–51. 
336 Convergence was supposed by O’Rourke, K. H.–Williamson, J. G.: Globalization and History. 
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 2009.  
337 Those, who challenge the idea of convergence are not unanimous, when divergence began: 
between 1820–1870 or between 1870–1910. Bourguignon, F.–Morrisson, Ch.: Inequality 
Among World Citizens.. are on the opinion , that divergence was observable between 1870–
1910, Maddison (Maddison, A.: The World Economy…; Maddison, A.: Monitoring the World 
Economy 1820–1992…) states that the whole period was characterized by this process, while 
Morys claims, that differences grew especially after WWI. Morys, M.: South-Eastern 
European Growth Experience in European Perspective, 19th and 20th Centuries. In: 
Monetary and Fiscal Policies. BNB, 2006. 34. 
338 Foreman-Peck, J.–Lains, P.: European Economic Development… 
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(i) Problems of measuring productivity and development – data 
interpretation 
 
Of course, these numbers cannot be considered as unquestionable, and 
there are still ongoing debates on the question of agrarian profitability. 
Palairet’s calculation show, that although absolute outputs increased 
both in Serbia (from 180 million to 340) and Bulgaria (from 395 million 
to 645 million leva between 1865–1911, but  
(1) considering the beginning and the end of the period (1870s-1910s) 
per capita outputs were rather decreasing-stagnating (in Bulgaria it 
fell from 220 to 180 leva, in Serbia from 180 to 130 dinars) as the 
population increase in agriculture was great; 
(2) output was rather fluctuating, than declining within this period due 
to the numerous crises after the 1870s. As an effect of the liberation 
and the decrease in wheat prices agrarian output per capita soon fell 
to 160 leva in Bulgaria. Once again a decline was observable at the 
turn of the century (the agrarian crisis of 1897–1900). 
(3) the reliability of these data (especially prior to 1878) was challenged 
by Ivanov and Lyberatos; and there is also contradiction in (and 
between) the calculations of Berov and Palairet.339 
Ivanov claimed that the Bulgarian data from 1923 could not serve as 
basis of comparison as it is still prior to the recovery of the agriculture, 
reflecting the effect of war. The output data prior to the liberation are 
also extreme (giving 2 t/ha yield) and unfortunately scarce. Thus data 
prior to 1878 are not comparable with each other. Our calculations 
based on local data also show, that the output was somewhat smaller, 
than given by Palairet: it regularly did not exceed 5000 grosh/5 hectares, 
or, in other words per capita output in the 1870s was under the Palairet 
estimated 200 francs. Berov calculates with the 3000 grosh. Lyberatos 
warned, that both Berov and Palairet committed mistakes in their 
calculations owing to the problems of reliability of sources.340 There is 
                                                          
339 Ivanov, M.: Understanding Economic and Social Developments in the Periphery: Bulgarian National 
Income 1892–1924. East Central Europe 24, Vol. 35. 2007–2008/1–2. 221–44;  
340 Lyberatos, A.: From Imperial to National Lands, 137–72. See his criticism on: Direkciyata na 
Financiite na Iztochna Rumeliya (Plovdiv, 1884) and Statisticheski svedeniya za zemledelcheskata 
proizvoditelnost na Balgariya pri navecherieto na I-to zemledelchesko-promishleno izlozhenie (Sofia, 
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contradiction in the average size of landholdings, as Dimitrov puts it to 
6 ha based on 9300 economies, Draganova calculates with 8 ha, Berov 
with 10-12 ha. The rate of extensivity is also not unambiguous as Berov 
first calculated with a 100% increase in arable lands between 1870–1910, 
than revised his view and put it to 35%.341 On the other hand the 5:1 
seed output accepted by Palairet as well does not seem to be low 
(measured to the 12:1 in western Europe), especially if compared to the 
input work and capital, and other examples confirm this even from the 
1910s (table 1–2).342 
Table 1. Average wheat yields prior to WW I 
Wheat yields (q/ha) Romania Bulgaria zerbia 
1862–66 9.6 n.a 9.5 
1891–95 11.1 n.a. 8.7 
1896–00 (crisis) 8.9 7.9 9.4 
1906–10 11.3 9.3 9.3 
1911–15 11.6 11.1 11.1 
Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 188. 
 
                                                                                                                                
1892). Official statistics only exist since 1896 in Bulgaria. Tax incomes cannot serve as 
reliable basis for estimating income, because of the iltizam and quickly changing tax rates. 
Incomes to estimate output in tons can only be used with precaution as prices were 
fluctuating, not to mention the regional differences in the measurement units. The 
interpretation of yields is often dubious as we do not always know whether it is measured 
to cultivated or to sown land (the proportion of fallow was not negligible). This modifies the 
output ratio, which is also problematic: Berov calculated only 0.5 tons/ha from income data, 
considered too low by Palairet (this ratio was reached early in 1750–1840). Contrary to this, 
Razboynikov calculated 1 kile (26 kgs) of seed/dönüm in Thrace, which means that output 
was 1 ton/ha if we accept the 5:1 output ratio. Jakšić put the output to 1100 kgs/ha, meaning 
a 7:1 ratio in Serbia in the 1860s. 
341 Berov, Ly.: Zemedelieto v Balgariya prez 1878-1912 g. Upravlenie na selskoto stopanstvo 25/8. 
1980. 47–48; Berov, Ly.: Promeni v razpredelenieto na pozemlenata sobstvenost v Severna Balgariya 
prez parvite dve desetiletiya sled Osvobozhdenieto. Izvestiya na Instituta po Istoriya 27, 1984. 
224–73; Bairoch, P.: New Estimates on Agricultural Productivity and Yields of Developed 
Countries, 1800–1990. In: Bhaduri, A.–Skarstein, R. (eds.): Economic Development and 
Agricultural Productivity. Cheltenham, 1997. 48. 
342 Razboynikov, A.: Chiftlitsi i chiftligari v Trakiya predi i sled 1878 g. Izvestiya na Instituta za 
Istoriya 9, 1960. 176–77. measures 1:5 – 1:10 output ration in thrace. In Iowa per hectare 
yield of maize was 6 times as great as measured in India, but comparing it to the invested 
capital and work, the output was only double than in India. Endrei W.: A textilipari technikák 
termelékenységének története. Budapest, 1993. 11. 
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Table 2. Income of peasants and output ratio in Silivri okolie in 1912 
Total 
land in 
kile* seed 
Fallow Name 
Wheat 
seed in 
(kile) 
Cost of 
sowing 
(grosh) 
Output 
 in kile 
Input / 
output 
ratio 
Product 
value 
Tithe 
in 
kile 
Tithe to 
output, 
% 
30 4 
Stavri Nikolov 
and 7 children 
11 330 100 1:9 2600 19 18 
120 15+45 Ivan Trendafilov 28 952 150 1:5.5 4500 19 12.5 
30 4 Todor Dimitrov 14 476 75 1:5 2325 10 12.5 
40 18 
Petko Tanev 
 (kmet, muhtar) 
18 648 120 1:7 3120 15 12.5 
*1.5 dönüm needs 1 kile seed (20-25 kg), thus 30 kile land = 4.5 ha. This amount of seed is similar to that 
of calculated by Palairet. Razboynikov, A.: Chiftlitsi i chiftligari v Trakiya, 175–76. 
 
Although estimations on Bulgarian GDP vary in a wide range (825-
1109 million leva in 1890, 1648 million in 1912),343 all agreed that 60–66% 
came from agriculture. 40% was produced by smallholders under 10 ha, 
10% by large estate holders in the 1930s.344 But there is a debate between 
Palairet and Ivanov about the value of GDP/capita (it increased from 
336 leva to 386 leva at current prices): the former calculates with a 20% 
decrease between 1890–1910 at real prices, while the latter with 
stagnation. 
The output of the Serbian economy – including the production of 
agriculture – is also debated. Stojanović – in 1919, when assessing the 
devastations of war – put the yearly agrarian output to 900 million 
francs showing a return rate of 35–50% (without amortization). Lampe 
put this to 600,345 while Palairet recently to 350 million.346 Accepting 
Lampe’s data would mean, that the Serbia’s total agricultural output 
was similar to the Bulgarian, thus per capita values even exceeded that, 
contrary to Palairet’s presumption. Only the share of agriculture from 
total GDP seems to be certain: everybody puts it between 60–70%. As 
the amount of agrarian output influenced the adjudication of total GDP 
(estimated from 560 to 1185 and to 1350 million dinars in Serbia) and 
                                                          
343 See the estimations of Manushev (900 million), Popov (1109 million) and Gueshov (825 
million) for the 1890s and Popov for 1912 (1648 million). Topalov, V.: Stopanska kriza v 
Balgariya prez 1897–1900 g. Izvestiya na Instituta za Istoriya 13, 1963. 65. 
344 Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. I. 515, 520; Topalov, Vl.: Stopanskata kriza v 
Balgariya… 
345 Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 439. 444. 
346 Palairet, M.: Balkanskite ikonomiki, 341. 
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GDP/capita, ranging from 233, 300 to 400 francs (the latter calculated by 
Lampe, the formers by Palairet and Stojanović) as well, it would be wise 
to recalculate agrarian output based on available data. We accepted a 
value between 300–400 million francs.347 This means that the return rate 
could not be 35% in 1910 as indicated by Stojanović, but only 12%348 
(measured to the value of a farm), which is smaller then calculated for 
1840–70, but similar to the general industrial return rate according to 
Lampe (8%). 
 
(b) The agrarian decline 
 
(i) Transformations I. – Land reforms andintrovertion in 
Bulgaria  
 
The following chapter highlights on the example of Bulgaria, that land 
reforms were not always progressive from economic aspects on the long 
run (even if they were considered successful from social aspects by 
some historians). Redistribution of land was not always optimal 
response to a challenge as it could even shrink the future possibilities to 
react successfully. 
According to Draganova 57% of the Bulgarian peasantry had his 
own estate of 5–10 ha prior to 1878 and only 25% of estates were larger 
than 25 ha. The estate structure did not change significantly during the 
reforms (table 1), only ownership. Although the stratum of agrarian 
wage-labourers (landless cheap labour force, rataj, argat) disappeared 
                                                          
347 If we calculate only with wheat hypothetically extended to the total area, it could have 
produced 190–240 million francs value yearly (calculating with 20% fallow, 1000–1200 kg/ha 
yield and 120–130 francs/ton price). Adding further the production of husbandry and other 
cultures (like plum), it is evident, that the two higher estimations are incorrect. Palairet puts 
the value of marketed agrarian products to 140 million (both inland and abroad), which 
cannot be less than 20% or more than 33% of the total production, if we accept 
Stojsavljević’s data on marketed surplus depending on estate size. Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje 
kapitalizma u selo (1919–1929). Zagreb, 1965. 31. (A farm under 1 ha could not market more 
than 10%, while a large estate over 20 ha could take 40% of its products to markets).  
348 It is even lower, 7% if calculating with net profits (deducing the seeds and animal and 
personal consumption ranging up to 50%). 
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after the reforms (contrary to the the Hungarian reforms in 1848), there 
were only 40 thousand (10%) new economies in 1890.349 This means that 
most of the land was given to those who already had some, in order to 
make their holdings more viable. The reform could be considered 
radical only from ethnic aspects (Jireček claims, that in Stara Zagora 
75% of the sold/redistributed lands were owned formerly by 
Muslims),350 but not from economic point of view (although it had 
longlasting socio-economic consequences), as only 20% of total lands 
were distributed. But, as this proportion exceeds the proportion of 
Muslim (and Christian) large estates, many Muslim smallholders also 
fell to victim of the “reforms”.351 Furthermore, not all chifliks were 
distributed: we can also speak about a change in ownership beside the 
dissolution of large landholdings: in the district of Stara Zagora the 
number of Bulgarian large estate owners increased from 313 to 442 
acquiring 2/3 of the redistributed land, while the number of Muslim 
large estate owners decreased from 251 to 176.352 
The collection of the tithe based on the size of the land (even if 
uncultivated) and not after the volume of harvest was unfavourable for 
absent, mainly Muslim owners.353 This, together with the shortage of 
labour force354 and the price decrease of wheat forced emigrant Muslims 
to sell their legal property at low prices (land prices fell by two-thirds as 
pressure from the state on Muslim landowners increased).  
Driven either by the egalitarian concept to moderate social 
differentiation or by a calculation to eliminate the layers threatening the 
positions of the new elite, the state did not allow to estabish new 
                                                          
349 Topalov, T.: Borba na Balgarskiya narod za demokratichno ustroitelstvo i nezavisimost na Balgariya 
(1878–94). Istoricheski Pregled. 1945–46/4–5. 442. 
350 Irecek, K.: Putovanie po Balgariya, 234. (Jireček, K. J.: Cesty po Bulharska. Praga, 1888). 
351 Data: Hristov, Hr.: Istoriya na Balgariya. Vol. 4. Sofia, 1987. 42.; Berov, Ly.: Agrarnite otnosheniya 
u nas po vreme na Osvobozhdenieto. Trudove na Visshiya Ikonomicheski Institut ‘Karl Marx’. 
2. 1956. 67–148.; Draganova, Sl.: Selskoto naselenie, 83, 91; Ikonomika na Balgariya do 
socialisticheskata revolutsiya. Sofia, 1969. 3. 
352 Berov, Ly.: Agrarnoto dvizhenie, 33–34. 
353 Ibid. 29. 
354 Macedonian workers were cheaper, therefore they were hired in Bulgaria, while 50 
thousand Bulgarian pechalbari migrated to Romania and Besarabia. 
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holdings over 9 ha, which decreased competitiveness.355 While in 
Hungary the reforms of 1848 produced a broad landless layer that still 
had to serve on large estates – but now for wages – as they could not 
afford to buy their own land, this agrarian stratum (from where 
industrial workers could have been recuited) remained thin in the 
Balkans. This hindered the future capitalistic transformation of 
agriculture and the accumulation of workforce in industry as well. 
Furthermore, this happened when wheat prices generally dropped, 
shrinking state revenues and eliminating local capital accumulation.  
It is also undeniable that speculation also characterized the activity 
of the elite profiting from land reforms: in Eastern Rumelia the value of 
lands purchased by Christians from Christians was 25 million piasters 
constituting 25% of all purchases.356 The Bulgarian smallholder often 
bought his land from Bulgarian chorbadjis at high prices, while the latter 
managed to obtain it from the original Muslim owner at low prices.  
The land reform was also exposed to fierce political fights: the 
Russophile Bulgarian government sold the land at low prices (50–80 
francs/ha) to get the benevolence and votes of the small peasantry, 
while the conservatives sold them at real market prices (180 francs/ha), 
to secure the interest of layers with higher purchase power, excluding 
small peasantry from the great redistribution.  
This also meant that those peasants who received land at higher 
prices became indebted: though the changes also eliminated the debts of 
peasants toward the Ottoman state (originating from the purchases after 
1858), lacking agrarian banks and access to credit until 1894, Bulgarian 
peasants fell to the hands of usurers offering loans at monthly 12% 
interest rate (instead of the yearly 12%). In Stara Zagora only 25% of 
their debt was paid in time. The decrease in number of owners (100 
thousand) between 1887 to 1892 partly reflects confiscations owing to 
debts. Mass indebtedness has appeared in 30% of settlements.357 Crop 
                                                          
355  Istoriya na balgarite v dokumenti, Vol. I/1. 441. 
356  Ireček, K.: Patuvanie po Balgarija, 235–36; Kosev, D.: Selskoto dvizhenie v Balgariya v kraya na XIX 
v. Istoricheski Pregled, 1948–49/5. 551. See also: Topalov, T.: Borba na Balgarskiya narod, 442.  
357 Svedeniya po zadalzheniyata na zemledelcite kam lihvarite. Centralno Upravlenie na 
Zemledelskite Kasi. Sofia, 1901. 
166 
 
failures of 1897–99 also contributed to the process. By 1908 36 000 
parcels out of the 80 000 parcels of community lands were confiscated 
from peasants by the Agrarian Bank.358 According to Gueshov, the 
indebtedness of Bulgarian peasantry reached 90 million leva by 1900359 
or almost 200 leva/economic unit (calculating with 420 thousand 
smallholders), in other words 20-30% of the yearly income. Only the 
inflationary policy of Stamboliyski managed to eliminate some of these 
debts after 1920360 (the same happened to Hungary).  
Not even productivity improved significantly. The theory of Arthur 
Young “gold from sand” (the mirage of private property) did not fulfill, 
total production did not increase even after the establishment of 
smallholder society, although this was the presumption of Bulgarian 
marxist historians, challenged by Palairet and Lyberatos. (The similar 
hypothesis of Hungarian historians, that uneven distribution of lands – 
the overwhelming role of large estates – hindered agrarian development 
between 1850–1910, has recently also been falsified. We have seen that 
neither chiftliks were obsolete ab ovo. The abolition of serfdom did not 
fulfill the expectation of scientists: in Hungary the abolition of robot 
increased agricultural output only by 1.5%,361 as corvéé – surprisingly – 
constituted only 5% of total working hours in agriculture as calculated 
by John Komlos and Scott M. Eddie).  
As these reforms took place side by side with the decrease of wheat 
prices, this eliminated the possibility of local capital (land) 
accumulation. The new, smallholdings dominated economy meant a 
return to a self-subsistence. The land reform did not create a sustainable 
agrarian structure in Bulgaria after 1878: owing to demographic 
pressure, the average size of landholdings continuously decreased. 
                                                          
358 Daskalov, A.: Zemedelskiyat kredit v Balgarija ot 1864 do 1913. Sofia, 1912. 137–38; Berov, Ly.: 
Rolyata na zadalzhitelni darzhavni dostavki vav vatreshna i vanshna targovija na balgarskite zemi 
prez XVI–XIX vek. In: Iz istoriyata na targoviyata v balgarskite zemi v XV–XIX vek. Sofia, 
1978. 107–52.  
359 Geshov, I. E.: Dumi i dela. Sofia, 1899. and Stopanska istoriya na Balgariya. Sofia, 1982. 225. 
360 Todorov, G.: Politikata na balgarskite burzhoazni pravitelstva po agrarniya i bezhanskiya vapros sled 
darzhavniya prevrat ot 1881g. (1881–1886). Istoricheski Pregled, 1961/2. 29. 
361 Equalling to a 2% increase in capital and workforce. See: Eddie, Scott M.: Ami „köztudott” az 
igaz is? Bevezetés a kliometrikus történetírás gondolkodásmódjába. Debrecen, 1996. 52–54. 
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(table 3). The situation even deteriorated by 1897, as the % of viable 
smallholdings decreased from 51% to 35%. The collapse of zadruga and 
the emergence of nuclear families was partly behind this phenomena. 
For example in Dobrich kaza the average land size was 15 
ha/households prior to 1878, but one household consisted of 3 adult 
males.362 Until industrial wages were lower, than the income of a land 
unit of 5 hectares, these males rather distrubuted the land, then to work 
in industry (contrary to the landless Macedonian peasants).  
 
Table 3. Changes in the distribution of land owing to Bulgarian ’land reforms’ (in %) 
Size 
1872–77 1897 (the same in 1908)* 
units land units land 
1–3 ha 18 3 45 7 
3–10 ha 51 35 35 30 
10–20-ha 23 35 14 29 
over 20 ha  7.5 26 7 33 
Lyberatos, A.: From Imperial to National Lands, 156., and Draganova, Sl.: Selskoto naselenie, 91–99.  
10% of the country was included in the investigation. 
*Due to the recovery of wheat prices at the turn of the century revitalization of agriculture was realized 
in extensive forms, which temporarily stopped fragmentation. (Data from: Trifonov, S. – Georgiev, V.: 
Istoriya na Balgarite I/2.) 
 
(ii) Transformations II. The landuse conflict of animal 
husbandry and grain production in Serbia 
 
The conflict between animal husbandry and grain production 
(illustrated on the example of Serbia) has different interpretations in 
historiography. A Malthusian approach is adapted by the ecological 
history writing arguing that a gradual overpopulation induced the 
landuse change, while traditional history writing emphasizes external 
circumstances, mainly the policy of Austria-Hungary.  
                                                          
362 Dimitrov, Str.: Za klasovoto razsloenie, 234. 5 ha/ 1 one male workforce was optimal indeed, 
later this value deteriorated. 
168 
 
The retreat of animal husbandry was general on the Balkans: 
according to Tomashevich the per capita livestock unit in Serbia fell 
from 1500 to 700 between 1860–95, while in Bosnia between 1895–1910 it 
decreased from 1540 to 1140.363 Parallel to this process the average grain 
yields increased from 3.6 hl/ha (1818) to 5.6 hl (in 1895) in the Croatian 
Militärgrenze, and potato consumption per capita increased from 26 kgs 
to 121 kgs.364 A recovery in the significance of animal husbandry only 
took place after 1929 (in Bulgaria). 
In order to understand the phenomenon a number of factors has to 
be taken into consideration. The zadrugas and the lack of primogeniture 
enabled early marriages even without creating the basis of financial 
independence for the new family. It means that the productive age of 
women began earlier in the Balkans than in Western Europe allowing 
more children to bear.365 In Serbia the net population increase was high 
(1.5% yearly even after 1880), often exceeding the increase in grain 
yields. The principle of equal male heritage led to decreasing farm sizes 
and growing fragmentation – zadrugas, until they existed, were to 
moderate this effect. 
Originally, there were plenty of space for woodlands and grazing 
lands for animals: cultivated land reached only 9% of the total surface of 
Serbia in 1844, and 21% in 1867,366 while it was over 62% hundred years 
later. Forest were utilized by swine herds, woodlands cut down were 
grazed by sheep. Animal husbandry gave 50% of the production of 
agriculture in the 1860s in Serbia – never again approached –, but 
measured to the extent of involved territory it was not high, indicating 
low productivity.367 
Until there was enough space, the extensive way of animal 
husbandry was sustainable. The population of the country was under 
                                                          
363 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 163. 
364 Vrbanić, F.: Prilozi gospodarskom razvoju hrv.-slav. krajine u 19. vijeku. In: Rad Jugoslavenske 
akademije znanosti i umjetnosti. Knj. 144. Zagreb, 1900. 115–21.  
365 Hajnal, J.: European Marriage Patterns, 101–43; Sklar, J. L.: The Role of Marriage Behavior in the 
Demographic Transition: The Case of Eastern Europe around 1900. In: Population Studies 28, 
1974. 231–247.  
366 Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije (1834–1867). Belgrade, 2014. 70. and 86–88. 
367 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 92. 
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one million in the 1840s, but by the 1900s in reached 3 million. Though 
per capita cultivated land grew from 3 to 3.6 hectares per farm (330 to 
780 000 ha) during the extensive period between 1834–67 (table 4),368 the 
extension of meadows and pastures did not keep up with this pace (30% 
decrease measured to 100 persons), and their proportion fell from 30% 
(1833) to 19% (1867).369 After 1867 a decrease in absolute numbers 
occurred as well, limiting the possibilities of husbandry.370 
Neither arable lands, nor wheat production increased at the same 
pace of with population increase. Between 1834-47 the population grew 
by 36%, while the cultivated area by 24%. Between 1840–60 while the 
population increased by 20%, per capita grain consumption fell by 20% 
according to Jakšić. The relative welfare of the 1830–40s turned into 
relative poverty after the 1860s. The share of maize on ploughlands – 
serving originally as animal fodder – also decreased from 80% to 50% 
between 1832–67, while wheat reached 25% indicating the landuse 
conflict.371 
 
Table 4. Landuse changes and per capita values in Serbia, 1834–67 
Year, Index Arable 
land 
Pasture Vineyard Total cultivated area  
1834, in 1000 ha 225 94 9.5 330 (9%) 
1834, % 68 22 2 100 
1834, to 1000 prs 225 94 9.5 455 (2.7 ha/hh.) 
1847, in 1000 ha    600 (3.6 ha/hh.) 
1867, in 1000 ha 604 133 24 781 (21%) 
1867, % 75 17 3 100 
1867, to 1000 prs 445 100 17 560 (3.4 ha/hh.) 
Increase +180% +40 +150 % +240% and  +180% 
population increase 
1 day kosač meadow = 0.2 ha, 1 day arable land = 0.6 ha (1 jutar or 1 kat. hold) 
Based on Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije... 
                                                          
368 Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije, 79–80. and 84. 
369 Cvijetić, L.: Popis stanovništva i imovine u Srbiji 1834 godine. Mešovita gradja, XIII, 1984. 9–118. 
esp. 110–114. 
370 Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije, 79–80. és 84. 
371 Cvijetić, L.: Popis stanovništva, 110–14. 
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The question is which produced more profits: animal husbandry or 
grain production? While 1 kg of wheat contained 3600 calories, 1 kg 
pork 2600–4000 calories. The price of the latter was 8 times higher than 
that of the wheat. But, to produce 1 kg of meat 8 kgs of grain is 
needed,372 thus the costs were the same, while 8 kgs of wheat contained 
more calory than 1 kg of pork: 8 kgs of wheat gives enough food for 8 
days for a person, while 1 kg of meat provided food only for 3 days.  
Therefore an average peasant economy could not feed more than 6 
pigs yearly, if animals solely depended on grains. Until the population 
remained low and uncultivated woodlands sprawled across the 
country, this did not create a conflict. But when population increase 
resulted in the extensive transformation of woodland to arable lands, it 
became unwise to feed porks from the grain.  
As the joint output of wheat and maize never really exceeded 300 
kgs per capita (with exception of the 1890s) (see figure 3) that could 
cover the yearly need of a grown-up and draft animals, grain would 
have been insufficient to supply animals beyond human consumption. 
While from purely economic point of view – if exports are considered – 
animal husbandry could give more profits, (it is not surprising that 1 ha 
of meadow cost 867 dinars, while 1 ha of arable land only 306 dinars), 
wheat was more advantageous from the aspect of subsistence 
consumption under conditions of overpopulation. 
Thus the question, which Serbia faced, was similar to the Bulgarian 
case: either to chose self-subsistence and low standard of living in order to 
maintain social stability, or to adapt to market demands. The latter option 
would entail efforts to increase competitiveness and to accumulate land, 
which in turn would lead to intensified social differentiation and the de-
classation of the rural masses.  
The population increase resulted in the decline of forests, economic 
space for animal husbandry. While in 1867 25% of the country was 
conscripted as woodland within 50 years 2 million hecares (one third of 
the country) disappeared.373 In 1884 still 1.3 million ha was woodland 
calculated it shrank to 0.85 million by 1905. (The same process took 
                                                          
372 The Hungarian historian, István Szabó came to the same conclusion. 
373  Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 221. 
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place in Hungary, S-Transdanubia, where 200 000 hectares of forests 
were destroyed).374 
The 1890s brought some relief: the increase of cultivated land 
exceeded 80%, while that of the population was only 7%. But the last 
stage of development (1893–1905) was characterised by a stagnation of 
ploughlands and a 20% of population increase putting the pressure 
again on agriculture (figure 1, table 5). And this great extensivity of 
arable lands is overshadowed by the fact that 50% of the cultivated land 
still remained fallow owing to the undeveloped techniques, while in 
Romania this decreased to 20% by that time.375 Fallow was not exploited 
by clover or other cultures to restore the Nitrogene-content of soils. 
Intensification was not a choice owing to the lack of proper knowledge 
(70% of the Serb intelligentsia received his degree abroad, but there was 
not any agronomist among the 350 persons in the 1840s).376 40% of 
peasants had not enough ploughs to plough the available land.  
Regional differences were also great, and wheat yields per hectare 
were still varying between 0.5 ton/ha (1860) and 1.8 ton/ha (1857).377 In 
Knjazevac average land per household fell from 9 ha to 4–5 ha between 
1844–89, in Valjevo it was stagnating, in Šabac it increased from 3.8 to 
6.5 ha.378 The situation was especially problematic in the NW territories: 
in Toplica and Užice only 11% of the land was cultivated compared to 
the 55% in Smederevo and Požarevac. Maize – inherited from animal 
husbandry – still remained the prevalent grain, because its output ratio 
was 25:1379 compared to the 7:1 of wheat. Bread made from maize was 
even cheaper by 25% compared to bread made of wheat – but it 
contained 25% less calory as well. The substitution of corn with potato 
was not considered seriously in the Balkans: potato yields/ha increased 
                                                          
374 Kaposi, Z.: Válság és alkalmazkodás. A 19. század végi agrárkrízis hatásai a dunántúli uradalmak 
működésére. In: Kövér Gy.–Pogány Á.–Weisz B. (eds.): Magyar gazdaságtörténeti évkönyv, 
2016. 196. 
375 Calic, M.-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 71. In Hungary fallow was cca. 10% by 1900. 
376 Many of the graduating 228 students did not return to agriculture.  
377 Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije, 116–18. 
378 Ibid. 94. This is partly due to the dissolution of zadrugas. Average family size fell from 6.5 to 
6 within a generation, and the number of households has doubled from 100 to 200 thousand 
(1834–67), while the population did not increase at such a pace. 
379 Keleti K.: A Balkán-félsziget… 
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only threefold between 1850–1910, while the maize yields increased by 4 
times. 
The result of these processes was that while cattle population 
increased by 20% in 1846–59, in the next 7 years it decreased by 10%. 
The cattle/inhabitant index decreased from 0.75 to 0.33.380The number of 
pigs per capita fell from 1.65 to 0.3 between 1860–1910, 381 while – a 
complementary process – the number of sheep increased from 2.4 
million to 3.8 million. Swine exports first increased from 7 million 
dinars to 18 million dinars reaching a share of 70% in the total exports 
(even per capita exports increased), but this fell back to 12 million in 
1879–80 and to 8.3 million in 1896–1900 contrary to the favourable price 
trends (figure 2). The number of pigs also sank from 1.8 million to 1.3 
million between 1859–66, then to 0.9 by 1910. Exported volume from the 
total swine population also fell from 24% to 16%. The total value of 
animals decreased from 69 million 38 million by 1900, while per capita 
value of pigs decreased from 65 to 15 francs between 1860–1900. Per 
capita swine exports also shrank from 12 to 3.3 dinars between 1871–
1900 (table 6).382 
The income from exports was influenced by price fluctuations, while 
the profit rate was determined by price differences. For example while 
the price of a pair of pigs increased from 350 to 550 grosh in Vienna 
(thanks to the military campaigns) between 1837–48, it was only 70-80 
groshes in Belgrade. Between 1865–66 the price of pigs fell from 700 
grosh to 250 in Vienna, while in Belgrade it decreased from 250 to 120. 
The ratio of pigs from total animal populace fell from 33% to 25%.383 
After the 1860s, prices trends and the development of traffic (railway 
from the Banat to Vienna was ready in the 1860s)384 would have been 
                                                          
380 Ivanić, S.: Poljoprivreda u Srbiji. Prilog za poučavanje ishrane i narodnog zdravlja. Belgrade, 1938. 
57. 
381 Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 214. 
382 Palairet, M.: Balkanskite ikonomiki, 325. 
383 Katić, B. M.: Poljoprivreda kneževine Srbije, 207–14. 
384 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 103–04. The creation of the Bazias railway track in 1856 
made it possible for the exporters to feed the pigs on the grains of Banat. This increased the 
profit rate of Serbian exporters, making it possible to bypass the mediating merchants in 
Győr (Raab), who previously bought up and fed the animals, then sold them to Viennese 
markets. 
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favourable for meat export, but overpopulation, the lack of processed 
food industry (to mitigate the effects of epidemics making for livestock 
export risky)385 and the political relations with Austria-Hungary made 
the utilization of these favourable circumstances impossible. 
 
Figure 1. Changes in the availability of land 
 
Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 234–35. 265. and Calic, J-M.: Sozialgeschichte 
Serbiens, 132. 
Figure 2. Changes in export prices of main products  
 
Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 234–35. 265. and Calic, J-M.: Sozialgeschichte 
Serbiens, 132. 
                                                          
385 Like in years 1854, 1859, 1879. 
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Table 5. Phases of Serbian agriculture: land availability versus population increase 
Period 
Population 
increase 
Increase of 
cultivated land 
Net changes 
1834–47 24% 36% 
 
+10% growth of estate sizes 
1840–60 21% 
6% 
+20% cattle 
–20% per capita grain consumption 
 attempt to live from animal husbandry 
1867–89 40% 
40% 
–10% cattle 
–25% pig 
Income/household from grain exports 2x, 
income/ha from grains 2x, 
exports and production per ha is stagnating 
(price fluctuations are determinative),  
costs of living are increasing 
unit prices of wheat are falling 
1889–93 7% 
80% 
–30% pig 
Income/household from grain exports 4x, 
income/ha from grains 2x 
size of economic units +50%,  
temporary success of extensive grain 
production 
1893–1905 20% 0% 
yield/ ha +10%,  
failure of extensive grain production  
1860–1911 180% 
agricultural income: +80% 
per capita agricultural income: –30% 
real income per economic units: –20% 
real income per ha –60% 
cultivated area: + 400% 
number of economic units: +90%  
population increase +150% 
 
 
Table 6. Changes in swine exports (at constant prices of 1860) 
Period 
Animal 
exports  
(million 
dinars) 
Animals 
altogether 
(million 
dinars) 
Exports 
measured 
to total 
animal 
population 
Value of 
exported 
animals 
(million 
dinars) 
Value of 
animals/capita 
(dinars) 
Animal 
export per 
capita 
(dinars) 
1859–60 10 79 13% 69 65 10 
1871–75 17.4 72 24% 55 40 12 
1879–80 12 74 16% 62 36 7 
1896–00 8.3 46.2 18% 38 15 3.3 
1911–12 8.5 43 20% 34 11 3 
Modified after Palairet, M.: Balkanskite ikonomiki, 325. 
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Figure 3. Per capita output of main products in Serba 1847–1910 
 
Based on Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens,  203.  
 
It would be unwise to focus only on the monocausal explanations of 
ecological history-writing. Concepts stressing the activity of Austria-
Hungary to create an economic vassal state from Serbia are also relevant 
in this question. Austria-Hungary often tried to exclude Serbian pigs 
from the markets of Austria-Hungary under the pretext of health 
condition of animals. The number of pigs exported to Austria-Hungary 
first rose from 67 thousand (1856) to 300 thousand (1886), then it fell 
back to 122 thousand (1901),386 owing to both the counter-strike of 
Hungarian agrarian lobby and the mentioned structural changes. But it 
is also true, that the export values still showed an upward trend until 
the “Pig War” of 1906: between 1884–93 the 57 000 exported cattle and 
the 200 000 pigs were worth 16.5 million francs, while between 1894–
1905 the number of exported animals was only 36 000 and 122 000 
respectively, but were still worth 26 million francs owing to the 
favourable price trends. Furthermore, the balance of trade of the state 
remained positive, which was very important for modernization.  
                                                          
386 Strausz A.: Szerbia közgazdasági viszonyai. Iparosok olvasótára. IX évf. 1–2 sz. Budapest, 
Lampel Róbert, 1902. 47. 
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Serbia’s main problem was, that the state was deprived of free tariff-
policy: the same tariffs were valid as in Ottoman Turkey. When the 
Serbs tried to increase tariffs to 5% in 1845, it was vetoed by Metternich. 
When Turkey successfully increased import tariffs to 8% ad valorem, it 
was not valid for Serbia, therefore the state introduced the trošarina, 
some kind of VAT. After gaining its political independence Serbia lost 
its economic independence in 1881 for further two decades and was 
prohibited to conclude any economic agreement without Austrian 
consent. The building of the Beograd-Niš railway line was also 
burdened on the Serbian treasury, while was advantageous for Austrian 
industrial import goods.387 By the time the Serbian economy became 
dependent from grain exports (table 18), Hungary just abandoned the 
price support of imported wheat (formerly the state paid back the tariff 
costs of each 100 kgs of imported wheat processed and exported as 
flour), threatening Serbian exports, although there was no direct 
political link between the two acts. Only the political turn after 1903 
created a way out of this situation. Although Serbia and Bulgaria 
abandoned their plans to establish a free-trade zone (1904) under the 
heavy Austro-Hungarian pressure, but the Serbs refused to buy 
Austrian military equipment, thus the ’Pig War’ broke out. Hungary 
forbade the imports of Serbian pigs and cattle (worth then 30 million 
francs), and Serbia had to find new economic partners in Europe. This 
explains the increasing Serbian territorial aspirations towards the 
Albanian coast and Macedonia.388 The long distance to Marseille, as new 
market forced Serbian exporters to invest into the food processing 
industry.389 
Forced grain exports 
Not only meat exports, but local meat consumption also decreased: in 
1907 in Serbia meat consumption per capita sank to 25 kgs, while it was 
51 kgs in Germany. (Meat was rather exported than consumed locally). 
                                                          
387 Calic, M-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 122.  
388 Stoyanovich, K.: The Economic Problems of Serbia, 22–24. 
389 Strausz A.: Szerbia közgazdasági viszonyai, 47. 
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In Užice the proportion of meat from daily calory intake remained 
between 1 to 20%. The retreat of flesh in human consumption was 
evaluated by Abel, W. as the result of a „Malthusian demographic 
crisis”. Losses in exports had to be compensated somehow, but owing to 
the lack of industrial products only grains could substitute animal 
products in home consumption and in exports. Calic defines this 
phenomenon as “hunger exports”: the proportion of grain in exports 
increased from 1% in the 1840s, to 30% in 1910 (animal husbandry still 
gave 25%, table 18),390 while 28% of households suffered from food 
shortages early from October and this increased to 50% from January. In 
Zlatibor (1906) a 35% lack in calory intake was measured.391 
Wheat export was forced and after 1878 it was against the price trends. 
Flour had three times bigger added value than grains, but milling 
capacities were missing from Serbia, while the rival Hungary developed 
the largest in Europe. The quantity of Serbian grain exports doubled 
three times (table 16). First between 1865–80 from 50 to 100 thousand 
tons owing to new railway connections that broadened the market and 
due to the favourable price trends; the second jump took place contrary 
to price trends in the extensive period of 1890, the third, from 102 000 to 
243 000 tons coincided with improving price trends, improving 
yield/ha392 and land shortages after 1900.393 
After 1880 while import per capita grew steadily, the agrarian output 
per capita and exports could not follow this.394 Marketed volumes 
remained small compared to Europe, where exports reached 17% of the 
NNI, while in Serbia the exports and internal markets together reached 
the same value (130 million francs out of 330, or 40% were marketed 
from the total agrarian production, and from this exports grew from 
12%395 of the production to 20% by 1910).396 The Serbian agriculture 
                                                          
390 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 122.  
391 Avramović, M.: Selo u Srbiji, 241–50. esp. 245. 
392 From 0.9 t/ha to 1.1 t/ha. 
393 Calic, M-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 116. 
394 Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 346. 
395 It was 25% in Bulgaria and 45% in Romania that time. The share of local markets was about 
30% in 1900 measured to production and decreased to 15% by 1910, with stagnating 
quantities (referring to stagnating local consumption). 
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remained vulnerable, depending on external processes. The failure in 
intensification – up to the tariff war in 1906 – is marked by the attempts 
of sugar-beet production by the companies Solvay and Thurn und Taxis 
which remained unsuccessful owing to the Romanian and Austro-
Hungarian dumping. 
Table 7. Total (in 1000) and per capital animal population in 1898 
Animal Greece Serbia Romania Bulgaria 
Sheep 2900 1.21 3094 1.32 5212 0.90 7060 2.14 
Cow 370 0.15 915 0.39 2520 0.43 1200 0.36 
Goat 360 0.15 525 0.22 n.a. n.a. 1450 0.44 
Horse 100 0.04 169 0.07 595 0.10 150 0.05 
Pig 180 0.08 904 0.39 926 0.16 440 0.13 
Based on: Szende Gy.: Földrajz-statisztikai tabellák a Föld összes államairól… 
(iii) Transformation in the borderlands I.: traditional conditions 
and development driven by colonization processes (Bosnia)  
 
The agrarian system in Bosnia was special from several aspects: first, the 
Muslim feudal elite survived here by making their fiefs inheritable. In 
Bosnia there were more than 3000 spahis in the 1720s and 50% of them 
was still wealthy enough participate in the Russian wars outside the 
boundaries of the province.397 Second, occupied Bosnia received huge 
amount of money after 1878, which was spent on the improvement of its 
economic performace (it was unique compared to other Balkan states). 
Third, animal husbandry played an important role in the improvement. 
The fate of Bosnia more or less represented the future of Serbia, if it 
had failed to gain its independence. The number of landlords was 6000 
in 1870 constituting 2% of the society, further 30% was free smallholder, 
while kmets (sharecroppers) constituted 50% of the population. Further 
                                                                                                                                
396 Export/farms grew from 70 kgs in 1867 to 600 kgs (or to 75-100 dinars) in 1910. 
397 Skarić, V.: Popis bosanskih spahija iz 1123 (1711). Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Bosni i 
Hercegovini 42, Sarajevo, 1930. 1–99. and Skarić, V.: Postanak i razvitak kmetstva u Bosni i 
Hercegovini. Pregled. Sarajevo 11, 1937. Pregled, Sarajevo, 1937. 481–89. 
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18% of the earners was not involved in agriculture. Catholics and 
Orthodox were mainly kmets, while 75% of Muslims was freeholder. In 
1870 23 thousand Catholic and 60 thousand Orthodox kmets and 75 
thousand Muslim freeholders lived in the province beside the landlords. 
The position of the freeholders was not always favourable: it improved 
only from the middle of the 18th century, when they revolted against 
the state, that wanted to extend taxation on them beyond compulsory 
military service. Finally, the government acknowledged that Muslim 
freeholders were the part of the askeri order, and had to pay only the 
12.5% state tax, which was lower compared to the 33% of Christian 
kmets working for landlords.398 (However, their land was also smaller). 
Tensions in the province were mainly of social character and not of 
religious prior to the 1870s.399 The basic turn was when military service 
was introduced to Christians as well, while their tax burdens did not 
decrease, and could not become owners of the cultivated land. 
Generally, the region was poor, poorer than i.e. Bulgaria. Prior to the 
reforms of 1858 the following estate categories did exist. Mülk was free 
landholding not paying the tithe, but ranging only to 500 m2 incuding 
the house of the producer. The kmets could have owned only these in 
case of a redemption realized without the dissolution of large Muslim 
landholdings (which did not happen even after the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation in 1878). Üsherie land was given to the conquerors or 
convertites, under the obligation of tithe-paying. Kharadzhije land was 
given to the subjected Christians paying the cizye beyond the tithe. The 
miri lands were owned by the state and given to the military elite in 
order to secure the financial basis of their service, but these were not 
inheritable (prebendal estates). Vakuf lands (lands of pious institutions) 
were also frequent. These financed the maintenance of roads, bridges, 
hospitals, schools from their revenues,400 thus had crucial role in social 
cohesion. As vakuf lands became manus mortua, thus cannot be 
mortgaged and taxed, while the donator retained the right of ususfructus 
in return for offering a certain amount of income, vakufs served as 
                                                          
398 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 108. 
399 Malcolm, N.: Bosnia. A Short History. NY Univ. Press, 1996. 
400 Asbóth, J.: Bosznia és Hercegovina. Budapest, 1887. 158. 
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asylum for peasants with debts. Spahis also adapted this strategy to 
make their lands inheritable. This abuse caused the loss of large sums 
for the central treasury. Mevat was uncultivated, metruke was communal 
land owned by the sultan, but used by the local people. These were not 
allowed to sell, but if a peasant planted some trees or built a house on 
these, he acquired the right to sell the products of the trees. Export of 
prunes gave an income of 12 million francs for the peasantry from such 
lands, while the total income from grains was not more than 50-60 
million, thus it was not a negligible revenue source.401 
Although the hatt-i sherif of 1839 abolished spahiluk, thus for 
example the Čengić-family lost Zagorje as a timar, most of the former 
spahis was able to continue the practice of tax-farming up to 1851. 
Contrary to the spahi-landlords living in towns without strict control 
over the reaya, the janissaries settling down in rural areas were more 
cruel in doing this. In order to unify the regionally diverse burdens of 
peasants in 1848 Tahir Pasha introduced the tretina: one-third of the 
production had to be paid to the landlord, but in cash, which forced the 
peasant to market the products. This requiered the abolition of corvéé. 
In North-Bosnia this brought some relief, but here it was the tax 
burdens that increased from the original 10%. With these changes large 
landholdings successfully exploited the possibilies in grain hunger of 
the West, while the peasantry became deprived of the surplus. But as 
the landlords still needed peasant work for their allodial lands, they 
revolted in 1849–50 against the reforms and after putting down the 
revolt Ömer Latas pasha abolished tax-farming once and for all.402 
The law of 1858 triggered changes in this system. Kmets could now 
redeem their sessio for money. They also got the right to buy mülk land 
or miri landholding, if they owned the trees or the house. The kmet 
settling on a miri land was not allowed to remove by force after 1858 
(but was allowed to leave at his own will), unless he denied to pay the 
share of the landlord (still ranging from 25% to 50% after the deduction 
of seeds) or resisted to cultivate the land. Peasants were deprived of 
uncultivated land and this determined the size of kmet-landholding, 
                                                          
401 Sugar, P. F.: Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878–1918. Seattle, 1963. 17. 
402Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics…  104. 
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which was around 20 ha owing to the great share given to the landlord. 
Their obligations were similar to the chiftchi in Macedonia, and the 
corvéé could reach even 3-4 days weekly. The size of Muslim 
freeholders’ estate was somewhat smaller, around 8 ha, as they did not 
have to pay tax towards any landlords.  
To find a way out from the new situation (which more or less 
secured the rights of peasants) the rebellious landlords began the 
transformation of agaliks (land distributed between peasants for a 
certain share from crops, similar to chiftliks) to begliks, large allodial 
estates merged from lands abandoned by peasant cutivators, plus the 
original hassa of spahis and mevat involved into cultivation, which were 
exempted from state tax-paying. Peasants were forced to cultivate these 
using corvéé. The state tried to hinder this process with the regulations 
of 1862, but the maintenance of agalik was also harmful, because the 
reinstalled restrictions on free peasant migration resulted in 
overpopulation and low labour intensity on the sessios. Furthermore, 
these regulations increased the state’s share from the tax from 10 to 20%. 
Since the landlords also retained their coercive measures to extract the 
revenues, thus – contrary to the laws – according to Paskal Buconijić, 
peasants in Herzegovina paid altogether 44% of their income to the 
landlord beyond the state’s share even in 1875, and state corvéé still 
existed even in 1872.403 This unresolved agrarian situation was one of 
the major causes of the revolt resulting in the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation of the two provinces. 
Although after 1878 there was a possibility to redeem the land from 
the landlord through bank loans supported by the state, from among 
the originally 83 000 kmets only 28 thousand families were able to pay 
the redemption between 1879–1911, and further 13 000 in 1911–14, while 
still 96 thousand families were working on agaliks owing to the great 
reproduction rate.404 The Austro-Hungarian authorities avoided radical 
intervention (like land reforms), referring to the Berlin Treaty which 
                                                          
403 Sugar, P. F.: Industrialization of Bosnia–Herzegovina, 10. 
404 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics…  
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secured the property rights of Muslims,405 as it was supposed that the 
Muslim landlords did not want to sell the land. This was not true, since 
many of them were prone to invest into industry, but unfortunately the 
kmets did not have capital to buy the land (according to Sugar’s 
interpretation). The vakufs – places of many abuses – also survived after 
1878 owing to the Treaty of Berlin, and the tax reform of 1875 (taxation 
based on the last 10 years yield average would have meant a decrease in 
burdens, as tax was usually overestimated prior to this) was only 
introduced in 1905.406 By 1910 the kmets constituting 33% of inhabitants 
had cultivated only 0.8 million ha (or 8.5 ha/family), or 16% of the total 
land (while the freeholders and landlords, 50% of the agrarian society 
owned 1.3 million, or 30%). State and treasury lands ranged to 1.5 
million ha forest and 0.7 million ha land. The average economic units of 
both kmets (from 20 to 10 ha) and freeholders (from 8 to 6 ha) shrank 
owing to population increase reaching 33% between 1886–1904. 
 
Table 8. Estate structure in Bosnia around 1906 
Farm size Freeholders % Kmets % Altogether % 
under 2 ha  97 000 51 19 000 20 116 000 41 
2-5 ha 48 000 25 21 000 28 69 000 24 
5-10 ha 26 000 14 27 000 28 53 000 19 
over 10 ha 18 000 10 23 000 24 41 000 14 
Altogether 189 000 100 96 000 100 285 000 100 
Frangeš, O., von: Die sozialökonomische Struktur der jugoslawischen Landwirtschaft. Berlin, 1937. 149. 
Thus, despite the efforts to promote redemption the number of 
kmets also increased by 33% within 25 years: in 1910 there were 137 
thousand free families, and 110 thousand kmet families beside the 10 
thousand landlords. Owing to the redemption the share of Muslims 
among freeholders decreased from 75 to 55%, but as 75% of kmets were 
Orthodox, the social structure was the most unfavourable among 
Orthodox inhabitants (table 9). From economic aspect the situation is 
                                                          
405 Fónagy Z.: Bosznia-Hercegovina integrációja az okkupáció után. Történelmi Szemle. 2014/1. 27–
60. The same treaty also secured Muslim property in Bulgaria, but we have seen, that 
Bulgarians found a way to bypass it. 
406 Asbóth, J.: Bosznia és Hercegovina, 145–46. 
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even more complicated as 50% of free peasants had less then 2 hectares, 
which was unsustainable from economic point of view (table 8). Thus 
the landsize structure of Bosnian freeholders was worse than in Serbia 
in 1897! Kmet landholdings were usually larger owing to larger tax 
obligations. If we take into consideration the family size and the 
differences in taxation we still get 23 thousand kmets and 45 thousand 
freeholders living in relative welfare, which is equally 25–25% of their 
group. So the statement, that Muslims enjoyed better conditions 
compared to Christians is only true for the large estate owners. Of 
course, there are examples confirming this statement. In Banja Luka 94 
out of the 95 opshtina was kmet community, 80% of the 4400 families 
were Orthodox, but 80% of the 671 landlords were Muslim. 65% of 
lands was under 50 ha, all owned by Serbs.407 
 
Table 9. Stratification of population according to farm size and religion (1000 persons) 
in 
thousands 
Orthodox Catholic Muslim Altogether 
Large estate 2 1 13 16 
Freeholder 40 30 74 137 
Shareholder 15 10 5 30 
Kmet 60 16 4 80 
Altogether 115 53 83 250+16 
% Orthodox Catholic Muslim Altogether 
Large estate 9 5 85 100 
Freeholder 27 20 55 100 
Shareholder 50 33 17 100 
Kmet 75 20 5 100 
Altogether 46 22 32 100 
% Orthodox Catholic Muslim Altogether 
Large estate 2 2 13 5 
Freeholder 34 53 77 55 
Shareholder 13 18 6 12 
Kmet 52 28 5 32 
Altogether 100 100 100 100 
Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 35. Families employed in other sectors reached 60 000. 
                                                          
407 Plamenac, Z.: Jauci sa zmijanja. In: Selo i seljaštvo. Sarajevo, 1937. 171. 
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Extensification as response to the population increase was also 
limited: the extent of cultivated land grew only by 12% (while 
population increase was 33% between 1886–1904). Even in 1955 the 
amount of cultivated land exceeded only with 5 % the 1.5 million 
hectares in 1904. Leaving the social structure intact up to 1920, only 
intensification was considered as solution by Benjámin Kállay in order 
to reduce demographic pressure and social tensions. Between 1886–1904 
per hectare outputs improved by 85%, while per capita output by 
40%.408 It is unique compared to Serbia or Bulgaria or to Macedonia 
which had similar land-tenure system (although the original values 
were low in Bosnia). 
Thus, another question to investigate is the productivity of these 
estates and the standard of living to understand whether the existing 
structures in Serbia or Croatia were attractive or not, as this could 
influence the sentiments and national affinity of the inhabitants in 
Bosnia. Based on the tithe data of Strausz, the total production could be 
estimated to 360 million piasters in 1865, while this was 400–500 million 
in Eastern Rumelia with similar population, 450 million in Serbia and 
600–700 million in the Danubian vilayet.409 This means that effectiveness 
did not characterize the region, which is not surprising either, if 
physical geographical or social conditions are taken into consideration. 
Only 33% (1.8 million ha in 1910) of the 5.4 million ha land was under 
cultivation. Marketization was so weak that 27 out of the 47 districts still 
paid the tithe in kind.410 The grain production was 500 thousand tons in 
1886, this meant only 300 kg/ha (including the fallow land and other 
cultures). If we calculate with the average kmet landholding in 1910 (8.5 
ha) and the mentioned increase in yields/ha, an estate like this produced 
7 tons of grain, only twice as much as an estate of 5 ha in Serbia. And 
only 50% of this belonged to the producer after paying the taxes. Since 
the consumption of 6 persons reached 1.7 tons, while the seed was 
                                                          
408 Palairet, M.: Balkanskite ikonomiki, 221. 
409 The given value may be correct, since if the total value is divided by total production (500 
thousand tons of grain), we get 140 francs/ton as unit price, which is realistic. 
410 Strausz A.: Bosznia és Herczegovina politikai, közgazdasági és földrajzi leírása. Budapest, 1883. 
227. 
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calculated 1.2 tons (20%), the average kmet hardly have any marketable 
surplus. (A free peasant with average units decreasing to 6 ha by 1910 
produced similarly 3.6 tons of grain). This also confirms the role of 
alternative cultures, like prunes. Output reached 200 francs/ha (600 kgs), 
which was higher than from wheat.411 Tobacco also produced net 10 
million piasters yearly, so diversification also contributed to the 
livelihood.412 If we compare this situation with that in Croatia or Serbia 
prior to 1848, we may find the Serbian model being more attractive. 
Table 10. Total and per capita crop production in Bosnia 
Year 
Total crop production 
(million quintals) 
Population 
 (in million) 
Per capita crop 
production (q) 
Population 
density per km2 
1882 5.0–6.0 1.16 4–5.2 22 
1910 17.5 1.90 9.2 37 
Hauptmann, F.: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und Herzegovina, 1878–1918. 
Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsentwicklung.  Graz, 1983. 
 
Table. 11. Per capita grain production in the Balkans in 1899 (kgs) 
Bosnia Croatia Serbia Styria Dalmatia Greece Romania Bulgaria Macedonia 
from 245 to 
356* 
414 378 228 97 110** 800 540 500–600 
*1895/1910. ** 1880. 
Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. 3. 148. (table I.72.). Hauptmann, F.: Die 
österreichisch-ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien… 
 
But while in Croatia the situation ameliorated after 1848, in Bosnia 
the reforms did not decrease the burdens of peasantry. The tithe had 
already grown from 3 million francs to 7 million between 1865–75. After 
1878 the cizye (1.5 million) disappeared, and income taxes decreased 
from 3.2 to 1.3 million francs, although state monopolies on salt, tobacco 
and coffee increased.413 Most of the Christians perceived this as a tax 
decrease owing to their consumption habits, but the implementation of 
compulsory military service after 1878 resulted in a revolt. The 
                                                          
411 Asbóth, J.: Bosznia és Hercegovina, 164. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Strausz A.: Bosznia és Herczegovina, 203. 
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governor, Kállay was generally criticized that burdens on agriculture 
grew during his rule: population increase was 40% between 1880–95 
while the tithe increased from 4 to 8.4 million francs and thus per capita 
tithe increased from 4 to 6 francs (+50%). But it is only due to the 
selection of the time interval. The increase of agrarian taxes under 
Habsburg role was measured great because of the previous decay in 
1875–78 and the subsequent classical ’restoration period’. Comparing 
the tax revenues chosing a year from the late Ottoman era, like 1874, the 
increase of tax revenues till 1895 (+20%) was similar to the population 
increase of the same era,414 thus the accusations against Kállay that he 
overtaxed the population cannot be maintained.415 The impressive 
increase in number of animals (+160%) and production (+150%) between 
1878–95 is also the result of the restoration period and the 
methodologically incorrect selection of the time-interval. (If we compare 
these results with pre-war data, this increase, like of tax-burdens, is 
smaller). 
Furthermore, not only agrarian taxes, but total agrarian output also 
increased by 60% after 1880 (from 116 million to 194 in 1914). Thus, per 
capita output also grew (table 10). The growth was partly due to the 
increase in the output of animal husbandry (this was not under taxation) 
and special cultures, like tobacco (the state income grew from 4.6 million 
francs in 1885 to 17.4 in 1910), but not owing to grain production, which 
was increasing, but per capita values were still low (table 11). (This is 
another difference compared to Serbia, Bulgaria or Macedonia). After 
1890 as a result of the increasing population pressure the increase 
decelerated to 20% within 20 years, and per capita outputs also 
decreased by 10%. However, it was still above the value measured in 
1879 (76 and 113 dinar/capita while state tax ratio fell from 12–20% to 
10%), although the value of agrarian output/capita was smaller than the 
Serb or Bulgarian. The difference in GDP/capita between Bosnia and 
other regions was rather eliminated by the better performance of 
                                                          
414 There was a great emigration in 1878, then a wave of return after 1880, that is the reason of 
the two different data (20 and 40%) for the two different period. 
415 Sugar, P. F.: Industrialisation of Bosnia–Herzegovina, 34–35. In 1878 many left the province, 
thus the population growth in 1874–1895 or in 1881–1895 also differed. 
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Bosnian industry. Agricultural products still constituted 50% of the 
export bucket, and although only some 10% of agrarian product was 
exported, this was low compared to Serbia and Bulgaria where it was 
20% (+ further 15–20% was sold in internal markets). 
 
(iv) Croatia, Slavonia, Slovenia and Dalmatia – the dissolution of 
communal lands 
 
The numerous changes in the 19th century did not uniformize the 
Northwestern parts of Southeast-Europe, which were not only 
characterized by different landuse, but also by different structures, 
where transformation was neither synchronous (1848 for Bačka, 1853 for 
Slovenia, 1881 for the military district), nor led to the same direction. 
The geographical diversity determining landuse of the microregions, 
the differences in feudal services made the borderlands, this transitional 
zone integrated to different empires very mosaic-like (table 12). 
 
Table 12. Landuse in the discussed region in the 1900s 
 Region Arable land % Meadows % Pastures % Woodlands % Grape % 
Slovenia 17 16 17 41 2 
Dalmatia 11 1 46 30 8 
Bosnia 24 9 12 50 1 
Croatia 27 11 15 38 1 
Slavonia 43 9 11 30 1,5 
Bačka, Banat 69 6 12 12 1,2 
Strakosch, S.: Lagen der Agrarwirtschaft in Österreich. Wien, 1917. 
 
In the 1850s, during the great grain prosperity the lack of direct 
railway connections to Viennese markets accompanying with the radial 
construction of lines from Budapest linked the Croatian agriculture to 
trends in Hungary. Slavonia was cut off from Civil Croatian markets 
owing to customs formalities of the Military Border detaching the parts 
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from each other. Thus, the reorganization of these regions seemed to be 
reasonable, and it was further enhanced by Hungarian fears, that the 
Military Border regions would once again serve the political interest of 
Vienna as in 1848 did so. Therefore the Hungarian government tried to 
abolish all old privileges (and thus the economic viability of this region) 
on the pretext of propagating free economic development and its 
unification with Croatia. 
In Slovenia and the western parts of Croatia feudal services 
(abolished in 1853) were not based on compulsory work and the 
collection of tithe (as it was in Hungary or the Balkans), but rather on 
services connected to the usage of forests and woodlands 
(Servitutenrechte). In the Carstic plateaus of Dalmatia, contadinaggio (a 
type of serfdom), was substituted by colonatus, in which sharecroppers 
cultivated the terraces dominated by wine and fruit production, owned 
by the urban (noble) elite in Dubrovnik.416 The small forests of 
secondary vegetation (Busch) in North-Dalmatia made forestry and 
animal husbandry unprofitable compared to the mountains in Styria 
and Carinthia or in Bosnia. The latter with its high mountains and the 
lack of tax on animals offered a splendid opportunity for peasants to 
earn extra income: there 50% of the arable land remained ’fallow’ (in 
fact it was utilized rather by husbandry owing to high taxes on grain) 
even in the 1900s, explaining the relatively low grain yields/hectare.417  
The abolishment of feudal rights in order to shift from self-subsistent 
economies to farms producing for markets took place in different ways 
and in many regions this shift was still not finished by 1910. The 
transition to capitalism in Slovenia was based on milk-producing 
smallholdings, in Vojvodina based on large estates, while in Croatia the 
persistence of smallholdings did not result such an outcome (self-
subsistence remained significant). The share of large estates from lands 
was 12% in Slovenia,418 15% in Croatia, while it grew to 22% in the 
                                                          
416 Katus, L.: A mezőgazdaság tőkés fejlődésének főbb vonásai az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia 
délszlávlakta területein. Történelmi Szemle, 1959/2–3. 362. 
417 Ibid. 364. 
418 Estates over 100 ha ranged to 40% of the land in Carinthia and 22% in Krajna. Österreichische 
Statistik, Neue Folge, vol. LXXXIII. 
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Vojvodina by the 1870s, although a century ago freeholders dominated 
the area. There were also differences in the composition of large estates: 
in Croatia 66% was dominated by woodland, while in Bačka 
(Vojvodina) arable land constituted 66% of large estates, and both were 
producing for markets: Croatian tree exports exceeded 30 million francs 
by 1895 (wood was important also in Bosnia). 
This was the era of the dissolution of communal property. The extent of 
these was not insignificant in these regions. Although in Hungary its 
proportion was only 14%, but in Croatia it was 27% (70 % of pastures in 
Croatian and 40% of woodland), and it had similar significance in 
Serbia. The abolishment of feudal rigths went hand-in-hand with the 
redistribution or redemption of these communal lands, partly due to 
population pressure (in the military border in 1819 36% of farms were 
over 10-16 ha, while in 1895 it decreased to 10%), partly to promote the 
development of private property and market processes. These changes 
were not always favourable for peasantry. In Bosnia 2 million ha of 
communal forest was turned into state property after 1878 (partly to 
prevent the general overuse), peasants received initially 50% of the 
profits in forestry (baltalik), but this decreased to 33% by 1913 (1.2 
million m3, 2 million francs or 1 franc per capita). In Slovenia peasants 
received only 26% of their former forests and just 16% of the pastures. 
Furthermore, these small parcels were often surrounded by large 
estates, thus peasants had to sell their share within few years at low 
prices.419 In the Military District the state forests (0.65 million ha) worth 
500 million francs were divided, but the peasants receiving 50% of the 
total woodland, demanded all (while the state wanted to prevent these 
forests from illegal overuse). In Dalmatia the communal forests and 
pastures ranged to 700 000 ha (57% of total land), but only 10% was 
distributed until 1910. 
Generally, the dissolution of community land resulted in the 
abolishment of life-long military service and state corvéé, but on the 
other hand new taxes were introduced, soldier-peasants lost their 
privileges on distilling spirits, selling tobacco, and smuggling was also 
                                                          
419 Katus, L.: A mezőgazdaság tőkés fejlődésének főbb vonásai, 367–68. 
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forbidden. These resulted in unrest in 1871 and 1883. The zadruga was 
also abolished, but this decision was soon withdrawn (1889) owing to its 
risk (in Bosnia and the military border for example only zadrugas were 
entitled to get/cultivate land as a contractor party). This also means, that 
here the self-subsistent traditional peasant economy also survived 
within certain limits, but these lands showed worse performance 
compared to other.420 On the other hand, due to the new circumstances 
17 000 peasants decided to dissolve the zadruga by their own will 
(illegally) and this resulted in smallholdings under 2-4 ha (such small 
estates were forbidden to establish). Thus, the traditional animal 
husbandry of the military border along Sava River, based on 
community lands was also ruined. Thus, existing zadrugas (especially 
strong in Ortodox regions, like Lika, where 70% of the families were 
living in zadrugas even in 1895) soon began to decline. An average 
family had then 7 members by 1850-1900 (it was 14 in 1780 in the 
villages of Turopolje).421 Though the process showed regional 
differences (in Varaždin in Slavonia zadruga members constituted only 
1% of the society), in 1915 (including the military district) still 112 000 
zadruga existed in Croatia with 0.85 million members (40% of peasantry 
cultivating 36% of the land).  
Though communal lands were dissolved, but the advanced 
fragmentation of farms hindered the formation of modern farming and 
private property. Furthermore, the land in the military district remained 
manus mortua (like the okučje in Serbia), the original sessio (16 ha) could 
not be sold (only the land surplus, the Überland), hindering the 
accumulation of land as capital.422 Here the large landholding was 
completely missing and ranged only to 5% even in 1895. 
There were evidently progressive consequences of the changes as 
well. The abolishment of contadinaggio in Dalmatia included the 
abolition of corvéé (90 days a year, after 1836 it could be redempted for 
10 golden forints). By 1902 35 000 persons worked as shareholders 
(colonus) on 42% of farms and 40% of these lands were wine-producing. 
                                                          
420 Vrbanić, F: Prilozi gospodarskomu razvoju, 40–131. 
421 See: Grandits, H.: Familie und sozialer Wandel im ländlichen Kroatien. Böhlau, 2002. 90. 
422 Katus, L.: A mezőgazdaság tőkés fejlődésének főbb vonásai, 369. 
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The coloni had larger farms, than freeholders (45% of farms under 1 ha), 
but the former paid 33% of the product to the owner.   
The changes were fruitful in Bosnia as well, where potato yields 
increased sixfold and prune production reached 6 million francs. In 
Croatia grain output per capita grew from 3.6 hl (1806–1818) to 5.4 hl in 
1888–1895,423 balancing the unfavourable price trends (due to the 
declining price trends incomes from grain did not grow!), and the 
advanced fragmentation of farms (in 1819 only 19% of estates was 
under 4 ha, in 1895 this grew to 39% along the military border).424 The 
number of animals increased by 80% within this period, which was 
smaller than population increase. Goat number (referring always to 
poverty) decreased by 80%, while the number of horses grew by 125% 
as a favourable effect of the military district. Despite the decrease in 
animal population per 1000 prs (450-490 cattle/1000 prs, while this was 
690 in Bosnia, the leader of the region in this respect), the animal 
exports of Croatia grew from 83 000 to 178 000 cattle, or from 7 to 45 
million francs between 1900–1913. (Exports reached 200–300 000 
animals in the neighboring Bosnia ranging to 33 million francs). 
In Slovene lands cattle-breeding was even more advanced, such as 
the agrarian cooperative movement: it had 200 000 members in Slovenia 
while only 65 000 in the larger Croatia, offering 46 and 16 million francs 
loan respectively (with 210 and 40 million francs deposit).  
Renting (arable) land was rare in Croatia (only 10%), which means 
that the transformation to monocultural large estates was not finished 
here. Not surprisingly then, the amount of loans was only 78 million 
francs, while this reached 412 million in South-Hungary by 1910.425 In 
Croatia 80% of engines operated in large estates, which means that the 
modernization of smallholdings did not begin (unlike in Hungary, 
where 48% of engines were applied on smallholdings!). Contrary to 
these data smallholdings performed well in Croatia. The sown area of 
wheat doubled between 1886 to 1913, and that of the potato increased 
by +180% (reaching 136 000 ha), while the increase of yields was even 
                                                          
423 Ibid. 385. 
424 Ibid. 370. 
425 Ibid. 380–81. 
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higher than this, +200% and +310% respectively. The wheat output of 
large estates grew by 60–75%, but this was tripled on smallholdings 
(reaching 1.1 t/ha). Thus, small farms also could participate in market 
processes in Croatia at a certain extent despite their lack of 
modernization. Furthermore, the proportion of landless was relatively 
small (128 000 agrarian wage labourers, versus 318 000 freeholders) 
compared to South-Hungary (221 000 labourers versus 150 000 
freeholders).426 On the other hand, this did not mean that agriculture 
was able to suck up all labour force: more than 200 000 persons left 
Croatia and 85 000 left Slavonia between 1900–1914, while in South-
Hungary emigration was under the country average. Internal migration 
was also significant: woodcutters from the Orthodox Lika regularly 
went to Slovenia, as their small parcels were unable to sustain their 
family after the dissolution of zadrugas.  
Estate size was often in connection with ethnicity, which helped 
politicians link the social issues with nationalism. Large estates in Bačka 
were hardly ever owned by Serbs (4 owners, compared to the 71 
Magyars and 11 Germans). The abolition of serfdom in 1848 did not 
mean the redistribution of allodial lands (only the non-allodial sessio 
cultivated by the peasant was distributed), and this created numerous 
wage labourers without land (in Subotica 13 000 out of the 20 000 
peasants had no land).427 In 1919 in Slovenia the 41 non-Slovene large 
estate owner owned 53% of large estates (in size).428 
So, the agriculture of Croatia was different from the Hungarian, 
partly because of its geographical diversity, partly because of structural 
differences. Slavonia was similar to the Hungarian plains, in Srijem high 
grape (even higher than in Hungary) and grain outputs were measured, 
while in Croatia the newly introduced potato, forestry and animal 
husbandry was dominant. The distribution of land was also different in 
these 2 sub-regions: in Slavonia the proportion of smallholders under 5 
hectares was the smallest in whole Hungary, but large estate owners 
                                                          
426 Ibid. 382–86. 
427 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 30–32. 
428 Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények. Új sorozat, Vol. 56. 431–54. Statistički godišnjak Kraljevina 
Hrvatske i Slavonije u 1905. Zagreb, 1913. 326–27. 
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were also rare. Contrary to this, in Croatia inequalities were greater: the 
proportion of farms under 3 ha was double of the Hungarian % value. 
There were not any significant changes in distribution of land until the 
end of WW2. In 1931 still 40% of the farms were under 2 ha (similarly to 
the 1910s, table 13).429 
 
Table 13. Distribution of lands in Croatia around 1900 
  under 3 ha 3-5 ha 5-10 ha 20-50 ha over 50 ha  Total (ha) 
farms % 44 27 20 7.5 1 407 403 
land % 8.5 17 24 18 31 4 663 000  
Karaman, I.: Uloga malog i srednjeg poduzetništva… 
 
The level of mechanization was lower in Croatia than in Hungary, 
where 80% of grains were processed by steam engines, but was only 
50% in Slavonia and some 25% in Croatia (the latter was characterized 
by high animal numbers). Agrarian density was much greater in Croatia 
than in Hungary (600 vs. 430 persons per 500 ha), partly due to different 
social structure430 and partly due to the lower percentage of cultivable 
land. Thus, average farming incomes generally did not exceed 60–70% 
of the Hungarian averages in terms of income per persons, although 
incomes per ha were similar: 110-160 francs/jutar in Croatia, 130 francs 
on average in Hungary. But the net income of an agrarian employee 
was 300 francs in Hungary in 1900, the gross output per agrarian earner 
was 1,000 francs – in Croatia it was 200 and 600–900 francs respectively 
with the exception of meadows, which performed generally twice better 
in Croatia than in Hungary (figure 5).431 
                                                          
429 Karaman, I.: Uloga malog i srednjeg poduzetništva u oblikovanju kapitalističkog privrednog sustava 
na tlu Hrvatske. Povijesni Prilozi 9, 1990. 1–36. 
430 The difference between Croatia and Hungary is smaller if not income/agrarian earner, but 
income/agrarian population is measured, as the proportion of helping family members was 
much higher in Croatia referring to the traditional structure of smallholdins. 
431 Nagy M.: A magyar mezőgazdaság regionális szerkezete a 20. sz. elején. Budapest, 2003. 
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(v) Transformations in the borderlands II: Macedonia – the 
alternatives of shrinking grain exports 
 
As in Bosnia, in Ottoman Macedonia chiftlik type large estates played a 
great but declining role. In 1894 16% of the population was in 
connection with this form, which decreased to 80 000 persons, or 10% by 
1903. But the extent of involved land was way larger. In Bitola only 15% 
of the villages were organized in chiftliks, but 50% of the land belonged 
to this form, and as further 30% was considered as vakuf-land, this 
means that the estate of free peasants was very small. In 1910 estates 
under 1 ha reached 33% of economic units, while 1.3% of landowners 
owned 35% of the land in 1910. Altogether 80% of farms were under 5 
ha, which is worse than in Serbia or Bulgaria (65%). Beside the large 
estate owners, only 10 000 free peasants subsisted (table 14).432 Most of 
the peasants were unable to subsist due to heavy taxation (bedel-i askerie 
or military exemption tax had to be paid after children as well) and land 
scarcity, they had to search for alternative ways of livelyhood, like 
seasonal migration, banditism, industrial occupation, or simply apply 
for work in a large-estate. It is also not surprising that Macedonia 
experienced substantial internal and overseas emigration: between 
1902–06 25 000 males (or 10% of workforce) left the country.433 
The chiftchi, shareholders of Macedonia paid 50% of the harvest 
either in cash or kind after the deduction of seeds and state taxes 
(ranging to 12.5%+20%), and he was also compelled to angariya (corvéé). 
These peasants owned only the draft animal and the house. Those who 
lost their equipment, became daily wage-labourer: momak (hamal).434 
Contrary to Bulgaria, agrarian wages remained low. In Leskovac the 
momak had to sustain his family from yearly 200 francs435 and 1 ton of 
grain, worth altogether 400 francs. Momci received only 800–1000 oke 
grains worth 200 francs and 10 francs in cash in Radomir too. The hamal, 
                                                          
432 Strauss, A.: Grossbulgarien. Posen–Leipzig–Budapest–Konstantinopel, 1917. 52–60. 
433 Adanir, F.: Die makedonische Frage ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908. Wiesbaden, 1979.  
41. 
434 Ibid. 35–39.  
435 Stojančević, Vl.: Društvenni položaj seljaštva u Niškom i Sofijskom sandžaku 1877–1878 godine. 
Istorijski časopis, 1974. 165–85. 
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though did not lose his right for free move or for alternative earnings, 
was forced to give a share from his wage earned in industry to the 
landlord.436 Nevertheless this inequality enhanced social tensions.  
The persistence of chiftlik – beside the social condistions – was due 
to the fact, that contrary to grain price decrease it provided secure (but 
low) incomes: while in case of applying wage-earners on large estates, 
expenditure cost 65 ’units’ and produced 90, resulting in 25 units 
profits, in case of using shareholders it resulted 40 units income (after 
dividing the crop between the contracting parties) and no 
expenditure.437 
It is evident from the report of the Patriarchate that in Macedonia 
prior to 1878 the Slavic population owned less land compared to their 
proportion of the population even compared to ’Greeks’. In Vodena 
district this conscription mentions 5800 Greeks, 23 000 ’Graecophile’ 
Bulgarians and 1800 Bulgarians, the latter two groups without any 
substantial land.438 
In 1878 altogether more than 300 villages (55% of the total)439 were 
liberated from sevices to landlords, when attached to Serbia.440 In 
territories remaining under Ottoman rule the number of chiftlik villages 
reached 50% from total (Prilep: 61/131, Petrich: 31/40, Melnik 53/72). It is 
not suprising that these regions soon became the hinterland of 
IM(A)RO, the left wing of which was socially more susceptible 
(Sandanski), than the right wing that emphasized the necessity of 
unification with Bulgaria (Protogerov). 
 
 
                                                          
436 Strauss, A.: Grossbulgarien, 52–60. 
437 Adanir, F.: Die makedonische Frage, 35–41. 
438Correspondence respecting the Objections raised by Populations inhabiting Turkish Provinces against 
the Territorial Changes proposed in the Preliminary Treaty signed at San Stefano. Presented to both 
Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London, Harrison and sons, 1878. 61. cites: 
Memorandum des Syllogues Grecs de Constantinople. Jean D. Aristocles, 6 Avril, 1878. 
M.A.H. Layard, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique á Constantinople. 
439 Formerly in the district of Niš there were 50 chiftlik-villages and only 16 village of 
freeholders, in Vranja the number of chiftlik-villages was 65, while 98 was free. 
440 Stojančević, Vl.: Društvenni položaj, 176. 
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Table 14. Distribution of land (385 000 ha) in Macedonia in 1912. 
Macedonia Farms Farms % Land %  Macedonia Farms Farms % Land %  
0–1 ha 31 720 33 3.5 10–20 ha 764 0.8 3.1 
1–5 ha 45 200 47 29 20–200 ha 1100 1.2 19 
5–10 ha 17 160 18 31 above 200 ha  177 0.1 15 
Data from Strausz, A.: Grossbulgarien…. 
Furthermore, after the collapse of grain prices (1880s) agriculture 
started to shrink in the three Macedonian vilayets, while the state 
needed extra revenues to pay indemnity, loans, or finance provinces 
with deficits, etc. In Kosovo vilayet still 50% of central revenues came 
from land tax, referring to a traditional social and economic structure, 
while its share decreased to 25–30% in the more industrialized Saloniki 
and Monastir. Akarli proved that tendencies of reindustrialization 
between 1878–1900 resulted in a 15–20% decrease of rural population. 
Thus, although per capita grain output increased by 20%, this still 
meant the stagnation of total grain volume and also a 15% decrease of 
total revenues owing to the falling prices weakening the position of the 
agrarian elite. Parallel with the 40% increase of total taxes this meant a 
70% increase of per capita burdens within 10 years (1890–1903)! Thus 
the economic reasons behind the Ilinden uprising in 1903 are evident 
(table 15). While in the 1850s 30% of the grains was exported, this fell 
back now to 5% (even imports occurred),441 which is even lower than the 
Bosnian 10%, clearly indicating the future unsustainability of the 
existing socio-economic formations.  
Table 15. Land tax and agrarian output in Macedonia 
Year 
Tax 
income 
Rural 
population 
Tax 
per 
capita 
Grain 
price 
index 
Grain 
production 
 (million t) 
For one 
inhabitant 
(t) 
Tax 
burden 
index 
1888–
1890 
41.5 
million 
2.04 
million 
20 100 1.1 0.5 100 
1901–
1903 
58.3 
million 
1.7 million 34 85 1 0.6 170 
Modified after Akarli, A. O.: Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880–1910, 121.  
                                                          
441 Akarli, A.: Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880–1910. In: Pamuk, S.-Williamson, J. 
G. (eds.): The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950. Routledge, 2000. 121. 
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The central incomes, population and yields/ha in Macedonia in the 
1900s were similar to the Bulgarian values in the 1860s, thus Macedonia 
lagged behind some 40 years measured to Bulgaria. There was one 
major difference: grain prices, which were higher in the 1860s. But this 
also meant that in order to produce the same amount of central income 
as in Bulgaria in the 1860s, the government needed higher tax ratio in 
Macedonia! Even the reforms of the Powers did not bring relief. 
Although in Bulgaria the tithe per farms grew from the average 100 
grosh to 270 between 1864–1867/68 and it was only 80–120 in Macedonia 
in 1903–1906 (per capita tax decreased from 34 piasters back to 21), thus 
one would conclude that the situation was ameliorating in Macedonia, 
other forms of taxes, tax-arrays (that could reach 25% of the total 
provincial budget!), the obsoleteness of the land-tenure system, the 
product composition and the survival of tax-farming and illegal 
practices made the situation for the peasant untolerable under Ottoman 
rule. 
As for overtaxation, the tax of Küchük Seymen (Silivri, Thrace) 
chiftlik (500 ha) was farmed out for 50 000 grosh, but 70 000 was 
collected442  resulting in a 40% profit rate. For the peasant this simply 
meant that the state tithe was 20% instead of the official 12.5%, beside 
the military exemption tax and the state schooling tax, which grew from 
1.5% to 6% (although the population rather visited religious schools 
maintained by either the Patriarchate or Exarchate). Furthermore, 
Christians had no chance to interfere into the course of events, as prior 
to 1903 only 10% of the gendarmerie was non-Muslim. 30 out of the 40 
Macedonian representatives in the Parliament were Muslims even after 
1908.443 Nedkov, the Bulgarian consul enumerated several examples of 
overtaxation: Apostol Georgiev with his family of 10 paid 300 grosh 
after 1.5 ha arable land444 (meaning 20% without the military tax, goat-
tax and vergi, which totalled another 250 grosh). If he produced grain, 
                                                          
442 Razboynikov, A.:Chiftlitsi i chiftligari, 176–77.  
443 Istoriya na Balgarite v dokumenti, Vol. I/2. 35. and 38. 
444 Ibid. I/2. 80–81. ref. Central State Archives (Sofia), fond 321, Inventory 1. archival unit 1616. l. 
2–13. 
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this would only create 300 francs income, which is low to feed 10 
people.  
Many illegal practices prevailed (on both sides). Forced auctions 
were frequent even for small debts. In these cases the peasant was 
deprived of the land, but the difference between the value of the debt 
and the land was not paid to the peasant, who was turned a chiftchi 
(shareholder) from being an owner. When the villagers refused to pay 
the beglik (goat-tax) unilaterally increased by a landowner, Jusuf bey, 
he gave the pasture to Muslim muhadjirs, who expelled the local 
inhabitants. In Kumanichevo conscriptions did not indicate chiftliks, but 
a bey from Nevrokop inisited on collecting 25% of the harvest.445 If the 
state was unable to maintain security and lawful order, Albanians were 
hired by local people to do so (Mavrovo, Tetovo district) and to protect 
private property from plunder, but the weakening of public security 
meant extra costs (not only at local level, but at macro level as well: the 
budget of the three vilayets showed serious deficits in 1903–06 owing to 
high military and security expenses).  
The decline of chiftlik system continued after 1903 owing to 
emigration (Macedonian workers in the USA sent home yearly 70–100 
liras) and the collapse of public security. As a result of the latter in 
Kosovo vilayet only 0.4 million hectares were under cultivation out of 
the 3.2 by 1912.446 In 1907 in only 8.5% of the total arable lands in 
Ottoman Turkey was sown with cereals, referring to a change in 
product composition and the obsoleteness of grain, as merchandise.447 
While the rural population of the 3 vilayets decreased by 10%, the 
Jewish population (as proxy for the urban – industrial – economic 
situation) increased by 40% between 1896–1903. Muslim owners rented 
their landholdings often to Jews. 
Since producers used ralo and the output ratio of grain was under 
6:1, the total output per ha never exceeded 200 francs in case of wheat. It 
is also not surprising why IMRO encouraged the production of tobacco 
and opium in areas under his rule, compelling peasants to abandon 
                                                          
445 Ibid. Vol. I/2. 88. 
446 Strauss, A.: Grossbulgarien, 52–60. 
447 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 124. 
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their original product structure (although this had already started 
earlier, without the encouragement of the organisation). Greater 
rationality of poppy seed can be underlined by the fact, that 1 ha 
produced 10–15 kg opium (with unit prices of 25–30 francs), thus the 
output per ha reached 250–450 francs. The total opium output of the 
Skopje sanjak was 100 000 kgs or 2.5–3 million francs. Altogether 100 
thousand farmers participated in tobacco in Macedonia growing on 30 
thousand ha resulting in 30 thousand tons total production. Owing to 
the external demand and intensification in labour the output increased 
from 640 kgs (1890) to 1100 kg/ha (unit prices also grew indicating a real 
prosperity, not a shortage-induced price increase). This resulted in 700-
1200 francs/ha output or 350-600 francs/farmers with averagely 0.5 ha 
(table 16). Thus, the labour intensive tobacco production was a possible 
outbreak for smallholders. Even daily wages were larger than in case of 
momci cultivating wheatland; monthly wages rose up to 250 francs (40 
piasters/day). But on the other hand, this was a capital intensive 
investment too: tobacco lands were sold at 100-2000 leva/dönüm, while 
arable land was only 100 leva – this limited the spread of tobacco.  
 
Table 16. Income from tobacco in S-Macedonia around 1910 
Area 
Farmers 
(1000) 
Land (in 
1000 
dönüm) 
Production 
(in 1000 t) 
Production 
value (in 
1000 francs) 
Land/farmer 
(dönüm) 
Production 
/farmer (t) 
Income 
/ farmer 
Income 
/ ha 
Kavala-
Nevrokop 
36.7 128 15 19 909 3.5 0.40 542 1500 
Xanthi-
Deridere 
28.6 134 6.8 10 350 4.7 0.23 361 730 
Data: Strauss, A.: Grossbulgarien, 64–66. 1 dönüm = 0.1 ha.  
Local examples also underline the profitability of opium trade. 3 ha 
produced 25 oke of opium, the total costs reached 530 dinars (collecting 
was 12 dinar/oke, tilling-sowing 80 dinars) meaning 21 dinars/oke, 
while the market price of opium was 60 dinars448 – the profits reached 
60% of the income! A merchant trading with the output of 1000 ha (8000 
                                                          
448 There was a great difference between the market price of opium and poppy seed: the unit 
price of the latter was 0.5. 
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oke opium and 160 000 oke poppy seed) could earn an income of 0.5 
million dinars while the expenses were 0.17 million.449 
The average income of peasantry can be calculated from the 
visitation data of the Bulgarian school-inspector, Vasil Kanchov.  
Without animals and grape the income varied between 1000–3000 
grosh/family showing a regional diversity (table 17). As comparison, in 
the chiftlik of Küchük Seymen 2500–3000 piasters was calculated for 
units of 4–6 ha in 1910. 
 
Table 17. The regional distribution of the value and composition of rural incomes  
in Macedonia, 1890s 
1890 
Sown 
grains 
in 
uvrat,  
Grain 
output in 
oke 
Sown 
tobacco, 
poppy, cotton 
in uvrat,  
Tobacco, 
poppy, 
cotton 
output 
Popu-
lation 
Grain 
output 
(oke/uvrat) 
Other 
output 
Grain  
oke / 
prs. 
Other 
product 
oke/ prs. 
Income 
/ family 
in 
piasters 
Seres kaza + 
Nigrita  
325 600 33 000 000 30 000 1 200 000 88 000 101 40 375 13.6 2796 
Zikhna kaza 55 000 7 100 000 470 000 1 650 000 32 600 129 3.5 218 50.6 2991 
Demirhisar 
kaza 
100 000 8 400 000 12 000   50 000 84   168 0 1028 
Petrich kaza 116 000 12 000 000 11 000 606 000 39 000 103 55 307 15.5 2043 
Melnik kaza 52 000 6 300 000 3000 86 000 26 000 121 28 242 3.3 1965 
G. Dzhumaja 
kaza 
80 000 82 00 000 18 000 550 000 29 000 102 30 282 19 1983 
Nevrokop 
kaza 
200 000 23 000 000 7000 550 000 76 300 115 78 301 7.2 1723 
Based on Kanchov, V.: Makedonija. Patopisi. Sofia, 2000. 
1890 
Horse, 
oxen 
Sheep, 
goat, pig 
Animal / 
capita 
Animal 
/ capita 
Wool in 
oke 
Vineyards in 
uvrat 
Grape in 
oke 
Grape 
(oke/dönüm) 
Grape / 
capita 
(oke) 
Seres kaza + 
Nigrita  
180 000 380 000 2.05 4.32 180 000 25 000 12 500 000 500 142 
Zikhna kaza 12 000 153 000 0.37 4.69   6880 4 000 000 581 123 
Demirhisar 
kaza 
14 000 194 000 0.28 3.88   6500 3 000 000 462 60 
Petrich kaza 25 000 116 800 0.64 3.00   1200 480 000 400 12 
Melnik kaza 8700 81 000 0.33 3.12 30 000 13 600 5 440 000 400 209 
G. Dzhumaja 
kaza 
30 000 123 000 1.03 4.24         0 
Nevrokop 
kaza 
3800 186 000 0.05 2.44         0 
1 kg grape is 0.1 frank or 0.5 grosh.1 oke of tobacco  = 6–10 grosh.  1 uvrat here =1000 m2= 1 dönüm. 
                                                          
449 Németh, J.: Szerbia egyetemes leírása. Budapest, 1919. 344–45. 
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(vi) Forced grain exports against price trends 
 
The alternative of grain exports soon became an exigence in Balkans: 
while import per capita grew steadily, the agrarian output per capita 
and exports did not.450 It meant that greater and greater proportion of 
income was spent on import products measured to incomes, and this 
led to the indebtedness of the society. Serbian domestic urban markets 
(90 million dinars) in the 1890s were more intensive than foreign 
markets (40 million). An urban dweller spent 200 francs yearly 
(compared to the tax of an urban earner reaching 88 dinars, and their 
income, 1000 dinars it is not negligible), while rural inhabitants spent 
only 45 dinars on agrarian products (peasants realized only 30% of their 
income in cash based on the marketed volume). Even the decrease of 
taxes could not promote production and marketing. 
Table 18. Grain export periods in Serbian economy 
Period Export in t Reason 
1862–1865 500 
Mainly domestic consumption. Grain exports are 
overshadowed by animal exports. 
1865–1870 27 500 
1871–1875 11 000 
1881–1885 42 000 First export upswing caused by the construction of 
Belgrade-Niš line – cheaper transport. 1886–1890 58 000 
1891–1895 128 000 
Second export upswing caused by the extensive 
period in agriculture. 
1896–1900 121 000 
1901–1905 102 000 
1906–1910 243 000 Third export upswing caused by increasing yields 
and foreign prices. 1911–1912 210 000 
 
It is questionable whether under the given circumstances – the 
agrarian output increased altogether by 66% between 1865–1910 from 
217 to 340 million dinars, while the population increased by 200% in 
Serbia – grain production was profitable or not. The Hungarian prime 
minister with evident agrarian interests, István Tisza pointed out that in 
                                                          
450 Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 346. 
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Austria-Hungary the consumption of grains has doubled between 1871–
90, but per capita expenses on bread were stagnating, because the prices 
were also halved (table 19). This may increase the living standard of 
urban/industrial population but was unfavourable for the producers (in 
this case it includes the large estates of the nobility).451 By the time the 
Hungarian river regulations were over and plenty of lands became 
available (especially for the political elite, like Andrássy, Tisza or 
Lónyay families), wheat prices began to fall. (The effects of regulations 
also ruined many small-peasants, wetlands and animal husbandry as 
well).452 Bulgarian and Serbian smallholdings were even more 
unfavourable for wheat production, because of the lack of capital and 
mechanization. Van Zanden stated that the abundance of harvesters and 
threshing-machines in Hungary – the by the existence of large parcels 
made the application of machines possible – was driven by the will of 
Hungarian producers to antecede their Balkan rivals in the markets. In 
the 1840s Hungary was only able to export (excluding Austria from this 
calculation) 5% of its grains, while it was 30% in case of Bulgaria and 
similar in Macedonia. While exports from Hungary to Austria showed a 
fourfold increase in 1843–82 and grew by another 50% till 1896, the 
share of export to foreign countries sank from 20 to 10% by 1896 and to 
5% in 1912. Therefore the Austrian markets were of vital importance for 
Hungary, and this led to the active participation of the grain producing 
nobility in political life. (The change in this situation after 1920 
endangered the positions of the ruling class).  
 
Table 19. The impact of oversupply on prices and consumption in Hungary 
Austria-
Hungary 
Production 
(million 
hl) 
Exports 
(million 
hl) 
Exports in 
% of 
production  
Consumption 
in million hl 
Consumption 
per capita 
Wheat price 
(Budapest 
franc/quintal) 
Value of 
consumption 
/capita 
1871–75 30 0.1 0.3 30 0.83 12.7 10.5 
1886–90 62 6 10 56 1.4 8 11.2 
Calculated after Tisza, I.: Magyar agrár-politika. A mezőgazdasági termények … Budapest, 1897. 
                                                          
451 Tisza, I.: Magyar agrár-politika. A mezőgazdasági termények árhanyatlásának okai és orvosszerei. 
Budapest, 1897. 12.  
452 Pinke Zs.: Alkalmazkodás és felemelkedés – modernizáció és leszakadás – kis jégkorszaki kihívások és 
társadalmi válaszok a Tiszántúlon. PhD-dissertation, 2015. 
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Unlike Hungary, the Serbs did not have the luck to have an 
integrated, protected market. The Serbian grain export reached only 
12.5% of the total output in 1900 due to the population pressure, while it 
was 26% in Bulgaria and 46% in Romania (table 22). The export amount 
per ’average’ economy grew from 70 kgs to 370 kgs (35–50 dinars) 
between 1867–93, then it reached 600 kgs (or 75–100 dinars) by 1910, or 
16–20% of the total output. The yields/ha also increased and were 
similar to the Bulgarian: 810–880 kg/ha in 1896–1907 and 1100 kgs in 
1911. In Bulgaria the draft power was somewhat greater453 and families 
were smaller, thus per capita output was greater here.  
In regional comparison, while the per capita agrarian GDP fell from 
186 to 130 francs in Serbia from 1860 to 1910 (figure 4 and 6), in Hungary 
it grew to 200–240 by 1910 from 150 according to László Katus. As the 
production structure was quite similar (both countries turned from 
animal husbandry to grain production) it was the (1) agrarian structure 
(smallholdings versus large estates), (2) the differences in population 
pressure (the Hungarian reproduction rate was smaller, table 22), (3) 
land quality and the (4) technical level (mechanization) that were 
responsible for the differences.  
 
Figure 4. Changes in Serbian agrarian outputs (in fixed prices of 1910) 
 
Calculated from the data of Palairet, including animal husbandry 
                                                          
453 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 316–317. 
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Table 20. Changes in the export structure of Serbia (in million francs) 
Product 1884–1893 1894–1905 1906–1912 
Livestock 17.3 23.3 8.5 
Grain 8 13.8 33.5 
Fruits 10.2 11.2 14.5 
Animal products 3.6 8 13.1 
Total agrarian exports 40 56 67 
Stoyanovich, K.:  The Economic Problems of Serbia. Paris, Graphique, 1919. 44–46. 
Table 21. Constraints of Serbian agriculture, 1860–1910 
Cultivated area +400%   
Population increase +150%   
Number of farms +90%   
Number of farms under 5 ha* +40% 
Total agrarian income** +80%  
Production from crops** +100%   
Total income per farms*** –20% 
Total income per ha*** –70% 
Costs of living +50–70% 
* between 1897–1910; ** because income from animal husbandry declined; ***at 1910 prices 
Table 22. Serbian agriculture compared to Europe 
Agrarian 
worker/km2 
Export 
measured to 
GDP (%) 
Animal husbandry measured to 
total agrarian production (%) 
 
Europe 46–52 
France 32 
Denmark 32 
Serbia 93 
 
Romania 25 
Bulgaria 20 
Serbia 15 
Portugal 13 
GBR 74 
Germany 66 
France 44 
Serbia 36 
Spain 30 
Bulgaria, 25 
Greece, 25 
Italy, 25 
Pamuk, S.–Williamson, J. G. (eds.): The Mediterranean Response, 79–80.  
Is this calculation correct? To check the validity of these 
macroeconomic data full of uncertanities at least for agrarian output we 
analyzed the data provided in the settlement level agrarian conscription 
of Hungary in 1865. In some cases (3.5% of the total dataset, considered 
to be representative) settlements were purely consisting of small estates, 
therefore we were able to calculate the average extent of farm units, 
their average income, and the net income per ha values as well. And the 
results show that the average peasant smallholding was 5 ha, just as in 
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Serbia. The net profits (if it means the same as in Palairet’s calculation) 
per farm units was 26 Forints (or 52 francs) in 1865 (table 23). According 
to Mariann Nagy, this had to be multiplied by 2.5 to get the value of 
gross income (in other words, the net marketable surplus in Hungarian 
agrarian economies was about 30%). Gross profits were cca. 130 francs, 
similarly to Palairet’s calculation for Serbia at the end of the century. 
This means that (as the deterioration of Serbian agrarian outputs is valid 
only for per capita outputs due to the overpopulation, but not for 
outputs per farm, which were stagnating) the average peasant economy 
showed similar outputs in Hungary in 1865, as Serbia produced in 1900. 
(By 1895, the agrarian income in Hungary grew by 30% per capita, thus 
Serbia was unable to decrease its 30 year lag. 
 
Table 23. The productivity of smallholdings and large estates measured to coutry average 
  
smallholders 
(sample) 
large estates 
(sample) 
dominantly ** 
large estates  
country 
average*** 
number of farms 144864 269 250 4 300 000 
total extent of land (kh) 
 1 kh=0.55 ha 1 610 000 913 000 393 141 58 000 000 
utilized land (kh) 1 480 000 815 000 360 000 55 000 000 
net profits in Ft  
(1 Ft = 2 francs) 380 0000 2 973 000 1 465 000 182 540 000 
average landholding size (kh) 11.11 3394 1572 13.49 
net profits per farm (Ft) 26.23 11052 5860 42.45 
net profits (Ft) per 1 kh 2.36 3.26 3.73 3.15 
utilized land in % (woods 
included) 91.9 89.2 91.5 94.8 
total farm number 4 260 000 35 000   4 300 000 
sample % 
3.4 % of 
units, 0.3% of 
land 
0.8% of units, 
1.5% of land 0.7% of land 100.00 
* There were 370 000 smallholdings in Serbia with 
an average of 5 ha in 1910, and some 200 000 in the 
1870s with 4 ha. Smallholdings in Hungary 
constituted 75% of the land, large estates 25% 
**x large estates with max. 3x 
smallholders. 117 smallholders 
lived on selected large estates 
***without Croatia 
Transylvania, 
 
But as the Hungarian agrarian structure was more diverse, the 
output of large estates may modify the overall situation. The average 
net income per ha of large estates (in cca. 100 cases the settlement 
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comprised of large estates only, so-called „puszta”) exceeded that of 
smallholdings by 33%, reaching 3.2 Forints/cadastral holds or 65 grams 
of silver (for smallholdings it was 2.4 Forints). Of course, this could be 
the result either of different cultivation techniques or different land 
quality. Although one might think, that the Hungarian nobility was able 
to acquire better lands after 1848, this question is still disputed in 
Hungarian literature. The assumption, that the evident lack of any 
difference in official statistics regarding the land-quality of the nobility 
and peasantry was the result of the pressure of nobility on influencing 
the value of land tax (land tax was officially based on land quality), had 
been recently challenged by Scott M. Eddie. So, as we cannot prove 
cheating in levying land-tax, and thus the differences in land quality are 
also unproven, it seems that technology was more advanced even in 
1865 on large estates, as it was in Bulgaria (but not in Greece). 
We even managed to select a set of settlements, where alongside 
with the 1–2 functioning large estates, several (from 1 to 4) 
smallholdings also did exist (column 3). The result was surprising: the 
net income per cadastral holds was even higher here compared to large 
estates cultivated by daily wage labourers (column 2), and compared to 
free smallholders. Unless it is a result of a coincidence (like the 
abundance of these estate-types on lands of good quality, which is only 
partly true)454 the revival of the old thesis of Adam Smith (and the 
marxists) that output is greater, if producers are interested in 
production should be (re)considered. The owners of these small estates 
might be trained agrarian experts, who were also participating in the 
direction of production in the large estates. 
We created maps based on the whole dataset containing cca. 10 000 
settlements, and the picture draws our attention to facts, that would 
change during the next decades. First, in 1865 it was the Great Plains 
rich in meadows and pastures and not the mountainous regions! As the 
water regulations went on, the proportion of grazing lands decreased. 
The question is why it was necessary to carry out these regulatory 
works. The traditional answer is to increase income and feed the 
                                                          
454 In N-Hungary we found no extremely fertile lands in this estate type, while S-Hungary 
comprised the best lands in this category, but unfertile were abundant as well. 
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population. Net income per farms was very high in the plains, but it 
was not because of the high net income per ha (it was mediocre indeed, 
except the Vojvodina and Banat), but because of the larger estate size! 
Thus, this does not refer to absolute overpopulation, but to an extensive 
strategy to acquire more land and utilize favourable export price trends. 
Even in the 18th century population density was the greatest in the 
western and northwestern parts of the country. Of course, relative 
overpopulation might still occur among the smallholders of the Plains 
owing to the extent of large estates, but the transformation of pastures 
and their redistribution among peasants as arable land was (1) rare in 
Hungary compared to Balkan states, furthermore (2) it did not result in 
better outputs on smallholdings as proved by the examples in other 
regions. Thus the change in landuse had a different reason: the nobility 
was motivated indeed in transforming grazelands to arable lands as 
Zsolt Pinke proved this. 
What is more impressing, the so-called „market line” (the hilly 
region, where the mountains and plains meet) showed better features. 
Although economic units were here averagely smaller, but net 
income/ha values were better (contrary to the unfavourable conditions 
for arable lands), than in the Plains, which results in mediocre income 
per farms. As there were hardly any pastures and meadows that time 
(this changed over time), only grape or large estates (their relative 
frequency was greater in the ’market line’ compared to the country 
average) could be responsible for the good income/kh values. I guess 
that prior to the phylloxera (1880–1896), this could handle or postpone 
the overpopulation in this region of Upper Hungary, but after the 
decline of wine-growing, the population here was also mobilized, as 
incomes decreased.  
Thus, the appearance of the workers on the labour market of the 
Great Plains was partly owing to “vis maior”, but it would have been 
futile, unless there was some labour opportunity (which could not be 
extensive animal husbandry, as it was not labour intensive). The 
relation between the course of events and causes remains in shade (was 
the transformation of pastures to arable land merely a consequence of 
the progression in regulatory works? or was the process in connection 
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with / accelerated by mobile masses or by the phylloxera?), but the events 
were finally favourable for the large estate owners of the Plains. The 
huge influx of labour surplus from the overpopulated mountains, which 
made cultivation cheaper was able to sustain the profitability of grain 
production even during the general decline in price trends. This cheap 
labour force could also substitute mechanization which was hindered 
by the lack of capital after the end of “Gründerzeit” in 1873. It is 
therefore not surprising that Hungarian estate owners invested only 
into harvester-machines, both the lack of capital and labour surplus 
made further investments inefficient. It is also not surprising that a 
general extensification took place in the 1880-90s. 
 
Figure 5. Regional differences of gross agrarian output/agrarian employee  
(country average=1001 francs) 
 
Source: Nagy, M.: A magyar mezőgazdaság, Appendix. 
There is one more phenomena worth mentioning. Traditional history 
writing claims that the Plains were characterized by large estates. On 
the one hand this is true, but the number of smallholdings here was also 
great. The relative frequency of large estates (measured to the number of 
smallholders) was surprisingly high in the mentioned ’market-line’, 
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where local urban centers developed (Lučenec, Rožňava, Košice, 
Oradea, Užhorod, Mukačeve, Berehove Carei, Oradea). Though that 
time, in 1865 they lacked connection with each other, but by the 1890s 
they were linked together through a transversal railway line – the only 
one that was not radial starting from Budapest as centre. The 
construction was probably due to the political lobby of local landlords 
(Lónyay, Andrássy, Tisza were Prime Ministers) who recognised the 
significance of such a line. The region became a revitalized dynamic 
ethnic and economic contact zone455 (satisfying both the landlords’ and 
local interestest), where a great influx of population was observable (the 
population of Košice and Sátoraljaújhely had tripled between 1828–
1910). This happened only partly in forms of organized settling on large 
estates which needed working hands. This also modified ethnic 
proportion in some localities. 
 
(vii) The effects of independence on the agriculture of Bulgaria 
 
The Serbian and Bulgarian agrarian model represented the struggle 
between ’social stability and stagnation’ (smallholder society) versus 
’economic competitiveness and declassation’ (land concentration). The 
first would cause increasing demographic pressure, while the latter 
would result in increased social mobility.456 The chosen frames were 
worst among the combinations: either agricultural production had to be 
adjusted to the estates’ structure – in that case it should have meant 
intensive agriculture based on vegetables and fruits – or the 
landholding structure had to be adjusted to the agricultural production 
(in case of wheat production it would have meant large states). Bulgaria 
and Serbia had to pay the price for the maintenance of social stability: 
smallholdings were incompetitive under the given circumstances. This 
structure had unfavourable impacts on industrial development as well.  
                                                          
455 This was ruined as a consequence of the peace treaties. 
456 If the task of the agriculture was to secure self-subsistence, then the smallholder society was 
a solution (for a time). If the goal was to enhance the competitiveness of agriculture and the 
increase of state revenues, large landholdings had to be preferred (when maintaining the 
same production system). 
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The sustainability of agrarian structure was constantly discussed by 
contemporary politicians. Agrarian socialists (BZNS) arguing for the 
maintenance of smallholdings stated, that industry would not develop 
owing to the lack of capital, therefore could not suck up the oversupply 
of labour force. But those who were arguing against smallholdings used 
the same reasons: industry would not develop within the exisiting 
structure, thus the positions of Bulgaria/Serbia for the competion over 
the resources of the Balkans would weaken. For the smallholders, losers 
of the industrialization (and land-concentration) process, it was 
indifferent whether they are exploited in the industry for low wages or 
earn the same amount of money in their autarchic peasant economy 
(industrial wages reached the income level of agrarian smallholdings by 
1910), but industry produced greater per capita output, thus its 
development would be more reasonable from macroeconomic point of 
view. The opponents of this view argued, that industry had only 
seemengly greater added value, but its demand on raw material was 
also great, thus profits per added value expressed in % was greater in 
agriculture. No matter who was right, one thing is for sure: substantial 
free capital generated by agriculture and favourable external 
circumstances were both missing to initiate industrialization prior to the 
1900s. 
In Bulgaria the effect of the land reform was not longlasting. Within 
a generation (1872–97) the number economic units under 3 ha increased 
from 18% to 45% (while constituting only 3 and 7% of land 
respectively). The structure of production also changed, diversity 
decreased.457 The rice exports of Plovdiv earlier constituting 3 million 
francs collapsed, tobacco exports also, not to mention silkworm-
breeding. Ami Boué mentioned that in the 1850s the irrigated cultures 
were flourising, but overirrigation ruined the roads, ricefields turned 
into swamps and finally Russians forbade the production fearing of 
malaria. In Lovech the cocoon production was 50 thousand in 1877, but 
only 15 thousand in 1880, as the result of the expatriation of Muslims. 
The expatriation of Tatars – who received only small parcels when 
                                                          
457 Lyberatos, A.: From Imperial to National Lands, 161–63. 
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settled down and therefore became the pioneers of intensification in 
tobacco, fruit and rose production – was also disadvantageous from this 
aspect. (In 1885 roses still produced 10 million piasters yearly in Eastern 
Rumelia). 
First the government reacted to the collapse of grain prices with the 
moderation of taxes (decreased under 10% from 15%) to maintain the 
income level of peasants. But this resulted in the expansion of fallow 
land and in the decrease central incomes. Every step of the state to give 
further concessions created a vicious circle instead of encouraging 
production. Finally (unlike in Serbia), the Stambolov government 
changed this agrarian policy and started to increase taxes in order to 
encourage peasants for production.458 But, the interpretation of this 
period (1885–94) is contradictorius in literature: Topalov claimed that 
these measures had ruined peasantry (see the decrease in the number of 
landowners and increasing indebtedness) instead of encouraging them 
as Palairet stated.459 While the latter thinks that oversupply of land was 
the reason of deteriorating yields (under self-subsistence), the marxists 
claim that the (absolute) shortage of land was the reason of 
impoverishment.  
What is evident: Bulgaria entered into a phase of extensification and 
any later improvement was driven by this process until WWI. The 
expansion of arable lands to slopes abandoned by herds (due to the loss 
of imperial purchases the number of sheep was halved in Plovdiv and 
fell to 10% in Chepelare)460 accelerated the erosion and decreased soil 
                                                          
458 The increase of tithe (+50%) exceeded the growth rate of the population, but tax rates were 
still lower than during the Ottoman era. There are two ways: (1) if land is taxed and not the 
production (see the tactics against Muslims); (2) if tax ratio is high enough to endanger self-
subsistence. In that case – if peasants have unexploited workforce/or land uncultuvated 
they are able to increase the produced amount. Example: if 1000 food unit is needed to 
subsist and the tax is 100 units, the peasant will produce 1100 units (if not interested in 
market processes). If the tax is 200 units, and the peasant produces 1100 units, he will ’die’, 
therefore, he will produce the 1000+200 units if this is possible (there’s enough land and 
workforce). 
459 Topalov mentions the following factors that contributed to the deterioration of peasant 
economies. (1) The lack of agrarian support system resulted in the persistence of usury. (2) 
State taxation was in its experimental phase. (3) The third factor was free trade beyond the 
collapse of grain prices and the agrarian crisis in 1897–1900.  
460 Ovchevadstvoto v Rodopite, prichini za otpadaka mu i sredstvo za povdiganeto mu. Sofia, 1902. 28. 
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fertility owing to the lack of manure and the decrease in fallow lands 
(from 40% to 20% between 1870–1920). As a consequence, per hectare 
grain outputs, 7:1 around 1878, shrank to 4.5:1. The decrease of grain 
prices would urge producers to export more and more wheat to 
produce the same amount of revenues, but the production itself was 
fluctuating. Thus, while in 1904–1907 40% of the grain production was 
exported, in the crisis years of 1896–1900 it shrank to 20–22%.  
Recovery was hindered not only by price depression, but by climatic 
anomalies in 1897–1900 as well. Although this was a local and short-term 
crisis, it is worth discussion, because it proved that the agriculture of the 
Balkans was still determined by preindustrial conditions. (1) The 
agriculture was unable to tackle with the climatic effects, and was 
characterized by unstable and low outputs; (2) the crisis in the 
agriculture infiltrated into other sectors of economy (which is important 
to understand the crisis in 1929 in this region), as industry was mainly 
based on agrarian raw material;461 (3) the tithe still played a dominant 
role in the state budget (30% in 1897 and in 1911 too).  Thus. any 
fluctuation in outputs threatened the balance of Bulgarian budget itself, 
also suffering from unpaid loans by that time. The risks generated by 
expiring loans associated with budgetary problems could be best 
exemplified on Greece, which declared the bankruptcy of the state in 
1897 after a defeat in a war with the Ottomans. In Bulgaria prior to 
1918–23 this was the only case when peasants revolted against the 
exisiting structure (Durankulak in 1900 cost cca. 100 lives) which 
claimed itself “egalitarian”.462 And this crisis was also a good example 
for the Labrousse-hypothesis: it was the smallholders who suffered the 
most from the decline in production (which is another important 
phenomenon to understand the situation in 1929, though that time 
climatic anomalies did not play a role in the decline). 
                                                          
461 Hristov, H. :Kam harakteristika na Stamboloviya Rezhim. Istoricheski Pregled, 1951–52/1. 30. 
40% of revenues or half of the taxes came from peasantry. 
462 In Serbia the Timok-revolt (1880s) was partly politically driven and encouraged (not 
spontaneous). The serious Romanian revolt of 1907 does not fit into the image as Romania 
was not a smallholder-society. 
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These consequences are said to be triggered by the El Niño: between 
1897–99 wheat production decreased  from 2.6 million tons to 1.5 
million tons (as 2 million adults with 2 million children consumed 1 
million tons of wheat, and the remainder 0.5 million ton was spared as 
seed /20%/, this decrease threatened the livelihood in general). The 
production of alfalfa fell from 3.5 million tons to 1.9 million and draft 
animals had to be sold under low prices owing to fodder shortages 
(horse prices fell from 125 leva to 90 leva). In Haskovo 80% of the 
population had to ask for a loan to pay the taxes. The crisis infiltrated 
into industrial branches based on agricultural raw materials: the output 
of brewery decreased from 5.9 million litres to 4 million. Capital 
invested into industry remained under 3 million francs in 1899–1901 (it 
was 3.3 million in the sole year of 1897). Daily wages in agriculture also 
fell from 1.9 leva to 1.45. 
Beyond the decline of tithe incomes, wheat exports also collapsed 
owing to the shortages (the decrease was altogether 387 thousand tons 
of grain worth 47 million leva in 1896–97). Furthermore, the fall in 
outputs did not induce an increase in export prices (this remained 120 
leva/t, while wheat prices increased from 110 to 160 leva in internal 
markets). Thus, the losses of the budget could not be compensated, as 
trade balance turned into negative. Imports had to be decreased. 
Furthermore, the agrarian crisis was deepened by a credit crisis. The 
state was unable either to pay its expired debts or to help the poor: the 
budget deficit soon increased to 60 million. Only a new loan of 80 
million could solve all these problems, thus Bulgaria became 
indebted.463 From this time on the budget showed strong correlation 
rather with the loans and expenditures than with incomes.464 
Finally, an increase of grain export prices (140 francs/tons in 1903 
and 200 francs in 1910) generated a 26% increase in yields, but it was 
rather the result of the 20% increase of croplands than the consequence 
of increasing productivity. Grain output between 1897–1900 was 0.96 
t/ha and 0.91 in 1908–11. Per capita output was 0.57 ton in 1889–92, 0.5 
                                                          
463 Topalov, Vl.: Stopanskata kriza, 50–68.  
464 Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. I. 
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in 1897–1900 and 0.51 in 1908–11.465 Although the weight of imported 
agricultural engines increased from 400 tons in 1900 to 4400 tons in 
1910, the extent of land cultivated by one draft animals also increased 
from 2.5 ha to 3 ha, thus did not keep up with the pace of 
extensification.466 Industrial plants were underrepresented in the 
production structure, the first sugar factory was established only in 
1898. Therefore the warning of the contemporary statistician Popov that 
this increase after 1900 was based solely on extensivity and on 
favourable changes in external circumstances (again) seemed to be 
correct,467 but politicians did not consider any other solution than 
expansion (which is interpreted broadly including the externalization of 
internal problems through nationalism). 
 
(viii) Frozen agrarian conditions – Albania (1870-1930s) 
 
In Albania the land-tenure system was diverse. Former timars turned 
either into chiftliks or to allodial large holdings ruled by the noble beys, 
but free smallholdings, communal lands (pastures, woodlands) 
persisted side by side. In many cases communal lands were controlled 
by the head of the fis. The estate structure showed also regional 
diversity.468 In Tirana kaza 75% of land (15 000 ha) was owned by the 
Toptani clan in 1910, while 16% of the peasants was landless (were 
forced to work on lands or serve as guards).  In other words, 84% 
owned only 25% of the land. The wealth of the Toptani’s was extreme 
compared to other beys, like Ibrahim Biçaku from Elbasan who had 
2500 hectares. Beys needed yearly 40 000 francs income to secure their 
position and maintain their ’private’ army, but most of them could not 
earn more than 15 000 francs from their lands, thus they were forced to 
                                                          
465 Statisticheski Godishnik na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo, 1912/4. Sofia, 1915. 242–43; Lyberatos, A.: From 
Imperial to National Lands,  164; Popov, K.: Stopanska Balgarija. Sbornik na Balgarskata 
Akademija na Naukite. Sofia, 1915 and 1916. Tom.  8. 140–41. 
466 Popov, K.: Stopanska Balgarija,  140–41. 
467 Lyberatos, A.: From Imperial to National Lands, 164. 
468 Mile, Ligor K.: Çështje të historisë agrare shqiptare. Tirana, 1984. 
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serve in Ottoman bureaucracy.469 The situation prevailed during the 
Interwar period: in Albania altogether 77% of farms, but only 33% of 
land was under 3 ha in 1945. Only 3 % of farms, but 27% of lands were 
over 10 ha.  (By 1950 this had changed to 1.5% and 7% respectively).470 
Both production structure and quantities were determined by the 
climate, the level of technical development was very low. Thus, grain 
outputs were very unstable, ranging from 1.5 t/ha to 0.7 t/ha around the 
plains of Skutari even at the turn of the century. Owing to the insecure 
internal situation and the local traditions husbandry was preferred to 
crops (only 13% of the land was sown around Skutari),471 as animals (3 
million goats and sheep) were more mobile. In the South income from 
animal husbandry meant yearly 46 million francs or 66% of the local 
GNP (100 francs per capita) in 1885, while grains meant only further 10 
million francs.472 In the 1870s Sax put the total Albanian grain 
production to 4.3 million kile, which means 137 kgs per capita, thus the 
region was not self-subsistent from grains.473 In good years Skutari was 
able to export grains to Dalmatia or Montenegro, but could supply no 
more than 30-50 000 persons.474 Local customs often prohibited 
exports.475 Mountainous areas (Mirditia, Malizi, Skreli, Hoti, Klementi) 
were dependant on Skutari or Prizren (that is why the borders of 1913 
made great unrest here).  
On the other hand, there were more than 78 million winestocks (or 
70 per capita) prior to the phylloxera, highly exceeding the 38 million in 
South-Macedonia and the 50 million in Thrace. Forestry was another 
alternative form of livelihood, but it resulted in overuse and 
deforestation (often beys, like Nedzhip Draga in the 1910s were 
involved in this). Cotton ranged to 0.1 million kile (while in South-
                                                          
469 Csaplár-Degovics, K.: Österreichisch-ungarische Interessendurchseztung im kaza vom Tirana. 
Südostforschungen 71, 2012. 129–182. 
470 Lange, K.: Die Agrarfrage in der Politik der Partei der Arbeit Albaniens. München, 1981. 48-49. 
471 Horváth Ö.: Albánia (II). Budapesti Szemle, 1902. 308.  
472 Ibid.  48–49. and Demeter G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Vol. 3. 205.  See also: Keleti, K.: 
A Balkán-félsziget…  
473 Sax, C.: Türkei. Bericht verfasst im Austrage des Comité für den Orient und Ostasien. Wien, 1873. 
375. 
474 Horváth Ö.: Albánia (II). 308.  
475 Nopcsa F.: A legsötétebb Európa. Vándorlások Albániában. Budapest, 1911. 56–59. 
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Macedonia this was still 3 million kile), industrial plants were rare, as 
local industry contributed only with 15% to the GNP.476  Total per capita 
income was low even in the industrialized Southern Albania: it was 48 
million piasters or 44 piasters per capita – it was 45 piasters/capita in 
Bosnia in 1865 and 55 piasters was the Imperial average that time –, and 
though it increased 80 in 1885 it still did not overtake any of the 
mentioned regions.477 
Albania’s economy was not market oriented in the 1860s (in Janina 
for example only 1 out of the 29 great merchants dealt with local 
agricultural products, and in Valona 3 out of 13),478 and it was 
characterized by North-South inequalities. Agrarian export in the North 
was composed of leather, wool (over 70% of the production was 
consumed locally) and some textiles worth 2.6 million francs, or 3-4 
francs per capita in the 1860s.479 This meant 15 francs per capita 
(altogether 9 million francs) for S-Albania (also 15 francs in Bulgaria and 
25 francs for Romania),480 but the balance was highly negative.481 In 1885 
50% of Kosovar exports were animals, 25% grains. In the South the main 
components of exports were maize and olive oil in 1900 (after the 
collapse of wine-production). 
 
(c) The era of extensive growth (1900–14) and price recovery 
(i) Alternatives of grain production 
 
As the general price trends of grains began to increase again at the turn 
of century, this made the situation Bulgaria, Serbia and in Romania (all 
mainly reyling on grain, the latter dominated by large estates) tolerable. 
In Serbia and Bulgaria grains still composed 50% of the agrarian 
                                                          
476 Sax, C.: Türkei, 375. 
477 Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. 2. 293. Table II. 38. 
478 Keleti K.: A Balkán-félsziget… 
479 Collas, B. C.: Turquie. Renseignements, statistiques, sur la commerce extérieur et sur les principaux 
produits Turquie. Annales du commerce extérieur. Paris, 1861. 3–20.  
480 Dufour, B. J.: Étude du mouvement commercial, 3–71. 
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output,482 while the Atlantic agriculture shifted towards producing eggs, 
butter, milk, dairies and other higher-value products. This was partly 
the result of the emergence of modern food-processing plants, totally 
missing in the Balkans – thus, peasants here lacked a local stimulus to 
shift production. The long price depression resulted in the lack of 
capital to modernize farms heading to the dead-end of extensive growth 
in order to maintain the former income levels. The “complementary” 
agricultures on the peninsula remained overspecified and export-
dependant, thus were vulnerable to external changes even in this 
period.483 In Romania 80% of ploughlands were sown with grains, 50% 
of wheat was exported (the highest ratio on the Balkans) constituting 
45% of total exports in 1910. Romania was the 6th greatest grain 
exporter of the world.484 In Serbia grain export volumes doubled again 
after 1900. Grain exports of Bulgaria also recovered from 20% of grain 
production back to 40%. Here, grain-fields increased in size by 50% 
between 1889–1911, though Van Zanden was on the opinion that only 
diversification in production (and in exports) could offer a way out.485 
But intensification efforts in Serbia (sugar beet) or establishing milling 
industry (flour had 3 times higher price than wheat) failed due to 
Austria-Hungary’s policy. Serbia’s turn toward processed food was 
successful only after the ’Pig War’ due to the redirection of trade.  
The alternative models (based on intensification) in the region 
(Greece: grape, raisins olive oil; Serbia: pig and plum, Macedonia: 
tobacco, opium) were yet not adapted for Bulgaria, Romania and 
Bosnia. While Italy, with great labour surpluses turned to labour 
intensive vegetables, which also needed huge capacity of synthetic 
fertilizers, thus an improvement in chemical industry started from the 
1890s, Bulgaria took the same step only in the 1930s. Intensification and 
                                                          
482 Ivanov, M.–Tooze, A.: Convergence or decline, 685. 
483 Price fluctuations influenced incomes from export. Although per capita production of wheat 
highly exceeded the needs of the society – in Romania the average grain production was 
over 0.8 ton per capita, while one person consumed maximum 300 kgs yearly (in western 
societies this was under 200 kgs) – grain exports/capita fell from 62 francs to 45–55 francs 
between 1891–1905, while the volume of total grain export increased a little. 
484 Roucek, J. S: Contemporary Roumania and her Problems, 1932.  
485 Zanden, J. L, van: First Green Revolution, 215–39. 
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the role of alternative cultures remained low. While tobacco production 
was dominated by smallholdings in Macedonia, in Bulgaria the average 
size was 20 ha and only 225 persons earned their living from tobacco in 
1905. Rose oil production concentrated in the Tundzha valley was 
characterized by 43 thousand small parcels, but in 1905 only 500 heads 
of families were engaged in the rose oil production.486 Those who had 
the knowlegde to grow intensive cultures rather left their home country 
in order to earn more, than to work as agrarian wage-labourers: the 10 
thousand Bulgarian gradinari in Hungary sent home 2000 leva yearly,487 
while a Bulgarian smallholder on 5 ha could not earn more than 700-
1000 leva from wheat. Only 25% of cattle gave milk – 1000 litres output 
compared to the western 3000 litres. Phylloxera ruined grape 
production. Outputs per dönüms decreased to 120 kg from 350–700, 
incomes from grape became similar to the income from wheat 
production (13 leva/dönüm). It is not surprising, that this labour 
intensive culture became neglected.488 Fruits were grown only on 60 
thousand hectares489 in Bulgaria in 1911 and although this had tripled 
since 1887, the 15 kg per capita production was still low compared even 
to Serbia. Per capita pig density was only one-third of the western.  
Comparing the profitability and output values of other cultures with 
wheat, the Hungarian Balkanist, Adolf Strausz analyzed the chances of 
diversification in agriculture. Sesame produced 11.5 leva/dönüm 
output, therefore it was also not profitable. Industrial raw materials, as 
sheer/flax would have been profitable giving 55 leva/dönüms,490 but the 
level of the Bulgarian and Serbian textile industry made its cultivation 
futile: there was no market for it. Flax, like potato was uncommon in the 
Balkans. Tobacco and poppy seed showed high outputs (over 50 
leva/dönüm), but owing to climatic conditions their production was 
limited to the southern part of the peninsula. Mulberry tree plantations 
were abandoned after the emigration of Muslim silkworm breeders. 
                                                          
486 Istoriya na balgarite v dokumenti, Vol. I/1. 458. 
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Rice required high initial investment costs, land concentration (0.1 
hectare of riceland was 15 Ottoman liras, while wheatland was worth 
only 1-2 liras),491 and needed irrigation (expertise and technical 
advance), furthermore, climate was also a limiting factor. Thus, though 
it showed better profitability, than large estates involved in grain 
production (dry economies), it could not become general. In Macedonia, 
Kočani the cultivation of 1 dönüm riceland cost 100 grosh (profitability 
partly depended on cheap labour force secured by the numerous 
landless hamals), while the rice output was 240 okes at 30 paras, 
producing altogether 180 grosh income (+80%). In large estates 
producing wheat (dry economies) the expenses were estimated only to 
63 grosh, but incomes were also lower: 120 oke of wheat (150 kgs) on 
one dönüm produced 90 grosh (+33%).492  
Considering only dry cultivation corn was more productive than 
wheat. In Bitola the cultivation of one dönüm of wheatland (22–30 oke 
seeds, tilling 50 grosh, harvesting 20 grosh) cost 100 grosh in 1908, while 
the expenses on one dönüm cornfield were estimated higher, to 170 
grosh.493 But maize produced 500–800 grosh, while the wheatland 
produced only 450–650 grosh even at extreme, 12:1 output ratio.494 
Wheat only had chances when western prices started to increase again. 
Though the average estate size was around 5 ha both in Serbia and 
Bulgaria, this average veiled great regional inequalities and standard 
deviation in estate sizes. In Bulgaria 66% of the 900 thousand farmers 
had less than 5 ha in 1897,495 and the situation did not improve till WWI 
(table 25). Though the extent of cultivated land increased, the number of 
smallholdings under 5 ha also grew by 90 thousand, while the total 
increase of farm number was 133 thousand. The Serbian peasant at least 
could earn income from animals, later from prunes and spirits, while 
                                                          
491 Central State Archives (Sofia), Fond. 321. Inv. 1. archival unit 1616. l. 2–13. 
492 Strausz, A.: Grossbulgarien, 122. 
493 Only 8 oke seed owing to better output ratios, tilling for 60 grosh, hoeing twice: 60 grosh, 
harvesting: 30 grosh). 
494 Istoriya na balgarite v dokumenti, Vol. I/2. 97. 
495 Appr. 50 thousand Bulgarians and Macedonians worked on Romanian wheat lands as wage 
labourers to find a way of living. 
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Greek peasants could count on the raisin-production consumed by the 
West.  
 
Table 24. Average value of a peasant economy in Bulgaria (given in francs) 
Components 
1871, Kötesh 
village (5 ha)  
1885** 
 (5 ha, 6 persons) 
1885  
(2 ha) 
1912  
(5 ha, 5 persons) 
House  1200–1500 300–500 300–500 
3300–5000 
Land 1100–1400 3300 1200 
Animals n.a 100 100 200 
Gross yearly production 900-1000  1000–1200 1000 800–1000 
Total value in francs 4000  5000–5500 2500–3000 4500–6000 
Based on the data of Keleti, Daskalov, Draganova and Palairet. See table 28 as comparison. 
Table 25. A comparison of Bulgarian and Serbian estate structure 
Size 
Bulgaria, 1897 Bulgaria, 1908 Serbia, 1897 Serbia, 1910 
farms in 1000 in % farms in 1000 in % farms in 1000 in % farms in 1000 in % 
Under 1 ha 257 32 293 31 54 17 
99 26 
1–2 ha 106 13 131 14 31 10 
2–5 ha 185 23 212 23 93 30 141 38 
5–10 ha 149 19 174 19 
118 38 
88 23 
10–20 ha 77 10 93 10 32 9 
20–50 ha 21 3 26 3 10 3 7.7 2 
over 50 ha 3 0 3 0 1 0 1.1 0 
Altogether 800 100 933 100 308 100 370 100 
Statistika na zemledelskata sobstvenost na 1908. Sofia, 1914. 4.  and Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics… 
The contemporary leading statistician, Popov – challenging the 
opinion of the BZNS (BANU) – stated that smallholding was 
introverted, it was the barrier of capitalization, industrialization. The 
added value was small compared to other, more intensive forms of 
cultivation, and the producer was exposed to the fluctuation of external 
prices and climate. Profits measured to expenses were a bit smaller in 
the industry compared to agriculture, but a peasant produced not more 
than 1000 dinars while an industrial worker generated 4000 leva in 1910. 
Investment costs were similar. A farm with house, animals and 
equipment cost 4000 francs producing 700–1000 leva (table 24), while 15 
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thousand workers were applied in industry, where 100 million francs 
were invested into by 1910, giving an average of 6600 francs per worker.  
The prosperity between 1900–12 (the “mini-spurts” of Lampe were 
observable in agriculture as well) was completely based on extensivity 
and the improvement of prices and not of the yields in Bulgaria and Serbia, 
unlike in Romania. Area sown by grains in Bulgaria increased from 1.7 
million to 2.4 million ha between 1896–1911, total output grew from 1.6 
million to 2.6 million tons in Bulgaria, which means that yields/ha and 
area/worker were almost stagnating. In contrast to this, in the large-
estates dominated Romania, yields per hectare were improving by 60% 
(table 26) referring to intensification, whilst the sown area/worker was 
decreasing referring to relative overpopulation. The latter remained a 
problem here generating growing social tensions,496 while the possible 
solution (land reforms after 1917) resulted in the decrease of outputs. 
Although the total agrarian output of Bulgaria increased from 500 
million golden francs (1892) to 1100 (1939), the population has also 
doubled, thus per capita outputs also stagnated as per hectare outputs 
did so. The lack of technical advance (as a cause for stagnating per hectare 
yields) is shown by the fact that in 1911 only 20% of the farmers had 
plug (iron plough) in Bulgaria,497 and in 1933 it was still under 50%. 
Mechanization of production was hopeless until 8-15 parcels constituted 
an average smallholding as the result of fragmentation (this was true for 
Hungarian smallholdings as well). In 1920 there were only 20 tractors in 
Bulgaria and although this had increased to 1503 by 1933, still only the 
landuse of 400 000 hectares (10% of the sown land) had been optimized 
by 1940. Beside land fragmentation, the weakness of purchase power 
also hindered the spread of machines: a tractor cost 10-year total income 
of an estate of 5 ha. 
Another problem was, that skilled experts tended to leave the sector: 
in Bulgaria 216 students studied in agrarian vocational schools in 1896, 
but only 8 remained in agriculture (4%), the others became state 
                                                          
496 Mollov, Ya.–Totev, Yu.: Tseni na zemedelskite proizvedeniya u nas prez poslednite 54 godini 1881–
1934. Sofia, 1935. 
497 Crampton, R.: Bulgaria. Oxford Univesity Press, New York, 2007. 290. 
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officials.498 By 1911 this increased to 40%, but the expenditure on 
agrarian education remained critically low, between 3 to 7% from the 
total expenditure on education. Education was rather of elitist (western) 
character in Serbia instead of being adjusted to the needs of local 
population.499 
 
Table 26. Per capita cereal production, total outputs and total area sown 
Period 
Romania Bulgaria Serbia 
Area 
sown (in 
1000 ha) 
Production 
(1000 t) 
tons/ha 
tons/ 
worker 
ha/worker 
Area 
sown (in 
1000 ha) 
Production 
(1000 t)  
tons/ha 
tons/ 
worker 
ha/worker 
Area 
sown (in 
1000 ha) 
Production 
(1000 t) 
 tons/ha 
tons/ 
worker 
ha/worker 
1896-00 4649 
3800 
0.85 
0.82 
1 
1763 
1579 
0.9 
0.54  
 0.6 
1107 
1171  
1.05 
0.56  
0.6 
1911-15 4987* 
6000* 
1.15 
0.98  
 0.8 
2428** 
2637 
1.1 
0.75  
0.67 
1202 
1307 
1.1 
0.54 
0.5*** 
* Intensification. ** Extensification. *** Overpopulation – stagnation. 
Mollov, Ya.–Totev, Yu.: Tseni na zemedelskite proizvedeniya u nas prez poslednite 54 godini. Sofia, 1935. 
 
(ii) Livelyhood, taxation, wealth, living standards 
 
The small size of farms was the most significant problem for farming in 
many areas of Southeastern Europe. It prevented technological 
modernization and kept living standards of peasants down, which in 
turn greatly depressed domestic demand as the peasants formed the 
bulk of the population, but they were weak consumers. Southeastern 
Europe seems to prove by default the assumption that the 
modernization of farming is a pre-condition for industrialization. On 
the example of Serbia we try to highlight the productivity and 
profitability of estates, social strategies and living standards of the 
smallholder agrarian society. 
An investigation of 835 estates by Avramović proved that 
landholdings under 4 ha were not profitable in Serbia: these (55%, cca. 
230 000 households)500 ranged to 30% of total cultivated land. 90 000 
peasants were landless: it is not surprising that 33% of peasants had 
                                                          
498 Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. I. 554–55. 
499 Daskalov, R.: Balgarskoto obshtestvo, Vol. I. 267; Strausz, A.: Grossbulgarien, 26. 
500 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 31. 
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problems even with paying their taxes in 1908.501 But the proportion of 
the viable farms between 5-20 ha (45% in 1897) was still better than in 
Croatia (27%) and in Bulgaria (25%) (table 25).502 Based on Avramović’s 
data Palairet proved, that a farm of 20 ha produced not 20 times, but 60 
times more than an estate of 1 ha, thus was more efficient (but there 
were only 100 farms over 100 ha in Serbia).503 This means that per 
hectare output was three times greater in large estates (contrary to 
Greece) than these estate fragments.   
Regional disparities were also among the numerous problems of 
agriculture. In 1897 the two-third of landholdings were under 5 ha in 
Vranja, Toplica. By 1905 Niš joined this group. In Valjevo, this ratio 
increased from 40% to 53% within 8 years. Also two–third of urban 
households did not have any land at all, which was a dramatic changes 
compared to the situation 50 years earlier. Although the number of 
modern ploughs increased from 50 thousand to 100 thousand, the 
number of ralo-type wooden ploughs also grew from 35 thousand to 
100 thousand.504 Adding up these two values it is evident that 33% of 
peasantry did not have any ploughs at all (while ’only’ 20% had no 
land)!  
As regards productivity, Avramović found that in Serbia (and 
similarly in Bulgaria) altogether 35% of male workforce remained 
unexploited.505 In Slovenia this was only 25%: 300 000 people working 
on the fields used up 60 million workdays out of the total 80 million.506 
In Bulgaria only 355 million workdays were used up from the possible 
564 million calculated by Egoroff. The oversupply of labour force on 
fields and the lack of industry to utilize it created and free time and 
poverty, that also enhanced the political susceptibility of masses 
                                                          
501 Djordjevic, D.: Serbian Society 1903–1914. In: Djordjevic, D.–Kiraly, B. K. (eds.): East Central 
European Society and the Balkan Wars. New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1987. 231. The 
Romanian settling policy in S-Dobrudja was also aware of the fact that viability starts over 5 
ha: here 55% of new economic units were over 6 ha, while in Serbia this was 36% in 1910. 
502 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 207. 
503 Németh J.: Szerbia egyetemes leírása, 202–03. 
504 Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 231. 
505 Avramović, M.: Naše seljačko gazdinstvo. Belgrade, 1928. 27–32. 
506 Maister, H.: The Employment of Peasant Population. In: Maister, H.–Uratnik, F. (eds.): Socialni 
problemi slovenske vasi. II. Ljubljana, 1938. 91–116. 
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exploited by the Radical Party led by Pašić, which often meant the 
externalization of internal problems. Similarly to the Hungarian 
agrarian “reform” of 1928, when 400 000 peasants were given only 
400 000 ha land (!) and further 200 000 received only houses, the Serbian 
okučje also blocked the flow of population from agriculture to industry. 
But while in Hungary the large estates were able to employ the 
workforce of agrarian proletariate, in Serbia this was missing (see next 
chapter, table 4 and 6). 
 
Table 27. Pauperization index in Serbia 1897 in %507 
No 
own 
land 
Not 
enough 
land to 
subsist 
Not 
enough 
draft 
animals 
No 
pigs 
No 
sheep 
Tax 
array 
Not 
enough 
food 
for a 
year 
Not 
enough 
food 
for half 
a year 
No 
plough 
20 50 30 32 46 32 60 46 41 
No 
own 
house 
Unhealthy 
living 
conditions 
No 
window 
glass 
No 
table 
No 
drinking 
water 
Inapt 
for 
military 
service 
No 
lighting 
No bed No cart 
18 72 14 20 95 25 38 38 57 
Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 231. and Djordjevic, D.: Serbian Society 1903–1914, 231; 
Đorđević, D.: Srbija i srbsko društvo, 418. Avramović, M.: Naše seljačko gazdinstvo, 17. and 
Avramović, M.: Selo u Srbiji, 243. and Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 30–40. 
 
Poverty was general in smallholdings (table 27): early in 1881 in 
Valjevo from the levied 216 persons 55 was unfit and inapt for military 
service.508 In 1918 around Sombor in Vojvodina 877 of 4773 peasants 
were landless, 883 had less than 1 jutar, 1400 did not own a house, in 
Titel 1753/5637 did not have any land (people worked as wage-
earner).509  Between 1891–1900 more than 19 800 rural estates fell victim 
to forced auctions in Serbia.510 In Croatia 50% of lands sold at auctions 
were under 2000 dinar value, thus were smallholdings (table 24). 30% of 
all land purchases was realized because of indebtedness.511 
                                                          
507 The values are similar in Hungary, where 70% had no draft animals in the 18th century. 
508 Đorđević, D.: Srbija i srbsko društvo 1880–tih godina. Istorijski časopis 29–30, 1982–1983. 418. 
509 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 30–32. 
510 Vučo, N.: Prvobitna akumulacija kapitala u Srbiji. Istorijski časopis, 29–30, 1983. 294.  
511 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 24. 32. 
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In the mountainous regions grain producing economies could not 
sustain the population. While Mocheva calculated that 75–85% of 
households were self-subsistent from grains in most of lowland 
Bulgaria, in Devin (Rodope Mts.) only 102 kg/capita was the average 
value instead of the required 200–250 kgs. In Chepino 40% of 
households had to buy wheat, because their landholding was under 4 
hectares. Smolyan produced only 4000 tons of wheat instead of the 
required 10 thousand even in 1938.512 The average wheat yield in 
mountainous Bulgaria was 930 kgs/ha even after the first world war, 
while it exceeded 1500 kgs/ha in lowlands. The technology was also 
obsolete: in 1910 around Rupchos only 44 modern ploughs were found 
in the 4400 farms (33% had no ploughs at all). Extensivity here was not a 
choice. Diversification might have meant a way out, but the collapse of 
tobacco prices after 1929 ruined the hopes of families. Thus the 
significance of itinerant craftsmen were not negligible: in 1891 Christian 
villagers worked as shepherds (14%), tailors (16%), or stonemasons 
(26%), only 15% dealt with land (contrary to the Muslims, who were 
dominantly farmers, but usually on smallholdings under 5 ha).513 
One strategy against pauperization was the zadruga itself. Yet, as it 
owned property collectively and made decisions usually only with the 
consent of all male adult members, it slowed down capital flows and 
was not very flexible changing conditions.514 The cooperatives established 
in 1871 by Svetozar Marković to stop the practice of usury also failed as 
these were based on the zadrugas loosing ground after the 
implementation of head-tax. But Raiffeisen-type cooperatives prevailed. 
These were small-scale savings banks, also issuing credits to promote 
the modernization of estates (for example tobacco production in 
Bulgaria), to encourage marketing, or simply to give a helping hand in 
cases of natural hazards by offering a loan. They also became the 
political-financial basis of agrarian movements in Bulgaria (BZNS). The 
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Approach to History. Columbia University Press, 1940. 95–108. 
226 
 
capital was collected from the cooperatives’ members, who paid 
monthly 0.5–1 dinar throughout 3 years at 4–6% interest rate (this is cca. 
15% of the profits of an average peasant economy) and the collected 
money was distributed as credit for the applicants. The conditions were 
much better than offered by usurers, who so often had led peasants into 
unsustainable debts. By 1909 670 cooperatives were operating with 27 
thousand members in Serbia, but half of them was illiterate.515 In 
Bulgaria there were 931 cooperatives, in Croatia they had some 60 
thousand members. Thus only 8–10% of farmers were involved into this 
system in Serbia, and 2/3 of members acquired credit. Per capita credit 
values were small, similarly to the Bulgarian case: their overall impact 
was still too small to modernize the economy.  
Emigration was another exit strategy to avoid pauperization, but 
unlike in Macedonia (140–200 million dollars was sent home in 1921–
1922 by emigrants) this was not characteristic for Serbia and Bulgaria. In 
both countries, the governments took emergency measures to restrict 
emigration to America. In the mountainous Dalmatia suffering from 
land scarcity, the migration rate was 4/1000 persons early in 1857–68 
and it was similar later in 1891–1900. But even this high ratio was 
insufficient to solve the problem of overpopulation: by 1902 50 
thousand economic units were under 2 ha (60%) and 13 500 from this 
were under 0.5 ha.  
Seasonal and internal migration (pečalbarstvo, gurbet) was also not 
negligible: in Macedonia 95 thousand people was involved in this 
process. Even in 1933–36 some 20 thousand villagers migrated in the 
Timok valley between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and 25 thousand left the 
region of Ohrid and Tetovo. In Veliki Jovanovac village 14% of the 
population (almost 1 men from each household) was missing owing 
seasonal migration, because in Mačva the “Pig War” ruined the poultry 
exports which was the main source of living with estates under 5 ha. 
High birth ratio (above 5% in Pomoravlje in 1881), the collapse of local 
industry (the Bulgarian Koprivshtica), unpaid dues, high land prices 
were also motivating factors. 33% of these seasonal migrants were 
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stonemasons, 20% was gardners, greengrocers (gradinari), and 45% was 
unskilled argat (daily wage-earner). Compared to the mentioned 
Bulgarian gradinari who earned more than 2000 francs yearly, the 
masons of Jovanovac earned yearly 400 dinars in Pirot in 1912 (50% of 
the yearly income of an average estate), while unskilled workers earned 
200 dinars. Argats working in Romania received only 120 dinars for half 
a year.516 In N-Albania the population often migrated to Greece for 
seasonal work earning 150-200 francs in winter. Indebted Albanian 
catholics (here the unofficial loan interest rate was over 50%) left their 
home behind forever and resettle in the plains of Metohija as tenants, 
thus modifying the ethnic pattern of Kosovo.517  
*** 
We may attempt to reconstruct the wealth of an average peasant 
economy. In Serbia the total value of the land had increased from 192 
million dinars measured in 1863 to 474 million dinars by 1897. 
Calculating with 33% inflation and the increase of total cultivated area, 
per hectare values/prices were then stagnating around 250 dinars. But 
between 1897 and 1905 the value of land grew to 783 million dinars 
parallel with their extension, which resulted in 400 dinars/ha and 470 by 
1910.518 One hectare land of excellent quality was even worth 2000 
dinars. The price of orchards also grew from 275 dinars to 590/ha. These 
all refer to shortage of land (and a change in product composition – the 
increasing role of plum). In whole Europe only Greece and Norway had 
less potential agricultural land than Serbia (52%), while other Balkan 
states were able to cultivate some 70% of the country’s area.519 
Based on these values we may calculate the value of a peasant 
economy. An average economy had 2.5 cattle worth 250 dinars, 2.5 pigs 
worth 70 dinars, 8 sheep (54 dinars altogether), 0.5 horse totalling 440 
dinars. A house was rated 1000 dinars around 1863 and approximately 
1500 dinars in 1910 similarly to Bulgaria (see table 24 as comparison) 
                                                          
516 Calic, M-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 180–189.  210. and Pejkovska, P.: Balgarskite obshtnosti, 
517 Nopcsa F.: A legsötétebb Európa, 56–59. 
518 Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 233–45.  
519 And 20% of this area in Serbia was forest. (This ratio was 37% in Bulgaria, 29% in Hungary, 
23% in Romania). 
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Equipments should be added to this value, which totalled 1400 dinars in 
case of 1 ha, 4700 in case of 5 ha and 27 000 dinars in case of 20 
hectares.520 In case of smallholdings 50% of the wealth was invested in 
farmlands, while in case of economies over 15 ha landholdings 
represented only 15% of total value (table 28). 
Table 28. The value of Serbian peasant economies in 1910 without the yearly production 
Size (ha) 
Value of 
Land 
Value of 
buildings 
Value of 
furniture 
Value of 
equipment 
Value of 
draft 
animals 
Other 
animals 
Total 
value 
2 910 860 115 66 260 100 2311 
5 2350 1210 285 190 490 180 4705 
10 4875 2300 530 380 620 240 8945 
Based on Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 273. 
We may also calculate the total value of peasant economies. The total 
value of agricultural goods and holdings was put to 2400 million francs 
(without harvest) by Stojanović521 after WWI, when Serbs claimed 
substantial indemnity for the devastation of inimical troops. Calculating 
with 1.9 million hectares the value of land reaches 900 million francs, 
together with the buildings, animals and equipments it totals to 1800–
2000 million, thus Stojanovic’s data in this respect are correct (while 
they were quite incorrect regarding the value of yearly production 
analyzed earlier).  
Palairet put the value of marketed agrarian products to 140 million 
(both inland and abroad), which means that the net income (the 
remainder after the deduction of seeds and consumption), was 360 
dinars per farms (calculating with 5 ha and 370 thousand units). After 
the deduction of expenses, only 2 dinars surplus remained on an estate 
of under 5 ha (in other words: no profits), while 50 dinars in case of 
estates between 5–10 ha and above 100 dinars over 10 ha according to 
Palairet’s calculations (table 29).  
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Table 29. Net incomes and expenses of Serbian peasantry in 1910 
Farm size 
(ha) 
Net income 
from grain* 
(dinars) 
Total net 
income 
(incl. 
animals) 
Expenses 
clothing 
Salt, 
sugar, 
lighting 
Equip
-ment 
Animals, 
health, 
culture 
Tax 
Total 
ex-
penses 
Balance 
1-2 ha 64 102 92 13 18 10 31 164 –62 
2-5 ha 180 290 163 23 26 13 63 288 2 
5-10 ha 320 480 201 31 34 27 136 429 51 
10-15 ha 690 874 257 53 88 142 242 784 98 
Data from Palairet, M.: Fiscal Pressure and Peasant Impoverishment… 
Was this income enough to subsist? Who bears the burden of 
maintaining the state: was it the peasantry that contributed more to the 
budget or other strata? Palairet wrote that more taxes were paid by the 
urban population after the 1880s than by peasantry constituting the bulk 
of society. Furthermore, even the per capita tax values were smaller in 
the case of peasantry from the beginnings, and this is true for tax ratio 
measured to revenues too.522 Unlike in Ottoman Turkey, the Serbian state 
did not finance its modernization on the cost of masses, thus fiscal pressure 
on peasantry was not unbearable. Contrary to this, Yugoslav marxists 
claimed that state taxes were to serve the intentional pauperization of 
peasantry and the creation of the working class.523 Calic or Berend was 
also right when argued that even a smaller tax rate could mean such a 
great expense for a peasant economy, that it could threaten livelihood: 
farms smaller than 5 ha had no profits after paying the taxes, they 
needed extra revenues to reach balance indeed. Thus the 
argumentation, that it was the urban population that bear the burden of 
modernization may be true (if per capita urban taxes are measured to 
urban incomes), but this did not ameliorate the situation of the masses. 
It is not surprising that in 1884, when land taxes were reinstalled (after 
their abolition in the 1830s), progressive taxation was approved! 
Furthermore, although Simms stated, that overtaxation could lead to 
                                                          
522 Palairet, M.: Fiscal Pressure and Peasant Impoverishment in Serbia before World War I. The 
Journal of Economic History 39, No. 3, 1979. 719–40.  
523 Vučo, N.: Privredna istorija naroda F NR J. Belgrade, 1948. 220–22. 
230 
 
decreasing agrarian outputs (Russia),524 but high taxes can also result in 
increasing output, as we saw in case of Bulgaria, while small tax burden 
did not result in the increase of private or state revenues, but the 
opposite! 
Thus, it is worth examining the situation further. Taxes in general 
increased from 8 million in 1862 to 120 million (15x) by 1910 exceeding 
the increase in total agrarian outputs. This seems high, but was 
moderated by the population increase (3x): thus although the total taxes 
increased fivefold from 9 dinars to 45 per capita, it did not exceed for 
example the rate of export-increase. Furthermore, 50% of the tax income 
came from indirect taxes paid mainly by urban dwellers (as consumers), 
representing only 0.4 million people. These urban dwellers paid 90 
dinars tax averagely, while peasants only 11.5 dinars per capita in 1911. 
As tax per capita was 20 and 8 dinars in 1880 respectively, thus per 
capita increase was smaller in case of agrarian society (table 30), though 
it was still higher than the increase of per capita outputs. Urban earners 
paid 13% of their average income (calculated to 600–700 dinars per 
capita), while peasants paid less measured to their gross production 
(8%). The only exception was the years between 1880–90 when per 
capita values were doubled owing to the introduction of the new 
progressive land taxes (1884) culminating in the Timok revolt. It is also 
not surprising, that the fluctuation of tax rates and values was in 
connection with political regimes. The Radical Party usually tried to 
moderate taxes as its main basis was peasantry. Smaller taxes meant 
more voters, since in Serbia a (small) wealth and income census existed. 
After the turn of century, when Radicals finally came into power for a 
longer period, taxes of peasantry started to decrease compared to the 
years of King Milan and the liberal government (1873–83, 1884–89, 
1893–1900). 
Contrary to this seemingly favourable situation, after analyzing the 
balance of payments of peasant households under 2 ha (table 29) we 
may come to the conclusion that not even the total abolition of taxes (in 
their case: 15-31 dinars, while their yearly deficit was 60 dinars) could 
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help them. Only a ban on selling and mortgaging their properties could 
have saved them from indebtedness and usurers (thus reasoning the 
persistence of okučje). Estates between 2–5 ha had no profits and more 
than 20% of their expenses (or 20% net income) was spent on taxes 
(constituting 8% of their total revenues). This layer suffered the most 
from the taxes, as these really deprived them of capital dooming them 
to stagnation without any progress. 
Table 30. Increase of taxes at constant, 1906/11 prices 
Period 
Agrarian population Urban population Tax and 
income 
ratio for 
the 2 
layers 
Direct 
tax per 
capita 
Indirect 
tax per 
capita 
Total tax and 
its proportion 
to production 
Direct 
tax per 
capita 
Indirect 
tax per 
capita 
Total tax and its 
proportion (%) to 
total production 
1867/71 7.65 1.05 8.7 (6 %) 7.65 16.92 24.5 (5%, 480 fr.) 2.8 (3x) 
1879/81 8.31 1.40 9.7 (6 %) 10.08 13.81 24 2.5 
1887/91 14.68 2.36 17.1 (11 %) 17.91 37.01 55 3.2 
1897/00 10.14 3.60 13.7 (10 %) 20.37 59.17 80 5.8 
1907/11 7.69 3.81 11.5 (8 %) 19.23 68.7 88 (14%. 650 fr.) 7.6 (4-6x) 
Modified after Palairet, M.: Fiscal Pressure and Peasant Impoverishment… 
Thus, despite low taxes in Serbia, peasants still suffered and this 
gave way to their increasing politicization, as evident in the rise of the 
Radical Party in Serbia, whose power base was the peasantry. In 
Bulgaria as well, the creation of a peasant party (Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union) was the consequence of peasant unrest and 
mobilization at the end of the 19th century. In Romania, where peasants 
suffered from a particularly exploitative system of share-cropping, 
peasant dissatisfaction erupted in the mass rebellion of 1907, which was 
brutally put down by the government at the cost of thousands of 
peasant lives. 
One could argue that the policies of territorial expansion and the 
declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire in 1912 was a failed 
attempt by the political elites of the Balkan countries to deflect public 
attention from the glaring inequalities in their countries and to mobilize 
peasants for their nationalist agenda. The mobilization of peasants first 
for the Balkan Wars, and then for World War One – Balkan countries 
had the highest mobilization rate in Europe and peasants made up the 
bulk of recruits – would lead to unexpected change: the experience of 
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fighting and making huge sacrifices gave peasants a new sense of pride 
and entitlement, so threat they would refuse to acquiesce with the 
inequality of land distribution that characterized some regions until 
1918. Considering these consequences (beyond the territtorial ones) the 
internalization of external problems was not a viable choice. It is not 
surprising that – especially after the experience of the agrarian regime of 
Stamboliyski (which denied of nationalism, the key ideology of the 
formerly ruling bourgeoise parties) in Bulgaria (1920-23) – both 
Yugoslavia (a successful example for expansionism and for that it 
would not solve the problems) and Greece (an example for failure in 
expansionism) decided to implement radical reforms to mitigate social 
unrest. 
Recruiting peasants also meant that wheat production decreased 
again from 2.8 million tons to 1 million by 1918 in Bulgaria.525 This was 
not enough to feed the population and animals as well. As the price of 
bread increased to tenfold, requisitions began to secure supply for 
urban workers. These sharpened the dichotomy between urban and 
rural dwellers. Agrarian production reached prewar values only after 
1924! Live stock losses in Romania reached 40-50%.526 In Serbia the 
production of agriculture was halved in WWI, 44% of agrarian 
equipments were destroyed.527 Though the devastation was great, this 
‘tabula rasa’ was still not enough to implement radical changes in 
production structure after WWI: major changes were primarily occured 
in estate structure. 
 
(iii) A dead-end success – the polarized agrarian system of 
Hungary in the 1870s–1914 
 
 
The different land-tenure system in Hungary offered better possibilities 
compared to the Balkan states even during the the crisis years, although 
the social situation of peasantry was not significantly better as testified 
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by the numerous movements in Békés County. Compared to the Balkan 
peasant secluding himself into self-subsistence, the Hungarian agrarian 
system also did not adapt to the Atlantic market economy in the sense, 
that it was still stuck between larger scale-provisionism and self-
subsistence, as 50% of the agrarian exports (esp. grains) were consumed 
by the twin-state. 
The political appeasement between Vienna and Budapest (1867) 
coincided with favourable external economic conditions. Hungary was 
thus able to exploit the grain prosperity through the abolishment of the 
internal tariff zone: grain exports increased to 1.6 million tons in 1868 
attracting investments fuelling industrialization. The bad harvests in 
1870–73 and the financial crisis decreased the speed of development, but 
did not deter it from the previous paths. Wheat exports fell to 0.2 
million tons in 1873, the total production from 3 million to 1.6 million 
between 1868–73 (this could feed only 6.5 million persons without other 
grains). But soon recovery took place in agriculture and after 1875 the 
milling capacities in Budapest increased to the second largest in the 
world (after Minneapolis). The new center substituted the old one, 
Győr. Although the Hungarian wheat was pushed out from external 
markets it still could keep its positions in Vienna, compensating the 
price decrease with increasing outputs. This doubled the consumption 
of the inhabitants, while their expenses on grains remained the same.528 
In Hungary 4.4 million people worked in agriculture in 1870 and this 
decreased to 3.5 million by 1900. Since the number of total employees 
remained constant in that period (6.6 million), we have to calculate with 
significant restratification into industry (20%). 1 million landless people 
worked as daily labourers, part of them was employed at the great river 
regulations, but when these were over, they burdened the agrarian 
sphere again. Further 6-6.3 million family members should be added to 
this value as auxiliary workforce, putting the total number of people 
employed in agriculture to more than 10 million (thus still over 50%). 
Although landlords usually complained about, that “it is not the taxes 
that ruin the economy, but high agrarian wages”, in the country 
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agrarian labour surplus was observable indeed, measured by the 
statistician Keleti to 35% (similarly to the Balkans). Out of the 900 
million workdays only 480–550 million was utilized (it decreased in the 
last cholera plague in 1872). Thus, the above mentioned complaint 
rather meant a political goal to limit wages, than a real shortage of 
labour force. The distribution (and oversupply) in agrarian labour force 
showed remarkable regional differences. The average arable 
land/farmer was more than 3 ha, but interestingly in the most fertile 
regions of Bacska, Banat, Békés, Csanád, Csongrád it was over 5 ha 
(owing to the great number of larger estates).  In the mountainous 
regions with small parcels this decreased to 1.5 ha showing huge 
amount of labour surplus, indicating also the directions of seasonal 
population movements.529 
The reason for this can found in the land-tenure system. Although 
serfdom was abolished in 1848 the laws did not allow the distribution of 
allodial lands, including those, that were rented by peasants, but were 
officially qualified as allodial or remanency land (in 1767). Thus 57% of 
lands remained in the hands of landholders with above 50 ha in 1870, 
although it is debated whether better land remained in the hand of the 
elite (Varga János) or not (Scott M. Eddie).530 The number of large estate 
owners between 100–500 ha was still some 7–8000 (the former bene 
possessionati, noblemen were also involved in local administration). 
Only some 1–2 thousand had more land. The agricultural elite was still 
among the richest layers even compared to representatives of other 
sectors (bankers, entrepreneurs) as proved by their position on tax-lists 
(virilists, list of richest taxpayers). The serfs were able to acquire their 
sessios (with the help of state loans to pay the redemption), which means 
that the average landhold redempted was only the often mentioned 0.5 
sessio/farm. It caused relative overpopulation and many peasants were 
compelled to work on large estates – the only difference was that they 
were paid for it instead of working in compulsory corvéé (robot). Thus 
the Hungarian land reforms were completely different from the Serbian 
or Bulgarian model and secured the persistence of large estates, by 
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providing substantial labour force. The law of 1878/XIII. even decreased 
the mobility of wage-labourers further in order to secure labour force 
for the exporting large-estates. The number of owners decreased by 100 
thousand within 20 years (similarly to the Bulgarian process), while the 
number of farms increased by 300 thousand. This means that land 
concentration progressed, while fragmention still did not stop (one 
owner could have numerous estates in different localities. On the other 
hand a modernized estate of 15-35 ha near the urban markets was more 
prosperous, than a badly equipped distant, but remarkably larger 
estate. 
Total land cultivated was 25 million ha, with only 7.3% remaining 
uncultivated, which was among best utilization percentage in Europe.  
The increase of cultivated land was less than 10% in this period contrary 
to the Balkans, which means that extensivity was over here earlier. There 
were significant transformations in the structure of agriculture: the 
proportion of arable land increased from 33% to 43% (in Romania this 
was 30% in Austria in 37%, but 50% in France) within 30 years (+23%), 
in order to compensate falling grain prices. The share of pastures 
decreased by some 4% and of woodlands with 2%, which was moderate 
compared to the Balkans. The increase of arable lands exceeded that of 
the population (0.8% vs. 0.5% yearly average), therefore it secured the 
possibility of maintaining exports even without the amelioration of 
yields.531 
The proportion of fallow also decreased from 25% to 10% between, 
this meant that Hungary finally overcame the three-year crop-rotational 
system: only 29% of the settlement used the latter by 1910. (In 1870 33% 
of the lands were sown by wheat, 33% by maize pushing out animal 
fodders referring to the old system of three-year rotational system). But 
land consolidation (merging small parcels) had taken place still in only 
44% of settlements (nevertheless it was better, than the Balkan average).  
As railway-constructions were one of the flagship-developments of 
the state, the transport costs declined to one-sixth between 1850–85 
integrating the distant regions into the market centres. Local price 
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differences within Hungary decreased from 100% in the 1820s to 15% in 
1885. But this did not help Hungarian grains that lost foreign markets 
owing to the US competition (the USA doubled its output, while its 
population grew only by 50%). Grain prices fell by 25% between 1867–
1891, but despite this grains constituted 50% of the agrarian exports.532 
Only Austria remained as partner owing to the joint tariff zone. Thus, 
contrary to the Balkans, Hungarian agriculture was still not integrated 
into the world economy. The nivellation of wheat prices measured to 
other grains continued: while in the 1820s wheat price was the double of 
other grains, in the 1870s this gap decreased to 25%.  
Contrary to price decrease the incomes from grain increased steadily 
as the output in case of wheat grew from 2 million tons to 4 million 
between 1870–90.533 50% of this increase was the result of extensification, 
the other 50% of increase came from the increase of yields – still 
fluctuating between 0.7–1.9 tons/ha. The average yield was 1 t/ha. 
Technological advance produced better output in N-Transdanubia or in 
the Plains, where 90% of the ploughs were made of iron. The most 
mechanized process was threshing, however based on solely the 
capacity of engines, it would take 130 days to process the grain in the 
1870s. In other words it means that only 25% of the harvest was 
threshed by the 5400 engines. By 1890 their numbers increased 
tenfoldand and 16% was driven by steam. 
The conditions for investments were more favourable than in the 
Balkans owing to the numerous (thus cheap) credit possibilities: 
between 1867 and 1890 the values of mortgages on lands increased from 
170 million francs to 1 billion (similar to the total value of large estates 
in Greece)! To break down usury, interest rates were maximized in 
yearly 8% owing to a government intervention in 1873, to moderate the 
impacts of the crisis.  
The 50% increase in total agrarian exports (wheat exports doubled 
between 1871–1890) contrary to price trends and to the insignificant 
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increase in cultivated land refers to production (and milling) capacities 
largerly exceeding local needs. Compared to the 1840s when 50% of 
exports were given by animal products, a great turn had taken place in 
animal husbandry as did in the Balkans. Animal livestock, wool, 
processed food constituted only 33% of the agrarian exports by the 
1870s (and even animal imports increased, see the Balkan quota-war or 
the Serbian “Pig War”).534 Wool prices also decreased from 3200 to 2600 
francs/ton535 between 1867–87 (reasoning the decrease in proportion of 
pastures), and the share of wool from agrarian exports also fell (from 11 
to 7%) owing to the Australian oversupply.536 As sheep gving wool were 
mainly raised in large estates this did not cause much harm for the 
peasantry. But the decline forced these large estates to turn towards 
grains. However, this decline in share did not mean a decrease in 
absolute numbers, as the total agrarian export increased from 500 
million francs to 750 million.  
The animal population suffered from fodder shortages as wheat 
production expanded. The fodder of oxen was measured to 4 million 
tons, and as 1 ox needed 4 tons yearly, this amount was only enough to 
feed 1 million draft animals, while the total number of cattle increased 
from 4.6 to 5.8 million between 1870–95.537 Since cattle was utilized in 
many forms, the recovery of their number measured to population was 
an important phenomenon. The Hungarian gray was substituted by 
western species (their share grew from 21% to 42% till 1895, then 
reached 78% by 1911) giving more milk and flesh, but requiring 
intensive raising (stables, fodder). And though European cattle density 
decreased by 10% measured to the population, and meat consumption 
increased by 40%, Hungary was unable to enter into markets as did it 
prior to the 1840s, because of the relative shortages within the country. 
While in 1857 the number of cattle per 1000 inhabitants reached 400 
(increasing from 270 in 1789), it decreased to 335 in 1880, increasing 
only to 366 by 1895 owing to the 50% increase in meat prices. This ratio 
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was not bad measured to countries like France, 317, Germany 387, but 
was definitely low measured to Denmark (750), or even to Bosnia (644) 
and Serbia (573). In Romania it was 372, similar to the Hungarian value, 
but Romania (as an ally) also exported animals to Hungary owing to 
relative scarcity, causing problems for Hungarian producers.538 
Competition for internal Hungarian and foreign markets was great (the 
Hungarian cattle population grew to 7.5 million including Croatia by 
1911). While in the 1830s the cattle of peasants gave 500 litres of milk 
yearly, this increased to 750 litres per animal, and if we calculate only 
with cows giving milk, this was over 1000 litres – similar to the Balkans. 
Cattle remained dominant in smallholdings, like pigs (77%) contrary to 
sheep (50% in large estates). In pig breeding changes also occurred: the 
Balkan mangalica pushed out the Hungarian ’bakonyi’ species. 
The decrease in number of animal units539 also meant that – after 
giving up fallows – there was not enough organic manure and draft 
force. But while the latter was substituted by mechanization, artificial 
fertilizers remained uncommon.540 To produce 1 ton of grains 4 tons of 
manure was calculated yearly. This put Hungarian manure demand to 
yearly 68 milion t, while the 8.6 million „animal units” produced only 
50% of this. By 1895 the number of animal units increased to 11.5 
million, but still covering only 66% of manure demand of the soil. But 
the replenishment of organic material was genarally not taken into 
consideration that time. The fertilizer consumption was under 15 kg/ha 
or 2.3 million tons, while in Belgium it was over 300 kg/ha, in Italy 120 
kg/ha. In Hungary replenishment through alrernative crops was 
dominant. 
Similarly to the distribution of exports, 55% of the production came 
from crops in 1870 (including industrial crops beside grains), 33% from 
animal products, 7–10% from wine, grapes and fruits. By 1890 this 
shifted to 70, 25, 5% respectively decreasing diversity further. But this 
tendency soon changed owing to the great crisis in 1873, which not only 
                                                          
538 Ibid. Vol. 6/2. 1087. 
539 The number of animal units per 55 ha was 59 in 1820, 67 in 1851, but only 44 in 1884 and 50 
in 1890. Gyimesi, S.: Utunk Európába, 105. 
540 Magyarország története. Vol. 7/1. 313.  
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affected the agriculture, but almost resulted in the bankruptcy of the 
state. As the consequence of the agrarian crisis in 1910 50% of the total 
output came from animal husbandry again and only 50% from crop 
production.541 83% of incomes from animal husbandry was generated 
then by peasant smallholdings, while specifications resulted that grains 
dominated in large estates (remarkable turn compared to previous 
decades, when animal husbandry was significant in large estates as 
well. The low share of animal products from exports is due to the fact, 
that smallholders tended to enter only into local markets). 
The agricultural crisis had the most serious effect on the plains 
because it had the least diverse product structure. The mountainous 
fringes were not effected as they did not produce substantial marketable 
surpluses, while Transdanubia had a more diverse structure, therefore 
the crisis did not have longlasting impact there.542 To tackle the agrarian 
crisis of 1873 tariffs were increased in 1887, following the German 
example on wheat and oxen. Due to the decreasing wheat prices 
Hungarian exporters turned to flour, which has three times greater unit 
prices: the milling capacity played a great role in the recovery. While 
wheat exports fell from 525 thousand tons to 416 thousand between 
1882–1911 (even contrary to rising grain prices after 1900), flour exports 
increased from 333 thousand tons to 700 tons. Large proportion of the 
processed grains stemmed from foreign countries (mostly from the 
Balkans). Another pull factor was the increase of livestock and meat 
prices: cattle exports increased from 96 thousand to 348 thousand in the 
same period. This was a great progress compared to period before 
1890s, when the number of cows for 1000 persons were decreasing. By 
1910 cattle population peaked at 7.3 million (still not exceeding 366 
animals per 1000 capita).  
Although swine population also increased from 4.4 million to 7.5 
million between 1869–1911, swine exports decreased from the average 
yearly 673 thousand to 484 thousand. For Hungary the Serbian pig 
export was a great rival, especially since diseases struck on the 
Hungarian swine population in 1894. Exports fell then from 1.3 million 
                                                          
541 Katus L.: A modern Magyarország születése. Pécs, 2012. 440. 
542 Magyarország története. Vol.  7/1. 293. 
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to 0.25 million. More than 2 million pigs decayed within 2 years and 4.5 
million in a decade.543 Owing to the fall of wool prices the number of 
sheep declined continuously from 10.5 million (1885) to 7.5 million 
(1895) even after the great crisis. These together with the peak of grain 
price decrease and the phylloxera destroying 50% of the country’s 
vineyards culminated in a second crisis of smaller extent (similar to that 
taken place in the Balkans) in the 1890s.   
The land reforms in 1848 resulted in a very unbalanced landholding 
structure (table 31). Such polarization in the agrarian society was 
measured only in Romania in whole Europe. 53% of farmers had not 
enough land to sustain a family, this was similar to the Serbian or 
Bulgarian value, but the proportion of lands over 1000 ha was also 
above 25% (meaning that the establishement of a smallholder-society 
would have been more realistic here than in the Balkans). Between 
1880–1910 only 0.5 million ha (2%) was distributed among peasants 
from large estates, river regulations added further 0.6 million ha 
(construction works also provided occupation for agrarian proletariate), 
while the total land cultivated ranged up to 25 million ha.  Leasing 
smallholdings was not common: while 16–20% of the lands above 500 
ha was leased, this proportion was only 2% among lands between 5–50 
ha. But leased large estates were often re-leased to smallholders at 
higher prices by entrepreneurs obtaining the landlease of large estates.  
The situation of landless peasants was not promising: by 1913 only 
33% of the agrarian proletariate, 700 thousand persons had any kind of 
insurance. Between 1871–1913 more than 1.3 million left the country (in 
which national minorities were overrepresented) and only 50% 
returned. The more than 1500 cooperatives had only 100 thousand 
members (small proportion compared to the Balkans), and the peasant 
parties were also divided. Their demands (distribution of state lands 
and private large estates, voting right, social insurance) were not 
welcomed by the elite. 
Most of the large estates were concentrated in Transdanubia, while 
the least was found in Transylvania. Landholdings between 5–50 ha 
                                                          
543 Ibid. Vol. 7/1. 296. 
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were the most common in the central part of the country (40%), while 
their share was under 30% in the northeastern parts of the country. Of 
course there were significant differences regarding the outputs: a cow in 
a smallholding weighted 280 kgs, while in large estates it was 570 kgs. 
The milk production was also different: 1130 and 1720 litres 
respectively.544 
 
Table 31. Estate structure in Hungary in 1900 
Farm size Farms (%) Land (%) 
0–0.5 ha 23 0.5 
0.5–2.5 ha 30 4 
2.5–5 ha 19 6.8 
5–10 ha 16 11 
10–50 ha ha 10 17.5 
50–500 ha 1 11.5 
over 500 ha 0.2 24.3 
Magyarország története. Vol. 7/1. 300. 
 
The total agrarian output constituting 50% of the GDP (produced by 
65% of the employees) increased to 4.5 billion francs in 1910 (the export 
was 17% of this),545 or 225 francs/capita increasing from 150–170 francs, 
exceeding the value calculated for the Balkans. Per capita number 
indicate formidable development. But it was only partly the 
consequence of a successful shift in agrarian structure after the turn of 
the century (revitalization of animal husbandry in smallholdings) or of 
the increasing outputs, that prove the modernization of the agriculture. 
As the extent of cultivated land did not increase between 1890–1910 the 
price trends (meat prices were increasing) also contributed to the better 
results and the change in the composition of production value.  
For the modernization efforts the required capital was supplied by 
loans. But, while the total value of credits increased from 1 billion to 3 
billion francs until 1910, still 35% of the cultivated land (state lands, 
                                                          
544 Nagy I.: Agrárpolitikai tanulmányok. Budapest, 1950. 188–90. 
545 Net output (excluding animal fodder and seeds) was 3.1 billion francs or 70%. Katus, L.: A 
modern Magyarország születése, 444. 
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community lands, lands belonging to the Churches) could be only 
mortgaged limitedly (like in Serbia owing to the okučje). The costs of 
modernization were also high: debts reached 160 francs/ha, or almost 
one year’s production in case of grain for an estate of 5 ha in the central 
parts of the country, while in Transylvania it was only 30 francs (Serbia 
or Bulgaria reached this share only in the Interwar period,).546 
Regarding technological advance Raiffeisen-type cooperatives enabled 
the modernization of some smallholdings. The development of ploughs 
made it possible to maintain viable economies even with two oxen, 
instead of the former four. Mechanization progressed further: between 
1895–1915 the number of thresher engines increased from 9 to 29 
thousand, now threshing 85% of the grains (it was under 33% around 
1870).547 The number of tractors reached some thousands by 1910 (in 
Bulgaria this was under 20). Furthermore, 44% of the sowing machines 
was owned by smallholder peasants.548 Despite the shortage in organic 
manure and artificial fertilizers, yields/ha also increased. Maize reached 
2 t/ha (0.7 t in 1870), wheat 1.3 ton/ha (under 1 ton in the 1840s) (table 
32). The increase of yields in case of potato was greater, from 2.5 tons to 
9 tons between 1870–1911, in case of sugar beet it was 17 t in the 1890s 
and 25 tons in the 1910s. It was stated that general output of agriculture 
increased from 2 tons/hectare to 5 tons/hectare in 1911,549 representing a 
3% increase yearly. However, this increase – among the greatest in the 
modern world the 19–20th c.– has recently been challenged by 
cliometrist. First, the selection of the compared years (the beginning and 
the end years of the investigated period) did not take trends and 
fluctuations into consideration. Scott M. Eddie proved, that if these 
output numbers are not based on 5-year averages but on deliberately 
selected years. Thus one can select years, which put yearly increase 
under 1%, but if different dates are chosen, the growth can reach even 
3.5% yearly. The growth based on 5-year averages is not more than 2.5% 
                                                          
546 Or in other words: as agrarian output was 4.5 billion francs on 25 million ha, the output was 
180 francs/ha. 
547 Katus, L.: A modern Magyaroszág születése, 444. 
548 Magyarország története Vol. 7/1. 310. 
549 Ibid. Vol. 7/1. 321. 
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according to Eddie, while Katus claims that the growth of total agrarian 
output was not higher than yearly 1.9%.550 (The difference had many 
reasons: Katus put the role of animal husbandry from total output to 
30%, while Eddie used the data of Fellner, who put it to 40%).551 If we 
take into consideration population increase as well, this growth 
decreases to yearly 1.5% according to Eddie and to 1% according to 
Katus (but still higher than in the Balkans). In countries with not so 
unbalanced estate structure, for example in England this growth was 
yearly 1.3% in the most dynamic period between 1820s–1860s, 1.2% in 
Germany (1853–1910) and 0.9% in the USA (1840–1900) and 2% in Japan 
(1885–1919, by stagnating population). This means, that despite its estate 
structure claimed to be “unfavourable” the Hungarian growth reached the 
European average, and highly exceeded the growth in the Balkans (which also 
showed improving total production, but stagnating-decreasing per 
capita values). It is also evident, that the uneven estate structure can 
only partly be responsible for the differences measured between 
Hungary and the Balkans, as the latter showed all kind of patterns from 
smallholding-dominated (Serbia, Bulgaria) to large estate-dominated 
countries (Romania), but all lagging behind the performance of the 
Hungarian agriculture.  
Some of the crops showed remarkable increase in outputs. The 
Hungarian average was above the European yields regarding sugar 
beet, while in case of other crops the yields/hectare exceeded the values 
measured in the Balkans (table 33). The reorganization of wine 
production also began, as the price of 1 hl wine increased from 15 francs 
to 40 francs (while in the 1870s, 7% of the exports came from wine, the 
country even became a net importer in the 1890s). Although the extent 
of vegetable gardens reaching only 15 thousand ha in 1895 increased 
fivefold, they still ranged only to 70 thousand ha (relatively small 
compared to Bulgaria, where it was also not dominant). Despite this, the 
onions of Makó, the watermelons of Csány, paprika of Szeged and 
Kalocsa, the apricots and peachs of Kecskemét and stud of Bábolna 
                                                          
550 See: Scott M., E.: Ami „köztudott” az igaz is? 36. 41–42. 
551 Fellner, F.: Die Schätzung des Volkseinkommens. Bulletin de l’Institut International de 
Statistique 14. 1905. 109–151. 
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became famous that time in Europe (partly owing to the activity of 
Balkan experts). 
 
Table 32. Development of agrarian outputs and yields/ha in Hungary (and Croatia) 
in 1000 tons Wheat Maize 
Grains 
altogether 
Potato Sugar beet 
1871–75 (crisis years) 1298 1153 4800 840 242 
1891–95 4014 3162 11 000 2840 1382 
1911–15 4102 4210 12 200 5167 3812 
Average yearly 
growth (%) 
3 3.3  n.a. 4.6 7.1 
 
Average yields/ha Wheat (q) Maize (q) Potato (q) Sugar beet (q) 
1871–75 6.5 7.4 23 123 
1891–95 12.8 15.3 63 178 
1911–15 12.4 17.2 83.4 246 
Katus, L.: A modern Magyaroszág születése. Pécs, 2012. 442–45. 
 
As for absolute values, the Hungarian grain production was the 4th 
in Europe,552 producing 60% of the grains in Austria-Hungary. Potato 
production was also ranked 4th, but per hectare outputs were not 
outstanding, rather average.553 But while even Serbia exported 20%, 
Bulgaria 30% of its wheat production by 1910, Hungary exported only 
16% of its agrarian output, not more than Turkey in 1900. Hungary 
mostly relied on the internal „imperial”markets (Cisleithania), that is 
why the collapse of this system after 1918 was so harmful.  
The other country with similar structure, Romania was the 6th in the 
world regarding the value of its grain exports, constituting 70% of the 
exports. Both extensification and the price increase after 1900 
contributed to the increasing value, and per capita output was growing, 
but in Hungary intensification was more visible.554 The Romanian per 
                                                          
552 Totalling 130 million tons. Russia was leading with 540 million tons, followed by Germany 
(460 million t) and France (170 million). Gyimesi, S.: Utunk Európába, 110. 
553 With 54 million tons. Germany produced 458 million t, Cisleithania 127 million, France 118 
million. Gyimesi, S.: Utunk Európába, 110. 
554 Lampe, J. R.: Varieties of Unsuccessful Industrialisation, 63. 
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hectare outputs still exceeded other regions of the Balkans by 15–30%. 
The economic growth of Romania was driven by grain exports up to the 
crisis in 1897–1900, but then oil took its place. Grain exports even helped 
surviving the Austro-Hungarian-Romanian tariff war in 1886–92, 
making the balance of trade positive.555 
 
Table 33. Agrarian yields in Europe (q/ha) in 1910 and 1930 
1910 Wheat Maize Potato 
Sugar 
beet 
1930 Wheat Maize Potato 
Sugar 
beet 
Denmark 33.1 
 
148.3 306 
 
27.6 
 
157 301 
England 21.2 
 
156.4 
      
Austria 13.7 15 83.4 204 
 
15.5 20.6 130 242 
Hungary 13.2 17.5 80.2 254 
 
12.3 16 57 192 
France 13.1 12.1 87.1 239 
 
14.1 16.2 108 290 
Romania 12.9 13.1 
 
205 
     
Serbia 10.5 13 41 208 
 
10.1 15 54 152 
Russia 6.6 11.3 70 161 
     
Bulgaria 9.9 12.9 36.7 129 
 
12.6 13.4 58.4 176 
 
To sum it up, the Hungarian „model” proved to be a dead-end success, 
partly because it also highly depended on external factors (the existence 
of Austria-Hungary). The growth after 1900 was rather limited, no 
further breakthrough was achieved. Beside its favourable possibilities 
the unbalanced estate structure also meant a burden, because it created 
unresolved social problems.  
Regarding historical topoi, Scott M. Eddie and Katus proved, that the 
economic growth of the Hungarian agriculture was average, not 
extreme and not too low (which would contradict to marxist 
assumptions, that large estates hindered economic growth). The 
abundance of large estates did not hinder agrarian improvements,556 
although it is also true, that large estates were not exclusively the 
catalysators of development: Scott M. Eddie also proved, that its role 
                                                          
555 Ibid. 62. 
556 Scott, M. Eddie: Ami „köztudott” az igaz is? 42. 
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was not so predominant as assumed in earlier historiography (burghers 
owned 38% of estates over 50 ha and their income, while aristocrats 
34%, the state and churches together 18%).557 While Hanák argues that 
the abolishment of the internal tariff boundary within the Habsburg 
Monarchy promoted agricultural development, John Komlos states, that 
his data are incorrect and the decomposition of tariff boundary had no 
real effect on the agrarian performance of Hungary.558 
Another topos, that the liberation of serfs had increased the agrarian 
output was also challenged (see earlier), such as the statement that the 
tariff system in Austria-Hungary rather served the interest of the 
agriculture than that of the industry. The hypothesis that the aristocrats 
managed to acquire lands of better quality due to the reforms in 1848 
(Varga János) cannot be verified, neither falsified (Szekfű in the 1920s 
stated, that the estates of aristocrats were recently turned into arable 
lands from pastures and fallows, as the names testify this, thus were not 
of the best quality). There are numerous examples supporting both 
statements. At the present state of research there is also no sign that the 
nobles tried to distort the land-taxation system in favour of their interest 
and pay proportionally less tax compared to the quality of their lands.559 
(These contradictorious assumptions basically influenced the 
adjudication of the land reforms in 1848). 
Finally the statement, that the tariff system in Austria-Hungary was 
unfavourable for the Hungarian parts proved to be true in case of 
agricultural exports (and agricultural goods constituted the majority of 
Hungarian exports), but only up to the 1890s, when there was a 
recompensation built in the tariff-system regarding the ’classical’ export 
                                                          
557 Ibid. 26. and Eddie, Scott M.: Agricultural Production and Output per Worker in Hungary, 1870–
1913. Journal of Economic History 28, Nr. 2. 1968. 197–222; Eddie, Scott M.: The Changing 
Pattern of Landownership in Hungary, 1867–1914. Economic History Review 20, Nr. 2. 1967. 
293–310. 
558 Komlos, J.: Austro-Hungarian Agricultural Development, 1827–1877. Journal of European 
Economic History 8, No. 1. 1979. 
559 From the four possible solutions: 1, the aristocrats acquired average or better lands and paid 
proportionally less tax; 2, the aristocrats owned average or better lands and paid 
proportionally not less tax; 3, the aristocrats owned average or worse lands and paid 
proportionally less tax; 4 the aristocrats owned average or worse lands and paid 
proportionally not less tax; the second solution is the most realistic according to Eddie. 
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articles (grains). As these products were stemming mostly from large 
estates, the changes were favourable for large estate owners – among 
them for the aristocracy.560 
Figure 6. Total agricultural production per capita in the Balkans, and the per capita 
contribution of animal husbandry to the agriculture 
 
Based on the tables given by Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies… 
  
                                                          
560 Those involved in milling industry also profited from this lobby. Eddie, Scott, M.: The Terms 
of Trade as a Tax on Agriculture: Hungary’s Trade with Austria, 1883-1913. Journal of Economic 
History 32, No. 1. 1972. 298–315. 
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V. The postwar agriculture, 1920s–40s 
 
The interwar period brought about significant changes, like land-
reforms on broadened base and attempts towards intensification, but 
neither of these was executed consistently in all countries of the region, 
nor was considered successful enough to solve the old problems. Land 
reforms in the Interwar period had (1) to cope with the problems of 
agrarian overpopulation, (2) to eliminate the significant regional 
differences, (3) and were to serve security issues by settling ‘reliable’ 
population along the new borders with a slight modification of the 
ethnic pattern. Intensification efforts were partly the consequence of the 
great economic crisis that proved the vulnerability of the less diverse 
Balkan economies.  
 
(a) Persisting problems 
The dualism in the structure of agriculture of Southeast-Europe 
persisted after World War I. In Greece and Hungary 50% of the 
population lived/worked on estates over 50 ha, in Romania it was 33%, 
while it was only 10% in Yugoslavia after the post-war land reforms, 
and 2% in Bulgaria.561 The agrarian proletariate in % was highest in 
Hungary (30% of agrarian earners or 780 thousand, while 731 thousand 
in the more populous Greater Romania, table 4). Owing to the frequency 
of large estates cereal production was still profitable for Romania and 
Hungary in the 1920s. In Romania, where estates over 100 ha comprised 
only 0.2% of economic units, but 46% of lands (compared to the Serbian 
1%)562 yields/ha were 20% higher, than in Yugoslavia, where – unlike in 
Romania – the product structure was adjusted to the existing estate structure. 
                                                          
561 Moore, W. E.: Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe. Geneva, League of 
Nations, 1945. Appendix, table 2. 
562 Zagoroff, Sl.–Vegh, J.–Bilimovich, A.: The Agricultural Economy of the Danubian Countries, 1935–
1945. Stanford University Press, CA, 1955.233. Estates over 500 ha gave 17% of the lands and 
only 0.1% of economies, while farms under 5 ha gave 75% of economic units and 28% of the 
land, similar to Bulgaria. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of agricultural production and and its cost 
Country 
Net National 
Production 
(million 
USD) 
Agricultural 
production in 
million USD 
and in % of 
NNP 
Net agrarian 
output 
(million 
USD) 
Net agrarian 
output in 
million golden 
francs  
Net agrarian 
porduction 
measured to 
total 
Price of 
foodstuffs 
(USA=100) 
Hungary 1100 400 (35%) 290 1080 72.5 130 
Romania n.a. 580 500 1446 86.2 100 
Yugoslavia 861 443 (50%) 310 1449 70.0 110 
Bulgaria 500 230 (46%) 150 691 65.2 128 
USA 72 500 9100 (12%) 5500 23 000 60.4 100 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of agricultural production and and its cost II 
Country 
Retail 
prices 
compared 
to US 
Total and net 
output to 1 
agrarian 
worker (in 
USD) 
Total and 
net output 
of 1 ha (in 
USD) 
Agrarian 
area per 
worker (in 
ha) 
General 
calory content 
/ quintals 
(kcal) 
Ratio of 
self-
subsistence 
(%)* 
Hungary 65 180 (120) 56 (38) 3.1 250 121 
Romania 41 66 (57) 36 (31) 1.8 291 110 
Yugoslavia 54 78 (56) 44 (32) 1.8 289 105 
Bulgaria 48 77 (55) 53 (33) 1.6 320 106 
USA 100 1000 (600) 51 (30) 20.2 
  
Zagoroff, Sl.–Vegh, J.–Bilimovich, A.: The Agricultural Economy of the Danubian Countries, 15–18. 
*100% means self-subsistence, values over 100% represent the surplus (to trade with) 
 
Measuring net output to total would suggest that the effectiveness of 
agriculture was the highest in countries dominated by large estates. But 
the situation is not so evident if other indicators are taken into 
consideration. Agrarian products were especially cheap in the 
smallholdings dominated Bulgaria and in the large estates dominated 
Romania (under 50% measured to the value in USA), while Hungary 
dominated by large estates had higher food prices (65% measured to 
USA). Thus, the price of foodstuffs was not determined by the estate 
structure (not even by production surpluses), rather by other factors 
(like general incomes and purchase power). Hungary was characterized 
by the greatest surpluses (+20% over home consumption), while 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was balancing on the edge of self-subsistence 
 
 
251 
 
by 1938. Overpopulation threatened Hungary the least (3.1 ha/agrarian 
worker compared to 1.6–1.8 in other countries), it is therefore not 
surprising that total output/capita was here the greatest (table 1–2). But 
regarding per hectare values the difference is not so significant (56 to 
36–53 USD). This means, that the favourable positions of Hungary were 
in connection with the lack of labour oversupply in agrarian sphere. The 
calory content of products was 15% smaller in Hungary, than in the 
southern countries. It is evident, that restratification progressed in 
Hungary the most, as agrarian production gave only 40% of NNP, 
which was the highest in the examined region (regarding both total and 
per capita value). The high production per hectare in Bulgaria (53 USD) 
refers to structural changes of the 1930s (intensification), while the low 
Romanian value (36 USD) refers to the fact the large estates did not 
react well to the changing circumstances  after the fall of grain prices in 
1929. In Bulgaria the proportion of industrial plants increased to 35%, 
grains decreased under 50%, while in Romania the latter still 
constituted 60% of the produced volume (table 3). 
 
Table 3. Distribution of produced crops 1934–1938 
Country Cereals % Fodder and other crops % Industrial plants % 
Romania 60 30 10 
Bulgaria 50 17 35 
USA 25 25 50 
Zagoroff, Sl.–Vegh, J.–Bilimovich, A.: The Agricultural Economy of the Danubian Countries, 22. 50. 
 
Contrary to the relatively good index values in the agriculture, the 
Hungarian peasantry was relatively overloaded (especially compared to 
the Serbian calulations prior to 1910). The per capita taxes increased by 
60% between 1910 and 1924. The middle class (18%) paid 40% of the 
taxes, the richest 50 thousand paid 21%, while the poor (constituting 
80% of tax payers, including all peasants under 55 ha) gave 38% of the 
state tax incomes. This means that taxation was not progressive: 
peasants still paid 20% of their income as at the end of the 18th century, 
while the middle class and the high society paid 25–30%.563 Both leftist 
                                                          
563 Romsics, I.: Magyarország története a 20. században. Budapest, 2000. 156. 
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(Ferenc Erdei, Péter Veres, Gyula Illyés, Géza Féja) and conservative 
writers (Dezső Szabó, Zoltán Szabó) complained about the health 
conditions and living circumstances of peasants.  
 
Table 4. The supply of workforce: agrarian proletariate and draft animals in 1938 
Country 
Animals in 
metabolic 
units/ha) 
Draft animals in 
metabolic 
unit/ha) 
Agrarian 
proletariate in 
1000 persons 
Agrarian 
proletariate in 
% 
Hungary 0.75 0.45 787 38 
Romania 0.67 0.42 731 9 
Yugoslavia 0.88 0.55 475 9 
Bulgaria 0.99 0.54 140 5 
 
After the Great War the tendencies of estate fragmentation and 
overpopulation generally became more pressing in the Balkans. Totev 
and Egorov put the unexploited workforce to 650 thousand in 
Bulgaria.564 Population increase in Yugoslavia exceeded yearly 2% even 
after 1929. According to Sundhaussen the yearly increase in agricultural 
output was under 1 %, under the rate of industrial development. 
Calculating with the population growth this meant a 0.5% decrease per 
year. Turina claimed that the efficiency of male labour force was about 
70% (250 million workdays to 360 million total days), while that of the 
women was over 90% (480 million days/542 million).565 In Banjane 
village a family of 5 with 7 ha needed 51 workdays from sowing to 
harvest in 1930, while it was only 30 days on an estate of 20 ha.566 
This decreased competitiveness and efficiency. Outputs per ha were 
30% under the European average, labour productivity was 57% lower 
than in Europe.567  In Yugoslavia 70% of the population generated only 
                                                          
564 Mollov, Ya.: Problemi na balgarskoto zemedelie. Sofia, 1935. 24. 
565 Turina carried out a similar investigation between the 2 world wars like Avramović did in 
1910. He calculated that housewives worked for 346 days yearly, husbands 200–245, 
assistant labour force 315 days and maidens 100–150. Turina, B.: Poljodjelstvo u Nezavisnoj 
Državi Hrvatskoj. Zagreb, 1943. 141–44. For better labour force explotation among Catholics 
see: Maister, H.: The Employment of Peasant Population, 91–116. 
566 Calic, M-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 92. quotes Petrović, A.: Banjane. Socialno-zdravstvene i 
higijenske prilike. Belgrade, 1932. 
567 Calic, M-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 238. 
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45–50% of the GDP. The improper use and small amount of agrarian 
credits,568 primitive agrotechnics, dominance of monocultural smallholdings, 
small parcels, yields still exposed to climate, incomes determined by external 
conditions, bad composition of exports were the reason of the low output and 
weak competitiveness. Governments also lacked a coherent strategy and 
interest in improving farming, reflecting the lack of political power of 
the peasantry.  
Until grain prices remained high  – the upswing in 1921–25 created 
higher grain prices than in the war (1912: 160 golden francs/t, 1925: 260–
300 francs/t),569 and this offered a possibility to earn incomes through 
the expansion of exports in Yugoslavia (31 000 tons in 1922, 417 000 tons 
in 1924 wheat+maize, producing 150 and 930 million dinars income 
respectively) – the problems could be deferred. But during the great 
crisis the unsustainability of the current practices became evident. 
Furthermore, any increase of incomes was partly eliminated by the 40% 
inflation of that period: costs of living (1913 = 100) grew from 553 in 
1919 to 1400 in 1922 (measured in paper dinars) in Yugoslavia. Thus, in 
1924 average national income per capita was 4800 dinars at current 
prices making it only to 290–300 in golden francs, which is slightly 
higher than the value prior to the War. 
From among the possible internal solutions (extensification, labour 
intensification, technological advance, changes in product structure, 
land concentration) extensification of landuse was unable to keep up with the 
rate of population increase in Yugoslavia,570 which grew by 4 million within 
20 years. This 33% increase (similar to Romania, Bulgaria and Poland) 
was among the highest in Europe. Because of the immigration 
restrictions in the United States, imposed in the early 1920s, and in other 
overseas countries, emigration was not a viable exit strategy for these 
                                                          
568 For example in Bulgaria between 1878–1903 state support was completely missing, thus this 
was favourable for usury again. 
569 Vučo, N.: Agrarna kriza u Jugoslaviji 1930–1934. Belgrade, 1968. 21–23. and 178.  
570 Lampe’s theory that population increase was initiated by the agrarian upswing in the 
middle of the 19th century may be true, but not for the postwar era. There is more reason in 
traditional explanations (like child as workforce; the lack of pensions and social security 
system. Even in the industrialized Czechoslovakia the average number of children was 3.8 
in agrarian families, while 2.8 in industrial families between the two world wars). 
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regions any more: from Yugoslavia, around 335 000 people emigrated to 
Europe and the US during the Interwar period, of whom 155 000 
returned.571 The refugee question after the war further aggravated 
problems for Greece and Bulgaria. 
The possibilities for extensification were rather limited. Between 
1921–31 the extent of cultivated land grew by 700 thousand ha from 6.9 
to 7.6 million in Yugoslavia, meaning a 10% increase, which remained 
under the rate of population increase. Although fallow land decreased 
from 0.9 million to 0.4 million ha, only 40 thousand new farms were 
established on these new lands, the rest, 170 thousand were the result of 
further fragmentation of estates. This meant that the living standards of 
more than 1 million people decreased. Extensification neither could be a 
choice owing to lack of animal power. During the Great War 35% of 
horses (0.55 million), 27% of cows (1.7 million), 46% of pigs (2.4 million) 
perished in the area of future Yugoslavia. 572 
Thus, according to Zagoroff, Bulgaria and Serbia became the most 
overpopulated European countries:573 in 1930–34 the number of agrarian 
inhabitants per square kms was 116 in Bulgaria, the same in Yugoslavia, 
’only’ 97 in Romania and 72 in Hungary, 52 in Germany and 17 in the 
USA.574  
Emigration was limited575 and neither industry, nor tertiary sector suck up 
the labour surplus (re)produced by the agrarian sphere partly because 
of the persistence of okučje, partly because of their weak capacities. 
These sectors created yearly 9000 new employments in Yugoslavia, 
while the number of grown-ups increased yearly by 50 thousand. 
Between 1921–31 the increase of labour force in agriculture was still 
greater (1.5 million) than in industry and trade (0.8 million). 
                                                          
571 See: Brunnbauer, U.: Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State Since the 
Late Nineteenth Century. Lexington Books, 2016. 131. and Yugoslavia: Annuaire statistique 1929, 
1936, 1940. (Belgrade, 1932, 1937, 1941). 131. 
572 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 229. 282. 335. 
573 Zagoroff, Sl.–Vegh, J.–Bilimovich, A.: The Agricultural Economy, 99. (table) and 369–448. 
574 Totev, A.: Sastojanieto na zemedelska prenaselenost na Balgaria. Spisanie na Balgarskoto 
Ikonomichesko Druzhestvo 39, 1940/6. 353–84.  
575 The average yearly contingent of 20 thousand people from Yugoslavia was limited in 5 
thousand for the US after 1929. 
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Furthermore, only 0.425 million of this 1.5 million came from villages, 
the others were the descendant of urban craftsmen or labourers.576 
Although in mining the ratio of workers with peasant origins was 75% 
and in construction industry 50% of the workers had some land, in 
chemical industry this was only 36%. Restratification remained limited: 
only 12% of all industrial workers was born as landless peasant, further 
10 percent had less than 3 ha, while 65% was the child of urban 
workers.577 
So, agrarian fragmentation continued (table 6): the number of 
agricultural wage labourers increased from 350 thousand to 450 
thousand in Yugoslavia. Dire necessity compelled many to take up 
secondary jobs either in agriculture or in industry. In Rakovica village 
40% of working hours was not spent on fields by 1932: many commuted 
to Belgrade carrying fresh milk to supply urban dwellers, exploiting the 
possibilities given by the expansion of the town. Regularly 45 villagers 
appeared in labour market as construction workers each year.578 
Generally 80% of farmers with 0.5–1 ha was still employed in 
agriculture, as the 55 thousand larger estates ranging to 4.5 million 
hectares out of the total cultivated 11 million suffered from labour 
shortage.579 (Due to territorial aggrandisement the proportion of large 
estates significantly increased in Yugoslavia temporarily providing 
occupation for the labour surplus). 
In Croatia the number of economies has doubled in rich villages 
within two generations (1850–1924), and this increase in case of estates 
under 2 ha was even higher (from 77/332 to 445/650), reaching 60% from 
the total. In poor villages more than 60% of the economies were under 5 
jutar (2 ha) early in 1850, but their number doubled within 70 years 
(from 104/171 to 209/309). In whole Yugoslavia 33% of farms were 
under 3 ha, another 33% between 2–5 ha even after the land reforms, 
similar to Serbia in 1910. In Bulgaria agrarian population grew by 46% 
                                                          
576 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 331–33. 
577 Kostić, Cv.: Seljaci – industrijski radnici. Belgrade, 1955. 166. 
578 Calic, M-J.: Sozialgeschichte Serbiens, 242. 
579 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 246. 
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between 1911–39, while the extent of cultivated land only with 20%.580 
Thus, average landhold size fell from 5.3581 ha to 4.3 (table 7). (Although 
population/economic unit also fell from 5.7 persons in 1900 to 4.7 in 
1934, this decrease did not solve the oversupply of labour force, as 
landholding sizes were also decreasing). Total production and output 
per hectares were increasing indeed, but it still meant stagnation in 
terms of output/person owing to the great population increase (figure 1)! 
The output/person values (in Bulgaria around 280 francs, as in 
Yugoslavia), were higher than prewar values, but in Yugoslavia this 
was partly the result of the effect of the incorporation of developed 
territories, partly owing to the grain prices remaining high after the war 
and not of the increase in output/ha value. (In 1933 this value decreased 
from 280 francs to 110 in Yugoslavia!) Bulgaria remained a smallholder 
society, where only 13% of the peasants worked both on own and 
rented land, and only 7% was considered wage labourer in 1926.582 
 
Figure 1. Yield/ha, Yield/workforce and ha/workforce values in Bulgaria (1892=100) 
 
                                                          
580 See: Berov, Ly.: Ikonomicheskoto razvitie, 120. 
581 Without landless agrarian wage-earners included. Crampton, R. J.: Historical Foundations. In: 
Grothusen, K.-D. (hrsg.): Südosteuropa Handbuch. Band VI. Bulgarien. Vandenhoek and 
Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1990. 53. 
582 Roucek, J. S.: The Economic Geography of Bulgaria.Economic Geography 11, No. 3, 1935. 309. 
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Ivanov, M.–Tooze, A.: Convergence of Decline,  624. 
 
As for technical advance, industry had no decisive impact on the 
productivity of agriculture, which would have been one of the major 
conditions for industrial revolution according to Black.583 Although the 
import of agricultural machines increased from yearly 500 tons (1888–
98) to 2500 tons (1906–11) in Bulgaria, World War I put an end to this 
                                                          
583 Black, C. E.: The Process of Modernization, 111. The other basic condition is the restratification 
of labour force into industry. 
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process and the import in 1929 was still the same.584 The available 
capital was not always used up to modernize an economy: although in 
Bulgaria the number of cooperatives increased from 37 in 1903 to 721 in 
1910 with 218 thousand members in 1926, and the establishments were 
also supported by the BZNS government, only 25% of agrarian loans 
was spent on the purchase of animals, goods and personalties, while 
50% was spent on the redemption of old loans in 1936.  
 
Table 5. Agrarian overpopulation, wage labourers (1930) 
Country 
Agricultural 
population to 1 
km2 arable land 
Proportion of 
population 
working on 
1–5 ha  
Proportion of 
population 
working on 
5–10 ha  
Proportion of 
population 
working on 
10–50 ha  
Proportion of 
population 
working* on 
estates over 50 ha 
Bulgaria 95 29 37 32 1.5 
Czechoslovakia 69 20 19.5 39 21 
Greece 87 17 12 21.5 50 
Hungary 63 14.5 12 22 51 
Italy 53 17.5 13.5 26 42 
Poland 87 15 17 21 47 
Romania 80 28 20 20 32 
Yugoslavia 100 28 28 35 9.7 
Moore, W. E.: Economic Demography, Appendix, Table 2.  
*Includes agricultural labourers as well as owners. 
 
The failure of further extensification and/or land concentration, the 
lack of capital to modernize farms and the constant attempts to recreate 
the viable smallholding resulted in that on the Balkans finally the 
system of agriculture and landuse had to be fit to the structure of 
landholdings (and not reversely) – thus, intensification remained the 
solution to solve low outputs and oversupply of labour force. 
One problem with the intensification was that only a labour-based 
intensification could be executed as capital was missing for 
mechanization. The question is could such a half-reform be productive? 
It is true that while in the mechanized USA the cultivation of one acre 
                                                          
584 Ivanov, M.–Tooze, A.: Convergence or decline, 696. 
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cornfield took 28 hours a year, it was 305 hours in Bulgaria in 1939,585 
but on the other hand – from methodological aspect – it is more correct 
to measure the output to the input work. In this respect the 
mechanization was often a waste of energy compared to traditional 
systems. For example, in the USA the number of work hours decreased 
by 40% and the output grew to 250% between 1945–70 owing to 
mechanization, but in numbers referring to energy input and output it 
meant that while 1 kcal input resulted in 3.7 kcal output in 1945, it 
decreased to only 2.8 kcal by 1970. Thus mechanization resulted in a 
waste of energy!586 
 
Table 6. Basic indices of postwar Bulgarian and Serbian agriculture 
Bulgaria Bulgaria 1926–46 Serbia* 1910–31 
Number of farms +25% +80% 
Number of smallholdings +66% +90% 
Increase of cultivated land +5% +80% 
Increase of population +70% +30 
Average holding size –15% 0%** 
Holdings under 5 ha  0 % +70% 
Holdings above 5 ha –15 % +70% 
Based on Bíró, L.: A jugoszláv állam 1918–1939. Budapest, 2010; Daskalov, R.: Balgarskoto obshtestvo,  
and Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics… 
*Based on Tomasevich, recalculated from Yugoslavian data, ** Due to reforms. 
 
The question still remains: was unmechanized smallholding 
sustainable or profitable? Although in Mollov’s opinion – to underline 
its viability – a small estate of 5 ha produced 25% more than a large 
estate regarding per hectare yields,587 but it was simply owing to the 
large (and unexploited) surplus of labour force. Production measured to 
workforce was evidently bigger on large estates. (This takes us back to 
the question of selecting the proper variables to characterize efficiency).  
 
                                                          
585 Clark, C.: The Conditions of Economic Progress. London, 1951. 223. and Crampton, R. J.: 
Historical Foundations, 53. 
586 Endrei W.: A textilipari technikák, 11. 
587 Mollov, Ya.: Organizacionna struktura na balgarskoto zemedelsko stopanstvo. Godishnik na 
Sofiyskiya universitet. Agronomicheski fakultet. Tom. 14. kn. 1. 1935–36. 391–432.  This is in 
contradiction to the above mentioned regarding the output/ha of large estates in Romania! 
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Table 7. Estate structure in Bulgaria 
Size 
Number of estates 
 in 1000 
Estates in % Size of estates in % 
1926 1934 1946 1926 1934 1946 1926 1934 1946 
Under 5 ha 428 559 712 57 63 69 23.6 30 37.5 
5–10 ha 210 232 254 28 26 25 34.5 37 39.3 
10–20 ha 94 81 64 13 9 6 29.3 24.3 18.6 
20–50 ha 17 12 6 2 1 1 10.6 7.2 3.9 
Above 50 ha 0.8 0.5 0.2 0 0 0 2 1.6 0.7 
Altogether 750 884 1036 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Based on Daskalov, R.: Balgarskoto obshtestvo… 
 
In Bulgaria Mollov’s investigation in 1932–33 showed that 90% of 
holdings over 5 ha had “chista pechalba” after the deduction of seed, 
taxes and personal needs. In case of holdings under 5 ha this was only 
43%. After the deduction of loans, these percentage values decreased to 
23% and 0% respectively! Since this investigation was carried out 
during the great crisis and the results can be distorted due to the export 
price support of the state – and large holdings had more surplus, 
therefore received more state support – the investigation was repeated 
after the great economic crisis. While “chista pechalba” occured in 82% 
of the investigated 57 farms (and 71% of these were bigger than 5 ha), 
real profits charaterized only 5% (all were over 5 ha).588 Thus we may 
assume that the lower limits of sustainable smallholdings were 
somewhere over 5 ha. The results of this investigation also mean that 
agricultural credits and indebtedness had a crucial role in determining 
the sustainability of peasant economies and the living standards of the 
stratum, as real incomes were very nearly the same in the 1870s and in 
1944 in a Bulgarian peasant farm (table 11–12). 
                                                          
588 Mollov, Ya.–Kondov, N.: Dohodnostta na 44 zemedelski stopanstva v Balgariya za 1929–1930 
godina. Sofia, 1932. 20–21. 50–55. and Mollov, Ya.–Kondov, N.: Dohodnostta na 66 zemedelski 
stopanstva v Balgariya za 1931-1932 stopanska godina. Sofia, 1936. 156–58; Mollov, Ya.–Kondov, 
N.: Dohodnostta na 73 zemedelski stopanstva v Balgarija za 1930-1931 godina. Sofia, 1934. 55. 
Daszkalov, R.: Balgarskoto obshtestvo, Vol. I. 285–86. 
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Another problem was that – according to Sanders – individualism 
and entrepreneurship was not a characteristic feature of Balkan peasant 
mentality. The autarchic family refrained from participating in market 
processes.589 Peasants were prone to exploit prosperous cycles according 
to Calic, but innovation, reinvestment of capital and high work moral 
was rare. The contemporary of Mollov, Chayanov in the Soviet Union 
also stated that smallholders were not interested in producing surplus 
beyond their consumption needs (goods bought at / brought to markets 
covered cca. 20% of their consumption in the 1900s), that is why they 
were less competitive compared to large estates. Though one might 
think that Chayanov was a protagonist of sovietization of estate structure, 
but not: he rather challenged the viability of socialist-type land-
concentration, claiming that it would not increase production per capita 
(as socialist cooperatives were based on collective property and 
cultivated by the peasants ofthe same mentality). This theory was later 
applied by Halil Inalcik for late the Ottoman conditions. This means 
that – according to them – there is hardly any difference between a 
mechanized chiftlik and a sovietized large estate (the latter could be 
interpreted as large estate cultivated by shareholders). 
Sundhaussen claimed that the adjustment of social structure and 
jurisdiction to ’global’ economic processes destroyed traditional values 
by the time the great prosperity of the 1840s–1870s was over, without 
the internalization of the new values. The implementation of western 
laws and educational system rather created new fault lines within the 
society, like rural-urban dichotomy in Serbia and Bulgaria, than 
promoted the adaption of western mentality.590 Peasantry refused 
central modernization attempts like in 1937 in Dragalevci, when the 
Bulgarian government wanted to substitute sheep-husbandry with the 
macroeconomically more rewarding cattle-breeding.591 This not only 
represents the conservativeness of peasantry, but also their recognition, 
that any centralized attempt would result in the attrition of traditional 
structures (and their potential to resist changes as well). 
                                                          
589 Sanders, I.: The Balkan Village. Lexington, 1942. 142. 
590 Sundhaussen, H.: Historische Statistik Serbiens, 22 and 29. 
591 Sanders, I.: The Balkan Village, 145. 
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(b) Reconstruction attempts of smallholder agrarian societies: 
land reforms and consequences 
 
Beyond the general problems of overpopulation and 
underdevelopment, Yugoslavia was even characterized by significant 
regional disparities in agriculture. This was observable not only in 
output values – in 1938 Sava and Dunav banovinas were the most 
developed regarding agriculture, the previous in animal husbandry, the 
latter in crop production: per hectare output of maize exceeded that of 
in Vardar banovina by 125% and that of in Zeta by 100%.592 – but 
regarding available land as well. In Dalmatia the average density was 
250 persons per 100 ha, in Serbia 166, in Croatia 190 (in Romania 107, in 
Hungary 76, in Bulgaria 109), while the limit of sustainable agriculture 
at the present technical level and agrarian structure was 80 persons/100 
ha.593 Beside extensification or intensification, the modification of estate 
structure could have been a solution – but only theoretically. Although 
with the acquisition of Bosnia, Macedonia, Croatia and Vojvodina the 
extent of redistributable large estates increased, even a full-scale land 
reform could not solve the problem without the reallocation of population, as 
not only the estate structure was problematic, but there was simply not enough 
land to create average estates of 5 ha for everyone! If we compare the 
distribution of land in Yugoslavia in 1931 (after the reforms) with the 
situation in Serbia in 1897, we hardly find any difference, although 2.5 
million ha was redistributed during the land reforms (30%) and 637 
thousand families received land (averagely 4 ha). Although this reform 
was definitely broader than the Hungarian or the Bulgarian one, it was 
only able reinstall the situation a generation earlier, thus merely 
postponed the solution for another generation. So, the restratification of 
population into industry or intensification would have been essential. 
The reform was neither full-scale, nor carried out in similar manner 
for each region, or quick: in Bosnia the land of 4000 begs was 
distributed, but there were 13 000 landlords: thus cca. 33% of the land 
was involved into the reforms. Compensation was only 1000 dinar/ha, 
                                                          
592 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 282. 
593 Ibid. 317. 
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lower than market land prices, but it meant 750 million dinars 
expenditure for the government (table 8). 113 thousand kmets received 
land (775 thousand ha),594 and they obtained viable estates of averagely 
7 ha. Further 50 thousand tenants working on begliks received 400 
thousand ha, averagely 8 ha.  
In Macedonia the chiftchi was entitled to get 5 ha land without 
compensating the landlords, and further 10 ha if he paid the tribute to 
the landlord (instead of the state). Until 1936 20 thousand chiftchi out of 
the 40 thousand received 120 thousand hectares (6.5 ha averagely), 
while the state paid 40 million dinars (40% of the total compensation) to 
the 4000 landlords, only 333 dinar/ha. (In Bosnia the higher 
compensation was a part of a political deal between the government 
and Bosnian landlords, who supported the centralized system of the 
SHS Kingdom contrary to the Croatian wills on decentraliztion). 
Colonization process also took place in Macedonia: 30 thousand families 
from the overpopulated Montenegro and Dalmatia received altogether 
160 000 ha (table 9).595 
North of Sava river 735 large estates were involved in land 
distribution, 375 belonged to private persons (126 Hungarian and 145 
Austrian citizens) and 77 to Churches. 1.2 million hectares were planned 
to distributed, but the status changed till 1935 only half of these. 173 
thousand persons received land and further 55 thousand were allowed 
to buy land by licits. But 140 thousand of them received only 1-2 ha (as 
they owned some earlier). For example, the 14 thousand hectares of 
Count Chekonits was distributed among 4000 applicants. Further 25-30 
thousand colonists received averagely 4 ha. Here the land was of better 
quality reasoning the smaller estate size.  
State security also played a role in the reforms as Muslim owners in 
Kosovo were limited to have 5-15 ha, and in the northern borders land 
purchases were forbidden after 1938,596 to stop the recovery of German 
                                                          
594 Bogojević, D.: Agrarna reforma. Jubilarni zbornik života i rada Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–
1928. Belgrade, 1928. 315.  
595 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 361. 
596 Müller, D.: Property between Delimitation and Nationalization: the Notions, Instittutions and 
Practices of Land Proprietorship in Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland. In: Müller, D.–Siegrist, H. 
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and Hungarian peasantry. However, until the expulsion of Germans in 
1945, when 60 thousand highlanders settled on the plains597 neither 
ethnic, nor economic breakthrough was made in this respect (22% of 
agrarian population remained wage labourer). 
 
Table 8. Yugoslavian state expenditure on land reforms until 1935 
Expenses Kmet 
lands 
Woodlands, 
pastures 
Beglik lands 
in Bosnia 
Dalmatia Sphiluk in 
Macedonia 
and Kosovo 
Support 
of settlers 
Million 
dinars 
130 50 600 400 100 185 
Kršev, B.: Finansijska politika Jugoslavije 1918–1941. Novi Sad, 2007. 248. 
 
Table 9. The results of land reform in Yugoslavia, 1919–35 
Area 
Head of 
family 
Landlord Land (ha) Land/farmer 
Land per landlord 
(taken away) in ha 
Bosnia* 
170 000 v.  
250 000  
4000 
970 000 v.  
1 200 000 
5.7 vs. 4.9 242.5 
Dalmatia 90 000 n.a. 50 000 0.5 n.a. 
Macedonia** 50 000 4700 590 000 12.0 127.6 
North of Sava 250 000 700 550 000 2.3 714.2 
Altogether 560 000 9500 2 120 000 3.8 223.1 
* Other data suggest 250 thousands persons with 1,2 million ha land including pasture and woodland. 
** Others claim 300 000 ha land to be distributed. 
Markert, W. (hrsg.): Osteuropa Handbuch. Jugoslawien. Köln-Graz, Böhlau Verlag, 1954. 216. 
 
Despite the reforms smallholdings under 5 ha became more 
frequent.598 Average estate size was 5.4 ha in Serbia, 4.4 in Croatia, 3 in 
Dalmatia, 5 ha in Bosnia, 7.1 in Vojvodina and 8 in Slovenia 
characterized by its bipolar system.599 The situation ameliorated in 
Bosnia and Croatia comparing the 1900s and the 1930s, but deteriorated 
for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro (table 10). Contrary to the extent 
of involved land the Yugoslavian land reform was not much 
progressive than the Bulgarian in 1878, criticized earlier. The average 
                                                                                                                                
(eds.): Property in East Central Europe: Notions, Institutions, and Practices of 
Landownership in the Twentieth Century. Berghahn, 2015. 126–27. 
597 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics,  367. 
598 Markert, W. (hrsg.): Osteuropa Handbuch. Jugoslawien. Köln-Graz, Böhlau, 1954. 216. 
599 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics,  388. 
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landholding size only a bit exceeded that of in Bulgaria (4.3 ha), that did 
not carry out significant land reforms in this period.  
In Bulgaria the peasant government (BZNS) of Aleksandar 
Stamboliyski meant a big (but temporary) ideological change compared 
to the previous ‘bourgeois’ governments, but it had to face several 
troubles. The post-war land reforms could only postpone the earlier 
mentioned processes by the total dismemberment of exisiting large 
estates (the proportion of farms over 20 ha fell from 14 to 4.5 % from the 
cultivated land), as only 82 thousand hectares could be distributed,600 
while hundreds of thousand refugees – mostly of peasant origin – 
arrived to the country after the war. Despite the radical intentions of 
Stamboliyski, to create peasant economies of similar size producing 
surpluses and participating in exports too,601 the land reforms remained 
moderate owing to the shortage of land: only 4% of the lands were 
distributed among peasants, while in Romania it was 30%. Though the 
proportion of units under 1 ha fell from 30% to 12%, inflationary policy 
was able to cancel most of the former debt of peasants (like in 
Hungary), village schooling improved, and maximum property holding 
was set, this was only a temporary relief.  As the peasant-government 
failied in moderating the strict reparations payments, a coup d’etat 
murdered Stamboliyski and soon the proportion of units under 5 ha 
increased from 57% again over 66% by the 1940s, as it had been earlier 
in 1897–1908. Though the formation of Druzhbi, special (not Soviet type) 
local cooperatives was to promote peasants’ access to internal and 
external markets, but hyperinflation deterred producers from marketing 
surplus (if had any: the agrarian output in 1924 was still only the 80% of 
the prewar output).602  
Both cases revealed that changes in the production system should be 
carried out, as the estates structure could not be ameliorated further. 
                                                          
600 Crampton, R. J.: Historical Foundations, 43. and Bell, J. D.: Peasants in Power. Princeton, 1977. 
22–54.  
601 For the problems of this see Chayanov’s theory on the productivity of ’non-capitalist’ 
smallholdings above. 
602 Palotás E.: Kelet-Európa története. Budapest, 2003. 439. 
266 
 
Hungary – together with Albania, where 77% of the farms, but only 
33% of land were under 3 ha603 – was the only country refraining from 
large-scale land reforms in the interwar period. In Hungary the level of 
agriculture in 1928 did not exceed significantly that of the pre-war era 
and the polarized land-structure was conserved. 90% of the farms were 
under 10 ha and 72% under 2.5 ha in 1935 (while this was 53% in 1895). 
The extent of farms under 10 ha did not exceed 30% of the cultivated 
land as was in 1895.604 These two data refer to advanced fragmentation. 
Only 0.5 million ha land was involved in the postwar land reforms 
(8.5% of the cultivated land) significantly less than in Czechoslovakia 
(16%) or in Romania (33%).605 Furthermore, this small amount of land 
was distributed among 0.5 million farmers, thus the average size of new 
holdings did not exceed 1 ha. Smallholdings were still not competititve: 
output per hectare values on large estates over 500 ha were 30% greater in 
the case of maize and potato and 20% in the case of wheat and sugar 
beet.606 
 
Table 10. Comparison of prewar and postwar estate structure  
(% based on number of estates, most frequent category is indicated by bold) 
Size 
Serbia  
1897 
Serbia 
1931=1910! 
Croatia 
1895 
Croatia 
1931 
Bosnia 
1906 
Bosnia 
1931 
Vojvodina 
1931 
under 2 ha  18 24 44 36.5 41 34 34 
2–5 ha 30 37 27 38 26 35 27 
5–20 ha 43 35 28 24 
33 
29 32 
20–50 ha 4 2 1 1 2 5.5 
Size 
Slovenia 
1902 
Slovenia 
1931 
Dalmatia  
1902 
Dalmatia 
 1931 
Macedonia 
1912 
Macedonia 
1931 
Montenegro 
1931 
under 2 ha 31.5 33 61 64 33 41 48 
2–5 ha 19 24.5 26 25 47 33 28 
5–20 ha 39 34.5 11 10 18 24 20 
20–50 ha 8.5 7 1 1 2.5 1.5 3.5 
Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 389. without taking landless agrarian wage-labourers into 
consideration. 
                                                          
603 Lange, K.: Die Agrarfrage, 48-49. 
604 Berend T. I.– Ránki Gy.: A magyar gazdaság 100 éve. Budapest, 1972. 150. 
605 Romsics I.: Magyarország története a 20. században, 160. 
606 Ibid. If output/person is used instead of output/ha, the numbers differ from the given. 
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Figure 2. The regional structure of land distribution in Yugoslavia 
Drina
Sava
Vrbas
Primorje
Zeta
Vardar
Drava
Dunav
estates under 2 ha > 40% prior to 1914
estates under 2 ha > 40% in 1938
mode over 5 ha between 1914-1938
Beograd
Morava
new estates over 5 ha
 
 
Table 11. A comparison of total and per capita GDP of economic sectors in Bulgaria 
between 1911 and 1934 (Inflation was 17–20x between 1910–1934) 
Sectors in 
1934 
Persons in 
1000  
% 
Per capita production 
and increase 
measured to 1910 in 
current prices* 
Total production (in 
current 1000 leva) 
and growth 
measured to 1910 
Distribution of 
production 
value % 
Agriculture 2800 88.2 10 000* (16–18x) 25 000 000 (27x) 55–60 
Industry 200 6.3 62 500 (17x) 12 500 000 (27x) 25 
Tertiary 200 6.3 35 000 (16x) 7 000 000 (18x) 17 
      
1910 
Persons in 
1000 
% 
Average income  
(francs/leva) 
Total income (in 
1000 leva)  
Production 
value % 
Agriculture 1300 80 560-660 650 000–900 000 55 
Industry 125 7.8 2500 310 000 20  
Tertiary 190 11.8 2200 400 000 25 
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In Romania the situation was also untenable as the revolt in 1862 
then in 1907 had already proved it (the latter resulted in 10 000 killed). 
Though in 1864 serfdom was abolised, and 0.5 million family heads 
were emancipated, but it did not mean radical changes: villagers still 
had to work on the landlord’s land, who hindered free movement (and 
restratification) and 66% of pastures and forests was given to 
landowners. Peasants had to choose either to live without land in 
freedom, or live with their land without freedom – summarized the 
situation Roucek. The lands distributed were not enough, and therefore 
from 1889 on the state lands constituting 33% of the cultivated area – in 
1864 the landholdings of Orthodox monasteries were secularized 
(ranging to 20% of total cultivated land) – , had to be sold in small lots 
in order to maintain the sytem and save peasants from declassation 
owing to the great population increase (as their free movement was 
hindered). 66% of lands owned by large estate owners were rented by 
peasants in 1910 (this was an increase compared to the situation a 
century earlier).607  
As an immediate result of 1907, contracts between peasants and 
landlords became public to defend the producer as well, and the old 
tithe based on the possessed area was abolished. But peasants still did 
not own enough land. Thus in 1917 in order to maintain the morals of 
peasant troops, lands belonging to the Crown were expropriated for 
future redistribution meaning more than 2 million ha. This was partially 
extended to private large estates in 1921. In Old Romania maximum 
landsize was set to 500 ha, but was set smaller (250 ha in Transylvania) 
in newly acquired territories.608 Owners were compensated with 40 year 
rental price in state bond, but the depreciation of leu to one-fourtieth of 
its original price meant drastic losses.609 Altogether 6 million ha was 
redistributed, thus while in the Old Kingdom farms over 100 ha reached 
3.4 million ha, or 42% of lands before the reforms, in 1927 this was 0.6 
million ha (or 8%). Smallholdings earlier constituting 60% of land, 
reached 90%. By 1927 two million ha had been given to peasants (or 3.6 
                                                          
607 Roucek, S.: Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems, 299. 
608 Müller, D.: Property between, 125–26. 
609 Roucek, J. S.: Contemporary Roumania, 303. 
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million in the whole country for 1.3 million peasants). This means, that 
the average land per capita given to producers was around 3 ha, still 
higher than in Hungary or in Bulgaria – but on the other hand, 0.6 
million peasants entitled to get some land received nothing.610  
The reform did not create a balanced situation: like in Yugoslavia in 
the 1930s 65% of farms (30% of land) were under 5 hectares (unlike in 
Dobrudja, where colonization efforts resulted in farms of dominantly 5-
6 ha).611 Only 22% of farms were between 5-20 ha (one third of lands).612 
During the crisis years many peasants became indebted, and their 
landholdings were confiscated according to a law issued in 1929. 
Similarly to Yugoslavia the general increase in difference between the 
prices of industrial and agrarian goods (while in 1913 264 kgs wheat 
was needed to buy a certain industrial article in 1939 690 kgs was 
needed for the same)613 eliminated the positive effect of land reforms 
(even wheat output could not compansate this harmful effect as it was 
1.2 t/ha in 1911 and remained 1 t even in 1935–38).614 
 
Table 12. The distribution of land in Romania and Albania (%) 
  
Romania, 1935 Albania, 1945 
landholdings arable land landholdings arable land 
under 3 ha 55 12.5 77 34 
3-5 ha 23 15 
20 39 5-10 ha 17 20 
10-20 ha 5.5 12 
3 27 over 20 ha 2.5 40 
Axenciuc, V.: Evoluţia economică Romaniei: Cercetari statistico-istorice 1859–1947. 183.  
Lange, K.: Die Agrarfrage, 48–49. 
                                                          
610 Roucek, J. S.: Contemporary Roumania, 304. 
611 Demeter G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol. 3. 442. and Strausz A.: Grossbulgarien… 
612 Murgescu, B.: Agriculture and Landownership in the Economic History of Twentieth-Century 
Romania. In: Property in East Central Europe… 
613 Palotás, E.: Kelet-Európa története, 367-68. 
614 Fagarasan, G.: Die Entwicklung Rumăniens zwischen Sgrarwirtschaft und Industrialisierung. St. 
Gallen, 1986. 154-59. 
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The Romanian reforms did not result in remarkable changes: though 
80% of the population were farmers, but only 40% of the national 
income was based on the agrarian sector (similarly to Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria). Romania was dominated by ploughlands: meadows, pastures 
decreased under 10–12%. Contrary to the fact, that Romania was 6th in 
1910 and 7th after the war among the greatest wheat-exporters, wheat-
growing declined in Romania from 730 to 580 kgs/capita615 in the 
Interwar period partly owing to population growth, partly owing to the 
decrease of yields per ha,616 which could be a consequence of land 
reforms and the spread of smallholdings. Total production also 
decreased by 30% in 1923-1929 owing to bad harvests, 617 which was not 
so characteristic for other Balkan states. However, grains share from 
agriculture did not decrease: 80% of arable lands were used for grain 
production (owing to the large proportion of smallholdings with self-
subsistence), while the total value produced by animal husbandry fell 
from 45 to 37%.618 Despite the decrease in per capita outputs, cereals still 
constituted 45-50% of exports (live stock only 12%, timber 16%, petrol 
19%), thus low prices during the crisis also affected the peasants, who 
became indebted, as in other Balkan countries. Generally speaking the 
production stagnated until the 1930s, or was similar to the adjacent 
Balkan states (during the crisis). So, neither this reform resulted in 
structural changes or intensification (vegetables and industrial crops 
reached only 400-400 thousand hectares out of 20 million, under 5% of 
cultivated land).619 The only exception was that maize began to 
substitute wheat (including local consumption) again (as it was in the 
18th century).   
 
                                                          
615 Murgescu, B.: Agriculture and Landownership… 
616 Axenciuc, V.: Evoluţia economică Romaniei: Cercetari statistico-istorice 1859-1947. Vol. 2. 
Bucharest, 1997.  525–26, 579–80. 
617 International Institute of Agriculture. International Yearbook of Agrarian Statistics, 1928-1929. 567. 
Roucek, J. S.: Contemporary Roumania, 255. 
618 Axenciuc, V.: Evoluţia economică Romaniei, 53. The number of sheep after the quick recovery 
from 8 to 11 million (1919-21) did not exceed 13 million, oxen stagnated around 5 million 
until 1930. 
619 Roucek, J. S.: Contemporary Roumania, 257. 
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(c) Social tensions: living standards, prices, wages and 
indebtedness, regional differences 
 
 
The estimation (and comparison) of living standards is problematic 
from several reasons.  
First of all, inflation rates were different and make the recalculation 
of outputs, incomes and purchasing power in the 1920s and 1930s 
difficult. Inflation was 1000-1500% in Yugoslavia and 1500-3000% in 
Bulgaria measured to golden francs between 1923–1940. For example, 
measured at constant prices, the Great Crisis decreased incomes per 
capita only by 20–25% in Yugoslavia, while in terms of current prices 
the decrease was over 50% according to Stajić.620  
Second, taxes do not represent the burdens well, indebtedness also 
played a great role by that time. If we compare per capita taxes 
measured to the indebtedness in agriculture, the latter exceeded the 
value the taxes. Although Zeta and Primorje provinces paid small taxes 
after 1929 (referring to weak agrarian performance), indebtedness was 
still 3–10 times greater than yearly taxes. So, it was not the state taxes 
that ruined the average peasant, rather loan interests. Nonetheless this 
is a complex question: in Vojvodina taxes were higher, such as the per 
capita value of indebtedness, but the latter did not exceed the value of 
the yearly tax, while the performance of agriculture was the best in the 
state.  
Incomes or expenses, and thus purchase power – representing 
standard of living better – are difficult to assess due to the previously 
mentioned processes and the modifying effect of the great crisis.  
Finally, the regional disparities regarding both agrarian outputs and 
taxes were enormous, especially in Yugoslavia, which resulted in 
unbalanced burdens (figure 3–4). The taxation system was harmonized 
only after 1929. While 3 ha cultivated land paid 210 dinars in Croatia 
and Vojvodina as land tax, and 340 dinars after 5 ha, Serbian regions 
paid half of this value. But the GDP/capita in the agriculture was 2360 
                                                          
620 Stajić, S.: Nacionalni dohodak Jugoslavije 1923–1939 u stalnim i tekucim cenami. Belgrade, 1959. 
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dinars621 in Vojvodina, 1620 dinars in Croatia, while only 1190 dinars in 
Serbia which explains the different agrarian taxes (and their ratio). 
However, other tax kinds were also levied unequally. A family of 4 with 
10 ha in Vojvodina with 250 000 dinars wealth paid 5400 dinars as taxes, 
while a similar economy in Serbia paid only 1500 dinars. The reason 
was that inhabitants of Vojvodina paid more military tax (420 vs. 37 
dinars), more contribution to the war-injured (840 vs. 74 dinars), more 
local surtax (700 vs. 0) and even paid more after their income (380 
dinars vs. 0).622 
The income of the Bulgarian peasant increased by 28% in real prices 
compared to 1911, but the economic crisis ruined this. According to 
Roucek, the income levels of 1911 were exceeded again only in 1934. But 
by that time great changes happened to the wages of industrial workers 
compared to smallholders’ revenues. While prior to the 1870s industrial 
wages were lower than agricultural incomes, and they were similar in 
1870–1910, by the 1930s industrial wages had exceeded the yearly 
income of smallholders by 30%,623 reaching 50% of the wage of a 
chinovnik. One reason for low peasant incomes in Bulgaria, as elsewhere, 
was the high share of subsistence production: marketed rural products 
reached only 35-40% of the total output in Bulgaria in the 1930s, not 
much higher than in the 1900s, while in Germany it was 80%.624 
Considering low marketing, the officially measured 6:1 income 
difference between urban and rural dwellers was ’only’ 3:1 in terms of 
total income (if incomes in kind are added to incomes in cash). 
As both figure 2 (in chapter 3) and table 13 prove, the GDP/capita of 
Bulgarian peasantry increased by 1939, but conditions were hardly 
better than in 1911, incomes were not even higher than prior to the 
’osvobozhdenie’. In 1935–36 a statistical analysis based on 939 
households showed that only 44% of the households had separated 
                                                          
621 At current prices, inflated dinars are not comparable to prewar dinars, which were nearly 
equivalent with French francs. 
622 Kršev, B.: Finansijska politika Jugoslavije 1918–1941. Novi Sad, 2007. 119–122. 
623 Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol I. 574. 
624 Chakalov, A.: Natsionalniyat dohod i razhod na Bulgaria. Sofiya, 1946. 59; Toshev, A.: Sastoyanieto 
na zemedelska prenaselenost na Balgariya. Spisanie na Balgarskoto Ikonomichesko Druzhestvo 
39. 1940/6. 30. 
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kitchen, 11% of villagers slept on the ground, 17% of houses lacked 
toilet. In Yugoslavia in Drina banovina only 15% of the houses were 
built of bricks, 50% had solid floor and basement and 45% had toilets of 
any kind. 20–40% had no beds at all.625 In the more developed Sava 
banovina 70% of houses had only one room, in 66% of houses more than 
5 people lived in one room626 and 50% of the dwellings had no toilets. In 
Bulgaria Mocheva wrote that the usual food was bread, leek, garlic, at 
least with some pork in winter. Nutrition became one-sided in 
Yugoslavia as well: although the daily calory intake reached 3000 
calories averagely, while in Hungary this was 2770 (and 2710 in 
Poland), its composition remained unbalanced. Only 10% of daily calory 
needs was covered from meat or fat. The yearly consumption of a 
villager was 19 kgs meat, 116 litres of milk, 65 kg of potatoes in 1925.627 
(Meat consumption did not show any progress since the turn of the 
century). Daily protein intake was 100 gramms (mainly from plants), 
while the consumption carbohydrates reached 620 grams! In 1932 the 
differences in calory intake of flesh eater and grain consumer societies 
were analyzed: while the former (consuming processed meat) reached 
even daily 4000 calories in winter and 2200 in summer, the daily calory 
intake of a grain producer did not exceed 2600 calories, showing a 25% 
difference at least.628 
 
Table 13. Incomes of smallholdings under 4 ha in Bulgaria in 1944 
Farm size 
Lower boundary of income (in 
current prices and in golden 
francs) 
Upper boundary of income (in 
current prices and in golden 
francs) 
0–1 ha 3900 (200) 6000 (300) 
1–2 ha 7400 10 100 
2–3 ha 8100 13 200 
3–4 ha 9800 (500) 15 200 (750) 
Berov, Ly. (ed.): Protekcionizam i konkurenciya na Balkanite prez XX. vek. Sofia, 1989. Compare data 
with table 10, 1910. 
                                                          
625 Isić, M.: Seljaštvo u Srbiji 1918–1941. I. Socijalno-ekonomski položaj seljaštva. Beograd, 2001. 
626 Malojčić, M.: The results of Survey of the Prevalence of Tuberculosis in the village. Socijalno-
medicinski pregled 1940/4. 437. These data were similar in Hungarian small towns – but in 1870!  
627 Škatarić, A.: Zdravstvene prilike našega sela. In: Selo i seljaštvo. Belgrade, 1937. 158. 
628 Petrović, A.: Banjane, 62. 
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As Yugoslavia was a grain consuming society, the export of cereals 
reached only 10% of the production, while in the case of meat, lard and 
fish this was over 15–20%.629 The Yugoslav peasants rather sold these 
products (to earn money), than ate them despite the protein deficit. The 
peasant sold only one third of his grain production in inland and 
foreign markets (two-third secured internal consumption and 
reproduction). Although Bulgarian peasants produced 80% of their 
food, and covered only 20% of their needs from markets, still 50% of 
their market expenditure (cash) was spent on foodstuff (in case of urban 
dwellers this was 20–40%).630 This also means, that altogether 66% of 
their income (in cash and kind) was spent on nutrition.631 
Therefore most of the Bulgarian peasants had no savings: only 18% 
of deposits were owned by peasants (while the basically narrower class 
of industrial workers owned 16% from the total).632 Although 60% of 
peasantry became involved in cooperative movements by the 1930s 
(which was a great step compared to the 1900s), their debt totalled 9 
billion leva or 12 000 leva per economic unit by the 1930s. This equalled 
to 75% of the yearly income of a farm of 5 hectares! Indebtedness per 
economic unit had doubled since 1900 (from 200 to 400 golden leva), 
and cooperatives were unable to solve this. The Yugoslavian value 
(averagely 10 thousand dinars/households) was similarily critical on the 
eve of the Great Economic Crisis.  
In Bulgaria 55% of the poor lived in villages (0.64 million), but 
constituted only 13% of villagers, while 66% of rural inhabitants (3.3 
million) were classified into the lower middle class.633 Peasants (75% of 
the society) paid only 35-40% of the total taxes, this means that the taxes 
of urban dwellers were 6 times greater regarding per capita values (as 
in Serbia in 1910). The tax rate of villagers was 7–16%, while in case of 
urban dwellers it was 18–33% in 1931 (due to the indirect taxes). This 
also gives us possibility to calculate urban incomes as well, which 
                                                          
629 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 543. 
630 Mocheva, Hr.: Hranata na balgarskata seljanin, 137–39. 
631 Food from land: 50 %, food from market: 17%, other stuff from market: 17%, other stuff from 
land: 17%. 
632 Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom, Vol I.  466–67. 
633 Ibid. Vol. I. 491. 
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remained three times greater in towns than in villages (5000–9000 leva 
vs. 2100–5600 leva in current prices) even during crisis years, similar to 
the value in 1911. Therefore the gap between these two classes did not 
decrease. During the great crisis, the income of rural households in 
Bulgaria shrank by 30% between 1931–33 (2000–4200 leva) and only by 
10–20% in urban households according to the calculations of Nedkov.634 
 
Table 14. Income distribution and productivity of farms based on their size in Yugoslavia 
1931 
Farmers 
% 
Secondary 
occupation 
(1000 prs) 
Land 
in 1000 
ha 
% 
Income 
in 
dinars* 
Total 
income in 
m. dinars* 
Output in 
dinar/ha 
Distribution 
of yearly 
income in % 1000 prs 
0-0.5 ha 159 8 54 (or 33%) 43 0.4 350 55 1279 0.6 
0.5-1 ha 175 9 31 (or 18%) 135 1.3 840 147 1089 1.6 
1-2 ha 337 17 34 (or 10%) 514 4.8 1700  570 1109 6.2 
2-5 ha 676 34 35 (or 5%) 2287 22 
3400 
(340) 
2297 1004 25 
5-10 ha 407 20.5 13 (or 3%) 2873 27 6500  2637 918 29 
10-20 ha 174 9 5 2380 22 11 000  1976 830 21.5 
20-50 ha 50 2.5 2 1388 13 21 000 1038 748 11 
over 50 
ha  
7 0.5 1 1000 10 68 000 480 480 5.4 
Total or 
average 
1985 100 175 (10%) 10 645 100 4600 9200 864 100 
Calculated after Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo… 
*In order to get values in golden francs, the given numbers should be divided by 10. 
 
In Yugoslavia the dominance of smallholdings (70% of the farmers 
had less than 5 ha, while 70% of the land was owned by the remainder 
30%) and their low profits together with the increasing consumption of 
imported goods and the need for land forced peasants to turn towards 
credits.635 Estates under or around 1 ha produced only 1000 dinars 
income (80 golden francs). The yearly income of an agrarian wage 
labourer was also not more than that (daily 10 dinars, less than 1 golden 
                                                          
634 Nedkov, B.: Razvitieto na Balgarskata finansova sistema prez poslednoto desetiletie. Trudove na 
stopanskiyat institut za socialna poruchvaniya pri Sofiyskiya darzhaven universitet 3, 1937. 
77. 
635 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 602. 
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franc, like prior to the 1870s). Despite increasing pauperization, the 
restratification into other sectors of economy was still not usual. Only 
25% of farmers under 1 ha took up a secondary job (table 14).636 
 
Figure 3. Regional characteristics of agriculture in Yugoslavia 
 
Drina
agrarian wage labourers >20%
less than 160 dinar/ha income, estates under 2 ha
over 40%
population surplus in agriculture > 50%
industrial workers above the average (11%)
Sava
Vrbas
Primorje
Zeta
Vardar
Drava
Dunav
Beograd
Morava
 
Pauperization even increased during the great economic crisis. While 
an estate of 5–10 ha produced 480 francs net and 1000 francs gross 
income in 1910, in 1930 the gross income was only 650 golden francs in 
Yugoslavia (similar to the Bulgarian value). While an estate of 6.5 ha 
produced 26 thousand dinars (1500 golden francs) after the crisis in 
1938, in 1931 10–20 ha was needed for the same amount of income. Per 
                                                          
636 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 246. 
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hectare output fell back to 100–120 golden francs, while the average 
income/ha was 220 dinars in 1928.637 (The reason was the falling prices, 
as output/ha did not decrease significantly). During the crisis 70% of 
estates (this means the category under 5 ha) produced less than 3500 
dinars income (350 golden francs), while Konstandinović claimed638 that 
prior to 1929 even an estate of 2–5 ha produced 5000–11 000 dinars from 
grains, with 1500 dinars (140 francs) of net income! (In Stojsavljevic’s 
calculation around 1931 this became the feature of farms over 5 ha). 
Similarly to the Bulgarian case (see Mollov’s calculation above) prior to 
the crisis, in 1929 10% of peasants had net income (after the deduction of 
seeds and taxes) between 1000-2000 dinars in Yugoslavia, 70% had less 
than 1000 dinars and only 10% had no profits at all (table 15). 
Owing to falling prices, actually more land would be needed to earn 
the same income from farming, which was missing. In mountanous 
regions extensivity was not a choice: in Smolyan (Bulgaria) 40% of 
wheat was produced instead of the required even in 1938.639 The 
collapse of tobacco prices after 1929 ruined the hopes in diversification 
as well. Though the crisis was generally accompanied by 
overproduction, in order to cope with the frequent local shortages 
during the crisis in Yugoslavia, huge amount of grains had to be 
transferred from the fertile Vojvodina.640 
As for modernization, a new plough cost 90 golden francs or 1000 
dinars (a tractor was still over 6000 francs). Thus only 10% of the 
peasantry could afford to invest into a new equipment immediately 
even prior to the crisis. A wine-press was even more expensive, worth 
580 francs. An estate of 40 ha produced 20 thousand dinars profits 
yearly prior to the crisis, but they also needed at least 4 years to 
purchase a tractor. At the same time, although each family had some 
kind of plough, 70% of peasant farms under 5 ha had no oxen or horse 
as draft animals. 
                                                          
637 Krstić, Ð.: Veličina i snaga našeg selskog poseda. In: Selo i seljaštvo. Sarajevo, 1937. 94. 
638 Konstandinović, N.: Seljačko gazdinstvo u Jugoslavijii, Vol. II. Belgrade, 1939. 
639 Brunnbauer, U.: Gebirgsgesellschaften, 169. 210. 
640 Vuković, Sl.: Srbsko društvo i ikonomija 1918–1992. Novi Sad, 2012. 195–99. 
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During the crisis Uratnik came to the conclusion that even estates 
above 5 ha became unprofitable, the threshold increased to 10 ha.641 
Filipović stated that medium sized estates also had to face with a 20% 
decrease during the crisis. But it is also true that small estates hardly 
had marketable surplus, thus did not suffer from the decline of 
purchase power directly (unless they had to pay their debts in cash). An 
estate of 4 ha earned 80% of its revenues in kind (while this was only 
45% in case of an estate over 8 ha),642 and only clothing and taxes meant 
expenditure in cash. 
 
Table 15. Distribution of peasantry according to net profits, 1929 
Net profits 
(dinars) 
Families 
in 1000 
Total land 
in 1000 ha 
% of 
families 
Average 
holding size 
Net income by Palairet in 1910 
and according to Vučo in the 
1930s* 
0 492 939 11 1.9  
0–1000 2900 5900 69 2.1 102 / 95 
1000–2000 440 2500 10 5.7 290 / 95–190 
2000–4000 280 2300 6.5 8.2 480 / 190–390 
* Income categories can be compared to Palairet’s data on 1910 (table 29 in chapter 4), if divided by 12. 
Vučo, N.: Poljoprivreda Jugoslavije 1918–1941. Belgrade, 1958. 48. 
 
The structure of expenditures did not change significantly compared 
to the pre-war era (table 29, previous chapter): still 33–50% was spent on 
clothing (this was very favourable for the imports and local industrial 
development), seeds for a holding over 10 ha cost 1.6–2.7 thousand 
dinars, while direct state and obština taxes reached 5–6%. Such a family 
spent 400 and 200 dinars on spirits and tobacco. But during the crisis the 
incomes even here fell from 34 to 18 thousand dinars, thus expenses (30 
thousand dinars) remarkably exceeded the incomes!643 In 1932 a smaller 
estate of 6 ha produced only 10 600 dinars income and from this 16% 
was paid as tax, 6070 dinars (60%) were spent on self-subsistence (while 
in Denmark this was only 17% as there 1.8 person cultivated 6 ha 
                                                          
641 Uratnik, F.: Pogledi na družavno in gospodarsko strukturo Slovenije. Slovenske poti VII. Tiskovna 
Zadruga v Ljubljani, 1933. 
642 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 194. and Dubić, Sl.: Prilog istraživanju seljačkog 
gospodarstva. Križevci, 1933. 16–33. 
643 Filipović, F.: Izbrani spisi. Vol. I. Belgrade, 1962. 
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instead of the Yugoslavian 6 persons). The rest, 2900 dinars or 27% had 
to cover all other personal needs.644 
The average peasant economy was even poorer. In village Vojska 
(Srijem) only 80 peasants from the 1000 had no land at all, but still 900 
had to buy food. In Banski Dušanovac only 20 out of the 200 households 
had no land, but 78 households did not have animals and 50% of the 
households did not have not enough food or seed for the next year. In a 
village in Šumadija 100 of the 300 households had no cattle, 115 had to 
buy food early in January. 60% of the children was illiterate.645 In 
Dvorovi-Hanište the ratio of farmers under 4 ha increased from 5% to 
47% within 20 years.646 
Zadruga was still among the possible microsocial strategies to tackle 
pauperization. The Babić zadruga in Zrinj village was composed of 19 
persons (9 workforces) owning only 12 jutar (7 ha) land, 3 cows. The 
output was 0.7–1 ton of wheat or potato per jutar. In good years this 
estate produced 500 kg per capita value in grain equivalent, in bad 
years the production remained under 300 kgs without the deduction of 
seeds, thus the family was forced to buy food in these years.647 
 
 
(d) The great economic crisis: causes, consequences and 
responses; agrarian policy during the protectionist era 
 
 
The depression appeared mainly as an agrarian crisis in the Balkans. 
Prior to 1929 in Yugoslavia the average agricultural output per 
economic unit peaked at 1700 golden francs owing to the price increase 
between 1920–26, totalling 30 billion dinars, doubling the average 
income measured in 1910. But the great crisis eliminated these 
achievements: The unit price decrease exceeded 50% in agriculture, 
setting the prices of the 1910s again, thus agrarian output fell to 15 
billion. The situation was similar across the region. 
                                                          
644 Krstić, Ð.: Veličina i snaga, 99. 
645 Škatarić, A.: Zdravstvene prilike našega sela, 158. 
646 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 266. 
647 Ibid. 274–75. 
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The early signs of the great economic crisis can be traced back to 
1926, marked by a decrease in agrarian outputs (in Bulgaria this was 
generally 91 golden leva/farm or 11%).648 But this time the decrease in 
outputs did not result in the increase of prices as internal markets could 
not consume the producted goods. In Bulgaria in case of industrial 
workers the share of flat rents from total expenditure increased from 
25% to 33% (or from 107 leva to 413 leva exceeding the 22% inflation) 
between 1923–26.649 
External markets were full because of the overproduction. Although 
Europe’s grain production was stagnating, the index of global 
production grew from 114 to 233 between 1925–29 (considering 1913 as 
base value = 100).650 In Yugoslavia the general price index (1923=100) 
also decreased from 74 in 1928 to 36 in 1932. Thus, although industrial 
goods became also cheaper, but the price gap between agrarian and 
industrial goods was increasing indeed, because the industrial price 
decrease was generally smaller (did not exceed 35%) than the decline 
measured in agriculture.651 For example, the unit price of artificial 
manure decreased from 110 to 95 dinars, that of the cement fell from 80 
to 55, while the price of agrarian products, like pork declined from 25 to 
12 dinars/kg between 1923–29. Wheat prices dropped from 2650652 to 
1100 dinars/t measured at current prices (reaching pre-war 1600 dinars 
again in 1936).653 Thus, the price of a plough expressed in wheat kgs 
increased from 360 to 880,654 while that of the phosphate-manure 
                                                          
648 Vasilev, At.: Stopanskata konyunktura v Balgariya prez 1925–1929. g. Istoricheski Pregled, 
1963/4.  94; Vasilev, V.: Polozhenieto na trudeshtite se v Balgariya v nachalniya period na 
ikonomicheskata kriza ot 1929-1933. Izvestiya na Instituta za Istoriya 8. 1960.  
649 Vasilev, At.: Stopanskata konyunktura v Balgariya, 93. 
650 Vučo, N.: Agrarna kriza u Jugoslaviji, 71. 
651 In Hungary price decrease in agriculture was around 45% and it was also smaller in the 
industry. Vučo, N.: Agrarna kriza, 149.  
652 In 1910 this was around 140 francs (1500–1800 dinars in 1924 prices). 
653 Bodrožić, M.: Obrazovanje jugoslavenske radikalne seljačke demokratije. Istorijski glasnik. 1964/2–
3. 49. 
654 It is an increase of 150%, while this was only 30% measured in dinars. Stojsavljević, B.: 
Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 174. 
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stagnated expressed in dinars, but increased from 50 to 85 kgs wheat 
equivalent (table 17).655 
In Bulgaria the unit price of industrial plants fell by 33% from 6 to 4, 
prices of vegetables were halved, and dropped from 9 to 5. The tobacco 
merchants reacting to the price collapse – in order to keep their share in 
external markets – decreased the prices paid to producers to one third 
(from 60 to 17 kgs/leva between 1928–32). Wheat prices also fell by more 
than 60% between 1928–33 (from 6 leva/kgs to 2 and from 3 leva to 1 in 
case of maize) below prewar prices.656 The average agrarian income per 
capita fell from 8400 to 7500 leva at current prices (280 and 250 golden 
francs respectively) early between 1926–29 (see table 16). (This also 
means that per capita GDP was not higher in 1929 than in 1911). 
 
Table 16. Decrease of agrarian income in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the crisis (dinars) 
 
 
Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 213. 
*In industry it was 26 and fell back to 21. ** Later decreased under 1400. 
 
Table 17. Price decrease of agrarian products 
Product Unit 1928 1930 (1933) 
Decrease in % 
between 1928–30 
Wheat 100 kg 686* 
438 
(234 in 1933) 
36.2 
Potato 1 kg 7.8 3.4 56.4 
Pork 1 db 2700 2200 18.5 
Wool 1 kg 74 55 25.7 
Vasilev, V.: Polozhenieto na trudeshtite, 12. 
 
This crisis was different from that in 1897 generated by harvest 
failures. Peasants first reacted with overproduction to the falling prices 
                                                          
655 Calculated from Vučo, N.: Poljoprivreda Jugoslavije, 83. and Agrarna kriza u Jugoslaviji, 194–95.  
656 In 1912 1 ton of wheat cost 130–150 golden leva, in 1928 this was 230 (6860 at current prices), 
in 1930 145 (4380 at current prices), in 1931 only 80 golden leva. 
Index 1923 1928 
Rural economy between 6–10 ha 22 222 17 420 
Income per capita 4350 3414** 
Daily income per capita 12* 9.5 
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in order to compensate the losses,657 thus – according to Stajić – per 
capita agrarian output remained around yearly 1350-1400 dinars at 
constant 1938 prices during the first crisis years.658 Wheat exports first 
grew from 252 thousand tons and 474 million dinars in 1930 to 309 
thousand tons and 475 million dinars in Yugoslavia, creating a vicious 
circle. Even the yields/ha and sown area began to increase: maize yields 
grew from 14.4 q/ha to 19 q/ha between 1930–32, its area from 34.5 
million ha to 48 million ha putting the total output from 48 million q to 
91 million.659 Total grain output has doubled, revealing the real work-
capacities of peasantry if its livelihood is threatened.  
But the immediate feedback was the further collapse of prices. This, 
together with the consequences of the protectionist policy (high import 
tariffs both on agrarian and industrial goods) applied as a reaction to 
the crisis, shrinking the markets further660 finally made exports 
unprofitable. Bulgaria exported in 1934 only about 40 percent of the 
value of 1924. Price decrease ultimately resulted in a reduction of 
production volumes as well. Wheat exports of Yugoslavia fell to 13 
thousand (!) tons, its yields shrank under 1 ton/ha in 1928–35. Thus – in 
order to restore original internal and export prices in Yugoslavia – the 
total production of agriculture also decreased from 30 billion to 12 
billion. Total exports also collapsed from 9.5 billion in 1924 to 3 billion 
in 1932 (out of this approximately 2.9 billion came from agriculture, 
constituting 20% of the agricultural output) and 3.8 billion in 1934 (then 
constituting 11% of agrarian output). Despite the positive balace of 
trade, the proportion of exported products measured to total agrarian 
production became less significant.  
The Yugoslav case is emblematic for the consequences of these 
developments for peasant families. Krstić drew our attention to the fact, 
that despite the huge regional differences, the agrarian decline was 
                                                          
657 This was a new response contrary to the reactions of former crisis years between 1876–85, or 
compared to 1897–1900 (this was not a climate induced shortage-crisis). 
658 Stajić, S.: Nacinalni dohodak Jugoslavije… 
659 Bodrožić, M.: Obrazovanje jugoslavenske radikalne seljačke demokratije, 48–51. 
660 The target countries of Balkan wheat exports also began to apply protectionism, or 
purchased cheap grains from elsewhere. 
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similar in all regions of Yugoslavia: the value of production decreased 
by 60-65% (table 18) sometimes ending even in regional shortages!661 
 
Table 18. Regional patterns in decline of per capita production in 1925–1932  
(given in dinars) 
Region 
Crop production Husbandry Altogether 
1925 1932 1925 1932 1925 1932 
Slovenia 1467 560 1409 540 2876 1100 
Dalmatia 1507 560 721 266 2228 826 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1028 373 1443 525 2471 898 
Montenegro 344 114 1270 438 1614 552 
S-Serbia 1142 418 1562 572 2704 990 
Vojvodina 4684 1716 1975 721 6659 2437 
Croatia and Slavonia 2217 846 1609 615 3826 1461 
N-Serbia 1813 656 1188 429 3001 1085* 
Krstić, Dj.: Veličina i snaga, 97.  
*108 francs/capita in 1910 prices, while then 150 francs/capita was the agrarian income. 
 
Similarly to per hectare outputs per capita income crushed by more 
than half as well; in 1932 they were below the 1910 value. The average 
income of peasant farms fell from 21 000 dinars to 7000 between 1925 
and 1933 according to Vučo. Per capita income decreased from 4800 to 
3400 dinars (300 francs) early between 1924 to 1928. In constant prices it 
meant stagnation indeed, but by 1932 this fell further to 1350 dinars (135 
golden francs), below the value in 1910. Agrarian daily wages also fell 
from 20–35 dinars to 10 dinars, below the wages in the 1870s (while in 
the industry wages remained around 20 dinars).662 
As taxes and other expenses had to be paid – contrary to most of the 
industrial goods the price of clothing increased in Yugoslavia between 
1913 to 1930, while prices were only 70% of the prewar era in Germany, 
and 60% in the USA – peasantry became completely indebted. Total 
debts reached 6.9 billion dinars (or 600 million francs, similar to the 
                                                          
661 Vuković, Sl.: Srbsko društvo i ikonomija, 195–99. 
662 Vučo, N.: Agrarna kriza, 51. 
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Bulgarian value). The average debt was 3400 dinars/household (300 
golden francs) or 9400 dinars/indebted households – reaching the yearly 
income of small peasant economies. The payment of interests 
(sometimes reaching yearly 40% instead of the general 12%)663 ranged 
up to 1 billion, while the complete income of the agrarian sphere was 
not more than 15 billion, thus it was equal with an additional 7% 
’surtax’ on production! State income from direct taxes decreased by 25% 
– illustrating the critical situation. But as the collapse of prices was 
greater than this, it also indicated the increase of burdens on peasantry. 
The general decrease in purchase power of peasantry can be observed in 
the decrease of consumption of basic articles: although population 
increased by 7% between 1929–34, tobacco consumption decreased by 
28%, match consumption by 33%.  
Peasants owning less than 2 hectares used up the loans for 
consumption purposes. Buying new lands, constructions were rare, but 
loans given for the purpose of stabilizing the existing economy were 
also regular (table 19). It was the layer owning 5–10 ha land that tended 
to purchase new lands, but even in this category 20% of the loans were 
used up to buy food, or to pay older loans (27)%.664 This means that half 
of the farmers in this category asked for loans because they had 
difficulties during the crisis. 
Peasant cooperatives offered favourable conditions with their 12% 
interest rate (8% in Slovenia), but there were private bankers available 
for 120% interest rate as well (meaning 12% monthly interest instead of 
the yearly 12%). As the macroeconomic situation in Yugoslavia 
worsened and the state declared moratory to bank transactions, the role 
of private financers (usurers) increased. Not surprisingly, by 1932 45% 
of total loans had been given by private persons. 
Most of the loans were required by smallholdings between 2–5, but 
the total value of debts here was the smallest here. (Estates between 5–
10, 10–20 and 20–50 ha had a similar share of 23-23-23% from the total 
debts). Regional differences were also not negligible: in Macedonia 
estates over 10 ha had the largest share from the debt, while in Bosnia, 
                                                          
663 Vučo, N.: Poljoprivreda Jugoslavije… 
664 Komadinić, M. J.: Problem seljačkih dugova. Belgrade, 1934. 51. 
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Dalmatia and Croatia it was the  landholdings under 2 ha. In Vojvodina 
the proportion of indebted households was the smallest, but the value 
of the debt was the greatest (19 000 dinars). When measuring 
indebtedness to output it was Primorje banovina in the worst situation 
(see figure 4).665 
 
Figure 4. Territorial pattern of indebtedness and agrarian output 
Sava
Vrbas
Drina
Morava
Beograd
Dunav
grain yield under 400 kg/capita
Drava
Primorje
Zeta
Vardar
households purchasing grain over 50%
indebted households under 33%
ratio of debt/output is great
 
In order to handle the situation and to hinder the further 
pauperization of peasantry, half of the value of debts towards the state 
under 25 000 dinars were abolished in 1932, and a fixed 4.5% interest 
                                                          
665 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 228–29. 233. and Komadinić, M. J.: Problem 
seljačkih dugova, 60–64. 
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rate was set on the rest of the sum for the forthcoming 12 years. 
Indebtedness towards private persons was also moderated, i.e. private 
persons were allowed to calculate only with 3% interest rate, deadlines 
were extended, and half of the debt was also annulled. In case of debts 
towards shopkeepers the sum of the loan was not halved, but the 
interest was abolished. 
 
Table 19. Distribution of debts (%) based on land size in Yugoslavia in the 1930s 
Purpose of loan Landless Under 2 ha 2–5 ha 5–20 ha 20–50 ha over 50 ha 
Buying land 9 16 21 32 49 72 
Buying animals 2 4 7 6 2 0 
Construction 8 15 17 13 9 12 
Production 10 6 7 3 7 11 
Maintaining the 
economy, paying 
younger generations 
to leave the house 
26 15 16 9 5 0 
Paying back debts 3 12 12 27 26 4 
Buying food 41 31 20 9 2 0 
Komadinić, M. J.: Problem seljačkih dugova. Belgrade, 1934. 51. Columns are cumulated to 100%. 
 
The other burden that deteriorated the living conditions of peasants 
was taxes. The total sum of direct taxes was measured to 1500–1900 
million dinars in 1930 and 1931, but only 900 million came from rural 
economies (this was 12% of the marketed products then valued at 7–
8000 million dinars, while the latter was 40% of the total agrarian 
output). Together with indirect taxes (which is hard to estimate in case 
of peasantry) Tomasevich put the tax burden of peasantry to 3200–3500 
million dinars, which was 16–20% of the total agrarian output in the 
crisis years, or 40% of the cash income of peasants! In our opinion 
Tomasevich’s data are exaggerating, and we may presume a 10–15% tax 
ratio.666 The increase of tax ratio above 15–20% (some of the taxes, as 
                                                          
666 He calculated that almost half of the total tax came from peasants (but this was less 
according to Palairet even in 1910!). If we accept this presumption and compare per capita 
urban and rural taxes we get a ratio of 3:1 like in the 1860s, although this was 7:1 in 1910! 
Urban dwellers paid thrice as much indirect taxes even then, compared to rural population. 
This could not change significantly even if we calculate with an increasing consumption of 
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head and land-taxes were not proportional, but fixed, and this meant 
increasing tax key measured to the decreasing household incomes) was 
also a problem in Bulgaria, where taxes were stagnating around 47 
golden francs/capita, the highest since 1878.667 (This could even 
challenge the reasonability of independence from Ottoman rule). 
The collapse of prices had the most serious impacts on peasantry, 
while in industry falling food prices could counterbalance the decrease 
of salaries and increase of housing costs. What could be done? Peasant 
debts reached 10 billion leva or 25% of the total national income in 
Bulgaria, therefore state intervention targeted primarily the agrarian 
layers. During the crisis years in Bulgaria the state supported altogether 
1.2 million indebted peasants by 6.6 billion leva (5000 leva per capita in 
current prices or 50% of the yearly income of a peasant with 5 hectares, 
166 golden francs). The state purchased over 800 thousand tons of 
grains within 2 years through the Hranoiznos at fixed prices of 4 leva 
(well over market prices) to support exports, which meant an extra 
expenditure, while state incomes were shrinking. Since 33% of the land 
tax was simply not paid in by the peasants, new sources were required 
to cover these extra costs and to balance the budget. One solution was 
that 10–30% of the officials’ salary was held back over 2000 leva, which 
generated a surplus of 500 million within 3 years.668 But this was still not 
enough and the state had to ask for new loans at very strict terms. 
Another result of the state intervention was that agrarian 
cooperatives lost their autonomy.669 Furthermore – although Hranoiznos 
was established also to secure social peace – price support usually 
helped those who had exportable surplus, thus usually farmers with 
more than 5 hectares. Large estates over 100 ha were responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                
peasantry. Thus we had better to put the tax of rural population to 2400 million. In this case 
we get 1000–1200 dinars per family instead of the 1700–2000 given by Tomasevich. This is 
maximum 10% tax ratio in case of the income of a 6–10 ha unit and 20% measured to the 
income of a 2–5 ha unit. 
667 Vasilev, V.: Polozhenieto na trudeshtite, 21–23. Those farmers who had less than 2 hectares 
earned only 157 golden francs, while the average income of those who had 2–10 hectares 
was calculated 264 francs. 
668 Berov, Ly.: Stopanska politika na narodniya blok. Istoricheski Pregled, 1953/3. 263. 
669 Tooze, A.–Ivanov, M.: Disciplining the ’Black Sheep of the Balkans’: financial supervision and 
sovereignity in Bulgaria 1902–1938. The Economic History Review 64. 2011/1. 46. 
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50% of exports: landholdings over 7–8 ha produced 20% of the exported 
crops, while farmers with only 4–5 hectares (8% of the land, but 60% of 
farms) produced only 5% of exported wheat. So, the activity of 
Hranoiznos helped the poor less.670 Therefore other solutions were also 
considered. The first 10 ha of land was given tax exemption from the 
tithe from 1932 on. This helped 400 thousand smallholders. Of course it 
was advantageous for large estate owners as well, as calculations show 
that while a farm of 3 ha paid 210 leva tax less, this exceeded 700 leva in 
case of landholdings over 10 ha.671 
In order to solve the problem of falling prices, Balkan states also 
turned to the weapon of isolation and protectionism that became an 
’evolutionary stable strategy’ (ESS) in terms of play theory, because 
most of the participants decided to react like this. This had three main 
components: high import tariff rates or import contingents (fixed quantity) 
to moderate imports, thus to decrease competition for the internal 
markets and the outflow of revenues; exports encouragement and 
transports support. In case of Bulgaria the tariff of 100 kgs of wheat was 
150 leva at current prices, reaching 50% of its retail price! Greece also 
applied a protective tariff policy similar to most of the Balkan states: the 
tariff of maize increased from 2–4 drachmas to 5–6 drachmas.672 
Beyond market protectionism export price support was also 
introduced (high import tariff rates did not help agrarian producers-
exporters, rather the industrial firms). In Romania the agricultural 
council offered 30% of VAT and tariffs to compensate falling prices and 
the effect of shrinking markets early in 1926. The price of wheat here 
also fell to 50% between 1928 to 1932 and in the case of maize the 
decrease (75%) was even more serious. The price support was only able 
to stabilize the prices increasing them from 2 to 3.3 lei between 1931–32. 
Greece offered 10 drachmas for each kg of exported cotton, Romania 
gave 10 thousand lei for each carriage of flour after 1935. This premium 
                                                          
670 Ibid. 250. and Berov, Ly. (ed.): Protekcionizam i konkurencĳa na Balkanite, 118–19. 139. (the 
chapter was written by V. Katsarkova és E. Damyanova).  
671 Berov, Ly.: Stopanska politika na narodnija blok, 249. 
672 Berov, Ly. (ed.): Protekcionizam i konkurenciya na Balkanite, 118–119. (V. Katsarkova és E. 
Damyanova). 
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reached 2500 million lei between 1935–39. But the scarce financial 
resources limited these efforts.673 When the state in Bulgaria donated 0.5 
leva for the producer after each exported kg of wheat, in order to cover 
the costs new credits had to be negotiated with the western countries 
under unfavourable circumstances.  
Bulgaria and Romania also applied low railway freight rates 
(decreased from 35% to 25%) in case of exports, and higher freight rates 
in case of imports. Summing up this means that while importing crops 
cost 100% (producer price) + 50% (tariff) + 35% (transport price) = 185 % 
of the original price from a country that did not adopt price support 
policies, exporting grains cost 100% + 25% (transport cost) – 25% (price 
support) + lower tariffs. Of course this pushed the partner country 
which was applying free trade also towards protectionism. 
The non-self subsistent Greece was also severely affected by the 
crisis – but from other aspects. The production of 1928–31 was so low, 
that it was hardly enough even for seeds. As grain imports had serious 
impact on the balance of trade (because exports were shrinking), the 
state initiated reforms aiming at self-subsistence. Between 1932–38 the 
extent of wheatlands increased from 606 thousand hectares to 882 
thousand hectares, first time since the 1870s. This meant that by 1940 
60% of the consumption was provided by inland grains contrary to the 
30% in 1931.674 
The agrarian crisis was finally solved by state intervention (state 
purchases, new loans). The development of industry based on 
agricultural products, the barter trade with Germany from the 1930s 
based on the clearing-system together with the intensification of 
agriculture pulled agrarian society out from the pit (next chapter). But 
these neither solved the structural problems in agriculture, nor were 
longlasting: the process was interrupted by World War II. 
 
                                                          
673 Ibid. 118–119. 146. and 154. 
674 Ibid. 118–119.  
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(e) The beginnings of modernisation: technological advance 
and intensification in the agriculture 
 
 
The economic crisis of 1929 strengthened tendencies urging for the 
modernization of farming which had already begun before the crisis. 
But the intraregional pattern of this development was very uneven. In 
order to illustrate this, we compare a country (Bulgaria) that initiated 
structural reforms successfully (though land reforms were moderate), 
with Yugoslavia, which failed to modernize its agriculture contrary to 
its efforts invested in the redistribution of lands.675 This exemplifies that 
a land reform may be essential, but not enough to modernize an economy. In 
this period the Balkans can be considered separate region due to its low 
per capita values, but the rate of development was neither lower, than in 
other regions, nor uniform. Finally, in order to show the character of 
interregional differences we compare the agrarian situation with the 
neighboring Hungary, which also lost its impetus compared to the 
previous decades. 
In Bulgaria the early signs of intensification can be traced back 
before the agrarian crisis (outputs were increasing such as yields/ha).676 
The extent of fallow land decreased from 20% to 12% by 1934,677 tobacco 
output increased tenfold between 1913–23,678 and contrary to the 
prevoius trends, the number of pigs per capita has also doubled. But it 
was not these changes that altered the situation basically, as tobacco 
prices collapsed in 1930. Traditional silk production also decreased 
further in the area of Harmanli and Mastanli by 50% during the crisis.679 
It was the great economic crisis itself that put an end to the rule of 
cereals – contrary to Greece which has just adopted a new grain policy –
, and 50 years after the Italian attempt Bulgaria finally started to adopt 
                                                          
675 See also Romania’s case. 
676 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 371. 
677 Daskalov, R.: Balgarskoto obshtestvo, Vol. I. 259. 264. 274–76. 281. 
678 Haskovo and Asenovgrad became the center of cooperatives involved in tobacco 
production, shifting their basis to the south. Thus, tobacco production supported the 
maintenance of BZNS power as well. Neuburger, Mary, C.: Balkan Smoke: Tobacco and the 
Making of Modern Bulgaria. Cornell Univ. Press, 2012. 
679 Roucek, J. S.: The Economic Geography of Bulgaria, 310–13.   
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the model based on fruits and vegetables. This turning point can be 
observed generally in the curves indicating the changes in per capita 
and per hectare outputs between 1892 and 1939 (figure 1). Per capita 
output exceeded the 200 golden leva of 1911 again in the late 1930s, 
while per hectare outputs rose from 150 to 230 leva.680 
What were the components of this success? Although at crisis years 
most of the increase was realised within arable lands,681 intensification 
and diversification continued after 1930. The proportion of rose, tobacco 
and vegetable gardeners increased from 3% of agrarian producers in 
1905 to 18% in 1939. The unit prices of cereals remained low after the 
crisis had ended, therefore contrary to the 40% increase in per capita 
grain production by 1939, per capita income from grains stagnated. As a 
consequence, the value of cereal production from the total crop 
production fell from 70% in 1892 to 45% in 1939, while the share of 
fruits and vegetables increased from 10% (in 1911) to 30% by 1939. 
Fodder increased from 6 to 10–20% and the share of industrial crops, 
rose and tobacco reached 10 % between 1924–39, while in 1892 it 
remained under 1%.682 
Animal husbandry also regained its importance in the economy. Its 
share from agrarian production rose from 15 to 28%, mainly due to an 
increase in constant prices between 1923–39 (+20%). And while in 1896–
1900 the share of animal products was 25% from the exports, in 1935–39 
it increased to 35–40%. Hand in hand with this, the share of grains from 
the exports fell from 85% (1896–1900) to 40% in 1921–25, then to 13% by 
1936–39. Cereals were overtaken by tobacco, vegetables and animal 
products too. There were years when 38% of the Bulgarian export value 
came from tobacco, and taxes on inland tobacco consumption 
(controlled by powers in order to finance state debt) reached 10% from 
the budget (unfortunately these incomes functioned as cover or token 
                                                          
680 Ivanov, M.–Tooze, A.: Convergence or Decline, 694. 
681 The increase was +200 000 between in 1930–36 as an extensive response to the fall of wheat 
prices: the index of cereal production also rose to 150 in 1931 compared to 1912 as peasants 
wanted to compensate their losses of income. 
682 Ivanov, M.–Tooze, A.:Convergence or Decline, 697. 
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for the new loans issued by western states, as it was in Greece after 1897 
and in Turkey between 1878–1914).  
The increasing dependency on the German market played a great 
role in the restructuring of farming. Germany’s share from Bulgarian 
export was 30% early in 1931, and soon it increased to 43%. (In Hungary 
it grew from 11% to 42% in 1933–37). Germany and Italy undertook to 
buy wheat above world prices, in return the countries of Southeastern-
Europe bought German industrial products.683 The different way of 
agrarian development in Greece can be explained by the fact, that 
Greece was never dependent on exporting agrarian products to 
Germany. Yugoslavia also took place in this barter trade, but rather 
with her industrial raw-material, thus the effect of foreign demand on 
agrarian products was smaller on agrarian development. Thus, the 
trend towards gradual improvement was not universal. In Yugoslavia 
agriculture remained stuck in structural problems. 
While Bulgaria initiated structural reforms684 (as it lacked enough land to 
redistribute), in Yugoslavia social reforms (distribution of land) were enforced 
instead, but intensification remained limited. Similarly to Hungary or 
Romania, wheat output/hectare was the same in 1930–34 as in 1911–15. 
Although yields improved between 1924–29 exceeding the prewar 
values, the great crisis ruined this progress: the yields of wheat fell from 
the 1.1 ton in 1923 to 0.8 in 1932; in case of maize this was 1.7 and 1 
respectively.685 That time maize yields were 2.3 tons/ha in Hungary, 3 
tons in Germany, 2.8 in Austria. Internal regional differences were also 
great: in Zeta banovina the average yield/ha was 0.75 ton for the wheat 
                                                          
683 Romsics, I.: Magyarország története a XX. században, 168. In order to eliminate inflation and 
low accessibility to currency, barter trade (clearing-system) was installed (constituting 80% 
of trade) – as a consequence of this multilateral international trade became largely bilateral 
in this region. Southeast-Europe not only became dependant on Germany, but furthermore, 
the latter was unable to cover its imports with its exports. Germany’s clearing-debt was 463 
million DM before the second world war! Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy.: Közép-Kelet-Európa 
gazdasági fejlődése a 19-20. században. Budapest, 1976. 375–88. 
684 Hungary took a similar turn, the number of fruit-trees doubled (4.6 million) compared to the 
1900, the output increased fivefold to 50 000 tons. Wine consumption doubled, to 
compensate the decrease in beer consumption, and reached 40 litres per capita. Romsics, I.: 
Magyarország története a XX. században, 170. 
685 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 476. 
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in 1931, while in Vojvodina it was 1.6 ton. (In Denmark wheat yield was 
2.8 tons/ha, while in Czechoslovakia it was 1.6, in Hungary 1.3, in 
France 1.4).686 
In Yugoslavia 1 ha produced three times less amount of wheat with 
three times greater labour force than in Denmark. In Denmark the index 
was 1373 pigs/1000 person, in Serbia it fell to 224. In Denmark a cow 
gave 3500 litres of milk a year, in Serbia it was 1000 litres. While in 1921 
the number of cattle was 4.9 million it decreased further to 3.8 million in 
1931. Milk exports decreased to 10% from 11 million litres.687 Denmark 
exported 6000 waggon eggs, while Serbia 2250, Denmark exported 2425 
waggon cheese, Serbia only 200.688 These numbers indicate how 
productive farming could become under the right conditions, and how 
much it lagged behind in the Balkans compared to Western Europe. 
The value of imported agricultural engines also decreased from 180 
to yearly 10 million dinars as the result of the great crisis. The import of 
tractors fell from 500 thousand kgs to 50 thousand between 1929/33 and 
1933/37. Anyway, half of the machine import contained mostly ploughs 
and not motorized engines. In 1925 there were 783 thousand iron and 
326 thousand wooden ploughs in Yugoslavia, meaning a 60 thousand 
increase compared to 1921. By 1948 the number of iron ploughs grew to 
1 million (50% of farms), but there were still 300 thousand wooden 
ploughs in service,689 and 33% of farms still had not any ploughs at all.690 
In Primorje this was even 50%, and 75% of the remainder was wooden 
plough. While in the Vojvodina the ratio between iron and wooden 
ploughs was 23:1 and it was 10:1 in Slovenia, 7:1 in Croatia and 4:1 in 
Serbia, in Macedonia this was 1:1 and 1:4 in Montenegro even in the 
1940s! 
The extent of irrigated land was insignificant, 1% of the total 
cultivated. The total number of tractors were 2400 opposed to 1.2 
million draft animals. In Vardar banovina 40% of cattle and oxen were 
                                                          
686 Vučo, N.: Poljoprivreda Jugoslavije, 63–65. Tobacco production per hectares was 1 ton in 
Yugoslavia, while 1.4 tons in Hungary and 2.4 tons in Germany.  
687 Stojsavljević, B.: Prodiranje kapitalizma u selo, 186. 
688 Krstić Dj.: Veličina i snaga, 100.  
689 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 440–42. 
690 Vučo, N.: Poljoprivreda Jugoslavije, 54–57. 
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used as draft animals, in Morava it was 33%, while in Sava and 
Vojvodina only 10%: here horses pulled the plough, while cows were 
used to produce milk referring to a different type of economy. In Drina 
banovina 43% of farms had no draft animal at all.691 Even the total draft 
power of animals decreased from 41 oxen to 27 for 100 persons between 
1921–31! In Yugoslavia the average was 0.6 oxen/ha, while in Austria 
this was twice as much, in Czechoslovakia 0.8.692 Contrary to the fact 
that Yugoslavia produced only 33% of its fertilizer-needs, it was one of 
the greatest fertilizer exporting countries in Europe! The local 
consumption of phosphates was 3 kgs/ha, while in Germany this was 58 
kg, in Denmark 139 kg and 6.6 kg in the USA.693 Natural manure was 
rather used to heat houses in winter in areas where deforestation 
became irreversible. Alternative cultures, like olive orchards were 
characterized by low outputs, 1 kg/tree (In Greece it was 2–4 oke/tree 
even in 1715). The spread of potato was hindered by its high need for 
seed: this was only 40 kgs in case of maize for a hectare, 160 kg in case 
of wheat, but 1000 kg in case of potato (the output was greater too, 
though the input/output ratio was similar to that of the wheat). 
Hungarian yields were similarly stagnating. While in Germany the 
wheat yield/ha was 2 t, it remained 1.2 in Hungary – at the level of the 
prewar era (it was 1 ton Yugoslavia). Some improvement (cca. 10%) was 
only observable after 1930, but Austria, Bulgaria and France were 
catching up Hungary by then regarding per hectare outputs. While in 
1910 Hungary was able to reach 70% of the yield/ha measured in 
Germany and Denmark, it decreased to 40–50% by the 1930s. The 
Czechoslovakian outputs even exceeded the Hungarian by 30%. Animal 
husbandry also collapsed. The animal population reached only 87% of 
the pre-war numbers even in 1929, although the milk production per 
cows increased from 1000 litres to 2000 litres.694 The proportion of 
agrarian income from the GDP fell from 45% to 40% during the Interwar 
period. Grain production remained dominant: 55% of the arable lands 
                                                          
691 Tomasevich, J.: Peasants, Politics, 458–59. 
692 Vučo, N.: Poljoprivreda Jugoslavije, 61. 
693 Ibid. 62. 
694 Romsics, I.: Magyarország története a 20. században… 
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was sown with cereals. The consumption of fertilizers still did not 
exceed 10 kg/ha (while it was over 100–150 kgs in the West): only 20% of 
large estates used fertilizers, and this was 1.5% among smallholdings. 
Contrary to fertilizers, mechanization progressed further: the number of 
tractors increased from 1200 to 6800 within 4 years till 1929. The 
agrarian products (including processed food) still composed 66% of the 
export.695 
After the crisis state intervention and barter trade (here the role of 
Germany providing artificial fertilizers, engines has to be mentioned) 
helped stabilize the situation. In Hungary the share of the neighboring 
countries from the exports fell from 71% in 1923 to 43% in 1931 showing 
the collapse of the traditional trade patterns as protectionism gained 
space, and the increasing role of Germany.696 In Yugoslavia the shift 
towards industrial plants was not so characteristic as in Bulgaria, but 
the number of factories processing agrarian products began to grow as 
an element of the reforms implemented by Milan Stojadinović. These 
also included a new, deflatory currency policy, the stabilization of 
agricultural revenues and exports through state intervention, a 
moderate tariff policy and industrial loans issued at low (5–10%) 
interest rate. Although most of the investments were realized in the 
industry, but as state purchases increased purchase power in these 
sectors, this helped the agriculture too (like in Turkey). The number of 
factories processing agricultural products increased to 1400 constituting 
32% of all industrial units. After 1935 the increase of agrarian output 
was above yearly 6% – while animal husbandry showed a yearly 3% 
increase –, but this was still under the general average 7.8% (industry 
and mining showed a rate of 15% according to Stajić).  
Although state intervention policies managed to give an impetus to 
the economy, but owing to the depletion of gold and currency reserves 
of the National Bank due to the overheated investments in the economy 
a huge price increase occurred, and by 1940 66% of the households sank 
back below the level of self-subsitence and minimum standard of living 
again.  
                                                          
695 Ibid. 163. 
696 Ibid. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
Southeast-Europe can be considered a distinct region of Europe based on its 
general level of development, but its agriculture showed a rather diverse 
pattern despite the common Ottoman heritage. This pattern neither showed 
stability throughout the investigated centuries, nor there was a general 
trend in the changes of agrarian structures (Greece never integrated into the 
great division of labour “wheat for manufactures” in the 19th century, 
Romania’s grain production was based on large estates then, etc.). Thus, 
from agro-economic aspect the investigated area cannot be considered a 
homogeneous region. However, there were general common trends, but 
these are rather in connection with demographic phenomena (population 
increase-overpopulation, conflict of husbandry and grain production, 
extensification as solution, lack of capital surplus in agriculture to finance 
industrial development, etc.) or with the general level (the lack) of 
development. Southeast-Europe rather functioned as a region with common 
patterns from this socio-agrarian aspect, than from agro-economic aspect. 
Those sub-regions that shifted to grain production, either to utilize the 
temporarily favourable price trends, or to cope with the population 
pressure or because self-subsistence and smallholder society was chosen for 
the new political regimes to secure stability, failed to become prosperous 
and were unable to overcome geographic obstacles and the lack of capital. 
Most of the problems (showing great regional variety), like the unutilized 
labour force and low mechanization, high indebtedness, low participation 
in market processes, uniform production structure (as a consequence of self-
subsisting smallholdings), unsustainable estate structure unfitting to 
production structure,  fragmentation, landuse-conflicts, low resilience-
flexibility, vulnerability owing to overspecified export structure, agriculture 
exposed to climatic anomalies or still determined by geographic features 
(lack of manure, intensification, etc.) and external circumstances (prices) – 
either be Ottoman heritage, or the consequence of the ‘first globalization’ – 
remained unresolved between the two World Wars. From this aspect 
(intensification, change in product structure, change in estate structure) the 
communist attempt is an interesting, but also dead-end experience. 
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